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FROM

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THE BATTLE

OF

GETTYSBURG.

BY

SAMUEL P. BATES.

Deeming it their duty to fight for Freedom and the Greeks, even against Greeks.—PLATO.

PHILADELPHIA:
T. H. DAVIS & CO.
1875.

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PREFACE.

WHAT the Battle of Waterloo was to Napoleon, the Battle of Gettysburg proved to the Confederates. Though not resulting in the immediate downfall of their power, Gettysburg was the first blow which made it reel, and finally totter to its destruction. The number of troops and guns was considerably less on the field of Waterloo than on that of Gettysburg, and the losses were less. The struggle at the gardens of La Haye Sainte was not unlike that at the Wheatfield, and in both the slaughter was terrible. At Waterloo, the gun which heralded the battle was fired at eleven in the morning, and before nightfall the fighting was ended. In marked contrast to this rapidity of combination was the tardiness of action at Gettysburg and the resolution on both sides to yield nothing,—the victory for three days remaining undecided.

This persistency in action of the Union army was largely due to the steadfast purpose of the privates in the ranks. They had come to that ground to gain a victory,

and it was not in their counsels to leave it, or be pushed from it until that end was attained. What was fit to be done in almost every emergency was as well understood by the subaltern as by the leader himself. Each man of the thousands in that embattled host felt a personal interest and responsibility in the turning of the event. A more intelligent rank and file never stood on any field.

And this personal responsibility, born of intelligence, was the marked feature in the fighting. It was especially noticeable in the first day's struggle, and it did not cease nor wane until the last dread encounter had been met and the battle won. Old John Burns shouldering his musket, going to the field, and never yielding until shot through and through by the enemy's bullets, is but a type of the personal interest in the issue which pervaded that army.

To exemplify this temper by a complete narrative, hitherto unattainable, induced the preparation of this volume. A detailed account of the manœuvres previous to the battle was necessary to the just understanding of its opening and progress, and a thorough acquaintance with the ground essential to an appreciation of the reasons which governed its combinations and conduct. In both these particulars care and a conscientious heed has been given to preparation.

The reports of the commanders-in-chief of both armies and general officers, and their testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, furnish ample material for a full understanding of the battle,

though the latter is in such prolix and confused form as almost to defy attempts to bring order from the entanglements. A few of the official papers and testimony are appended for the convenience of those who may desire to verify the statements of the text. In moulding the narrative into the form which it has here taken, a desire to apprehend the facts and set them in a veritable light has been the ruling motive.

S. P. B.

MEADVILLE,
June 23, 1875.

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HISTORY

OF THE

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE UNDER HOOKER.

NO part of Virginia, which in the late war was everywhere ploughed by battle, has more stirring associations than that bordering upon the Rappahannock. At the head of navigation, upon the right bank of this stream, is Fredericksburg, and a dozen miles above this, on the same side, but a little back from the river, is Chancellorsville. For nearly a year, from October, 1862, to June, 1863, the two contending armies, that of the Potomac, and that of Northern Virginia, had lain stretched out upon the opposite banks, warily watching each other, but principally concentrated about the town of Fredericksburg. Twice during that time the Army of the Potomac had crossed and offered battle, first under General Burnside at Fredericksburg, on the 13th of December, 1862, a most inclement season, and again under General Hooker, at Chancellorsville, on the 2d and 3d of May. In both of these engagements, that army had been repulsed, and had returned decimated and dispirited to its old camps.

In the latter battle, the rebel army had achieved a victory with only a part of its ordinary strength, heavy columns, upwards of 40,000 men, having been sent away under some of its most trusted

Generals, Longstreet, Hill, Picket, Hood, Garnett, Anderson, Jenkins, and Pettigrew, to operate against the Union troops south of the James, principally at Little Washington, North Carolina, and at Suffolk, Virginia, with the design of regaining all that coast. Failing in carrying either of those places either by assault or by direct approaches, the siege of the latter, which had been conducted by Longstreet in person, had been raised on the very day that the most desperate fighting was in progress at Chancellorsville. The new rebel department which had been erected in that locality, and over which General Longstreet had been placed, was broken up, and the troops thus released were hurried away to join General Lee upon the Rappahannock.

Elated by two great victories, and made confident by the large accessions of strength he was receiving, the rebel chieftain at once began to meditate a systematic invasion of the North. In this he was seconded by the government at Richmond. If a permanent lodgment could be made on Northern soil, great advantages were promised, and the hope, from the beginning cherished, of transferring the theatre of war to that section, would be realized; the great network of railroads concentring at Harrisburg could be broken up; the supply of coal from the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania, the almost sole reliance for the entire navy of the Union, could be deranged; the casting of heavy guns for both the army and navy, at Pittsburg, could be impeded; and foreign Governments, seeing the vitality displayed, might thereby be induced to recognize the new power as a nation. Doubtless political considerations at home also urged on the leaders to this enterprise. But greater than all these, the rebel President had learned that Vicksburg must fall before the victorious armies of Grant, and he hoped by a brilliant campaign on Northern soil to break the crushing weight of the blow thus impending from the West.

An invasion seemed to promise some if not all of these advantages. Having gained victories so easily upon the Rappahannock, General Lee argued that he could gain them with equal ease upon the Susquehanna. Turning to the Union army, now commanded by General Hooker, he saw in its condition ample matter of encouragement. It was dispirited by defeat. There was a want of

J. Hooker
Maj. Genl.

harmony among its Generals, and especially between its Commander and the General-in-chief of all the armies, Halleck. Besides the time of about 40,000 nine-months' men had expired, and the places which they had left vacant had not been filled. But there was one untoward circumstance, the importance of which, in his overweening self-confidence, he had failed to recognize. On that evening in May, at Chancellorsville, when with the force of an avalanche his massed columns had been precipitated upon the Union army, Stonewall Jackson, that thunderbolt in war, who had led his legions victorious in almost every battle, had fallen, mortally wounded, and was borne forever from the theatre of mortal strife.

In his confidence the whole army and the entire South shared, and on the morning of the 3d of June, just one month from the close of the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee put his columns in motion for a campaign in the North. He, however, skilfully masked his movements, leaving Hill's corps to occupy his old camps upon the immediate Union front, upon the Rappahannock, and to hold, apparently with his accustomed strength, the intrenchments along all the heights, and sending clouds of cavalry to hover upon his right flank. He also exercised unceasing vigilance to prevent any one from crossing the river who could carry intelligence of his purposes into the Union lines, and all of Hooker's scouts who had been sent across to ascertain what movements were in progress were seized, not one of them returning.

But nothing could escape the keen eye of Hooker. The most insignificant change of camp was noted, and its interpretation divined. As early as the 28th of May he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton: "It has been impossible for me to give any information concerning the movements of the enemy at all satisfactory. I have had several men over the river, but, as they do not return, I conclude that they have been captured. The enemy's camps are as numerous and as well-filled as ever. It was reported to me this morning, by General Gregg, that the enemy's cavalry had made their appearance in the vicinity of Warrenton, on the strength of which I have ordered on to that line Buford's division, to drive them across the river and to keep them there. If necessary, I

will send up additional forces. . . . In the event a forward movement should be contemplated by the enemy, and he should have been reinforced by the army from Charleston, I am in doubt as to the direction he will take, but probably the one of last year, however desperate it may appear—desperate if his force should be no greater than we have reason to suppose. The enemy has always shown an unwillingness to attack fortified positions; still, you may rest assured that important movements are being made, and, in my opinion, it is necessary for every one to be watchful. The enemy has all his cavalry force, five brigades, collected at Culpeper and Jefferson. This would indicate a movement in the direction of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and this it is my duty to look after."

We see in this dispatch already prefigured in the mind of Hooker the probable course which the rebel army would take. Intimations continued to come to him from various sources strengthening this opinion. A Savannah paper had published an outline of the contemplated invasion, which had reached the Northern press. The movement of rebel troops northward was also discovered and reported to him from a signal station in the First corps.

To enable the rebel army to move with assurance of success, its commander had been allowed to draw every available man, taking the columns from before Suffolk, from North Carolina, from Virginia in the direction of Tennessee, and from the rebel capital. A like concentration was not attempted on the Union side. Dix was at Fortress Monroe, Peck at Suffolk, Foster in North Carolina, Heintzelman in the Department of Washington, Schenck at Baltimore, Tyler at Harper's Ferry, and Milroy at Winchester. Over the troops in these several districts General Hooker had no control, and when a detachment from one of them near Harper's Ferry received an order from him, its commander refused to obey it, as did General Slough at Alexandria, when a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserve corps was ordered up to the front. Against this isolation Hooker remonstrated repeatedly. In concluding an important dispatch of the 5th of June, he said: "In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forcibly

impress upon the mind of his Excellency, the President, the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army. Under the present system all independent commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others—at least such is my situation. I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, and only suggest it as I feel the necessity for concert, as well as vigor of action." But his appeal was not heeded, whether from lack of confidence in his ability to direct operations on so large a scale, or whether it was deemed better to have minor movements under the control of the head of the army at Washington, is not apparent.

In the midst of his efforts to harmonize counsels, and centralize the Union forces, intimations thickened from all sides tending to the one conclusion, that Lee's army had been largely reinforced, and that it was secretly moving on an important campaign, either of invasion, or to turn the right flank of the Union army. Should he find the former supposition to be correct, General Hooker, in the communication quoted from above, desired permission to cross the Rappahannock, and fall upon the isolated portion left in his front. The reply of Mr. Lincoln is characteristic, and illustrates remarkably the clearness of his conceptions, and the homely but pointed similes with which he enforced them: "Yours of to-day," he says, "was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments, and have you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come

to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defensive according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck."

The opinion of Mr. Lincoln, expressed in his quaint but forcible way, must be acknowledged remarkably just, and withal is so modestly propounded that it cannot fail to commend itself to the most violent advocate of the opposing view. A small force in the intrenchments, upon those frowning heights which had been before attacked with such disastrous results, would have been equal to a much larger one in the attacking column.

That he might, however, discover what was really behind the works on his front, the Sixth corps was ordered down to Franklin's crossing of the Rappahannock a little below Fredericksburg, on the morning of the 6th of June, and a portion of it, under command of General Howe, was thrown across. A strong demonstration showed that the enemy was in heavy force in front, and that the heights, for a distance of twenty miles, were still firmly held, Hill's entire corps of 30,000 men being present. But that he might seem to threaten the rebel rear and retain his troops as long as possible, Hooker kept the Sixth corps in position at the river, with the Fifth at Banks' and United States Fords, and as late as the 12th threw across two pontoon bridges as if to pass over. Lee, in his official report, says: "General Hill disposed his forces to resist their advance, but as they seemed intended for the purpose of observation rather than attack, the movements in progress were not arrested."

Determined to be satisfied of the real position of the rebel infantry, Pleasanton, who commanded the cavalry, was ordered to cross the Rappahannock at the fords above, at daylight on the morning of the 9th, with a strong column, stiffened by 3000 infantry, and attack the enemy's cavalry camp,—supposed to be located in the direction of Culpeper. A severe battle ensued in the neighborhood of Brandy Station, in which the enemy was roughly handled. But the rebel infantry coming to the rescue, Pleasanton was obliged to withdraw. From information obtained

and official papers captured, it was learned that the enemy's cavalry, which, by accessions from the Shenandoah Valley and from North Carolina, now numbered 12,000 men, and had, the day before, been reviewed by General Lee, was on the following morning, the 10th, to have started on a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania.

The result of this reconnoissance was two-fold, and proved very important to the Union commander. It crippled the enemy's cavalry in such a manner that it did not recover so as to be effective in the campaign upon which it was about entering, giving an evil omen to its opening scene; and it disclosed the fact that two corps of the enemy, those of Ewell and Longstreet, were well on their way towards the Shenandoah Valley. It also demonstrated the very unpleasant fact that Lee's cavalry was at least a third stronger than Hooker's. Having abundant force to seize and hold all the fords of the river, the enemy was secure from attack while on the march, and when the valley was reached, by holding the passes of the Blue Ridge, he was completely protected by this great natural wall.

Convinced that the movement of the opposing army was not a feint, but the opening of a real campaign northward, on the morning of the 12th, Hooker ordered General Reynolds to assume command of the right wing of the Union army, consisting of the First, his own, Third, and Eleventh corps, and all the cavalry, and proceed with it along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, to Manassas, a movement correspondent to that which the enemy was making, though upon an inner circle, with Washington as a centre; and on the following day ordered the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps into motion northward. The moment the Union forces disappeared behind the hills of Stafford, Hill withdrew from his position and followed Lee. Ewell, who was in the advance, had crossed the Shenandoah river at Front Royal and passed down behind the great mountain range which walls it in on the south; but Longstreet, seeing the Union army moving away from him, felt secure in marching by the more direct route on this side of the Blue range, and entered the valley by Snicker's Gap. Hill moved upon the track of Ewell. That

his left flank might be protected from incursions from West Virginia, Lee sent Imboden with a body of cavalry towards Romney, who destroyed the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, effectually cutting off communication from Union forces operating in that direction.

The old counsel of keeping a force at Harper's Ferry to guard the mouth of the valley, and prevent incursions into Maryland and Pennsylvania, had been persevered in, and when the enemy's cavalry sent forward under Jenkins approached, closely followed by the infantry of Ewell, they found a Union force at Winchester of 7500 men under General Milroy, and another at Harper's Ferry under General Tyler of 10,000,—too many troops to throw away, and too few to cope with the numbers brought against them, enough to tempt to enterprise, and give zest to the play. Again was this the field of shame, disaster, and defeat. By a strange oversight, neither General Halleck nor the Secretary of War had informed General Milroy, who was first to be struck, that the rebel army was moving in force down the valley, and he had no intimation of the fact until the head of Ewell's column was upon him. He made such resistance as was possible, but was speedily routed, and all his guns and many of his men fell into the enemy's hands. On the night of the 14th, having ascertained that two corps of the rebel army, numbering 60,000 men, were upon his front, and being convinced that further resistance was useless, he had determined, in council of war, to cut his way out. He accordingly spiked his guns, and leaving all his trains which had not already been sent away, marched at two in the morning of the 15th; but at a point four miles out on the Martinsburg pike, he encountered a heavy column under Johnson posted to intercept him, and though making a gallant fight was unable to move the foe. His forces were broken, and while many of them escaped and made their way into the Union lines, the killed, wounded, and missing numbered more than half of his command.

That Lee should not out-manœuvre him, and from powerful demonstrations northward, suddenly turn and come in upon his rear, Hooker moved slowly, keeping himself constantly informed of the progress of the main body of his antagonist's force, and

sending the Second corps to Thoroughfare Gap, and a division of cavalry supported by the Fifth corps, to Aldie. At this point a brisk action occurred with the cavalry of Stuart, wherein the latter was pushed back through Upperville into Ashby's Gap, by the division of General Gregg, supported by General Kilpatrick. "We took," says General Pleasanton, "two pieces of artillery, one being a Blakeley gun, together with three caissons, besides blowing one up. We also captured upwards of sixty prisoners, and more are coming in, including a Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and five other officers, besides a wounded Colonel, and a large number of wounded rebels in the town of Upperville. They left their dead and wounded upon the field. Of the former I saw upwards of twenty. We also took a large number of carbines, pistols, and sabres. In fact, it was a most disastrous day for the rebel cavalry. Our loss has been very small both in men and horses. I never saw the troops behave better, or under more difficult circumstances."

It was now thoroughly apparent to Hooker that the rebel army was intent not merely on crossing the Potomac but on pushing the invasion as far north as the Army of the Potomac would allow. He had, on the 15th, six days before this latter engagement, telegraphed to the President: "I now feel that invasion is his settled purpose. If so, he has more to accomplish, but with more hazard, by striking an easterly direction after crossing than a northerly one. It seems to me that he will be more likely to go north and to incline to the west. He can have no design to look after his rear. It is an act of desperation on his part, no matter in what force he moves." Hooker never appears to better advantage than in the few sentences here quoted, except it be in the manœuvres preliminary to Chancellorsville. He seems as conversant with his adversary's plans and purposes as does that adversary himself, and his movements are timed with a skill unexampled to completely shield Washington, and to be in readiness to strike should the opportunity be presented. This is now made apparent by General Lee's own report. "The position occupied by the enemy," he says, "opposite Fredericksburg, being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined

Engraved by A. Fecht

GEN. ROBERT E. LEE

to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. . . . In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success."

What those valuable results were may be inferred from the rumors which found their way into the Southern press, and were commented on in the most extravagant and visionary manner. The Richmond *Whig*, of July 1st, counting confidently on success, said: "If it be true that the Confederate forces occupy Harrisburg, the attention of the Commanding General will no doubt be directed to the coal-fields, which lie within forty or fifty miles of that city. His first aim will be to cut all the railroad connections, and thus put a stop to the transportation of fuel. His next will be to destroy the most costly and not easily replaced machinery of the pits. Whether he would stop at this is questionable. He might set fire to the pits, withdraw the forces sent out on this special duty, and leave the heart of Pennsylvania on fire, never to be quenched until a river is turned into the pits, or the vast supply of coal is reduced to ashes. The anthracite coal is found in large quantities in no other part of the world but Pennsylvania. Enormous quantities are used in the United States navy, the countless workshops and manufactories of the North, in the river boats and even upon locomotives. It cannot well be replaced by any other fuel. The bituminous coal which is found near Pittsburg would not answer the purpose, even if it would bear the cost of transportation. Our troops already hold the railroads and canals leading from the Cumberland coal-fields. All that is needed is to seize the anthracite fields, destroy the roads and machinery of the pits, set fire to the mines and leave them. Northern industry will thus be paralyzed at a single blow. These views may have induced General Lee to move upon Harrisburg. We doubt whether he would fire the mines, but the destruction of the Mauch Chunk Railroad and pit implements would be as legitimate as blowing up tunnels and aqueducts, or burning bridges. Of one thing we may be sure, that whatever is best to be done will be done by

Engraved by A. Hoburn

GEN. ROBERT E. LEE

General Lee, and if he thinks proper to destroy the Pennsylvania mines they will certainly be destroyed."

Three days before this was written, General Lee records in his report: "Preparations were now made to move on Harrisburg," showing that the Richmond papers, though mistaken as to the result, were correctly informed of the purposes of the Confederate chieftain.

While the armies of Hooker and Lee were moving northward, only separated from each other by a mountain chain, the States north of the Potomac, which lay directly in their way, began to take the alarm. But a narrow section of Maryland had to be traversed before the southern border of Pennsylvania would be reached, a country luxurious with waving grain, plenteous flocks and herds, and orchards bending with mellow fruit, tempting the hand of the spoiler. For the defence of the border no preparations had been made, and no power existed capable of arresting the march of the veteran army of the enemy, other than an equally strong and well-disciplined force. The attempt to have kept a body of militia, or even of trained soldiers unskilled in battle, to guard it, would have been as impracticable as it would have been useless. But to prepare for temporary defence, and to succor the army of the Union in its grapple with its adversary, which was sure to come, was now the part of discretion; and accordingly, on the 9th of June, two military departments were erected, one embracing all that part of Pennsylvania east of Johnstown and the Laurel Hill range, with head-quarters at Harrisburg, at the head of which Major-General Darius N. Couch was placed, and the other, the portion of the State west of that line, together with parts of West Virginia and Ohio contiguous, with head-quarters at Pittsburg, and to the command of which Major-General William T. H. Brooks was assigned. These officers were charged with organizing troops within their respective districts, under the title of departmental corps. In this work they were powerfully aided by Governor Curtin, who issued his proclamation on the 12th, assuring the people of the danger impending, and urging them to enlist in the proposed organizations, and on the 14th, especially called upon citizens of African descent to rally around the standard of the State.

But little progress was made in the work of gathering troops. Men were slow to come. It was at a season of the year when every laboring man was needed to gather the maturing crops, and every walk of life had been already depleted to swell the ranks of the National armies. It would seem, too, that even those in authority were not impressed with the belief that an invasion by the whole rebel army was meditated. In his proclamation, Governor Curtin said: "Information has been obtained by the War Department, that a large rebel force, composed of cavalry, artillery, and mounted infantry, has been prepared for the purpose of making a raid into Pennsylvania;" and General Couch, in his order announcing the formation of his corps: "To prevent serious raids by the enemy, it is deemed necessary to call upon the citizens of Pennsylvania to furnish promptly all the men necessary to organize an army corps of volunteer infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to be designated the Army Corps of the Susquehanna."

Unfortunately for getting an immediate strong force to act for the emergency, it was announced by General Couch that the troops "would be mustered into the service of the United States, to serve during the pleasure of the President, or the continuance of the war." The majority of men were deterred, by this condition, from enlisting, who, to meet the emergency, if one really existed, would have come promptly forward. The inference derived from the language of Governor Curtin, and of General Couch, left the impression that no invasion in force was anticipated, but that the General Government was desirous of taking advantage of the threatened rebel advance to obtain soldiers for the National armies. In the two former years, these rumors had been frequent, but had never resulted in any material harm to the State, and it was now scarcely credited that the enemy would be so adventurous as to come, with all his legions, upon Pennsylvania soil.

But the disposition of the enemy to advance became daily more apparent. On Sunday evening, June the 14th, affrighted contrabands from the Shenandoah Valley commenced arriving in Greencastle, the first town in Pennsylvania over the border, and soon after reached Chambersburg, bringing intelligence of the rout of Milroy, and the rapid advance of the head of the conquering rebel

column. As it was known that at Winchester and Harper's Ferry there was a strong army corps, it was now perceived that the enemy was coming in earnest. "On Monday morning," says Mr. McClure, in an article published in the Chambersburg *Repository*, "the flood of rumors from the Potomac fully confirmed the advance of the rebels, and the citizens of Chambersburg and vicinity, feeling unable to resist the rebel columns, commenced to make prompt preparation for the movement of stealable property. Nearly every horse, good, bad, and indifferent, was started for the mountains as early on Monday as possible, and the negroes darkened the different roads northward for hours, loaded with household effects, sable babies, etc., and horses, wagons, and cattle crowded every avenue to places of safety."

The hegira thus commenced received a fresh impetus at nine o'clock on that morning, by the arrival of the advance of Milroy's wagon train, which had escaped across the Potomac, and was making haste to put itself beyond the reach of the enemy. As the long dusky train wound through the town, and for hours continued to wend its weary way, affright seized the inhabitants and spread wildly through the country. Valuable stock of all descriptions was put upon the road northward, and did not halt in its course until the Susquehanna had been left behind. The more common and less valuable was hurried away to the mountains and by-places. The great covered bridge across the Susquehanna at Harrisburg presented a scene of ceaseless activity, and never was such a toll business done there before. Milroy's train reached it first, and in its rear came an endless stream of human beings of every age and size, and beasts and four-footed things innumerable. By night the steady tramp and rumble of the heavy teams lulled the senses of the weary, and through the long hours of the sultry June day, a cloud of dust rose constantly far down the valley, reaching forward and across the stream, as far in the opposite direction as the eye could penetrate. With the fine impalpable particles settling down ceaselessly, rider and horse, vehicle and occupants, flocks, herds, all were enveloped, until thick folds wrapped them like a garment.

Not until the 15th did the General Government seem to be fully

impressed with the seriousness of the situation, or realize that the predictions of Hooker, made ten days before, were the words of truth and soberness. On that day, the President issued a proclamation for 100,000 men from the States immediately menaced, to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged; 50,000 from Pennsylvania, 30,000 from Ohio, and 10,000 each from Maryland and West Virginia. Governor Curtin seconded the call by a proclamation, in which he said: "That it is the purpose of the enemy to invade our borders with all the strength he can command is now apparent. Our only defence rests upon the determined action of the citizens of our Commonwealth. I therefore call on the people of Pennsylvania, capable of bearing arms, to enroll themselves in military organizations, and to encourage all others to give aid and assistance to the efforts which will be put forth for the protection of the State, and the salvation of our common country." Indications of mischief thickened so rapidly at Harrisburg, that preparations were commenced for removing the archives of the Government, and in the hours of a short summer night, the papers of all the departments, even to the 28,000 volumes of the State Library, and the fine old portraits of the Governors, were securely put upon cars and moved to Philadelphia. The excitement likewise ran high at Pittsburg. Fears were entertained that the rebel army, or at least a strong detachment, might bear westward, especially if, in a general battle, the enemy should prove victorious. Engineers were accordingly employed in locating and planning forts, and thousands of busy hands were at work in constructing them. The merchants and mechanics organized themselves into military companies for the defence of the city; business was suspended, all the bars, restaurants, and drinking-saloons were closed, and the sale or giving away of liquors stopped.

On the 15th, General Jenkins crossed the Potomac, and cautiously made his way northward. The rebel army was in need of transportation and supplies, and Jenkins from the first kept a sharp look-out for these. Greencastle was possessed without opposition, and in due time Chambersburg. Of his entrance to the latter place Mr. McClure, in the article above quoted, gives a facetious account, though it was to his own sore spoliation.

"Jenkins," he says, "had doubtless read the papers in his day, and knew that there were green fields in the 'Green Spot;' and what is rather remarkable, at midnight he could start for a forty-acre clover-patch belonging to the editor of the *Repository* without so much as stopping to ask where the gate might be found. Not even a halt was called to find it; but the march was continued until the gate was reached, when the order 'file right!' was given, and Jenkins was in clover. Happy fellow, thus to find luxuriant and extensive clover, as if by instinct. By the way of giving the devil his due, it must be said that, although there were over sixty acres of wheat, and eighty acres of corn and oats, in the same field, he protected it most carefully, and picketed his horses so that it could not be injured. . . . For prudential reasons the editor was not at home to do the honors at his own table; but Jenkins was not particular, nor was his appetite impaired thereby. He called upon the ladies of the house, shared their hospitality, behaved in all respects like a gentleman, and expressed very earnest regrets that he had not been able to make the personal acquaintance of the editor. We beg to say that we reciprocate the wish of the General, and shall be glad to make his acquaintance personally—'when this cruel war is over.' . . . General Jenkins also had the fullest information of the movements of the editor of this paper. He told, at our house, when we had left, the direction we had gone, and described the horse we rode."

For nearly a week, Chambersburg and all the southern part of Franklin county was occupied by the rebel forces, busy in gathering horses, which were regarded as contraband of war, and in seizing whatever goods of every variety that could be of use to them, pretending payment by delivering in exchange their worthless Confederate scrip. Though falling upon all this afflicted region with a crushing weight, yet in telling the story, their chronicler, Mr. McClure, yields to a grim humor. "True," he says, "the system of Jenkins would be considered a little informal in business circles; but it's his way, and our people agreed to it perhaps, to some extent, because of the novelty, but mainly because of the necessity of the thing. But Jenkins was liberal—eminently liberal. He didn't stop to higgle about a few odd

pennies in making a bargain. For instance, he took the drugs of Messrs. Miller, Spangler, Nixon, and Heyser, and told them to make out a bill, or if they could not do that, to guess at the amount and the bills were paid. Doubtless our merchants and druggists would have preferred greenbacks to Confederate scrip, that is never payable and is worth just its weight in old paper; but Jenkins hadn't greenbacks, and he had Confederate scrip, and such as he had he gave unto them. Thus he dealt largely in our place. To avoid jealousies growing out of rivalry in business, he patronized all the merchants, and bought pretty much everything he could conveniently use and carry. Some people, with antiquated ideas of business, might call it stealing to take goods and pay for them in bogus money; but Jenkins calls it business, and for the time being what Jenkins calls business was business. . . . Jenkins, like most doctors, don't seem to have relished his own prescriptions. Several horses had been captured by some of our boys, and notice was given by the General commanding that they must be surrendered or the town would be destroyed. The city fathers, commonly known as the town Council, were appealed to in order to avert the impending fate threatened us. One of the horses, we believe, and some of the equipments were found and returned, but there was still a balance in favor of Jenkins. We do not know who audited the account, but it was finally adjusted by the Council appropriating the sum of $900 to pay the claim. Doubtless Jenkins hoped for $900 in 'greenbacks,' but he had flooded the town with Confederate scrip, pronouncing it better than United States currency, and the Council evidently believed him; and, desiring to be accommodating with a conqueror, decided to favor him by the payment of his bill in Confederate scrip. It was so done, and Jenkins got just $900 worth of nothing for his trouble. He took it, however, without a murmur, and doubtless considered it a clever joke."

Of a piece with the above is the account of Jenkins himself: "He graduated at Jefferson College in this State, in the same class, we believe, with J. McDowell Sharpe, Esq., and gave promise of future usefulness and greatness. His downward career commenced some five years ago, when in an evil hour he became

a member of Congress from Western Virginia, and from thence may be dated his decline and fall. From Congress he naturally enough turned fire-eater, secessionist, and guerilla. He is of medium size, has a flat but good head, light brown hair, blue eyes, immense flowing beard, of a sandy hue, and rather a pleasant face. He professes to cherish the utmost regard for the humanities of war, and seemed sensitive on the subject of his reputation as a humane military leader."

The sudden removal of horses, flocks, and herds, into the mountains, and across the Susquehanna before his arrival, greatly interfered with the purposes of Jenkins; yet he succeeded in sweeping together a vast body of plunder, which he hurried away to the Potomac, and into the folds of the main force. He came down upon the fairest and wealthiest portion of Franklin county, and, as he retired, separated into squadrons, which scoured every road and byway, spending some time at Greencastle, Waynesboro', and Welsh Run, and at Mercersburg a detachment crossed Cove Mountain and penetrated to McConnellsburg, passing on down the valley from that point. It would appear that Lee had hoped by this demonstration to have induced Hooker either to rush forward and cross the Potomac, and thus uncover Washington, or to have tempted him to attack the rebel army while on the march northward, when a rapid concentration would have been made, and a defensive battle fought, in which Lee felt confident of a victory. These purposes are plainly disclosed in Lee's report. He says: "With a view to draw him (Hooker) further from his base, and at the same time to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with instructions, left Fredericksburg for the valley as soon as the enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court House on the 15th, and advancing along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. . . . As these demonstrations (Jenkins') did not have the effect of causing the Federal army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already reached the valley."

But Hooker was too wary to be caught in either of these traps, and while beating back the enemy through the passes of the minor range of mountains which still interposed between himself and Longstreet, and guarding well his flank, he was in no haste to advance into Maryland. Mr. Lincoln, in his great anxiety to protect the entire territory of the North, and to ward off the disgrace of invasion, had telegraphed to Hooker on the 16th: "Your idea to send your cavalry to this side of the river may be right, probably is; still, it pains me a little that it looks like the defensive merely, and seems to abandon the fair chance now presented of breaking the enemy's lengthy and necessarily slow line stretched from the Rappahannock to Pennsylvania." But to this Hooker says: "With all deference to the views of his Excellency, the President, it appeared to me that the wisest course for me to pursue was to move the army on a concentric but inner circle to the one followed by the enemy, and endeavor to keep abreast of his main column. This would relieve me from all embarrassment concerning my communications and supplies, and would enable me to act promptly, with my force concentrated, in thwarting the general designs of the enemy. To have followed the plan suggested, it seemed to me that I would be marching the army away from the point at which it was most needed."

Close upon the heels of Jenkins followed Ewell, who, with 12,000 men and sixteen pieces of artillery, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 15th, the same day that the former reached Chambersburg. He did not advance far, however, remaining between the bank of the stream and the borough of Hagerstown, and, like an attentive gallant, gracefully handing the plunder of Jenkins across to Lee. From the 15th to the 22d, this delightful work was continued without material change, Lee receiving much needed stores, and bringing up the rear of his army.

In the meantime, the troops called out to meet the emergency gathered slowly. On the 16th, Governor Curtin addressed an appeal to the people of Philadelphia, in which he exhorted them to come forward at once, to close their places of business, and apply their hearts to the work. But the apparent halt in the rebel column at the Potomac, and its inactivity beyond that of gathering

supplies, created the impression that the main body was not coming. The leading editorial of the Philadelphia *Press* on the morning of the 17th contained the following view: "As we understand the situation, as it appears at midnight, there is less ground for alarm than prevailed during the day. The rebels have occupied Chambersburg; but beyond that point no force is known to be advancing. . . . This suggests to us that the rebels have too great a dread of Hooker to divide themselves in his front, and that, while they might rejoice in the opportunity of occupying and holding Pennsylvania, they would not dare to do so with a powerful army on their line of communications."

Great consternation, however, prevailed at Harrisburg, and endless trains still continued to move out of the valley across the Susquehanna. Rifle-pits were thrown up in Harris' Park to command the ford just below the island. A large fort, inclosing several acres, was surveyed by competent engineers on the bluff just above the heads of the bridges leading to the city, and messengers were sent through every street requesting the inhabitants to set out empty barrels upon the side-walks to be used in constructing it. Day and night the work was vigorously pushed. Just beneath the soil was a loose shale, not of a sufficient solidity to require blasting, but so much so as to render the labor difficult. A heavy earthwork was finally completed, with dry ditch and numerous platforms for guns. Half a mile in advance was a minor work erected upon a bold spur which commanded the valley on all sides. The few clumps of trees which dotted the fields here and there were swept away, as was also the grove, grateful for shade, and relief of the prospect from the city's side which stood upon the utmost summit, where the main fort was located. A span of each bridge was severed, ready for instant destruction, but supported by props until the necessity should arrive for its demolition.

Jenkins, having brought in his cattle and horses gathered during the week to the Potomac, worshipped on Sunday with Ewell at Hagerstown, and early Monday morning, the 22d, headed again towards Chambersburg, now accompanied by the infantry of Ewell's corps. Rodes and Early, the division commanders of

Ewell, moved in advance, the former reaching Chambersburg on the 23d. They were closely followed by Johnson, the leader of his remaining division. Maryland was by this time thoroughly aroused. The Councils of Baltimore had appropriated, on the 16th, $400,000 for defence, and the labor of fortifying was vigorously pushed, earthworks being erected around the north and west sides of the city. To provide against a sudden incursion of cavalry, the streets were barricaded with barrels and hogsheads filled with bricks and sand, where it could be effectually stopped. At Harrisburg, the camp which had been established began to swarm with volunteers, and the white tents were spread out far and wide. On the 19th, Captain William H. Boyd, who had been instrumental in saving Milroy's train, was dispatched with his company from Harrisburg on cars to Shippensburg, where, finding the road impassable, he mounted and rode to Greencastle, back to Chambersburg, and forward again to Greencastle before he found an enemy. Here he had a smart skirmish with the head of the hostile column, now on its second advance. Boyd continued upon its front, observing and reporting its progress, and dashing in upon its trains at every favorable point. On the 20th, a force under the command of Brigadier-General Knipe, consisting of E. Spencer Miller's Battery and two regiments of militia, moved down the Cumberland Valley to occupy Chambersburg. But, finding on his arrival near, that the rebel cavalry were already there, with infantry advancing to their support, he fell back, skirmishing as he went, until he reached Carlisle. In the meanwhile, General Imboden, of the rebel cavalry, who had been sent out by Lee upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, having broken up that line and rendered the canal useless, thus preventing troops from West Virginia from coming suddenly upon the flanks of the rebel main force, in obedience to his orders struck boldly out towards Fulton county, and after a short skirmish with a fragment of the First New York Cavalry, occupied McConnellsburg.

Early on Sunday morning, the Philadelphia City Troop, an organization which had been preserved since the days of the Revolution, and which in that struggle acted as body-guard to

Washington, now composed of about forty members, some of them the descendants of its original members, with holy memories of that early service, arrived in Gettysburg, and in company with a small body of mounted militia, under Captain Bell, moved out upon the Chambersburg Pike towards the South Mountain. At Monterey, a little village on the way, they came up with a party of rebel skirmishers, with whom they exchanged shots. These reconnoissances were repeated on the 23d, and on the following day Colonel William W. Jennings, with the Twenty-sixth regiment of the Pennsylvania militia, one company of which, under Captain F. Klinefelter, was composed principally of students from the Pennsylvania College and from the Theological School, both located at Gettysburg, arrived in town. Major Granville O. Haller, of General Couch's staff, had been sent by that officer to represent him at this point, and assume command of all the Union forces. His conduct of affairs was most unfortunate. At the moment when the veterans of the enemy were advancing on the town, he ordered this regiment of undisciplined men out to meet them—a most suicidal policy, which must have resulted in its certain capture had not Colonel Jennings, who was an officer of experience, skilfully withdrawn it in time. Major Haller was subsequently dismissed from the service, "for disloyal conduct," strengthening the belief which was entertained at the time, that he was not devoted to the cause he represented.

At Chambersburg, General Ewell separated his two advance divisions, sending Early in the direction of Gettysburg, and Rodes toward Carlisle and Harrisburg. Early reached Gettysburg on the afternoon of Friday, the 26th, with Gordon's brigade of 5000 men, and took possession unopposed, having been preceded by a battalion of cavalry, which dashed in, uttering demoniac yells, and delivering an indiscriminate fire from their pistols. He made large demands for sugar, coffee, flour, salt, bacon, whisky, onions, hats, and shoes, amounting in value to $6000, or in lieu thereof, $5000 in money. The town council pled poverty, and he appearing to be satisfied that the place was poverty-stricken, abandoned his suit, getting neither goods nor

money. Early remained in town over night, but his forces hurried on to Hanover and York, that they might come upon those places before all the valuables they contained had been spirited away, and they be found as bare as was Gettysburg. At Hanover Junction the work of destruction on the Northern Central Railroad began, as it had likewise been practised on the Gettysburg branch. Bridges were burned, tracks torn up, rails twisted, and rolling stock demolished. Soon after the departure of Early from Gettysburg, on Saturday, the 28th, three mounted Union scouts came in from Emmittsburg, where the advance of Pleasanton's cavalry then was, who captured two of the enemy, one of them a chaplain, bearing a dispatch from Ewell, then at Shippensburg, to Early, cautioning the latter about advancing too fast. At noon of the following day two regiments of Union cavalry, under General Cowpland, arrived from Emmittsburg, on a reconnoissance. They encamped for the night near by, and departed on the following morning in the direction of Littlestown.

The Twentieth regiment of emergency militia had been sent out from Harrisburg, under Colonel Thomas, to guard the Northern Central Railroad and the Wrightsville branch. But as the veteran troops of Early advanced, Thomas was obliged to fall back, a part of his regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sickels, towards Wrightsville, and the remainder towards Harrisburg. Major Haller, with the City Troop, had also retired before the rebel advance, and had reached Wrightsville for the purpose of defending the passage of the magnificent bridge which there spanned the Susquehanna. Early was likewise eager to grasp that rich prize, as it would afford, if once securely in rebel hands, ready means of throwing Lee's entire army across a wide and difficult stream, that would otherwise prove a formidable barrier in his way. Its importance had been recognized by General Couch, who had four days before sent Colonel Frick, with the Twenty-seventh emergency regiment, with instructions to hold it to the last extremity, and subsequently ordered, if likely to fall into the enemy's hands, to destroy it. Upon his arrival, he was met by the City Troop and a part of the Twentieth, under

Lieutenant-Colonel Sickels, and was joined by four companies of militia, three white and one colored from Columbia situated at the eastern head of the bridge, a detachment of convalescent soldiers from the hospital at York, and the Petapsco Guards, in all less than 1500 men. Frick took position on commanding ground, a half mile back from the western head of the bridge, and proceeded to fortify.

Early, who was doubtless kept constantly advised of the number and character of the forces set to guard the bridge, had no sooner reached York, than he hurried forward Gordon's brigade, well provided with artillery, to seize it. Frick made a stubborn resistance, and in the fighting which ensued, had several wounded. Having no artillery with which to meet that of the enemy, and being greatly outnumbered by veteran troops, he soon saw that he would be compelled to yield. He had ordered his engineer to prepare one span of the bridge to be blown up in case it became necessary to abandon it. When, therefore, he was forced back, he ordered the match to be applied; but the train failed to ignite the powder, and the only alternative remaining was to apply the torch, and that immense structure, more than a mile and a quarter in length, lighting up the heavens for many miles around with its flames, was utterly consumed.

At York, Early found a profusion of those things which he had failed to obtain at Gettysburg. He had come with five brigades of infantry, three batteries of artillery, and part of two regiments of cavalry. Being prepared to enforce his demands, and having a rich old city in his grasp, he made a requisition for supplies similar to that at Gettysburg, and, in addition, for $28,000 in money. Should it be complied with promptly, he agreed to spare all private property; otherwise, he would take what he could find, and would not be responsible for the conduct of his troops while in the city. There appearing to be no other alternative, the stores and money were delivered, and he scrupulously kept his word, order being strictly enforced, and private property left untouched.

A few facts recorded by Mr. Gall, of the Sanitary Commission, respecting the condition and habits of Early's men, as seen at this point, will serve as a fair specimen of the make-up of the entire

rebel army: "Physically," he says, "the men looked about equal to the generality of our own troops, and there were fewer boys among them. Their dress was a wretched mixture of all cuts and colors. There was not the slightest attempt at uniformity in this respect. Every man seemed to have put on whatever he could get hold of, without regard to shape or color. I noticed a pretty large sprinkling of blue pants among them, some of those, doubtless, that were left by Milroy at Winchester. Their shoes, as a general thing, were poor; some of the men were entirely barefooted. Their equipments were light, as compared with those of our men. They consisted of a thin woollen blanket, coiled up and slung from the shoulder in the form of a sash, a haversack swung from the opposite shoulder, and a cartridge-box. The whole cannot weigh more than twelve or fourteen pounds. Is it strange, then, that with such light loads, they should be able to make longer and more rapid marches than our men? The marching of the men was irregular and careless, their arms were rusty and ill kept. Their whole appearance was greatly inferior to that of our soldiers. . . There were no tents for the men, and but few for the officers. The men were busy cooking their dinner, which consisted of fresh beef, part of the York levy, wheat griddle cakes raised with soda, and cold water. No coffee nor sugar had been issued to the men for a long time. . . The men expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with this kind of food, and said they greatly preferred the bread prepared in the way they do it, to the crackers issued to the Union soldiers. I asked one of the men how he got along without a shelter tent. His answer was, 'First rate.' 'In the first place,' said he, 'I wouldn't *tote* one, and in the second place, I feel just as well, if not better, without it.' 'But how do you manage when it rains?' I inquired. 'Wall,' said he, 'me and this other man has a gum blanket atween us; when it rains we spread one of our woollen blankets on the ground to lie on, then we spread the other woollen blanket over us, and the gum blanket over that, and the rain can't tech us.' And this is the way the rebel army, with the exception of a few of the most important officers, sleeps. Everything that will trammel or impede the movement of the army is discarded, no matter what the conse-

quences may be to the men. . . . In speaking of our soldiers, the same officer remarked: 'They are too well fed, too well clothed, and have far too much to carry.' That our men are too well fed, I do not believe, neither that they are too well clothed; that they have too much to carry, I can very well believe, after witnessing the march of the Army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville. Each man had eight days' rations to carry, besides sixty rounds of ammunition, musket, woollen blanket, rubber blanket, overcoat, extra shirt, drawers, socks, and shelter tent, amounting in all to about sixty pounds. Think of men, and boys too, staggering along under such a load, at the rate of fifteen to twenty miles a day. On Tuesday morning, 30th, at about four o'clock, the last remaining brigade passed through the city, with flags flying and band playing, and took the road to Carlisle."

While Early was demonstrating in the direction of Columbia, the remainder of the corps, and much the larger part, under Ewell's immediate command, proceeded towards Harrisburg. As it went, the Cumberland Valley Railroad was destroyed. The militia, who had taken post at Carlisle, were quickly driven before the strong columns of Rodes and Johnson, and the town was occupied. Here many of the rebels were at home; for some had been educated at Dickinson College, others had been stationed at the United States barracks, and a few had even married their wives here. But their visit now was not so agreeable as of yore, when, as gallant young collegians, or spruce officers, they had escorted the blushing maidens of the city, and been welcome at the firesides of its people.

General Knipe, who was still in command of the force of observation, had fallen back before the rebel advance, until the night of the 28th, when he reached Oyster Point, within four miles of Harrisburg. The enemy having approached, apparently with the design of pushing on still nearer to the city, Knipe opened upon them with the guns of Miller's battery with good effect, causing a rapid movement to the rear. This was the nearest approach to the capital of Pennsylvania of the enemy in force, though his scouts were captured in and about the city. One, a powerful man, with a sinister face, and evidently a person

of great daring, was taken in the vicinity of Camp Curtin, and was held under guard at the head-quarters of General Couch, where he was gazed upon by the curious. Another was seized while in the act of making drawings of the fort and its armament opposite the town. A little flat boat was overhauled in the Susquehanna river, on the night of the 1st of July, in which was a rebel with an ingenious contrivance for discovering the fords of the stream. He had a small stone suspended by a cord which, as he floated on down the main channel, would not impede his progress; but the moment he came to a shoal place, less than three or four feet deep, it would drag upon the bottom and stop his craft. In this way, the fords of the river were noted. A map was found upon his person, containing a draft of the river, with the fords above and opposite the city marked on the Cumberland shore for their entrance.

In the meantime, troops had been rapidly assembling at the camps at Harrisburg, Pittsburg, and Philadelphia, and regiments were daily organized. As the enemy advanced, he broke up all means of communication with the North, and was careful to spread false rumors. In the midst of the wild excitement which prevailed, it was difficult to sift the true from the false, and arrive at a just conclusion respecting the numbers, position, or purpose of the rebel army. A judgment could be formed by balancing probabilities, and the most favorable view, the wish sometimes being father to the thought, was entertained. As late as the morning of the 26th, the New York *Herald* contained the following judgment: "We have no idea that General Lee meditates an advance upon either Harrisburg or Baltimore. In the one case, the trip would not pay expenses, as the broad, rocky Susquehanna river is in his way, and in the other case, his army, in getting into Baltimore, would get into a trap, from which Lee would never extricate it." And the Philadelphia *Press* of the 27th, but three days before the great battle began at Gettysburg, expressed the following opinion: "Our intelligence as to what force of rebels has entered Pennsylvania is still unsatisfactory and unreliable. Probably Ewell's corps, which is estimated to number about 34,000 men, is alone in this aggressive movement; although it would not

greatly surprise us to learn that General Lee's entire force, having crossed the Potomac, is within supporting distance."

So threatening, however, had the aspect of affairs become on the 26th, that Governor Curtin issued his proclamation calling for 60,000 State militia. He said: "Pennsylvanians! The enemy is advancing in force into Pennsylvania. He has a strong column within twenty-three miles of Harrisburg, and other columns are moving by Fulton and Adams counties, and it can no longer be doubted that a formidable invasion of our State is in actual progress. The calls already made for volunteer militia in the exigency have not been met as fully as the crisis requires. I therefore now issue this my proclamation, calling for 60,000 men to come promptly forward to defend the State. . . . The time has now come when we must all stand or fall together in defence of our State, and in support of our Government."

As the enemy approached Harrisburg, and the dangers of occupation thickened, preparations for meeting them were hastened. One of the wealthiest and most powerful corporations in the State, and one which was contributing immensely to the support of the National Government, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, had its property of many millions exposed to destruction. Vigorous measures were taken to save it. Block houses of sufficient strength to resist infantry attacks were erected so as to cover the bridges, and the great number of valuable locomotives and vast quantities of rolling stock, kept at Harrisburg, were moved to Philadelphia.

As soon as the advance-guard of the rebel army, consisting of Ewell's corps and Jenkins' cavalry, had commenced its march for the Susquehanna, striking for the bridges at Columbia and Harrisburg, Lee, who now had his remaining force in hand, prepared to follow, and on the 24th and 25th crossed the Potomac, Hill near Shepherdstown, and Longstreet at Williamsport. The two columns reunited at Hagerstown, and moved thence to Chambersburg, where they arrived and encamped on the 27th. Hooker had no sooner seen that his antagonist was about to cross the Potomac than he prepared to execute the corresponding movement; and on the 25th and 26th, one day behind

Lee, he likewise passed over, effecting the crossing upon pontoons at Edward's Ferry.

The Union General now realized that a battle could not long be delayed, and he was filled with anxiety lest his force should be insufficient to fight it with a fair prospect of success. He had ascertained by the most trustworthy testimony that the actual strength of the enemy's army then moving forward into Pennsylvania was 91,000 infantry, 5000 with the artillery numbering 280 pieces, and 11,000 cavalry, a grand aggregate of 107,000. This was a larger number by several thousands than he then had in hand, and would be fully equal to his with all the additions he could receive from the neighboring departments. He, accordingly, dispatched his Chief-of-staff, Major-General Butterfield, to Washington to obtain the returns of soldiers under General Heintzelman there, and under General Schenck at Baltimore, and from these two departments to organize a column of 15,000 troops to move without delay to Frederick, Maryland. Though he found under General Heintzelman over 36,000 men, yet it was deemed inadvisable by General Halleck, in view of the immense depots of material there accumulated, and the necessity of guarding the Capital, to lessen it. At Baltimore he found but a small force, there being 12,000 of Schenck's command at Harper's Ferry, and 7500 at Winchester, the latter having been already broken and nearly destroyed. Of the force under immediate command, General Schenck promptly ordered out Lockwood's Brigade, consisting of 2500 men. The force at Harper's Ferry, now under the command of General French, was the only considerable one which Hooker could therefore hope to obtain.

Accordingly, as soon as his army was across the river, he directed General Reynolds, in command of the right wing of the army, to send detachments to seize the passes of the South Mountain, at Turner's and Crampton's Gaps; and with the First, Third, and Eleventh corps to follow and take position at Middletown, across the Cotocton range, his object being to confine the rebel line of advance to the one valley in which he then was, and to bring a strong force within supporting distance should the enemy turn back from Pennsylvania and offer battle to the force


Huntingdon
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Rockville
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READING R. R.
Conedogwinet Cr.
Carlisle
PENNSYLVANIA R. R.
Newville
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Dill's Town
Conewago C.
SUSQUEHANNA
Columbia
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Wright's Ty.
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VALLEY
CUMBERLAND
Shippensburg
Petersburg
Heidlersburg
York
Scottland
Chambersburg
Mummasburg
Cash T.
McConnellsburg
St. Thomas
Huntstown
Hanover Junction
Gettysburg
Bonaugh T.
Two Taverns
Hanover
Strasburg
CENTRAL R. R.
Mercerburg
Green Castle
Fairfield
Waynesboro
Fountaindale
Littles T.
Emmittsburg

which Hooker was about to send upon his rear. The Second and Sixth corps he ordered to Frederick. The Twelfth he directed to move to Harper's Ferry, which he accompanied in person, there to be joined by two strong brigades from General French's command, thence to march upon the enemy's line of communications at Williamsport, destroy his pontoon bridge at that point, and stop the enormous quantities of flour, grain, horses and horned cattle which were steadily flowing into Virginia. After visiting Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights, and finding the point to possess no strategic value, presenting no obstacle to the invaders, defending no ford of the river, and being itself indefensible, he decided to abandon the post, and transfer the material collected there to Washington. This would release 10,000 good troops to join his army. "After ascertaining," he says, "that the public property could all be removed before twelve o'clock at night, I seated myself, and was engaged in writing an order for the abandonment at daylight."

But what was his surprise and disappointment to receive at that moment a dispatch from General Halleck, saying: "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us. . . . I cannot approve of their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity." And this, after Halleck had himself placed the troops at this point under Hooker's control in the following words, telegraphed on the 22d: "In order to give compactness to the command of troops in the field covering Washington and Baltimore, it is proposed to place that part of the Middle Department east of Cumberland, and commanded by General Schenck, under your direct orders. The President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable." To this Hooker answered: "Yes, provided the same authority is continued to me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals Schenck and Heintzelman." To send the Twelfth corps alone to Williamsport, without the addition of French's troops, he did not regard advisable, as the enemy might suddenly turn upon and overwhelm it before he could bring up his supporting forces. He accordingly abandoned the movement, and ordered that corps to countermarch and follow the other troops to Frederick.

He now felt that to have his plans thus interfered with, and his movements in the face of the enemy cut short when in full progress by one far from the field, who could not know the exigences of the moment, would only result in shame and defeat to the army. He accordingly telegraphed, at one P. M. of the 27th, to General Halleck: "My original instructions were to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal, and I earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy." This desire was immediately granted, and at four o'clock on the following morning, Colonel Hardie, a special messenger from Washington, arrived in camp bearing an order relieving General Hooker from duty, and directing him to turn over the command of the army to General Meade, then at the head of the Fifth corps.

Of General Hooker's ability as displayed in the preliminary movements at Chancellorsville, and in the movements up to the moment of yielding his authority, the best military critics award him very high praise. That he was right in demanding the use of the troops at Harper's Ferry, and in abandoning the post, is undisputed, and was virtually acknowledged by General Halleck himself, inasmuch as he allowed the successor of Hooker to take them. But Halleck, it appears, had distrusted the ability of Hooker from the first, and when it was proposed, in September, 1862, to make the latter the successor of General McClellan instead of General Burnside, and the President and five members of the cabinet were of that mind, Halleck opposed it, and, with the remainder of the President's advisers, succeeded in defeating him. Of this opposition to him Hooker was aware, when, finally, he was placed in chief command of the Potomac army, and in accepting the position, he made but one request of the President, that he would stand between Halleck and himself.

Geo. G. Meade

CHAPTER II.

PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE UNDER MEADE.

GETTYSBURG, upon the slopes and hills around which the great battle was fought, a quiet village of 2500 inhabitants, is the capital of Adams county, Pennsylvania. For miles around, the country is for the most part gently rolling. The soil is fertile, and kept under a high state of cultivation, little timber being left standing. To the northwest, eight or ten miles away, is the South Mountain chain, extending from northeast to southwest, until lost to view in the dim distance. "From an elevation a little below the Monterey House on the summit of South Mountain," says one long schooled by European travel, "the view of the flat lands extending towards the Susquehanna, as far as the eye can reach, is magnificent in the extreme. I have seen few views in Italy which exceed it in romantic beauty."

In the neighborhood of Gettysburg are several minor ridges, parallel to this principal one. That to the west of the town, and but half a mile away, is known as Seminary Ridge, from the fact that upon its brow, where it is crossed by the Chambersburg Pike, are located the buildings of a Theological School of the Lutheran denomination. It is also known as Oak Ridge. Beyond this, at intervals of a quarter of a mile, or less, are two or three other slight ridges, and a mile and a half out is Willoughby Run.

To the east and south of the town is a ridge whose general direction is parallel to the others, but broken and quite irregular, at some points rising into much higher and bolder outline than

the opposite Seminary Ridge, and at others falling away to a level, or even lower than the intervening plain. This is designated Cemetery Ridge, from the beautiful Evergreen Cemetery located upon the summit of its nearest approach to the town, and by the side of which is the National ground where now sleep those who there fell. A little to the west and south is Zeigler's Grove, a half acre or more of forest oaks. From this the ridge, which presents a shelving rock on the west of a few feet in height, is well defined for a mile south, when it falls away, and for at least another half mile is low, wet, clay soil, where it is entirely lost, but again suddenly breaks out into bold, rugged, rocky, wooded ground, and terminates in a granite spur known as Little Round Top. Beyond this, and separated from it by a narrow valley, is Round Top, much more rugged and precipitous than its neighbor, and attaining a height of four hundred feet above the waters of neighboring streams. "When the force which folded and raised up the strata," says Professor Jacobs, in his "Later Rambles at Gettysburg," "which form the South Mountain was in action, it produced fissures in the strata of red shale, which covers the surface of this region of country, permitting the fused material from beneath to rise and fill them, on cooling, with trap dykes, or greenstone and syenitic greenstone. This rock, being for the most part very hard, remained as the axes and crests of hills and ridges, when the softer shale in the intervening spaces was excavated by great water-currents into valleys and plains."

Science thus renders a reasonable account of the huge masses of rock which are reared in the most various and fantastic shapes upon the sides and summits of these bold mounts, the casting about of which, in a superstitious age, may well have been regarded as the sport of the giants. At a little way beyond the cemetery, in the opposite direction, the ridge makes a sharp turn nearly at right angles to its main course, and at less than half a mile distant reaches up into a bold and precipitous headland, looking towards the town, known as Culp's Hill; and farther to the right is Rock Creek, which stream cuts through the ridge at less than a mile away, separating Culp's from Wolf's Hill, still

farther to the right. At the time of the battle, all this beautiful country was clothed in verdure; the fields were covered with waving grain, whitening for the harvest; the flocks and herds, revelling in abundant pasturage and sated by cool fountains, rested beneath refreshing shade; the whole presenting with all its innumerable concomitants a rare picture of repose and peace.

General Lee had, for several days, been halting at Chambersburg, while the main body of his army was concentrating about that place, and his advance corps under Ewell was reaching out towards the Susquehanna, approaching the stream at Columbia and Harrisburg, evidently feeling for a crossing. When his purposes were thwarted at the former point by the burning of the bridge, the division sent in that direction was ordered to march to Carlisle, plainly indicating the intention of moving the entire army that way. General Hooker had concluded, from the fact that he did not take a pontoon train along with him, that Lee did not design to cross the Susquehanna, and so expressed himself to General Meade. But at this season of the year that stream is shallow and fordable at many points. His scouts were already searching for them, as has been shown in the case of the one captured. But of his purposes we are not left to conjecture. In his official report he says: "Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 29th, information was received from a scout that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain."

Of Hooker's intention to march upon Williamsport, and break up his communications, or even of the passage of the Potomac by the Union army, up to this time, Lee knew nothing. That he should have so long remained in ignorance of these movements was due to the mishaps which befell the operations of that division of his cavalry under Stuart. When about to cross the Potomac, Lee had ordered that daring cavalry leader to remain on guard at the passes of the Blue Ridge, leading to the Shenandoah Valley, and observe the movements of the Union forces, and should they attempt to cross the Potomac, he was to make demonstrations upon their rear, so as to detain them as long as possible in Vir-

ginia. But, in the event of their passage, he was also to cross, either on the east or west side of the Blue Ridge, as to him should seem best, and take position upon the right flank of the main rebel column. So far south had his demonstrations carried him, however, that Stuart determined to cross at Seneca, some distance to the east of the point where the Union army had passed. When once over he found it impossible to reach his chief, and take position upon the flank as ordered, the Union army being interposed. He accordingly kept northward, passing through Hanover, and did not arrive at Carlisle, where he expected to find the main rebel column, until the 1st of July, after Ewell had been recalled from that place and was on his way to Gettysburg. He was at Carlisle met by a messenger from Lee ordering him forward to the scene of conflict, but did not arrive until the result of the battle had been well-nigh decided, and the star of his chief had gone down in blood. The need of cavalry was sorely felt by Lee in the manœuvres preliminary to the fight, as he was thereby stripped of the means for ascertaining the whereabouts of his antagonist, and his flanks and rear were indifferently protected. Thus are the plans even of great leaders the sport of fortune.

The moment Lee became aware of the position of the Union army he initiated movements to checkmate it. "As our communications," he says in his report, "with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle." Thus on the evening of the 29th, orders went out for a concentration, and on the following morning the whole rebel army was marching on Gettysburg.

This point had been well reconnoitred by the enemy's forces while on their way to York, Early having passed the night there four days before. It possessed great strategic value. So easily are the rugged features which surround it shunned, that great highways approach it from almost every point of the compass, centring here like spokes in the hub of a wheel, those from Shippensburg and Carlisle on the north, from Harrisburg, York, and

Hanover on the east, from Baltimore, Littlestown, Taneytown, and Emmittsburg on the south, and from Fairfield and Chambersburg on the west. Several of these roads were macadamized, and there was in addition a railroad leading out to the Northern Central Road by way of Hanover. Should Lee concentrate his army here, he would secure a route to his base at Williamsport, much shorter than by Chambersburg, over which he could bring up his ammunition, and in case of disaster, hold it for retreat. It would give him the control of a complete system of roads, any one of which he could move upon at will as policy should dictate. In case of being attacked and forced to fight a battle there, he would have an abundance of good solid ways in his rear, on which to manœuvre his troops, and take his heavy guns from one part of the line to another,—a consideration of great importance, as a battle is not unfrequently lost by the delay imposed in constructing a road over some brook or impassable slough, or in cutting through an impenetrable wood for the passage of guns and ammunition.

But it was not alone the rebel commander who had regarded with a soldier's eye the strategic value of Gettysburg. General Pleasanton says: "I may say here that I had studied that whole country the year before very carefully indeed, all its roads and topographical features, and was probably about as well posted in regard to it as any officer in the army. . . . I was satisfied from my general knowledge of the country—and so mentioned to General Meade several times—that there was but one position in which for us to have a fight, and that was at Gettysburg."

At the moment when these orders went out from Lee for the rebel army to concentrate at Gettysburg, the Union army was reposing at Frederick, and was upon the eve of marching to find the enemy, under the belief that he was still moving towards the Susquehanna. The 28th was the Sabbath, and "that day," says General Hooker, "I designed to give my army to rest," an example of regard for the Sabbath as noble as it is unusual in military operations. But at dawn on the morning of that day he was relieved of command. To the army his removal came like a thunderclap from a cloudless sky. To the rank and file he had become

greatly endeared, for he had brought his command from a condition of demoralization to one of great efficiency. To strike down a popular commander in the very face of the enemy, and on the eve of a great battle, was an act that, in almost any other country, would have been attended with extreme hazard. But the temper of that army was known to be one of intense devotion to the National cause, and full confidence was felt that it would fight under any commander, or even without a commander if need be. The course of General Hooker at this critical moment was one of most disinterested patriotism and gallantry. In his farewell order he says: "Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotions. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support." By the testimony of General Butterfield, General Hooker had advised, in case he was relieved, that General Meade should be appointed in his place, and when the officers who had served under him called in a body to bid him farewell at his departure, he said that "General Meade was a brave and gallant man, who would undoubtedly lead them to success, and that he hoped that all who regarded him, or his wishes, or his feelings, would devote every energy and ability to the support of General Meade."

The new commander had made a good record. He had been with that army from its organization, and at Beaver Dam Creek, at Gaines' Mill, at Charles City Cross Roads, at the second Bull Run, and more especially at Fredericksburg, he had exhibited the qualities of an able soldier. In his order, he said: "By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order —an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises nor pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved,

and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me."

His first care was to acquaint himself with the late movements, and exact position of the enemy, and the plans and purposes of General Hooker. To this end he retained the officers who had formed General Hooker's military family—General Butterfield, chief of staff, General Warren, chief of engineers, General Hunt, chief of artillery, and General Williams, adjutant-general. He himself had a conference with General Hooker, before his departure, respecting his plan of campaign; but that he might be fully assured of the latter's purposes, he requested General Butterfield to have another official conversation with the retiring chief, and make himself thoroughly conversant with the movements in contemplation.

The operations indicated by Hooker were in the main adopted. General Meade very cogently inferred from the movements of the enemy that it was his intention to cross the Susquehanna, a purpose which Lee declares he was acting on up to the evening of the 29th. Accordingly, in his telegram accepting the position to which he had been assigned, he said: "Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can only now say that it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle. I would say that I trust that every available man that can be spared will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force." In response to this latter request, not only the garrison at Harper's Ferry, which had been the bone of contention between Hooker and Halleck, and the withholding of which was the immediate cause of the former's

resignation, was placed at his disposal, but also the entire force of militia at Harrisburg, under General Couch, and such forces as could be used from the departments of West Virginia, Baltimore, and Washington, from Fortress Monroe, and even the returning troops from North Carolina, were hurried forward to his support, thus proving conclusively that it was not a necessity of holding the troops at Harper's Ferry, but a distrust of Hooker's ability as a soldier, which made Halleck unwilling to give them to him.

Orders were accordingly issued on the 28th, for the army to move forward on the following morning, in fan shape, in three columns from Frederick, where it had been principally concentrated, on to a line represented by the road running from Emmittsburg to Westminster, the First and Eleventh corps being directed to Emmittsburg, the Third and Twelfth to Taneytown, Second to Frizelburg, Fifth to Union Mills, and the Sixth to New Windsor; the cavalry, likewise in three columns, moving upon the flanks of the infantry—Buford upon the left, Gregg upon the right, and Kilpatrick in advance—and this order of march was continued on the 30th. On this latter day Stuart, who, with the main body of the enemy's cavalry, had been hanging upon the rear of the Union army, and having crossed the Potomac at Seneca, was moving up on the right flank, fell in with Kilpatrick at Hanover, and had a sharp encounter, in which the enemy was worsted, and one battle-flag and a number of prisoners were taken.

The order of march issued on the 30th, for the movement of the army on the 1st day of July, was for the Third corps to go to Emmittsburg, Second to Taneytown, Fifth to Hanover, Twelfth to Two Taverns, First to Gettysburg, Eleventh to Gettysburg in supporting distance, and Sixth to Manchester. General Reynolds had been continued in command of what had been the right wing, now getting into position upon the left, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, and the cavalry, and as he was now approaching the enemy, he had turned over the command of his own corps, the First, to General Doubleday, and was himself directing the general movements.

In the meantime, the orders issued by General Lee on the evening of the 29th, for all his forces to concentrate at Gettysburg,

were being executed, but not with the usual enterprise and daring, the rebel commander sorely feeling the need of his cavalry, that which he had depended on having been isolated, as we have seen, and by the fight at Hanover been pushed still farther away towards the Susquehanna. He says in his report: "The march towards Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been, had the movements of the Federal army been known." Had his cavalry been present, those movements would have been observed, and constantly reported to him. Thus, precisely what had happened to Hooker at Chancellorsville, the absence of cavalry, and which lost him the battle, befell Lee in this campaign. The strategic prize was Gettysburg. Whichever party should seize that, would strike with great advantages in his favor.

But while the two armies were approaching, each with imperfect knowledge of the other's movements, for a death grapple, the Union commander was unaware of the change which had occurred in the plans of his antagonist, and supposed him still pushing forward to cross the Susquehanna. Hence, while Lee was making all possible speed to concentrate on the Union flank, Meade, all unsuspicious of danger, was moving, much scattered, to catch Lee before he should get across. But the moment Ewell's forces began to fall back from before Harrisburg, they were followed up by the militia at that place, under General William F. (Baldy) Smith, who had been assigned by General Couch to that duty. As Ewell withdrew from Carlisle, Smith entered it, but, as the enemy thought, in too much haste, and turned upon him. A sharp skirmish ensued, and the solid shot from the enemy's battery, planted upon an eminence to the south of the place, tore wildly through the astonished city. No great injury was done, but the anger of the foe at the obstinacy of Smith, in not again surrendering the town, was vented in firing and utterly destroying the United States barracks, near that place, and the arsenal of supplies. This determination of Smith to press upon the rear of the rebels disclosed their purpose of concentrating, and the intelligence was flashed over the wires to Washington, and thence to Westminster, which had now become the base of intelligence as well as of supply to the Union force. On the 30th, Couch telegraphed to

Halleck: "My latest information is that Early, with his 8000 men, went towards Gettysburg or Hanover, saying they expected to fight a great battle there. At Carlisle, they said they were not going to be outflanked by Hooker." No man was more active or successful in gaining accurate information, or divining the purposes of the enemy, than the Hon. Thomas A. Scott, Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and subsequently Assistant Secretary of War. In this, as in the management of the great corporation with which he is associated, he showed Napoleonic vigor. On the same day, Couch, from information furnished by Scott, again telegraphed: "Lee is falling back suddenly from the vicinity of Harrisburg, and concentrating all his forces. York has been evacuated. Carlisle is being evacuated. The concentration seems to be at or near Chambersburg; the object, apparently, a sudden movement against Meade, of which he should be advised by courier immediately;" and at a little past midnight Couch sent still another telegram: "Information just received leads to the belief that the concentration of the forces of the enemy will be at Gettysburg, rather than at Chambersburg. The movement on their part is very rapid and hurried. They retired from Carlisle in the direction of Gettysburg, by the way of the Petersburg pike. Firing about Petersburg and Dillstown this P. M., continued some hours. Meade should, by all means, be informed and prepared for a sudden attack from Lee's whole army."

At about the same hour, July 1st, at a quarter before one in the morning, General Schenck telegraphed from Baltimore: "Lee, I think, is either massing his troops, or making a general retreat towards Cumberland Valley. Most likely the former. They are so near that I shall not be surprised if a battle comes on to-day."

Up to the moment of receiving these messages, which did not reach him until the morning of the 1st of July, General Meade had been moving his army forward by rapid marches towards the Susquehanna under the apprehension that Lee was intent on crossing that stream. It is true that he had obtained reports which induced him, on the evening of the 30th, to issue a circular to each corps commander, saying: "The Commanding General

has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed. . . . Corps commanders will hold their commands in readiness at a moment's notice, upon receiving orders, to march against the enemy. . . . The men must be provided with three days' rations in haversacks, and with sixty rounds of ammunition in the boxes and upon the person."

It would seem from the following telegram from Meade to Halleck, sent at seven o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July, that Meade had not yet been apprised of the important messages from Schenck and Couch, quoted above, and which were dispatched to Washington at a little after midnight: "My positions to-day are, one corps at Emmittsburg, two at Gettysburg, one at Taneytown, one at Two Taverns, one at Manchester, one at Hanover. These were ordered yesterday, before receipt of advices of Lee's movements. . . . The point of Lee's concentration, and the nature of the country, when ascertained, will determine whether I attack him or not."

Thus it will be seen that thirty-six hours had elapsed from the time Lee had issued orders for all his forces to concentrate at Gettysburg, before Meade became fully aware that such a concentration was in progress, and during all those hours, pregnant with the gravest issues, he was moving on, "fan-shape," as he terms it, by this time sweeping a broad belt of more than thirty miles, intent upon striking the enemy before he should cross the Susquehanna, or while entangled upon the stream. This is evident from his telegram to General Halleck of the 29th, in which he says: "If he [Lee] is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do." The purpose here expressed is confirmed by his testimony before the committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War: "I determined," he says, "and so notified the General-in-chief, that I should move my army as promptly as possible on the main line from Frederick to Harrisburg, extending my wings on

both sides of that line as far as I could consistently with the safety and the rapid concentration of that army, and should continue that movement until I either encountered the enemy, or had reason to believe that the enemy would advance upon me; my object being at all hazards to compel him to loose his hold on the Susquehanna, and meet me in battle at some point. It was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give battle wherever, and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of course, by such general considerations as govern every general officer—that when I came into his immediate neighborhood some manœuvres might be made by me with a view to secure advantages on my side in that battle, and not allow them to be secured by him."

As soon, however, as it became evident to him that the enemy had let go of the Susquehanna, and was rapidly concentrating on his flank, he instantly realized that a change of policy was necessary.

He accordingly issued a circular on the morning of the 1st of July, of which the following extracts indicate the purport: "From information received the Commanding General is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz.: the relief of Harrisburg and the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Pennsylvania beyond the Susquehanna. It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other *impedimenta*, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek. For this purpose General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg two corps [First and Eleventh], by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and after crossing Pipe Creek, deploy towards Middleburg. The corps at Emmittsburg [Third] will be withdrawn, by way of Mechanicsville, to Middleburg. General Slocum

will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and Two Taverns [Fifth and Twelfth] and withdraw them by Union Mills. . . . The *time* for falling back can only be developed by circumstances. Whenever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will at once be communicated to these head-quarters, and to all adjoining corps commanders. . . . This order is communicated that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack if made in strong force upon any portion of our present position. Developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions."

Against the movements contemplated in this circular, which was merely a notification of a purpose which would be followed by an order when the trains of the several corps could be disposed of, and the movements of the enemy should make it advisable, some of Meade's officers entered vigorous protests. But to the adoption of this plan he was incited by many weighty considerations. He was convinced, from information hourly reaching him, that the whole rebel army, numerically stronger than his own, was rapidly concentrating, and was probably within striking distance of Gettysburg. Should he push the two corps which he had approaching that place into the town, and attempt to hold it, the probabilities were that they would be fallen upon and annihilated before he could bring up the balance of his army to their support, one corps of which, the Sixth, was over thirty miles away. It was his intention, therefore, that these two corps, instead of resolutely fighting the whole rebel army, should simply hold the attacking force in check, in case the enemy should assume the offensive, sufficiently to bring off the trains, and then concentrate his whole army before engaging in a general battle. He was convinced, besides, that however excellent the position at Gettysburg might be, and however great its strategic value, it was then absolutely beyond his power to keep it from the enemy's grasp. The sequel shows that both these catastrophes, which the quick military eye of Meade saw impending, did actually follow, the two corps being crushed with a loss of 10,000 of their number,

and the town falling into the enemy's hands. Meade did not know, having never been at Gettysburg, nor could any one in his army have known, until he reached the ground, nor does any one now claim to have been aware, that there was a position outside the town which could be taken up after the town itself had fallen, that would prove more favorable for gaining a victory than the possession of Gettysburg itself, though counted upon as of so great value. The whole advantage, to the Union side, of Gettysburg as a battle ground, after the town was lost, consisted in the fact that a position was found near there which proved to be a good one from which to fight a defensive battle. Not knowing that any such ground existed, and not having been advised by any of those who are now most loud-mouthed in claiming the credit of indicating Gettysburg as a favorable battle-field, the design of Meade to concentrate, made known in this circular, was a proper one, and dictated by the highest considerations of military policy. Besides, if he could withdraw the isolated wing, now shown for the first time by the telegrams of Couch and Schenck to be threatened with destruction, and take the position a few miles to the rear, which he had selected, he would be brought nearer his own base, at Westminster, which could be held with only slight diminution of his strength for guard. He would at the same time be drawing his antagonist still farther from his base, and would thereby make him so much the more vulnerable.

It is true that to that portion of the army which was at the moment in advance of the line he had selected, the contemplated movement would appear like a falling back, and in that view might have a demoralizing effect. General Butterfield says: "When General Meade presented this order to me, which was in his own handwriting, I stated to him that I thought the effect of an order to fall back would be very bad upon the morals of the army, and that it ought to be avoided if possible. General Meade seemed to think that we were going ahead without any well understood plan, and that, by reason of that, we might be liable to disaster." But the effect here deprecated by Butterfield would not have applied to the main body of the army, which was already

on or near the line selected, and could have had no serious influence upon the wing touched.

The only fault then that can be imputed to Meade in regard to this order, which was probably more a misfortune than a fault, was that he had allowed his antagonist to be thirty-six hours concentrating before he discovered the fact, and he, in the meantime, marching on with corps scattered, and allowing a contingency to occur which necessitated such an order.

There was, however, one consideration, which subsequent disclosures show to have been of the highest importance, that failed to impress the mind of the Union leader. Suppose he had fallen back, and found a strong position, and got his army concentrated, would the enemy come forward and attack him in it? General Lee says, in his official report: "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy." Swinton, in his "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," says that after the conclusion of the war he had a conversation with General Longstreet, concerning this battle, in which the latter declared that "General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him." It would seem, therefore, that any strong position selected and fortified by Meade would have been futile, as he would have been obliged, in the end, to have come out from behind his fastnesses, and have attacked. But this does not militate against the soundness of his order for concentration, as that was imperative before, with the hope of success, he could attack an enemy which had had thirty-six hours the start in drawing in his legions and compacting them for the onset.

But a power above human wisdom was controlling events which set at nought the counsels of the wise. Buford, who had been charged with moving upon the left flank of the Union army, with one of the divisions of cavalry, having encamped at Fountain Dale on the night of the 29th of June, started in the morning towards Gettysburg; but unexpectedly coming upon a detachment of the enemy's infantry, while on the way, which proved to be a part of Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division of Hill's corps,

which recoiled before him, he retraced his steps, not having orders to attack, to Fountain Dale, and thence moved to Emmittsburg, where he received orders to march to Gettysburg, from Pleasanton, chief of cavalry, and to hold the town to the last extremity, receiving assurance of support from the infantry. On the same morning a portion of Heth's division of Hill's corps, which had crossed the mountains some days before, and had been engaged in gathering supplies of beef, flour, and grain, approached Gettysburg, accompanied with artillery, and a train of fifteen wagons, the whole, several thousand in number, forming a line a mile and a half in length, apparently having been ordered out to take possession of the town. The head of this column had reached the crest of Seminary Ridge, and the pickets as far down as Mr. Shead's house, in the outskirts of the place, when it was halted. After the officers, with their field glasses, had ridden back and forth for some time, reconnoitring and conversing with the inhabitants, the column countermarched, and at half-past ten had disappeared. It is not difficult to account for this singular manœuvre, for Buford, with his resolute cavalry division, was rapidly approaching. As the enemy withdrew, they attempted an ambuscade when arrived at Marsh Creek, hiding themselves to right and left of the road, under cover of a wood that skirts the stream, while a minor force was thrown forward as a decoy. But the disguise was too thin for the practised eye of Buford.

In an hour after the rebels had departed, the magnificent column of Buford arrived, and to the gladdened eyes of the inhabitants, unused to gaze on hostile pageants, it seemed indeed "terrible as an army with banners." With firm tread it moved up the main street of the town, and out upon the Chambersburg pike. It consisted, at the time, of only two brigades, a third under Merritt being at Mechanicstown with the trains, one commanded by Colonel J. M. Gamble, composed of the Eighth Illinois, Eighth Indiana, and Eighth New York, the other by Colonel Thomas C. Devin, embracing the Sixth New York (Ira Harris), Ninth New York, and Seventeenth Pennsylvania, and a battery of light guns of the Second Artillery, under

Lieutenants Clark and Calef. It was reputed to contain 4000 men, and probably bore that number upon its rolls; but when drawn up for action could only present 2200 muskets. At the distance of a mile and a half from the town it was deployed, Gamble across the Chambersburg, and Devin across the Mummasburg and Carlisle roads.

Thus was the column of the enemy, which had approached the town in the early morning evidently for the purpose of taking forcible possession, foiled, and the advantage in the preliminary manœuvre was with the Union side, an augury of ultimate triumph. Gamble threw out his scouting parties towards Cashtown, and Devin towards Hunterstown, which scoured the country, capturing stragglers from the enemy, from whom important information was obtained. Buford now became satisfied that the mass of the rebel army was converging towards Gettysburg, and that heavy columns were already in close proximity.

A Lieutenant, who was signal officer of Buford's division, reports the conversation of the chiefs on the occasion, which is published by General De Peyster in his "Decisive Conflicts": "On the night of the 30th," he says, "General Buford spent some hours with Colonel Tom Devin, and while commenting upon the information brought in by Devin's scouts, remarked that 'the battle would be fought at that point,' and that 'he was afraid it would be commenced in the morning before the infantry would get up.' These are his own words. Devin did not believe in so early an advance of the enemy, and remarked that he would 'take care of all that would attack his front during the ensuing twenty-four hours.' Buford answered: 'No, you won't. They will attack you in the morning and they will come *booming*—skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this position and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold we will do well.' Upon his return, he ordered me, then first lieutenant and signal officer of his division, to seek out the most prominent points and watch everything; to be careful to look out for camp-fires, and in the morning for dust. He seemed anxious, more so than I ever saw him."

The judgment of Buford was just, showing that he was possessed of remarkable discernment and penetration. Two divisions of Hill's corps were already across the mountains, the last to leave the Rappahannock, and the first to appear upon the front of the new field, while his remaining division and two divisions of Longstreet's corps were already upon the western slope ready to cross at dawn, and the body of Ewell's corps was in bivouac at Heidlersburg, only nine miles away.

The Union army, too, had been moving thitherward, and at the moment when Buford was holding this conversation in the tent of Colonel Devin, Reynolds was bivouacking on the bank of Marsh Creek, four miles away, with the First corps; Howard with the Eleventh was on the Emmittsburg road some miles farther back, Sickles with the Third corps was at Emmittsburg, Hancock with the Second at Frizelburg, Slocum with the Twelfth at Littlestown, Sykes with the Fifth at Union Mills towards Hanover, and Sedgwick with the Sixth at Manchester.

The army was now on Northern soil or verging upon it. As they crossed the Pennsylvania line the fact was announced to the men from the heads of the columns, and the passage was signalized by the wildest enthusiasm, and demonstrations of joy. Caps flew in air, shouts of rejoicing resounded, bands struck up the National airs, and the heavens echoed with patriot songs. General Meade, recognizing the importance of exciting the fervor of his men, and intent on seizing every opportunity to heighten it, issued the following earnest appeal: "The Commanding General requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe; our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars are involved. The army has fought well heretofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps commanders

are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this hour."

General Reynolds, having been kept aware of the movements of the enemy by the ever watchful Buford, had taken up a strong position on the heights beyond Emmittsburg, on which, should he be assailed, he could make a good defence, and here he had passed the night of the 29th. On the 30th he moved forward only a few miles, where he again formed his camp on ground from which he would fight if attacked, until he could withdraw to his position of the night before near Emmittsburg. But the night of the 30th passed peacefully, and on the morning of the 1st—the last of earth's mornings for him—he was early astir, having been apprised of the near approach of the foe. Seeing that Buford was about to be attacked, he put Wadsworth's division, accompanied by Hall's Maine battery, in motion towards Gettysburg, and sent for Doubleday, who was in command of the First corps. After reading and explaining his telegrams, he directed Doubleday to move with the remaining two divisions close upon the footsteps of Wadsworth. He then mounted his horse and rode rapidly towards the front.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE.

EING well assured that the enemy was about to attack him, Buford was early in the saddle, and had made the most imposing disposition to meet them which his little force would admit. Had he had at his back the half million of troops, that a farmer's wife, in reply to inquiries of rebel officers, had declared were in Gettysburg, he could have scarcely made one more so. But in addition to being imposing it had the virtue of being effective, and when the rebels came on "booming, skirmishers three deep," as Buford had predicted, they met a stubborn resistance.

His skirmish line extended from the point where the Millerstown road crosses Willoughby Run, following the somewhat tortuous bluff bordering the left bank of that stream across the Chambersburg way, and thence around crossing the Mummasburg, Carlisle, and Harrisburg pikes, and the railroad, reaching quite to Rock Creek, thus covering all the great highways entering the town from the north and west. In rear of this, upon a ridge running parallel with Seminary Ridge, and a half mile from it, were posted the rest of his forces dismounted. Covering the roads on which the enemy was expected first to advance were planted the guns of his light batteries.

Having every disposition made, he watched eagerly for any indication which could disclose the purpose of the foe. He had not long to wait; for the enemy being in strong force, and intent on seizing the coveted prize, which he now believed was within his grasp, moved up his skirmishers. The first shot was delivered by the enemy at a little before ten o'clock, which was responded to

GEN. JOHN F. REYNOLDS.

on the Union side by three single shots, the signal for a general discharge along the skirmish line, and the Battle of Gettysburg was begun.

As Buford's men for the most part fought dismounted, the enemy at first took them for infantry, and consequently moved tardily, and with much circumspection, giving time for the First corps, which was now rapidly approaching, to come up. So from the opening, fortune favored the Union arms. A constantly increasing skirmish fire was continued for half an hour, when the enemy, having brought up his artillery, opened with much spirit. The guns of Buford answered promptly, and maintained the contest gallantly, preserving the delusion that he was well supported. The fury of the fight increased at every moment, and Buford saw that the weight of numbers bearing on him would soon press him off the field; but not an inch was yielded, though he had every preparation made for retiring to Cemetery Hill when he could hold out no longer. It was a moment of gloom and anxiety to that true heart. Would he be left to his fate, and be at last obliged to sacrifice that vantage ground he had striven so hard to hold?

The signal officer, above quoted, had early in the morning taken his station in the cupola of the Theological Seminary, whence the country for many miles around lay open to view. "The engagement," he says, "was desperate, as we were opposed to the whole front of Hill's corps. We held them in check fully two hours, and were nearly overpowered when, in looking about the country, I saw the corps flag of General Reynolds. I was still in the Seminary steeple, but being the only signal officer with the cavalry, had no one to communicate with, so I sent one of my men to Buford, who came up, and looking through my glass, confirmed my report, and remarked: 'Now we can hold the place!'" With what joy was the eye of the leader gladdened as he beheld the folds of that flag floating upon the morning air, and read in its bright emblems the assurance of succor! "General Reynolds," continues the signal officer, "and staff came up on a gallop in advance of the corps, when I made the following communication: 'Reynolds, himself, will be here in five minutes. His corps is

about a mile behind.' Buford returned and watched anxiously my observations made through my signal-telescope. When Reynolds came up, seeing Buford in the cupola, he cried out: 'What's the matter, John?' 'The devil's to pay,' said Buford; and going down the ladder, Reynolds said: 'I hope you can hold out until my corps comes up.' 'I reckon I can,' was the characteristic reply. Reynolds then said: 'Let's ride out and see all about it,' and mounting we rode away. The skirmishing was then very brisk, the cavalry fighting dismounted. Buford said: 'General, do not expose yourself so much;' but Reynolds laughed, and moved nearer still."

Having closely reconnoitred the field, he requested Buford to hold fast the position he had, and said that he would bring up the whole right wing of the army of which he had been put in formal command on the previous morning by the new chief, as rapidly as it could be concentrated. He then dispatched his staff officers, one to Howard, who was already on the way, with orders to bring up his corps with all possible dispatch; another to Sickles, to look for the Third corps; and a third to hasten on the divisions of the First corps. Having shown his determination by these orders to concentrate and to fight, Reynolds again mounted and rode back to meet the head of his column. As he was descending the hill, after having passed the Seminary, accompanied by his escort, he met an old man, possessing an air of authority, whom Reynolds asked if he could not point out a shorter way back to the Emmittsburg road than by the centre of the town, by which he had come. The old man was John Burns, who had been entrusted by his fellow-citizens with the office of constable, and for several days had been watching for suspected persons, having already a number of rebel spies and messengers locked up in the Gettysburg jail. Burns assented to the request of the General, and recognizing the need of haste, at once started down a by-street on a rapid run, the cavalcade dashing on after him. Burns' blood was now up, and he watched eagerly for Reynolds' return. Having come near the town with the leading division, Reynolds determined to strike across the fields by the most direct route to the Seminary, and ordered the fences levelled. "The pioneers," says Burns,

who watched every movement with the greatest interest, "made the fences fly with their bright axes."

When General Reynolds arrived at the front, the enemy were pressing the cavalry with much energy, and he accordingly led his troops at once to its support. Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division had the advance. Three regiments of this brigade, the Seventy-sixth and One Hundred and Forty-seventh New York, and the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, Reynolds ordered Wadsworth, accompanied by Cutler, to take to the right of the line facing westward, north of the bed of an old unfinished railroad, while Reynolds himself took the two remaining regiments, the Ninety-fifth New York and the Fourteenth Brooklyn, with Hall's battery, to the south of the railroad grading, and posted them on a line with, but a little in advance of the other regiments of the brigade, the battery being placed upon the pike. As the infantry moved up, the cavalry retired. The regiments to the right of the cut had scarcely got into position before they were heavily engaged with superior numbers. General Cutler, in a letter to Governor Curtin, written soon after the battle, said: "It was my fortune to be in advance on the morning of July 1st. When we came upon the ground in front of the enemy, Colonel Hofmann's regiment, the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, being the second in the column, got into position a moment sooner than the others, the enemy now advancing in line of battle in easy musket range. The atmosphere being a little thick, I took out my glass to examine the enemy. Being a few paces in the rear of Colonel Hofmann, he turned to me and inquired, 'Is that the enemy?' My reply was, 'Yes.' Turning to his men he commanded, 'Ready, right-oblique, aim, fire!' . . . The fire was followed by other regiments instantly; still, that battle on the soil of Pennsylvania was opened by her own sons, and it is just that it should become a matter of history. When Colonel Hofmann gave the command, 'aim,' I doubted whether the enemy was near enough to have the fire effective, and asked him if he was within range; but not hearing my question, he fired, and I received my reply in a shower of bullets, by which many of the Colonel's men were killed and wounded. My own horse, and those of two of my staff, were wounded at the same time."

Hill's corps, a force of 30,000 men in three divisions, had crossed the South Mountain in the order of Heth's, Pender's, and Anderson's; and Longstreet's corps, of like strength and divisions, was following in the order of McLaws', Hood's, and Pickett's; the latter, however, left for one day at Chambersburg to hand forward the ammunition, reserve artillery, and trains safely, and to hold itself in readiness to come up the moment the battle should wax warm. Ewell, who commanded the remaining corps, and was coming in from Carlisle and York, had started from Heidlersburg early on the morning of the 1st, and with his three divisions was marching in the order of Early's, Rodes', and Johnson's. The divisions of Heth and Pender were the first to strike the head of the Union army. As they arrived upon the field they were deployed upon the bluff overlooking the west bank of Willoughby Run, Heth upon the right and Pender upon the left, and at commanding points along this bluff the artillery was planted. At the point where the rebel line was formed, there is a cross-road running north, and from it another branching east and approaching the town in general course nearly parallel with the Chambersburg pike. On this, Pender advanced and finally reached out towards Oak Hill, a commanding eminence, destined to be an important point in the day's battle, and in the direction in which Ewell was approaching.

General Doubleday, who had been directed to bring up the two remaining divisions of the First corps, having seen them fairly in motion, galloped forward and overtook the First division just as it was filing through the fields at the foot of Seminary Ridge, and immediately sent his aid, Lieutenant Martin, to General Reynolds for instructions. The aid returned bringing orders for Doubleday to attend to the Millerstown road, the next south of the Chambersburg. Midway between these two roads was a triangular piece of woods, the base resting on Willoughby Run, and the apex reaching up towards the Seminary Ridge, the elevation on which Cutler's troops were forming, cutting through its upper extremity. "These woods," says Doubleday, "possessed all the advantages of a redoubt, strengthening the centre of our line, and enfilading the enemy's columns should they advance in the open space on

either side. I deemed the extremity of the woods, which extended to the summit of the ridge, the key of the position." To seize and hold this, therefore, was of prime necessity.

The brigade of Meredith followed close upon that of Cutler, and the latter had scarcely got into position, before it also came upon the field. It was composed of Western men, gallant soldiers, and gallantly led. It was known as the Iron Brigade. This tongue of wood, the importance of which General Doubleday had recognized, was also coveted by the enemy, and Archer's brigade of Heth's division had been sent across the run to occupy it, and was already advancing upon its base when Meredith arrived. Not a moment was to be lost, if it was to be saved to the Union side. Doubleday detached one regiment, the Sixth Wisconsin, to remain as a reserve, and immediately ordered the others to form and charge into the woods. "I urged them," says Doubleday, "to hold it to the last extremity. Full of the memory of past achievements, they replied cheerfully and proudly, 'If we can't hold it, where will you find the men who can?'" Led by the Second Wisconsin in line, under Colonel Fairchild, since Governor, and followed, *en echelon*, by the Seventh Wisconsin, Nineteenth Indiana, and Twenty-fourth Michigan, this sturdy body of men dashed forward. As the leading regiment was approaching the wood, General Reynolds, accompanied by two aids, Captains Mitchell and Baird, and an orderly, Charles H. Veil, rode up, and ordering it to advance at double-quick, joined in the charge. As it moved he exclaimed, "Forward! men, forward! for God's sake, and drive those fellows out of the woods." He then turned to look for his supports and to hasten them on. The woods were full of the enemy's sharp-shooters, and as he turned he was struck in the brain, and never spoke more. An abler or more devoted soldier perished not in the Union cause. His fall was not noticed by the troops, who swept on, and pressing Archer's brigade closely, compelled it to surrender, taking 1000 prisoners, and Archer himself, who was brought in by private Patrick Maloney, of Colonel Fairchild's regiment, who afterwards fell on the field of his heroic exploit. The enthusiasm of the charge was so great that the brigade was carried across the run,

and was formed on the high ground beyond. Seeing that this was too far in advance of the main line, it was ordered back and posted in the woods.

General Doubleday was now informed of the fall of Reynolds, by which sad event the whole responsibility of maintaining the fight was thrown upon him. At about this time, and before Doubleday could communicate with his officers, other disasters fell upon his little force. The enemy having formed in two lines in front, and to the right of Cutler's brigade, advanced upon it in vastly superior numbers, while another force charged up the railroad cut, and attacked the guns of Hall's battery. So overwhelming was this onset, that Wadsworth was induced to order Hall to retire with his guns to the Seminary Ridge, and also to withdraw the three regiments of Cutler's brigade posted north of the cut. One of these regiments, the One Hundred and Forty-seventh, under Major Harney, failed to receive the order, and remained upon the front battling with the swarming foe until nearly annihilated, and so far surrounded as to preclude the possibility of withdrawing. Hall had again been ordered forward, and the guns of his battery did fearful execution by the free use of canister. He had held in check the charging columns for some time; but seeing his supports withdrawn and his guns in danger of being lost, and receiving a summons from Wadsworth, he fell back. The last gun to retire lost all its horses, and before the men sent to rescue it could accomplish the purpose, they were either shot or taken prisoners, and the gun was for the time left upon the field.

At this juncture Doubleday was for the first time able to give attention to that part of the ground. Seeing that the right of his line had been crushed, and that the disaster, if not speedily repaired, would work the ruin of his corps, he sent for his reserve regiment, the Sixth Wisconsin, and forming it upon the enemy's flank, at right angles to the line of battle, ordered a charge. To save themselves from the determined front presented by this regiment, the enemy sprang into the railroad cut near by, and commenced a murderous fire from this sheltered position. As the Sixth moved it was joined by the two regiments of Cutler, which

had been originally posted on the left of the cut. The struggle for a time was desperate, and while some of the enemy gave token of surrender, the more resolute still held out. Finally, Colonel Dawes of the Sixth threw a squad into the cut upon his right, so as to enfilade the enemy's line, and pressing him in front, carried the position at the point of the bayonet. A portion of two regiments of Davis' brigade, with their battle-flags, were taken prisoners, and marched off to the rear. This relieved the One Hundred and Forty-seventh, which had been surrounded and had suffered fearful losses, and the gun of Hall's battery, that had been left, was rescued.

So bold a manœuvre astonished the enemy, and gave assurance to the troops which Wadsworth had ordered back, insomuch that the line was reëstablished, and one of Tidball's batteries was advanced to take the place of Hall. Tidball's guns were soon hotly engaged, and after replying to the enemy with spirit and effect for some time, they were relieved by Captain Reynolds.

Though suffering severe losses in killed and wounded, this single division of only two brigades had achieved a marked success, two brigades of Heth's division, Archer's and Davis', having been broken and large numbers captured, and the ground originally taken triumphantly held. This furnished a favorable opportunity to have retired, and taken position on more defensible ground. But Doubleday, who was still in chief command on the field, did not deem it wise to withdraw until a more determined fight had been made. He believed that General Reynolds, who had been placed in command of the whole right wing of the army, and who enjoyed the full confidence of his chief, had taken this position with the intention of holding it until supports should come up, which had been already ordered and whose arrival was hourly expected, and of preventing the enemy from gaining possession of the town. He was aware that the remaining divisions of his own corps were near at hand, that the Eleventh corps was approaching, and that the Third and Twelfth corps were within striking distance. He accordingly determined to hold fast and breast the storm. A passage of his official report discloses the patriotic devotion with which, at this perilous moment, he

was actuated. "A retreat," he says, "without hard fighting has a tendency to demoralize the troops who retire, and would in the present instance, in my opinion, have dispirited the whole army, and injured its *morale*, while it would have encouraged the enemy in the same proportion. There never was an occasion in which the result could have been more momentous upon our national destiny. Final success in this war can only be obtained by desperate fighting, and the infliction of heavy loss upon the enemy."

But the successes thus attained were not suffered to remain long undisputed. New actors were rapidly coming upon the scene. Pender's division, which had not yet been engaged, was now deployed, and on the Union side, the two remaining divisions of the First corps, Rowley's and Robinson's, arrived on the field. Robinson was at first ordered to hold his men in reserve, and to throw up a barricade in front of the Seminary, to which, in case of necessity, the line of battle could retire. Rowley's—Doubleday's own before taking the corps—was divided. One brigade, commanded by Colonel Chapman Biddle of the One Hundred and Twenty-first Pennsylvania, was sent to the left to cover the Millerstown Road and the left flank of the Iron brigade. Biddle made a skilful disposition of his troops, sending two companies of skirmishers forward to occupy a brick house and stone barn considerably to the front of his line, who did fearful execution upon the advancing enemy, without being themselves exposed. Later in the day they were obliged to abandon this coigne of vantage to escape capture as the enemy in overwhelming numbers advanced, and the buildings were finally burned.

Stone's brigade, which was composed of the One Hundred and Forty-second, One Hundred and Forty-ninth, and One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania regiments, and was known as the Bucktail Brigade, sturdy men from the forest region, was posted on open ground to the right of Meredith, where they were much exposed. Stone was a man of undaunted courage, and accustomed to manœuvre troops in the face of the enemy, having led a battalion of the original Bucktail regiment upon the Peninsula with eminent skill. Doubleday had great confidence in this fine body

A. Doubleday

MAJ. GEN. ABNER DOUBLEDAY

of men, and assigned it to this most critical portion of the field. "The men," says Doubleday, "were in very fine spirits, and were elated to the highest degree. One division that I had [Rowley's] was composed almost entirely of Pennsylvanians. I made short speeches to each regiment as it passed and went into action, and the men were full of enthusiasm. I had assigned one brigade under Colonel Stone to quite an open position, where they were shelled pretty severely. Colonel Stone remarked, as he took the position, 'We have come to stay.' This went quickly through his brigade, the men adopting it as a watchword; they all said, 'We have come to stay,' and a very large portion of them never left that ground."

In gaining his position, Stone showed the most determined spirit. The skirmish line which he sent forward to occupy a fence on his front towards Willoughby Run had to meet unshielded the deliberate fire of a heavy line of the enemy's skirmishers, who already had possession of it. But disregarding the rapid fall of companions they rushed on, drove out the foe, and held the fence against every attempt to regain it.

But now a new terror threatened. The veteran troops of Ewell, Stonewall Jackson's old corps, men who had rarely been led but to victory, had been marching since early morn from Heidlersburg, and the head of the column was already deploying, the skirmishers pushing into every nook and sheltered way where they could come unobserved upon the Union line. Devin's brigade of cavalry was there, and though its commander had expressed his confidence the night before that he could hold his own for twenty-four hours, before midday he found himself hard pressed. Never was a line of cavalry put to severer strain. The ground whereon it stood was open, with no advantageous positions from which to fight. The advance of Ewell was first felt on the Hunterstown Road. The instant the firing commenced, Devin disposed his men so as to strengthen that part of the line. "Shortly after this," says the signal officer, "the prophecy of Buford was fulfilled. 'Booming skirmishers three deep' came, nearly a mile long, and it seemed that a handful of men could not hold them in check an instant. But, taking advantage of every particle of fence, timber, or rise in

the front, they held the forces of Ewell temporarily in check." The fighting on the part of Devin was dismounted, and proved very effective, that whole front, looking northward, being held by that small cavalry force, aided by the light guns of Calef, until relief came.

Reynolds had early on the morning of the 1st ordered Howard, who was in the neighborhood of Emmittsburg, to move up to Gettysburg in compliance with Meade's order of march for this day. "I am very clear and distinct," says Captain Rosengarten of Reynolds' staff, "in my recollection of the fact that one of General Howard's aids [Captain Hall] reported to General Reynolds as we were near Gettysburg, the early arrival of the Eleventh corps on the Taneytown Road. General Reynolds made some inquiries as to the condition of the men, and the distance of the divisions from each other, and then desired the aid to return to Howard, with orders to move on rapidly to Cemetery Hill, where he would be put in position. When Reynolds got to the front and found the pressing need for troops, and the long intervals between the arrival of successive divisions, he sent back to Cemetery Hill, and to the Eleventh corps, to bring the head of Howard's column up to the front. He was killed long before the return of the aid who carried this message."

Howard's corps had rested in the neighborhood of Emmittsburg on the night of the 30th, but had moved early, and finding the road leading to Gettysburg occupied by the trains, and by Robinson's division of the First corps, had moved to the right on a byway leading to the Taneytown Road, and was still on this way eleven miles from Gettysburg, when the messenger of Reynolds met him. General Buford, ever watchful, remained near his signal officer, regarding every movement of friend and foe. "One of my men at the glass," says the signal officer, "came down to me with a message, saying that they saw another infantry corps, and thought that it must be Howard's. This proved to be the case. Buford then ordered me to ride as fast as my horse could carry me, and ask Howard to come up on the double-quick. I did so. He ordered his batteries forward, but his men came slowly."

Howard had ridden up, when he found that the First corps was

engaged, in advance of his column, arriving at about one o'clock, and, ranking Doubleday, assumed command of the field. Doubleday continued in command of the First corps, that of the Eleventh being turned over to Carl Schurz. The Eleventh was composed of three divisions, commauded by Generals Von Steinwehr, Barlow, and Schemmelfinnig. The division of Von Steinwehr, with the artillery, was posted on Cemetery Hill, in accordance with the order of Reynolds, and the divisions of Barlow and Schemmelfinnig were moved forward, and relieved the cavalry brigade of Devin, north of the town, Barlow on the right, reaching around to Rock Creek, and Schemmelfinnig extending towards Seminary Hill, but not quite reaching the right of the First corps.

In the meantime the divisions of Pender and Heth, of Hill's corps, had developed their full strength, nearly three times that of the entire First corps, and the troops of Pender had extended their line upon the left until they grasped the hands of Rodes' division of Ewell's corps. At the point where these two corps joined, Oak Hill rises to a considerable altitude. This hill is really a part of Seminary Ridge, but a little to the west of it. Here powerful batteries were planted, so as to enfilade the First corps line of battle. This necessitated a change of the Union front. The whole line might have been withdrawn to Seminary Ridge; but as that ridge is in some parts open, a line of battle would have there been enfiladed from Oak Hill. Accordingly, Doubleday ordered Wadsworth to retire his force north of the railroad bed to the crest of Seminary Ridge, which was wooded, and Reynolds' battery was also withdrawn. Captain Reynolds himself had received a shot in the eye, but refused to leave the field. This modification of the line necessitated a change of position of Rowley's division. Stone, leaving Wistar's regiment facing westward, brought his two remaining ones, first Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight's, and finally Colonel Dana's, into the Chambersburg pike, so as to face northward. This left a considerable interval between Stone and Cutler. Through this, Cooper's battery, which had been posted in the wheatfield in rear of Stone, also facing northward, answered the enemy's heavy guns on Oak Hill. At the same time Biddle's brigade was likewise faced northward to support the guns of Cooper.

Though Howard had arrived on the field and was now in chief command, he was wholly occupied in directing his own corps, leaving the First entirely to the management of Doubleday. "General Buford now reported to me," says Doubleday, "that the rebel General Ewell, with his whole corps, was coming down from York on my right flank, making another 30,000. I sent word to General Howard and requested him to keep Ewell off my flank, as I had as much as I could do to attend to A. P. Hill. About the same time I received an order from General Howard, to this effect: 'Tell Doubleday to fight on the left, and I will fight on the right.' A little later, he sent word to me that if forced back I must try and hold on to the Seminary. These were all the orders I received from him during the day that I remember."

The First corps, with Buford's two brigades of cavalry, had borne the brunt of the battle. It was destined still to do so. There had been a lull in the storm, the enemy apparently preparing to crush at one blow the small force which they had now learned was checking them. This they were well able to do. For they had in hand Heth's and Pender's divisions of Hill's corps, and Rodes' and Early's of Ewell's, a full half of the entire rebel army, with the remainder in supporting distance. "At about half-past one in the afternoon," says Colonel Stone in his official report, "the grand advance of the enemy's infantry began. From my position I was enabled to trace their formation for at least two miles. It appeared to be a nearly continuous double line of deployed battalions, with other battalions in mass as reserves." As this powerful body advanced, its formation being continuous, it could not conform to the Union line, which, as we have seen, was irregular. In consequence of this the rebel left became first engaged, striking the northern extremity of the First corps line. As there was here a gap between the First and Eleventh corps, Doubleday ordered Robinson, who had been held in reserve, to send one of his brigades, that of Baxter, to fill it. The latter arrived in time to meet the enemy's advance; but his small brigade proved insufficient to measure the open space, and though fighting gallantly, driving back the enemy, and taking many prisoners and

three battle-flags, he was constantly outflanked and exposed to a hot enfilading fire. Recognizing the danger which threatened at this point, Doubleday ordered General Robinson himself with Paul's brigade, his last remaining reserve, to this part of the field. Stewart's battery of the Fourth United States Artillery was also sent to the assistance of Robinson. Although Robinson was still unable to close the opening at the angle made by the two corps, yet by swinging his right around upon the Mummasburg road, he was enabled to protect the flank and prevent the enemy from marching in.

The battle now waxed warm, the enemy attacking with the most determined valor. At that point in his long line, as it originally advanced, opposite that where Cutler's left ended, it had separated, the southern extremity holding back before Meredith and that part of Stone's brigade which looked westward, and the northern portion sweeping up to meet Cutler and Baxter. This gave that part of Stone's line which looked northward, and Cooper's battery, a good opportunity to attack upon the flank as the hostile lines swept past, and, though at long range for infantry, with excellent effect; and when the troops of Baxter dashed gallantly forward, the rebels seeing themselves pushed on three sides, surrendered in large numbers, and were swept into the Union lines. Repeated assaults were made upon Paul and Baxter with ever fresh troops, as if determined to break through and bear down all before them. But more daring or skilful leaders than Robinson, Paul, and Baxter were not in the whole army, and their men were of the same spirit; and though suffering grievously at every fresh onset, hurled back the foe, and maintained their ground intact. In one of these fierce assaults, General Paul, the veteran commander of the First brigade, while gallantly encouraging and directing the fight, was severely wounded, losing both his eyes.

While the chief force of the attack fell upon Robinson and Wadsworth, Stone was able to effectually supplement their operations; but when the enemy, unable to make an impression, turned upon Stone, Robinson and Wadsworth were too far away to return the compliment, and the blow fell with withering effect. In two

lines, formed parallel to the pike, and at right angles to Wadsworth, the enemy first advanced upon Stone, who, anticipating such a movement, had thrown one of his regiments under Colonel Dwight forward to the railroad cut where the men awaited the approach. When arrived at a fence within pistol shot, Dwight delivered a withering fire. Nothing daunted, the hostile lines crossed the fence, and continued to move forward. By this time Dwight's men had reloaded, and when the advancing foe had arrived close upon the bank, they delivered another telling volley. They then leaped the bank and vaulted forward with the bayonet, uttering wild shouts, before which the rebels fled in dismay. On returning, Dwight found that the enemy had planted a battery away to the west, so as to completely enfilade the railroad cut, making it untenable; whereupon he returned to his original position on the pike.

At this juncture Colonel Stone fell, severely wounded, and was borne off, the command devolving upon Colonel Wister. Foiled in their first attempt, with fresh troops the rebel leaders came on from the northwest, that, if possible, the weak spot in the Bucktail line might be found. But Wister, disposing the regiment which in part faced the north to meet them, checked and drove them back from this point also. Again, with an enthusiasm never bated, they advanced from the north, and now crossing the railroad cut, which the rebel guns guarded, rushed forward; but a resolute bayonet charge sent them back again, and that front was once more clear. Believing that a single thin line unsupported, unrenewed, and unprotected by breast-works, must eventually yield, a determined attack was again made from the west; but with no better results than before, being met by the intrepid Colonel Huidekoper, who had succeeded to the command of Wister's regiment, and though receiving a grievous wound from the effect of which he lost his right arm, the ground was firmly held, and the enemy was sent reeling back.

But the wave of battle as it rolled southward reached every part in turn, and the extreme Union left, where Biddle's brigade was posted, at length felt its power. A body of troops, apparently an entire division, drawn out in heavy lines, came down from the



Union Troops
Rebel Troops

MAP OF THE
GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD, FIRST DAY, JULY 1st 1863.

west and south, and overlapping both of Biddle's flanks, moved defiantly on. Only three small regiments were in position to receive them; but ordering up the One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania, which had been detached for special duty, and throwing it into the gap between Meredith's and his own, and wheeling the battery into position, Biddle awaited the approach. As the enemy appeared beyond the wood, under cover of which they had formed, a torrent of death-dealing missiles leaped from the guns. Terrible rents were made; but closing up, they came on undaunted. Never were guns better served; and though the ground was strewn with the slain, their line seemed instantly to grow together. The infantry fire was terrific on both sides; but the enemy, outflanking Biddle, sent a direct and a doubly destructive oblique fire, before which it seemed impossible to stand. But though the dead fell until the living could fight from behind them as from a bulwark, they stood fast as if rooted to the ground.

It was upon this part of the field, and soon after Stone's brigade had come into position, that an old man with hair of grizzly grey, dressed in a long swallow-tailed coat, and a silk hat badly battered and worn, carrying a musket, came up at a rapid walk through the wheatfield, from the direction of the town, and desired permission to fight. Colonel Wister, to whom he addressed himself, asked him if he knew how to shoot. He answered that he would show them whether he could or not if they would give him a chance. "Where is your ammunition?" inquired Wister. Slapping his hand upon his pocket, he replied: "I have it here." Colonel Wister told him that he could have a chance to fight, but advised him to go to the woods where the Iron brigade was posted, as he could there shelter himself. This did not suit the old man's idea of fight, and he persisted in going forward to the skirmish line at the fence, upon the extreme front, and here he fought so long as that fence was held. Few were the useless shots he fired, and many a foeman was made to bite the dust before the sweep of his faithful rifle. When that skirmish line retired he was the last to leave. He subsequently fought with the Iron brigade until the end of the battle, and was left wounded upon the field. That old

man was constable John Burns, the only civilian, so far as known, who fought in the battle of Gettysburg.

While the battle was raging with such fury on the First corps front, it was warmly maintained on the right, where two divisions of the Eleventh corps had been posted. When General Howard first arrived on the field, and became aware that the enemy was advancing in great force from the north, he saw at a glance that Seminary Ridge would not for a moment be tenable, unless the descent from this direction could be checked. Ewell, who was upon that front, seemed indisposed to make a determined assault until the bulk of his corps was up, and he could act in conjunction with the forces of Hill, advancing from the west. He accordingly pushed Rodes with the advance division over upon the right until it formed a junction with Hill. He likewise sent the division of Early upon the left until he flanked the position which the cavalry of Buford was holding. Howard saw the great disadvantages of the field which he would be obliged to contend upon, and doubtless from the first realized that sooner or later both corps would have to fall back, unless he should receive timely and powerful support. In his anxiety to hold the town until evening, and until the balance of the army could come up, he committed the fatal error of attempting to string out his two divisions in one thin, continuous line, so as to cover the whole open front, upon any part of which the enemy could mass and easily break through, or by planting his artillery in commanding positions, could rake with an oblique and even an enfilading fire. Had Howard, instead of attempting to cover the whole front with an attenuated line, selected some commanding positions on which to have planted his artillery, and instantly have thrown up simple works for the protection of the pieces, and so posted his infantry as to have charged upon any force that should have attempted to wedge its way through the unoccupied spaces, as was done in the case of the First corps; or, had he made the north bank of the north branch of Stevens' Run his main line, making the Almshouse a fortified point, which would have enabled him to hold a strong reserve ready to meet any assault from whatever direction it should come, there is no doubt that the ground would have been

longer and more successfully held, perhaps with the fruits of captives and standards. Bloody work may have been entailed; but with skilful management the enemy would likely have suffered much greater losses, as he would have been forced to be the attacking party.

But, notwithstanding this seeming error, the fact must ever remain apparent, that the task attempted by Howard was a difficult one. When he came upon the field, he found the First corps on ground of its own selection, skilfully posted for meeting a front attack, but incapable of holding its own when pressed upon its flanks, and indeed at that moment most seriously threatened with capture. The position left for him to take, and which he was forced to occupy to save the First corps, was one not easily defensible, and by the time his corps arrived upon the field the enemy was already upon the front and flanks of that position, or in easy supporting distance, in numbers treble those he could bring to oppose to them. It is evident, therefore, that he went there with the expectation of playing a losing game; that he realized that he could only interpose a temporary check, and thereby be enabled to withdraw to a more favorable position; and though he might by a more skilful disposition of his forces have made a more stubborn resistance and have withdrawn his little army with less loss, yet the possibility of permanently holding that position unaided could not reasonably have been entertained.

But there was one labor which was being executed at this time under the direction of General Howard which proved of vital importance in the final cast of the battle: it was the fortifying of Cemetery Hill. This is the boldest and most commanding ground upon the central portion of the line where the struggle during the two succeeding days occurred. Reynolds had noticed the great advantage it presented, and had designated it as the position on which to hold his reserves, and as a rallying-point in case he was forced back from the more advanced position in front of the town where he had made his stand, and had himself early fallen. When Howard came up he left one division under General Alexander Von Steinwehr upon this hill, with directions to have it posted most advantageously to hold the position, and to cover

retiring troops. Around the base of this hill were low stone walls, tier above tier, extending from the Taneytown road around to the westerly extremity of Wolf's Hill. These afforded excellent protection to infantry, and behind them the soldiers, weary with the long march and covered with dust, threw themselves for rest. Upon the summit were beautiful green fields, now covered by a second growth, which to the tread had the seeming of a carpet of velvet.

Von Steinwehr was an accomplished soldier, having been thoroughly schooled in the practice of the Prussian army. His military eye was delighted with this position, and thither he drew his heavy pieces, and planted them on the very summit, at the uttermost verge towards the town. But the position, though bold and commanding, was itself commanded, and Steinwehr instantly realized that there would be blows to take as well as to give. No tree, no house, no obstruction of any kind shielded it from the innumerable points on the opposite hills, from Benner's on the extreme right, beyond Wolf's Hill, around far south on Seminary Ridge to the left; but it stood out in bold relief, the guns presenting excellent targets for the enemy's missiles the moment he should come within artillery range. However powerful and effective his own guns might prove, while unassailed, Steinwehr saw that they would be unable to live long when attacked, unless protected. Nor would any light works be of avail. There was no time to build a fort, for which the ground was admirably adapted. He accordingly threw up lunettes around each gun. These were not mere heaps of stubble and turf, but solid works of such height and thickness as to defy the most powerful bolts which the enemy could throw against them, with smooth and perfectly level platforms on which the guns could be worked. If the First and Eleventh corps performed no other service in holding on to their positions, though sustaining fearful losses, the giving opportunity for the construction of these lunettes and getting a firm foothold upon this great vantage-ground, was ample compensation for every hardship and misfortune, and the labor and skill of Steinwehr in constructing them must ever remain subjects of admiration and gratitude.

When Barlow, who commanded the division of the Eleventh corps which took the right of the line in front of the town, was going into position, he discovered a wooded eminence a little to the north of the point where the Harrisburg road crosses Rock Creek, and here he determined to make his right rest. It was the ground which the skirmish line of Devin had held. But as the cavalry retired the enemy had immediately thrown forward a body of skirmishers to occupy it. To dislodge these Barlow sent forward Von Gilsa's brigade. At the Almshouse the line halted, and knapsacks were thrown aside. It was then ordered to advance at double-quick. The order was gallantly executed, and the wood quickly cleared. Dispositions were made to hold it, and Wilkinson's battery of the Fourth United States was advanced to its aid. The watchful Von Gilsa, however, soon discovered that the enemy was massed upon his flank, the brigades of Gordon and Hayes of Early's division being formed under cover of the wooded ground on either side of Rock Creek, and ready to advance upon him. He was very much in the situation of the right of the Eleventh corps at Chancellorsville, the enemy massed and ready to come down, as did Jackson, upon front, flank, and rear. Barlow found it impossible to hold this advanced position, and was obliged to allow that wing to fall back to the neighborhood of the Almshouse.

On the left, in the direction of the First corps' right, the brigade of Colonel Von Amesburg was placed, with Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries. The extreme left was occupied by the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania. This regiment was much reduced in numbers, and in attempting to cover a long space it could present little more than a skirmish line, which rested at a fence, by a cross-road connecting the Carlisle and the Mummasburg ways. The Eleventh corps line had hardly been established, before the enemy, whose dispositions had been mainly perfected previous to its arrival, came down upon it with overwhelming might.

On the southern slope of Seminary Ridge, on a prolongation of the First corps line northward, was a commanding position which the enemy could not be prevented from occupying, and where he now planted his artillery so as to send an oblique and very destructive fire upon the left of the Eleventh corps. From

this point also, having massed his infantry, he came on, sweeping past the right of the First corps, and breaking and crumpling the left of the Eleventh. The right of the First being thus turned was obliged to retire, and was carried back. At this juncture, Early, who was already massed on the extreme right flank of the Eleventh, also advanced. Near the Almshouse he met a stubborn resistance, and in the midst of the fight the gallant Barlow was wounded, and fell helpless into the enemy's hands. Schemmelfinnig, too, while attempting to stay his troops, and hold them up to the fight, was taken prisoner, but subsequently managed to escape, and rejoined his command. Stands were made at intervals, and the enemy held in check; but it was impossible to stay the onset. Until the town was reached the retirement was comparatively deliberate and orderly; but when arrived there, being huddled in the narrow streets, subjected to a rapid fire from batteries which raked them, and the enemy's swarming infantry intent on their destruction or capture, the men fell into confusion. Their officers strove to save them by ordering them into the cross alleys. But this only added to the confusion, the men either not understanding the commands, or hoping to escape the fire of the foe, and over 1200 were made prisoners in less than twenty minutes.

While this was passing upon the right, the enemy assaulted upon the left with no less vigor, but not with the same success. Though the First corps had now been five hours in the fight, some portions of it six, and without supports or reliefs, it still stood fast, determined to make good the cry which they at the first had raised, "We have come to stay." But when it was known that the right of the corps had been turned, and that the Eleventh corps was falling back, it became evident that the position which had been so long and so gallantly held, and withal with such substantial fruits, would have to be given up. Baxter's brigade, which had fought with stubborn bravery upon the right, was brought to the rear of the ridge at the railroad cut, where it defended a battery, and still held the enemy advancing from the north in check. Paul's brigade, having lost its commander, in retiring became entangled, and a considerable number fell into the enemy's hands.

On the left, Meredith's and Biddle's brigades were ordered to fall back and cover the retirement of the balance of the line. Wister, who had succeeded to the command of Stone's brigade upon the fall of the latter, had likewise received a severe wound, and had turned over the brigade to Colonel Dana. At a barricade of rails which had been thrown up early in the day by Robinson's men, a final stand was made, and here the chief of artillery, Colonel Wainwright, had posted his batteries, those of Cooper, Breck, Stevens, and Wilbur, thus concentrating twelve guns in so small a space that they were scarcely five yards apart. Captain Stewart's battery was also in position on the summit, two pieces on either side of the railroad cut.

Encouraged by this falling back, the enemy was brought up in masses, as to an easy victory, and forming in two lines, swept forward. As they approached, the artillery opened upon them, Stewart's guns being so far to right and front that he could enfilade their lines. Their front line was by this concentrated fire much broken and dispirited, but the second, which was also supported, pressed on. When arrived within musket range their advance was checked, and the firing for a short time was hot. The rebels, who greatly outnumbered the small Union line, now began to show themselves upon the left flank. Seeing that the position could not much longer be held, Doubleday ordered the artillery to retire, and it moved in good order from the field, wending its way back to Cemetery Hill. But before the pieces were all away the enemy had gained so far upon the flank as to reach it with his musketry fire, shielding himself behind a garden fence which runs within fifty yards of the pike. Before the last piece had passed, the fire had become very warm, and the horses attached to this gun were shot. The piece, consequently, had to be abandoned, together with three caissons.

The infantry held its position behind the barricade, successfully checking the enemy in front, the men showing the most unflinching determination, Captain Richardson, of General Meredith's staff, riding up and down the line waving a regimental flag, and encouraging them to duty. But the enemy was now swarming upon the very summit of the ridge upon the left flank of Double-

day. So near had they approached, that Lieutenant-Colonel McFarland while reconnoitring to discover their exact position, received a volley which shattered both legs. "When all the troops at this point," says General Doubleday, "were overpowered, Captain Glenn, of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, in command of the Head-quarter Guard, defended the building [Seminary] for full twenty minutes against a whole brigade of the enemy, enabling the few remaining troops, the ambulances, and artillery, to retreat in comparative safety."

And now was seen the great advantage in the position of Steinwehr's reserves. As the begrimed cannoniers, and the beasts foaming with the excitement of battle, and the sadly thinned ranks of infantry exhausted by six hours of continuous fighting, filed through the town, and approached Cemetery Hill, they came as to the folds of an impregnable fortress. Here at length was rest and security. Whenever the foeman attempted to follow, they came immediately into range of Steinwehr's well-posted guns, and at every stone wall and building was an abattis of bayonets. The heroic Buford, who had first felt the shock of battle, and during the long hours of this terrible day had held his troops upon the flanks of the infantry, joining in the fierce fighting as opportunity or necessity required, and who from his watchtower had scanned and reported every phase of the battle, was now at the critical moment a pillar of strength. The insignificant division of Steinwehr would alone have presented but a narrow barrier to a powerful and triumphant foe, intent on pushing his advantage, and, to the left, where the country is all open, and nature presents no impediment to an advance, it could have been flanked and easily turned out of its position. But here, like a wall of adamant, stood the veterans of Buford, with guns skilfully posted, ready to dispute the progress of the enemy. His front was tried, and the attempt was made to push past him along the low ground drained by Stevens' Run, where some severe fighting occurred. But he maintained his ground intact, and that admirable position, where the army at length fought and won the battle, was again saved. General Warren, the Engineer-in-chief of the army, who first came upon the field at this crisis, says in his testimony: "General

Buford's cavalry was all in line of battle between our position there and the enemy. Our cavalry presented a very handsome front, and I think probably checked the advance of the enemy." Indeed the spirit of Buford, like a good angel, seemed to be constantly hovering over the entire field of that first day. One of the best read of our military critics says of him: "He not only showed the rarest tenacity, but by his personal capacity made his cavalry accomplish marvels, and rival infantry in their steadfastness, not only in the battle itself, but afterwards, when deployed in the intervale drained by Stevens Run, west of Gettysburg." He died not long after from the effect of protracted toil and exposure in this campaign. "On the day of his death," says the "American Cyclopedia of 1863," "and but a little while before his departure, his commission as Major-General was placed in his hands. He received it with a smile of gratification that the Government he had defended appreciated his services, and gently laying it aside soon ceased to breathe."

On the right of Steinwehr's position were the rugged heights of Wolf's Hill, a natural buttress, unassailable in front from its abruptness, and though susceptible of being turned, as it was on the following evening, yet so curtained by an impenetrable wood as to convey the suspicion of danger lurking therein. Early, who was in front of this hill, made some attempts to carry it, but finding it apparently well protected, did not push his reconnoissance.

As the two broken corps of the Union army ascended Cemetery Hill, they were met by staff officers, who turned the Eleventh corps to the right and the First corps to the left, where they went into position along the summit of the ridge stretching out on either hand from the Baltimore pike. A ravine to the right of Cemetery Hill, and between that and Wolf's Hill, seemed to present to the enemy a favorable point of attack, and hither was at once sent Stevens' Maine battery and Wadsworth's division of the First corps. Here Wadsworth immediately commenced substantial breast-works along the brow of the hill, an example which other troops followed, until the whole front extending to Spangler's Spring was surmounted by one of like strength. Through that ravine the enemy did assail, but the preparations to meet him were too thorough to admit of his entrance.

Thus ended the fighting of the first day. It had proved a sad day for those two weak corps, battling as they had been obliged to against a foe nearly thrice their numbers. The First corps had gone into the battle with 8200 men, and had come out with only 2450. The Eleventh corps went in with 7400, only two divisions of which, however, being actually engaged, and retired with a little more than half that number. But though the losses had been grievous and the survivors were worn out with the severity of the fight, yet was not honor lost. A most heroic and determined stand had been made. Prisoners to the number of 2500 had been taken, and the enemy had sustained a still greater loss in killed and wounded than had the Union side. A position of great natural strength had been gained, and was now firmly held.

Of the generalship displayed on the first day of fighting at Gettysburg there has been much speculation, and we can only judge by the official records, the dispositions upon the field, and by the results attained. The questions have been raised, was the fighting at Gettysburg an accidental collision, unforeseen and unpremeditated? Was General Reynolds justified in precipitating a battle there, and Doubleday and Howard in continuing it? In one sense the collision was accidental. Not until the evening of the 30th, and after the order for the movement of each corps of the army on the 1st day of July had been issued, was Meade made aware of the purpose of the enemy to let go the Susquehanna and concentrate. It was not until the morning of the 1st of July that he learned that Lee was marching on Gettysburg. It must be borne in mind, in considering the movements of the army, that the orders which were emanating from the brain of the leader had to be communicated to corps scattered over a belt of more than thirty miles. During the day these corps were in motion, and hence it was impossible to arrest and change their courses, as the movements of a single person or even a compact body of men could have been. Time thus enters as an important element in the game. A circular had been sent out indicating a cautious policy, and prefiguring what would be the order of the following day,—a concentration on Pipe Creek. But the positive orders for

the movement of July 1st carried the First corps to Gettysburg, the Eleventh to Gettysburg or supporting distance, the Third to Emmittsburg, the Second to Taneytown, the Twelfth to Two Taverns, the Fifth to Hanover, and the Sixth to Manchester, and the cavalry to front and flank well out in all directions. The tone of the circular afterwards issued indicated that Meade would not have given the order for the march on the 1st had he known the purposes of the enemy sooner. Hence we must conclude, that though he did not anticipate meeting the enemy when he issued the order, yet he received information on the morning of the 1st, when the movement of the corps was about to commence, that it was likely to result in a collision.

On the side of the enemy, it would appear that General Lee had not expected a battle on this day. He had become aware that the Union army was much scattered, and he did not suppose that a small fragment of that army would dare to bring on an engagement. Lee's own account of it was this: "The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of the 1st of July. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a large force, with which two of his divisions became engaged. Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the way of the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement." Moreover, it would appear that if either Lee or Meade had anticipated a battle, he would have been at the front to direct it.

But though Meade was aware before the collision did actually occur, that it was likely to, he seems to have hoped, and indeed have confidently expected, that the effect of his cautionary circular would be to induce Reynolds to interpose only such resistance as became necessary to enable him to withdraw his corps in safety. To understand why Reynolds disappointed this hope, and, by a stubborn stand in an offensive position, brought on a general engagement, several circumstances must be taken into the account. There appear to have been at this time at the head of the several army corps two classes of men, in temper and policy quite opposite to each other. The one class was for pushing forward, and attacking and fighting the enemy wherever he could be found,

and never ceasing to manœuvre and fight until a victory was gained. This party was totally opposed to falling back, but the rather intent on falling forward, and eagerly counselled against Pipe Creek, and in favor of Gettysburg. On the other hand, Meade seemed inclined to a cautious policy, in which he received countenance, and was at this moment anxious to take up a defensive position in the hope of inducing the enemy to attack and allow him to fight a purely defensive battle. That Reynolds was of the former class there can be no doubt. "When we crossed the river," says General Doubleday, "at Edwards' Ferry, I rode on to Poolesville, and while waiting for the troops to come up, had a conversation with Reynolds. He was clearly of opinion that it was necessary to bring the enemy to battle as soon as possible. He wished to put an immediate stop to the plundering by the enemy of Pennsylvania farms and cities. He said if we gave them time by dilatory measures, or by taking up defensive positions, they would strip the State of everything. Hence he was in favor of striking them as soon as possible. He was really eager to get at them."

But Reynolds was too true a soldier to disobey orders, however much he may have differed in judgment from his chief, and though he must have known the temper and inward wish of that chief, he still had ample authority for pursuing the course he did. In the first place, the circular was only admonitory. The order of march for the day was absolute. That order carried Buford's cavalry and the First and Eleventh corps to Gettysburg. The cavalry, which reached there first, had positive orders from Pleasanton to hold the town to the last extremity. Reynolds found upon his arrival the cavalry heavily engaged. There was no alternative but to go to its relief; and doubtless believing the position a good one from which to fight, immediately ordered up the three corps of the army under his command, well knowing that there were three other corps within supporting distance. But, besides the order carrying Reynolds to Gettysburg, he had certain discretionary powers as to bringing on a battle, if not directly conferred, at least implied. Among the instructions contained in the very order for the march of the army on this day

are these: "The telegraph corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line, and all commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and Hanover. Staff officers report daily from each corps, and with orderlies to leave for orders. Prompt information to be sent into head-quarters at all times. All ready to move to the attack at any moment." In the circular to which frequent reference has been made, Meade says: "Developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions." And in a communication to General Reynolds, dated on the very morning that the battle opened, in which Meade freely unbosoms himself and discloses how much trust and confidence he reposes in Reynolds, he says: "The Commanding General cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack, until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least, so far as concerns your position. . . . If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the General is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character, either for an offensive or defensive position. . . . The General having just assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to *morale* and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and of the country than he does." Thus, in three successive communications that came to Reynolds, the last before opening the battle, and one of these in the form of a positive order for his guidance, Meade urges his troops to be ready to move to the attack at any moment, states that developments may cause him to assume the offensive from the present positions, and finally discloses his indecision, and frankly declares that Reynolds is better able to judge of affairs on that part of the field than he is himself.

Reynolds, accordingly, opened the battle in earnest and summoned his troops, doubtless with the expectation that he would be

promptly supported by all the army as fast as it could be brought up. What the result would have been had Reynolds lived, is impossible to divine. He had scarcely marshalled his first battalions before he was slain. The chief command upon the field then devolved upon General Doubleday, which for upwards of two hours he continued to exercise. It was during this time, and under his immediate direction, that the chief successes of the day were achieved, a large number of prisoners and standards having been captured in successive periods of the fight, and at widely separated parts of the field. To any one who will traverse the ground held by the First corps from ten in the morning until after four in the afternoon, will note the insignificance in the number of its guns and of its muskets, as compared with those of the two divisions of Hill and one of Ewell which opposed it, and will consider the triumphs won, and how every daring attempt of the enemy to gain the field was foiled, it must be evident that the manœuvring of Doubleday was admirable, and that it stamps him as a corps leader of consummate excellence. For, mark how little equality of position he enjoyed, the opposing ridge and Oak Hill affording great advantage for the enemy's artillery, and how his own infantry stood upon open ground with no natural or artificial protection except in a short distance upon his extreme right, where was a low stone wall. Where, in the whole history of the late war, is this skill and coolness of the commander, or this stubborn bravery of the troops, matched?

The chief losses of the day in killed, wounded and prisoners occurred in the act of retiring to Cemetery Hill. In conducting this, General Howard was responsible. It was a difficult movement to execute. The whole country where the fighting of the first day occurred is so open that no movement could take place on the Union line that was not plainly visible from almost every part of the rebel line, affording ample opportunity to instantly checkmate any advantage in manœuvre. At twenty minutes past three in the afternoon, about the time that the onset of Rodes upon the point of junction of the First and Eleventh corps had penetrated the Union line and was carrying back the flanks of both, Buford, who had been watching everything from the signal-

station in the cupola of the Seminary, wrote the following message to Meade through Pleasanton: "I am satisfied Longstreet and Hill have made a junction. A tremendous battle has been raging since half past nine A. M., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town; the enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. *In my opinion there seems to be no directing person.*" And then after his signature, he adds what doubtless seemed to his practical mind the cure-all for this trouble, "We need help now."

To his practised eye the outlook appeared gloomy. The whole rebel army was now rapidly concentrating, and already swarming upon his immediate front, and there seemed wanting a controlling spirit on the field. It was doubtless apparent to him, as it now is to every careful observer, that the time for the prompt action of the commander upon the field was fast passing, if not already gone. If, when Howard found that he was no longer able to hold his advanced position, he had ordered some demonstrations on different parts of the field, and planting some pieces to have commanded the main thoroughfares over which his troops should retire, had withdrawn the two corps before the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers and *compelled* him to go back, it is probable that he might have rescued the greater portion of his men who were eventually engulfed in the streets of the town, and were swept back as prisoners, and have saved many who were killed and wounded.

Howard is without excuse for holding out so long, when the evidence was spread out on all sides before his eyes, that the enemy was coming down upon him with resistless power. Some time before his forces were driven back, Doubleday sent his Adjutant-General, Halsted, to Cemetery Hill, to implore him either to send reinforcements from Steinwehr's division, or else order the hard-pressed troops at the front to fall back. Halsted pointed out to him the advance of vastly superior forces on all sides, which he could plainly discern through his field glass. But Howard even then refused to order a retreat, and said to

Halsted: "You may find Buford and use him," although Buford had been fighting from early morning, and was still engaged. It seems that Howard, at a council of corps commanders held at Chancellorsville just before the army retired across the river, voted to remain and fight, giving as a reason that the misconduct of his corps forced him always to vote for assaulting, whether it was the best thing to be done or not. That senseless policy appeared to influence him here, and the troops of both corps had to pay the penalty of his temerity. The commander of the First corps, according to his sworn statement, never received any orders to fall back, and it is a noticeable circumstance confirming this, that the First corps was the last to leave the ground, and it seems almost miraculous that it was brought off in tolerable order, and with insignificant loss in prisoners.

The idea has been advanced that the fighting on this first day constitutes no part of the Battle of Gettysburg. General Sickles says, "We in the army do not regard the operations of the two corps under General Reynolds as properly the Battle of Gettysburg. We regard the operations of Thursday and Friday, when the whole army was concentrated, as the Battle of Gettysburg." But wherefore? Did not Reynolds fall in the Battle of Gettysburg? Are the dead who there perished to be despoiled of their part in that great victory? Shall the works and watchings of Buford be turned into nothingness? Is the matchless heroism of that First corps on that blood-washed field to count for nought in the final winning? Shall Doubleday, and Howard, and Steinwehr, have no credit for taking and holding that impregnable fortress on Cemetery Hill, where the battle was finished? Is the taking up and fortifying that ground no part of that great struggle? Ay! rather was the fighting of that first day, and the planting immovable footsteps on the fastnesses of Cemetery Hill, THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. As well might it be said that the fight made by the gallant Sickles himself, and the glorious Third corps, baptized in blood as it was, constitutes no part of the battle. As well might the struggles of McCook and Johnson, and Davis and Sheridan, and Rousseau and Negley be gainsayed in the Battle of Stone River; or the opening of the contest by Hooker in the Battle of

Antietam. No, No! The glories of that battle cannot be divided, and apportioned and parcelled. They are parts of one great whole. Who knows of the battle of Oak Ridge! How does it become the mouth to say that Reynolds fell at the battle of Willoughby Run!

Is it asserted that the army was not all up on that first day? Neither were they all up on the second or the third. That glorious company who had gone down in the fight, and who, could they have been more promptly and cordially supported, might have been saved to come, were not up. Is it said that the leader himself was not present? His orders had carried those troops upon that ground and involved them in the fight, and any honors which were there finally gained are due to the stubborn execution of those orders. Side by side on the now peaceful hillside, in order indiscriminate, lie the victims of that immortal field, reminding the pilgrim as he treads lightly by, that they are *all* the slain in the Battle of Gettysburg.

CHAPTER IV.

MARSHALLING FOR THE SECOND DAY.

BUT where, during all this long day of carnage, was the rest of the army? Why were these two feeble corps left from early morn until the evening shadows began to set to be jostled and torn without succor? Were there no troops within call? Was not the very air laden with the terrible sounds of the fray? Was not the clangor of the enemy's guns more persuasive than the summon of staff officer?

The order of General Meade for the march of the several corps of the army on the 1st would carry the Third corps to Emmittsburg. But General Sickles says in his testimony, that he had reached Emmittsburg on the night of the 30th. This place is ten miles from Gettysburg. The Third corps had been placed under the command of Reynolds as the leader of the right wing of the army, and he had sent a staff officer on the morning of the 1st to summon it forward. It had no farther to march than had Howard's corps, and following the course that Howard went—the by-way leading to the Taneytown road—not so great a distance. But Sickles had that morning received the circular of Meade, indicating the purpose to concentrate on Pipe Creek, though containing no order. It was his plain duty, therefore, to have responded, had the message reached him, to the call of Reynolds. But to this he seems to have paid no attention. In his testimony, Sickles says: "I was giving my troops a little repose during that morning. . . . Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, I got a dispatch from General Howard, at Gettysburg, informing me that the First and Eleventh corps had been engaged



MAJ GEN W S HANCOCK.

MAJ. GEN. W. S. HANCOCK.

during the day with a superior force of the enemy, and that General Reynolds had fallen; that he (Howard) was in command, and was very hard pressed, and urging me in the most earnest terms to come to his relief with what force I could. I, of course, considered the question very anxiously. My preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg were to go there and hold that position with my corps, as it was regarded as a very important flanking position, to cover our rear and line of communication." In this testimony, Sickles ignores the early summons of Reynolds, which a staff officer, Captain Rosengarten, asserts was sent by an aid with great dispatch and immediately after Reynolds had reached the front. But Sickles says, "My preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg." Is this a misprint in the testimony, and should it read Emmittsburg? If Gettysburg, then to what order does he refer? General Meade had given no such order. If Gettysburg, he must refer to an order which he had received from Reynolds, which he disobeyed, probably allowing the circular of Meade, which had no binding effect, and which bore that declaration in so many words on its face, to override it. But when, between two and three o'clock, he received the summons of Howard, he concluded to respond to it. Moreover, it would seem that besides the order of Reynolds and the appeal of Howard, other messages had reached Sickles before he decided to go to Gettysburg. An article published in the "Rebellion Record," vol. viii., page 346, contains this statement: "Besides numerous reports, the following brief communication reached him [Sickles], which accidentally fell into my hands: 'July 1, Gettysburg. General Sickles: General Doubleday [First corps] says, For God's sake, come up with all speed, they are pressing us hard. H. T. Lee, Lieut. A. D. C.'"

It is but justice to Sickles, however, to say, that when he had once decided to go, he moved rapidly, and that his character as a soldier, established on many a bloody field, was never to shun a fight. He was among the few officers in the army who evidently relished one. He says: "I therefore moved to Gettysburg on my own responsibility. I made a forced march, and arrived there about the time that General Howard had taken position on Cemetery Hill. I found his troops well posted in a secure posi-

tion on the ridge. The enemy, in the meanwhile, had not made any serious attack upon him during my march." The concluding statement is a mistake, as the time between two and five o'clock marked the most severe and disastrous struggle of the day.

The Twelfth corps, according to Meade's programme, was to march from Littlestown, ten miles from Gettysburg, to Two Taverns, which would bring it within five miles of the battle-field, four and a quarter from Cemetery Hill. The march was commenced at six in the morning, and, after passing Two Taverns, a line of battle was formed. The following is from the diary of an officer who commanded a regiment in Kane's brigade: "July 1st, marched at six A. M. a short distance; passed Two Taverns; formed line of battle; heavy firing in front; a report that the First and Eleventh corps are engaged with the enemy." The enemy's Whitworth gun could have sent a bolt nearly this distance. The smoke from the field must have been plainly visible. The roar of the battle was constantly resounding. But here the corps remained idle during the whole day.

It is the first duty of a soldier to obey the orders of his superiors. "All inferiors are required to obey strictly and to execute with alacrity and good faith, the lawful orders of the superiors appointed over them." This is the fundamental principle of military discipline, the foundation-stone on which the whole superstructure of an army rests. The order was to move from Littlestown to Two Taverns, and, moreover, there was the intimation from General Meade that he desired, in case any part of the army was attacked, that it should hold the enemy in check until it could fall back on the line of battle selected.

But notwithstanding all this, there is enough in the orders and circulars of Meade to have warranted General Slocum in moving up to the support of these distressed corps. In his order for July 1st, Meade enjoins upon his officers to be at all times prepared, "all ready to move to the attack at any moment." In his circular proposing the concentration on Pipe Creek, he says: "Developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions." The order issued to the commander

of the Fifth corps, at seven o'clock on the evening of the 1st, is in these words: "The Major-General commanding directs that you move up to Gettysburg at once upon receipt of this order, if not already ordered to do so by General Slocum. The present prospect is, that our general engagement must be there. Communicate with General Slocum, under whose directions you are placed by the orders of this morning. The General had supposed that General Slocum would have ordered you up." From all this it would seem that General Meade anticipated, that if the forces in advance were attacked, any corps within supporting distance would go to their assistance; that it would act upon the Napoleonic principle, "March to the sound of the enemy's guns." Indeed the order to the Fifth corps indicates clearly that Meade not only expected that Slocum himself would move up, but that he would have ordered the Fifth corps forward. It appears that Slocum did finally move on his own responsibility, but not until the fighting was over; for Hancock, in his testimony, says: "General Slocum arrived about six or seven o'clock. His troops were in the neighborhood; for they apparently had been summoned up before I arrived, by General Howard possibly, as well as the Third corps." But why so tardy in his movements? It is of little moment at what hour Howard summoned him, if he summoned him at all. The guns of the foe had been sounding the call all the day long. A fifteen minutes' ride would have carried him to Cemetery Hill, where he could have overlooked the whole field, or by his staff he could have held almost momentary communication with the front.

The Fifth corps had marched on the 30th through Liberty, Union Bridge, and Uniontown, aud had encamped for the night two miles beyond the latter place. It moved at five o'clock on the morning of the 1st, and at two in the afternoon halted near the Pennsylvania State line. At dark the march was resumed, and not until two of the following morning was the column halted, having passed through Hanover, to which place the order of Meade carried it, McSherrystown, and Brushtown, between which and the field it bivouacked. This corps was therefore beyond call, unless it could have been put upon a more direct route than that by Hanover.

The Second corps, General Hancock, rested at Uniontown during the 30th, and on the morning of the 1st moved up to Taneytown, arriving there at eleven o'clock, where were General Meade's head-quarters. This place was fourteen miles away, and this corps was therefore not available.

The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, the only remaining one, was at Manchester, thirty-four miles away.

Intelligence did not reach Meade of the fighting at Gettysburg until after noon. In his testimony he says: "The moment I received this information, I directed Major-General Hancock, who was with me at the time, to proceed without delay to the scene of the contest; and having in view this preliminary order [circular] which I had issued to him, as well as to other corps commanders, I directed him to make an examination of the ground in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, and to report to me, without loss of time, the facilities, and advantages and disadvantages, of that ground for receiving battle. I furthermore instructed him that in case, upon his arrival at Gettysburg—a place which I had never seen in my life, and had no more knowledge of than you have now—he should find the position unsuitable and the advantages on the side of the enemy, he should examine the ground critically as he went out there, and report to me the nearest position in the immediate neighborhood of Gettysburg where a concentration of the army would be more advantageous than at Gettysburg." This order was issued to General Hancock at ten minutes past one, P. M., of the 1st. It would seem from the reference to his preliminary circular that General Meade had been confidently anticipating a mere checking of the enemy's advance at Gettysburg, and a final concentration either upon Pipe Creek or upon some intermediate position, where his army could all be brought up and marshalled before the work of battle should begin. In that circular the details of the whole movement were sketched, and that evening would have brought to each corps an order for the march in accordance therewith, had not the battle been precipitated. For the execution of such a movement, his head-quarters at Taneytown were in the right position. It is upon the supposition that he entertained a confident expectation that this movement would be finally exe-

cuted, that we can explain his refusal to go earlier to the field himself, and that he delayed so long the sending any one to represent him.

To this cherished purpose of Meade, his Chief of Staff, General Butterfield, was strongly opposed. Against the original issue of the circular he had exerted his influence both with Meade, and also with officers high in command, who had the latter's confidence. And now, as General Hancock was about to proceed to the front, clothed with ample powers to act, Butterfield urged the importance of a forward rather than a retrograde movement. In his testimony he says: "Before General Hancock left for Gettysburg, I stated to him my views of the matter. I told him that I hoped as he was vested with this authority, he would not, if circumstances were such that it could be avoided, have the army fall back; that I thought the effect upon the *morale* of the army would be bad." Leaping into an ambulance, that he might have an opportunity to consult his maps, Hancock went forward. Warren, Chief of Engineers, upon information received from Buford that the enemy were moving down upon him from the direction of Fairfield, had been sent by Meade, some time earlier, to Gettysburg to examine the ground. It appears, besides, that before he started, news had come that Reynolds had been killed. This would indicate that Meade was kept well informed throughout the day of what was passing at the front. As he was only fourteen miles away, an hour and a half would suffice to bring him intelligence, or have carried him upon the field. Warren mistook his road, and went by the way of Emmittsburg. He arrived upon the field shortly after Hancock, and they were soon joined by Sickles of the Third corps, and Slocum of the Twelfth. The presence of so many corps commanders was hailed with satisfaction. It gave assurance that their troops were on the way, and that the brave men who had battled heroically through that terrible day were not to be wholly abandoned to their fate.

General Hancock in his testimony says: "I found that, practically, the fight was then over. The rear of our columns, with the enemy in pursuit, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg." If such was the fact, it must have been between four and

five o'clock when he arrived. By virtue of his order from Meade he at once assumed command on the field, though he was outranked by both Howard and Sickles, and had they resisted his assumption he would have found himself powerless. Upon this point General Hancock says: "However, I did not feel much embarrassment about it, because I was an older soldier than either of them. But I knew that legally it was not proper, and that if they chose to resist it, it might become a troublesome matter to me for the time being."

He proceeded to post the troops as they came up, accepting the general disposition of Howard. General Geary of the Twelfth corps, who had come on in advance of General Slocum, was posted upon the high ground towards Round Top. "The enemy," says Hancock, "evidently believing that we were reinforced, or that our whole army was there, discontinued their great efforts. . . . There was firing of artillery and skirmishing all along the front, but that was the end of the day's battle." Soon after arriving, Hancock informed Meade that he could hold the ground until dark, and at twenty-five minutes past five he sent the following dispatch: "When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the Cemetery, which cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the Third corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the meantime, Gibbon [in whose command the Second corps had been left] had better march on so as to take position on our right or left to our rear as may be necessary, in some commanding position. . . . The battle is quiet now. I think we shall be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops."

Soon after sending this note, General Hancock turned over the command to General Slocum, who had now arrived, who outranked

him, and to whom he had been instructed before leaving head-quarters to deliver it, and returned to Taneytown. Before his arrival, Meade, acting upon the information he had received, had decided to fight at Gettysburg, and had sent out orders to all the corps to march for that place. To Sedgwick, who had the largest corps and was farthest away, frequent messengers were dispatched at intervals through the night, urging him to hasten his march with all practicable speed. His trains he ordered back to Westminster, and here he established his base of supply, a railroad leading to this place being utilized for the purpose. Having thus set his whole army in motion, he broke up his head-quarters at Taneytown at a little before midnight, and pushed forward to Gettysburg. It was one o'clock on the morning of the 2d of July before he arrived upon the field. The centre of the line passed through the Cemetery, and the soldiers who had battled through the fearful day were sleeping amid the graves. As the numerous cavalcade entered the place of the dead, and now of the living also, the sleepers started up as if in resurrected forms, but quickly settled back to their slumbers, overcome by the weariness that was oppressing them.

While these things were passing in the Union camps, what was transpiring in the rebel? Lee, as well as Meade, had not been present during the fighting of the first day. He also arrived at the front during the night, and vigorously addressed himself to the task of preparing his army to continue the battle. As we have already seen he had promised his Lieutenants, before leaving Virginia, that he would not fight an offensive battle. But the game had been precipitated in his absence, and it was now difficult to decline the wager. The result of that day's work had, on the whole, been encouraging to him. Though he had lost some prisoners he had captured more, and though he had suffered grievously in killed and wounded, he had likewise inflicted severe losses upon the Union corps, which he had driven from their position. He had also gained possession of the field, and of the town with all its network of ways. He says in his report: "The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await

the arrival of the rest of the troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and in the meantime every effort was made to ascertain the number and positions of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy; but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack."

He could not reasonably have expected to invade the North, and make a campaign in an enemy's country without fighting whenever occasion offered. He could hardly have been so credulous as to have indulged the hope of moving at his own sweet will to despoil and ravage, of flitting from city to city and making requisitions upon a defenceless people, unopposed. His army, moreover, was full of fight, and now more than ever believed itself invincible. It is true that it was forced to acknowledge that the Army of the Potomac had never been known to fight so stubbornly before as on this day; but the assurance of all was unshaken. Professor Jacobs, who was a citizen of Gettysburg, and was at his home throughout the mighty throes of the conflict, in his hand-book of the battle, says: "The portion of Rodes' division which lay down before our dwelling for the night, was greatly elated with the results of the first day's battle, and the same may be said of the whole rebel army. They were anxious to engage in conversation—to communicate their views and feelings, and to elicit ours. They were boastful of themselves, of their cause, and of the skill of their officers; and were anxious to tell us of the unskilful manner in which some of our officers had conducted the fight which had just closed. When informed that

General Archer and 1500 of his men had been captured, they said, 'To-morrow we will take all these back again; and having already taken 5000 (!) prisoners of you to-day, we will take the balance of your men to-morrow.' Having been well fed, provisioned, and rested, and successful on this day, their confidence knew no bounds. They felt assured that they should be able, with perfect ease, to cut up our army in detail,—fatigued as it was by long marches and yet scattered, for only two corps had as yet arrived. Resting under this impression, they lay down joyfully on the night of the first day."

With soldiers impelled by such feeling, Lee could not well withhold battle when thrust in his face. Besides, his pride as a soldier would not allow him now to show a timid front. Mr. Swinton very justly remarks upon this point: "What really compelled Lee, contrary to his intent and promise, to give battle, was the animus and inspiration of the invasion; for, to the end, such were the 'exsufflicate and blown surmises' of the army, and such was the contempt of its opponent engendered by Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, that there was not in his ranks a barefoot soldier in tattered gray but believed Lee would lead the Confederate army into Baltimore and Washington, if not into Philadelphia and New York. To have withdrawn, therefore, without a battle, though materially easy, was morally impossible; for to have recrossed the Potomac without a blow, and abandoned the invasion on which such towering hopes had been built, would have been a shock beyond endurance to his army and the South."

The leaders of both armies being now on the field, and both having decided to fight there, we may well conclude that they were deeply solicitous and busy in maturing their plans. General Lee established his head-quarters at the little stone house of Mrs. Thompson, on the right of the Chambersburg road, where it crosses Seminary Ridge. The rebel army consisted of nine divisions, as already noticed. Of the three under Ewell, two, Rodes' and Early's, had been in the first day's conflict. The other, Johnson's, did not arrive until the fighting was over, and too late to assist in renewing it, which was contemplated. This corps was posted on the rebel left, Rodes' division occupying Middle

street, the crest of the eminence on which the town is built, and extending to the Seminary Ridge, Early taking position next, stretching through the eastern part of the town, and upon his left was Johnson. Hill's corps was formed upon the right of Ewell's, the point of junction forming almost a right-angle, with Heth upon the left, Anderson upon the right, and Pender in the centre, Heth and Pender having sustained the brunt of the hard fighting of the first day. Upon the right of Hill, and joining Anderson, were two divisions of Longstreet's corps, McLaw's first, and next him Hood's. These two divisions of Longstreet encamped during the night of the 1st within three miles of Gettysburg on the Chambersburg road, and hence did not get into position until late in the forenoon of the 2d. Longstreet's third division, Pickett's, did not come up until the 3d. Thus the entire rebel infantry, with the exception of this last division, was practically on the field ready for action early on the morning of the 2d, and had not been worn by long marches.

The Union army, in this particular, was less fortunate. For two days the corps had been stretching away at their best movement to overtake the enemy before he should cross the Susquehanna, and now they had imposed the added duty of a sudden and unlooked-for concentration upon the very extremity of a line over thirty miles in length. General Meade, soon after coming upon the field, took up his head-quarters at a little frame house on the Taneytown road, just in rear of and to the south of Zeigler's Grove. It was sheltered from infantry fire by the swell in the ground, but much exposed to artillery, as the sequel proved. As soon as it was light, Meade was in the saddle, and proceeded to examine the ground and to post his forces. General Howard, with what was left of his corps, was directed to remain upon the Cemetery Hill to the right and left of the Baltimore pike. His men were sheltered by the stone walls and houses about the foot of the hill, upon the summit of which Steinwehr had planted his guns. Upon Howard's right was Wadsworth's division of the First corps, which held the western section of the wooded, and towards the enemy, precipitous and rocky Culp's Hill. To the right of Wadsworth the Twelfth corps, General

Slocum, was assigned, and a portion of it was in position that night. Geary's division had, however, been brought upon the field late in the afternoon, and two brigades of it posted in the neighborhood of Round Top, on the extreme left. Two divisions of the First corps, which had been led in the fight of the previous day with so much gallantry by Doubleday, Rowley's and Robinson's, were held in reserve in rear of Cemetery Hill. The Second corps, General Hancock, which had been in bivouac three miles from the field on the Taneytown road during the night, arrived early in the morning, and was placed to the left of Howard, its line stretching along the crest of Cemetery Ridge from Zeigler's Grove, where its right rested, in the direction of the Round Tops.

The Third corps, General Sickles, as it arrived on the evening of the 1st, was massed for the night to the left of the Eleventh corps. Two brigades of this corps and two batteries were left at Emmittsburg to guard that line, but were relieved during the night and arrived at the front at about day-break. A singular adventure occurred to the division of General Humphreys while upon this march. It was after four o'clock in the afternoon before he started from Emmittsburg. He took the road running nearly two miles to the west of the main road, and moved up upon that flank. Having been cautioned by a note from Howard against running into the enemy as he approached the field, General Humphreys, when about half way to Gettysburg, desired to move over to the east, and thus avoid that ground where the enemy was known to be; but Colonel Hayden, who had been sent as guide, insisted that Sickles had directed him to conduct the column by the way leading to the Black Horse tavern, the very ground where the enemy lay. Humphreys unwillingly consented to move on, but ordered the column to close up, and directed the men to move silently as they approached the neighborhood of Gettysburg. At midnight he suddenly found himself confronting the enemy in his camps. "We found," says Humphreys, "that the enemy were posted there in force. They were not aware of my presence, and I might have attacked them at daylight with the certainty of at least temporary success; but I was three miles distant from the

remainder of the army, and I believed such a course would have been inconsistent with the general plan of operations of the Commanding General. As soon as I found what was the exact condition of things, I retraced my steps, and moved my command by the route I have already indicated, bivouacking near Gettysburg about one A. M. on the 2d of July. . . . It shows what can be done by accident. If any one had been directed to take a division to the rear of the enemy's army and get up as close as I did unperceived, it would have been thought exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to do it."

In the morning General Geary's division, which had remained during the night near Round Top, was ordered over to Culp's Hill, where the rest of the Twelfth corps was in position, the Third corps was moved out farther to the left to the ground which had been occupied by Geary, and the Second corps was interposed between the Third and the Eleventh.

The Fifth corps as it arrived was held in reserve in rear of Cemetery Hill, but was eventually moved over to the extreme left occupying the Round Tops and supporting the Third corps. The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, not getting upon the march until eight o'clock on the evening of the 1st, coming by the way of Westminster, and having thirty-four miles to move, did not arrive on the field until two in the afternoon of the 2d. It was held in reserve, for the most part, in rear of the left flank.

The general form of the line thus established and which, though varied somewhat in the course of the fight, was finally settled down upon, has been compared by De Peyster to a Limerick fish-hook. The head, where the cord is attached, is exactly represented by the Round Tops. The point is at the easterly extremity of Culp's Hill, where is Spangler's Spring. The centre of the curve is represented by the Cemetery Hill, where the dead of the battle now repose, and directly opposite the town. The short curve from the point to the centre of the curve of the hook is one and three-fourths miles; the long curve or shank, two and three-fourths. Oak, or Seminary Ridge, along which the enemy's right lay, is opposite the shank, and at a distance of from a mile to a mile and a half away. Opposite the Cemetery Hill the rebel line left Semi-

nary Hill, passing through the town and resting upon Benner's Hill, opposite Culp's Hill. If the position of the cavalry upon the two flanks be included, the length of the Union line was over five miles, and that of the enemy, forming the segment of a concentric circle, over seven.

In rear of the Union line were the Taneytown and Baltimore pikes, connected by cross roads, which afforded admirable means for moving troops and guns quickly from one part of the line to another, thus offering all the advantages in this respect which could have been enjoyed by holding the town itself. On one of these cross roads was parked the reserve artillery. To complete the requirements of a fortified camp, in rear of Cemetery Hill, are Power's and McAllister's Hills, gentle eminences, on which were planted powerful batteries to protect the reserve artillery, and which were eventually used to admirable advantage in driving back the enemy upon the right flank.

After examining the field, General Meade decided to assume the offensive, and to attack from his right. The enemy's position was here plainly visible, and his line at several points appeared to be vulnerable. Opposite the Union left, the enemy's movements were screened by a curtain of wood, and to attack directly on that side would have necessitated a movement over a long stretch of perfectly open ground, where the advancing troops would have been raked from front and flanks by interminable lines of the enemy's guns. Meade's intention was to use the Twelfth, Fifth, and Sixth corps for the attacking column. But the latter corps was still upon the march, and would not reach the field for several hours. He accordingly ordered General Slocum, who was to lead the assault, to prepare to move with his own and the Fifth corps.

But to any one who has been on the ground, or who has regarded attentively an intelligible description of it, the difficulty of moving troops, and the impossibility of taking artillery forward from that flank will be apparent, and when once out upon the open ground it will be observed how every rood is commanded from eminences on all sides. Slocum, after making a careful study of the position, reported that he did not think that an attack would

have promise of success, which opinion was concurred in by Warren, who had been sent by Meade for the purpose of examining it, and the design was abandoned. It is not apparent why Meade should ever have thought of attacking from that flank; for had he driven the enemy, he would have encountered a great obstacle at the town itself; and had he driven him to Seminary Ridge, he would have been attacking him in an exceedingly strong position, thus reversing the Battle of Gettysburg. Besides, had the enemy been driven from this stronghold, he would have been pushed over upon the left flank of the Union army, the most dangerous and menacing position into which he could have been forced, as he would have been nearing his base, and been getting upon direct lines to Washington, which would have inevitably forced the Union leader into a change of base. No more encouraging outlook was presented from the left centre, where an assaulting column would have been exposed to a raking fire of artillery from the moment of starting, and from being observed from the first would be received by the enemy's infantry with prepared minds. Upon the extreme left was wooded, rugged ground, which also presented obstacles to an attack.

It appears from the testimony of several officers high in command, that the mind of General Meade at this juncture was much exercised. He had concentrated his army within a very small compass. Should he remain inactive the enemy might, by keeping up a show of strength upon his front, flank him upon the left, and gain a great advantage over him. Indeed the very excellence of his position for defence was in itself a weighty argument for believing that the enemy would decline the offer of battle, and seek by adroit manœuvring to turn the Union army out of its stronghold. Military critics have descanted with much warmth upon Lee's lack of skill and judgment in making a direct attack upon Meade in this formidable position. "With the groans of the victims of Malvern Hill," says De Peyster, "repeating in thunder tones the condemnation of Magruder, Lee exposed himself to a severer judgment for a greater act of reckless disregard of the commonest military—and common—sense. He had heard the whole world resound with the censure heaped upon Burnside for giving

into his hand to work his will upon it, the army of the Potomac, wasted in attempting to storm the heights of Fredericksburg, and yet he imitated the action. The French military critic, Roussillon, remarks, 'Lee, like Burnside at Fredericksburg, committed the fault of attacking in front, a position at once very strong in itself and vigorously defended.' . . . Imagine the effect of a similar turning movement on the part of Lee. It would not only have placed him upon the roads constituting our lines of supplies, and have given him the major part of our trains, but have planted him between the northern army of succor and Washington and Baltimore. In other words, it would have delivered up everything in the rear of the army of the Potomac into the hands of the rebels."

What these critics censure Lee for not doing, Meade, during the ominous stillness of that long summer day, strongly suspected he was doing. Hence when he found by the report of Slocum and his own observations that he was in a bad position for assuming the offensive, he appears to have been casting about for a more favorable outlook, and, in case he found that the enemy was seeking to turn his position, that he might be in condition to defend himself, and prevent his trains and base from being cut off. Accordingly as soon as his Chief of Staff, General Butterfield, who had been left at Taneytown during the night to hasten the march of the Sixth corps, arrived at head-quarters, he was directed to prepare an order for the withdrawal of the army from this position should circumstances render it necessary. Butterfield objected that he was unacquainted with the location of the different divisions and corps of the army with relation to the roads it would be proper for them to take, and would need to go over the field first. Meade replied that he could not wait for that; and to remove the objection made a draft of the field, showing the position of all the troops, and the roads in their vicinity. With this and by the aid of maps, Butterfield drew the order, which, on being shown to Meade, received his approval. As it was of the greatest importance that in case it was issued it should be accurate, permission was obtained from Meade to show it to corps commanders, to solicit any suggestions they might make for improving it. It was shown to General Gibbon, among others. On seeing it, he was

struck with astonishment, exclaiming: "Great God! General Meade does not intend to leave this position?" inferring that the order had been drawn with the intention of issuing it. The preparation of this order rests upon the testimony of Butterfield. General Meade testified that he had no recollection of directing it to be drawn, or of having seen it after it was drawn, but that he only ordered his Chief of Staff to familiarize himself with the location of the troops, so that if in any contingency he should need to issue such an order, it could be readily prepared. That preparations were made for executing this order is supported by the following instructions promulgated by Meade, at or before ten o'clock on the morning of the 2d: "The staff officers on duty at head-quarters will inform themselves of the positions of the various corps—their artillery, infantry, and trains—sketch them with a view to roads, and report them immediately, as follows: Third corps, Colonel Schriver; Second corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Davis; First corps, Lieutenant Perkins; Twelfth corps, Lieutenant Oliver; Fifth corps, Captain Cadwalader. It is desired to know the roads on or near which the troops are, and where the trains lie, in view of movements in any direction, and to be familiar with the head-quarters of the commanders."

It is, therefore, of small moment whether the order was actually prepared or not. Nor is it any disparagement to General Meade, if the order was prepared and approved by him. As a precautionary measure it was eminently proper, and instead of being imputed to him as a reproach, should be, in view of the uncertainty as to the designs of the enemy, accredited as an act of wise generalship. That it was merely a precautionary measure is clearly apparent from the following dispatch sent to General Halleck, at three o'clock in the afternoon: "I have to-day, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I having a strong position for defence. I am not determined as yet in attacking him till his position is more developed. He has been moving on both my flanks apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed attacking to allow the Sixth corps and parts of other corps to reach this place, and to rest the men. Expecting a battle I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get

any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear, and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster. I will endeavor to advise you as often as possible. In the engagement yesterday the enemy concentrated more rapidly than we could, and towards evening, owing to the superiority of numbers, compelled the First and Eleventh corps to fall back from the town to the heights on this side, on which I am posted. I feel fully the responsibility resting on me, and will endeavor to act with caution."

CHAPTER V.

SEVERE FIGHTING ON THE LEFT.

WHEN, upon the night of the 1st, General Sickles had brought his corps upon the field, he had thrown out the Sixty-third Pennsylvania regiment to picket along the Emmittsburg pike, its left covering the cross-road leading from the Peach Orchard to Little Round Top. Early on the morning of the 2d, this regiment was pushed forward upon the skirmish line to a fence running parallel with the pike, in the rear of Joseph Sherfy's house. As early as nine o'clock in the morning, fire was opened upon this regiment, and a company of sharpshooters was sent out to feel the enemy in a piece of wood in front, which soon returned, reporting that it was swarming with the foe. Skirmishing continued active, until finally the enemy's sharpshooters crawled stealthily up to a low stone fence just in front of the line of the Sixty-third, when his fire became hot and very destructive.

The order sent to Sickles on the morning of the 2d was to bring his corps into position upon the left of Hancock, on ground vacated by Geary. As Geary had simply bivouacked in mass without deploying in line, Sickles reported to Meade that Geary had no position, and that there was no position there, meaning that it was low and commanded by ground in its front, rendering it untenable. Meade repeated his general instructions; whereupon Sickles went to head-quarters, and representing the great disadvantages of the position indicated, asked Meade to go with him over that part of the field. This Meade excused himself from doing, nor could he spare General Warren for that purpose;

D. E. Sickles

MAJOR GENERAL U. S. ARMY.

but General Hunt, Chief of artillery, did go, to whom Sickles pointed out the ground, more elevated and commanding, a half or three-quarters of a mile in front, which he proposed to occupy.

It should here be observed that between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges, which run nearly parallel with each other, is a diagonal ridge connecting them, which, touching Cemetery Hill at its northern extremity, and extending past the Peach Orchard, soon strikes Seminary Ridge, and along the crest of which runs the Emmittsburg pike. It nowhere attains to any great eminence, but affords excellent ground for artillery. From the Peach Orchard to Round Top is broken, rugged, and in part wooded surface, which it was exceedingly desirable to hold, inasmuch as it would have afforded cover for the enemy to have worked his way up very near to the position which is now known as Cemetery Ridge, and from which he could have assaulted with great advantage. In fact, there is a space from a half to three-quarters of a mile to the right of the Little Round Top swell, where there is no ridge at all, but low swampy ground instead, easily commanded from the Emmittsburg Ridge, with a curtain of woods to the left reaching out in front of the Round Tops. Sickles believed this ground ought to be occupied, and seems to have had the sanction of Hunt in that opinion; but receiving no direct order from Meade to do so, he held his columns back, momentarily expecting the final mandate of his chief. At eleven o'clock the firing between the skirmishers on the Emmittsburg road being very sharp, General Birney, who commanded the division holding the extreme left of the line, by direction of General Sickles, sent a regiment and a battalion of sharpshooters to reconnoitre. This reconnoissance showed that the enemy was moving in three columns under cover of the woods to the left. At length General Sickles, finding his outposts gradually driven back, determined to await no longer for more explicit orders, and moved out his whole corps upon the advance ground, Birney's division stretching from a point near the Devil's Den, in front of Round Top somewhat *en échelon* over the rough wooded heights, his right bending back and resting at the Peach Orchard, and Humphreys' division extending along the Emmittsburg pike from

Peach Orchard to a point nearly opposite, but a little in advance of Hancock's left, thus leaving a slight break in the line at that point. Technically, this fulfilled the direction of Meade. His left rested at Round Top, and his right connected with Hancock; but being so much advanced, it was necessarily very long and presented too much front for so small a corps to cover. Besides, it formed an angle at the Peach Orchard, where was open ground, which was consequently a source of weakness.

He had scarcely got his corps out upon the line he had decided to take, when he was summoned to a council of officers at Meade's head-quarters. Perceiving that the enemy was about to attack him, and feeling the necessity of his personal supervision, he excused himself from attending, in the meantime hastening forward his troops and posting his batteries; but he soon after got a peremptory order to report, and turning over the command of the corps to General Birney, he hastened back with all speed. Before he had reached head-quarters the battle opened; but spurring on, he was met at the door by Meade, who excused him from dismounting, and said he would soon join him on the field, the council having broken up as the guns announced the opening of the fight. On reaching the ground and hastily examining the position which the corps had taken, General Meade remarked that it was too much advanced, and expressed his doubt about being able to hold it. Sickles observed that it was not too late to withdraw; but to this Meade objected and said he would send up the Fifth to put in upon the left, and to the right troops could be called from General Hancock, while a free use of the reserve artillery was tendered. General Meade's head-quarters were not over a three minutes' walk from a position on Hancock's front, where the whole ground, both the advance and more contracted lines, was plainly visible. Why General Meade did not give explicit orders for the formation on the left early in the day and himself see that the proper dispositions were made, seems inexplicable, and can only be accounted for on the supposition that he did not anticipate that the enemy would attack from that direction. In the document above quoted it is reported that in answer to Sickles' urgent representation of need of preparation to

meet the enemy, Meade remarked: "Oh! Generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they are." No possible business of the Commander-in-chief could have been more important or more pressing than this.

Unfortunately for General Sickles, Buford's cavalry, which had been posted on the left flank of his corps, was ordered away at a time when the enemy was moving in that direction, and its place was left unsupplied until it was too late to be of any use on that day. General Pleasanton in his testimony says: "On the 2d of July, Buford's division having been so severely handled the day before, was sent by me back to Westminster, our depot, to protect it, and also to recruit." These were worthy objects, and Buford had well earned a claim to repose; but at the moment when the enemy was swarming forth upon that flank which had been reported by Hancock as the one most vulnerable it is almost beyond belief that General Pleasanton should have ordered the cavalry entirely away, before other and equally reliable troops were ready to relieve them. It left unchecked the whole power of the enemy's force to be employed in turning that flank.

Lee had early seen the importance of the ground which General Sickles had been so intent to occupy, and had determined to make his main attack to regain it. He says in his report: "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position, from which if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to carry the position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack."

This plan was studiously carried out, though the attack of Ewell was not coincident with that of Longstreet, being nearly two hours delayed, perhaps designedly, in the hope that troops would be taken from his front to strengthen other parts of the line, and would leave him an easier task in carrying it, an event

which did actually transpire. As it was planned that the weight of the attack should be made by Longstreet, he was active all through the early part of the day in getting his troops and his guns upon that part of the field where he could make it with the hope of success. It has been asserted that Longstreet vigorously opposed the making this attack until his division under Pickett, which was still at Chambersburg, should come up, significantly saying that he did not wish to be compelled to walk with one boot off. But, having been peremptorily ordered by Lee to fight, he did not hesitate. Having only two divisions, those of Hood and McLaws, he led them around upon the extreme Union left. Instead of being able, as perhaps he had hoped, to wedge his way in upon the rear of the Union column, which to him appeared to be holding the line of the Emmittsburg road, he found a line refused, and nearly at right angles to that road stretching away to Round Top. To face that refused line he formed his own line, with Hood upon the right and McLaws upon the left, leaving the front occupied by Graham and Humphreys to be faced by Anderson's division of Hill's corps, and along the commanding ground upon the left he planted thick his artillery. To face these two powerful divisions of Longstreet, Sickles could only oppose the two weak brigades of Ward and De Trobriand. Ward, who was upon Sickles' left, opposite Hood, had posted his brigade across the open ground covering the approach to Little Round Top, his left extending across the front of Round Top, and his right reaching up into the wooded ground beyond the wheat-field. De Trobriand had posted two of his regiments, the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania and the Fifth Michigan, upon the front in line with Ward; but with his right refused and reaching back towards the Peach Orchard, making it conform to the advantages of the ground. He held two of his regiments in reserve, the Fortieth New York and the Seventeenth Maine, while the Third Michigan was deployed as skirmishers to cover the open ground to his right and connect with the left of Graham.

Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, General Birney, who was in temporary command of the Third corps, having for some time been watching the columns of the enemy,

now plainly visible, ordered Clark's rifled battery in position to the left of the Peach Orchard, to open on them. It did so with good effect. The enemy's guns, which had been brought up in large numbers, were wheeled into position, and answered; and soon after, along all that ridge, where he had advantageously posted battery upon battery, seemingly an interminable line, the fire was terrific, and the very air was filled with shots and bursting shells, like hail in the thick coming storm. The brigade of Graham, in rear of which the Union guns were posted, was fearfully exposed, as it occupied both legs of the angle.

For some time the fire of artillery was appalling. But this was only the prelude to more desperate work. Longstreet had formed his lines under cover, and was now moving down to strike the extreme Union left a stunning blow and if possible crush it. But he found the troops of Ward prepared. With screeches and yells the foe pressed on; but before the deliberate aim of that veteran brigade they were forced to fall back. Ward realized from the strength of the attack that his weak line would be unable to withstand another, and called for supports. De Trobriand sent the Seventeenth Maine, which took position behind a low stone wall, to the left of the wheatfield, where its fire would have a deadly effect if the line of Ward should be forced back. Soon afterwards the Fortieth New York, the last reserve, was hurried away to the support of Ward, and took position, on his extreme left and front, so as to block the way to Little Round Top, which was now in imminent danger of falling into the enemy's hands. But the foe did not stop to carry that part of the line at once, but bore down in succession upon one part after another along Birney's whole front, rapidly reaching forward towards the Peach Orchard. The front of Ward had hardly been reinforced before De Trobriand was struck. "*Allons-y ferme, et tenons bon! Il n'y a plus rien en réserve,*" was the word of that well-schooled and skilled leader. Knowing full well that the storm would soon reach them, his men had brought together the rocks and trunks of trees which they found lying about, and when the men in grey came swarming on not twenty paces distant, a crash of musketry, like the crack of a thunderbolt, arrested

for a moment their progress; but recovering themselves they answered the fire and the fusilade was rapid. "*Des deux côtés, chacun visait son homme, et malgré toutes les protections du terrain, morts et blessés tombaient avec une effrayante rapidité.*" It was an unequal struggle; for the enemy were thrice their strength; but the accuracy of their fire was unsurpassed. "Never have I seen," says De Trobriand, "our men strike with equal obstinacy. It seemed as though each one of them believed that the destiny of the Republic depended upon the desperate vigor of their efforts."

But if the assault proved deadly to De Trobriand's men, who had a good position and were shielded by some works, how fared the troops of Graham, who were on open ground, and had no protection except such as accidentally fell to their lot? The position at the Peach Orchard was a commanding one for artillery, and could the pieces have been protected by lunettes, as were those of Steinwehr, they could have defied the whole weight of opposing metal from right to left that was brought to bear upon them. But they were naked, and were forced to endure the brunt of a concentric fire. As for the infantry, the cut where the road-bed makes up to the Emmittsburg way afforded some protection while the artillery fire was hottest; but when that slackened, and a charge of the enemy's infantry came, there was no alternative but to boldly face it. Then it was that Greek met Greek, and bayonets were crossed in the deadly encounter. The One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsylvania, of Graham's brigade, was posted in support of these guns, facing south, when this charge came. They were lying down, and apparently were not seen by the foe as they swept forward, looking only to the guns, which they confidently regarded as their certain spoil. But waiting until they had come near, the tried men of this regiment sprang to their feet, and pouring in a well-directed volley, dashed at them with the bayonet. Swept down by ranks, and bewildered by the suddenness of the apparition, the enemy halted and for a moment attempted to beat back their assailants. But the tide was too strong to stem, and they fled with precipitation. The horses of the Union artillery had all been killed, and many of the officers and men had fallen. The ammunition was well-nigh spent. The guns were accordingly seized and drawn back by the infantry to the rear of the road-bed.

Fortunately for the rest of Graham's line, and for that of Humphreys, the order of General Lee to Hill was only to threaten the force in his front and watch for a favorable opportunity to attack, and consequently that officer for some time contented himself with simple demonstrations and a vigorous fire of artillery.

While this wave of battle, commencing at Round Top, rolled on towards the Peach Orchard, and dashed with such fearful violence against the faces of that devoted Third corps, the calls for reinforcements were long and loud. Every man of the Third corps was almost from the first put in, making altogether barely one single thin line, and not a musket in reserve. It is no wonder that the time seemed long, and the troops summoned appeared tardy in coming. General Birney says: "I sent a staff officer to General Sykes, asking him to send me up at once the division that had been ordered from his corps to support me; that an attack by the enemy was imminent, and that I thought it would be made at once. The staff officer saw him, and he returned for answer that he would come up in time; that his men were making coffee and were tired, but that he would be up in time. He came up with one of his divisions in about an hour." General Sykes may have made the answer attributed to him; but he was a regular army officer, and he was not the man to disregard an order upon the field of battle, or execute it tardily. He had a long distance to march, and what in his extremity seemed a full hour to Birney, may have actually been less.

General Warren, after proceeding with Meade to inspect the position of Sickles, just after the battle opened, had, by the direction of the latter, proceeded to Little Round Top. "From that point," Warren says, "I could see the enemy's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent, as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes' corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle, I should think a mile and a half long, began to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once." The first onset, as we have seen, was stayed by Birney's division. But the fiery and impetuous Hood, he who attacked Sherman with such daring before Atlanta, had discovered that Little Round Top was

not occupied, and that only a thin curtain, composed of the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania, hung in its front. This rocky fortress was the great prize of the day. Could he break through the feeble force which held its front and plant himself amid the rocks and fastnesses of that precipitous height, the whole army of Meade might beat itself against it in vain attempts to dislodge him. Taking only his most trusted men, he formed them for the death grapple and led them forth. He pointed to the dark ground whereon he desired them to plant their footprints. It was enough. Where had their bold leader ever led them that was not to victory? But before they had reached the thin line which they thought easily to brush away, supports had come. The Fortieth New York was there, the Sixth New Jersey and the Fourth Massachusetts had been gathered in, and now the path across Plum Run, which they had hoped to stealthily pass, they found closed. But they were desperate men, formed with ample supports, and as the repeated blows of the battering-ram will finally loosen the strongest wall, and topple it down, so did the head of this column by the mere weight of numbers force its way through, and press rapidly forward to climb the heights unopposed. But as they dash heedlessly on, suddenly a sheet of flame leaps out from the very roots of the mountain, that sweeps down the boldest and the bravest, and throws back that fiery column in disorder and confusion. Whence so suddenly have come these bold defenders? Ten minutes before and not one was there; but the hill all peaceful and unguarded was inviting approach.

When General Warren arrived upon this hill, as the battle opened, he found there only some officers who had been using it for a signal station. When these signal officers saw the long lines of the enemy sweeping on, inferring that Sickles would be totally unable to check them, they commenced folding their flags to make way for the men in grey. But Warren, knowing instinctively that all was lost if that hill was lost, bade them unfurl their flags and signal on the supports that were approaching. Eagerly he had watched that first assault, and when he saw the enemy's line broken and driven back, he secretly rejoiced; for now he knew that hope still remained. He saw at a glance what a terrible effect

the plunging fire of artillery would have, delivered from this eminence, if guns could once be got upon its summit. Hazlett's battery in the neighborhood was immediately ordered up, and by almost superhuman exertions was brought upon the glad crest. And now seeing the head of Barnes' division of the Fifth corps approaching on the double quick to reinforce the Third, he assumed the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, and ordering it upon Little Round Top. Passing rapidly to the rear of the mountain, Vincent hastened his men into position at its very base; the Sixteenth Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel Welch, upon the right, facing the wheat-field; next it the Forty-fourth New York, Colonel Rice, facing the Devil's Den; by its side its twin regiment, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Captain Woodward, facing the little valley between the two mounts, and not inaptly called the Valley of the Shadow of Death; and upon the extreme left, looking towards the rear of Round Top, was the Twentieth Maine, Colonel Chamberlain. So hastily had they been brought upon the field that they had not stopped to load. The work of formation was momentary, and before the men had been five minutes settled behind the huge boulders which lie scattered over all its broad breast, away to the left was heard, says Captain Judson of the Eighty-third, "a loud, fierce, distant yell, as if all pandemonium had broken loose, and joined in the chorus of one grand, universal war-whoop." Three lines deep, at double-quick, with bayonets fixed, on came that mass of Hood's impetuous men. It was the supreme moment, and the stoutest held his breath, grasping with firmer grip his trusty piece. Not upon the Old Guard in its most desperate hour ever rested a graver trust. The weight of the shock fell upon the Forty-fourth New York and the Eighty-third Pennsylvania. The first impulse was scarcely broken ere the line was new formed, and from behind rocks and trees, at close quarters, a most deadly fire was poured in. Again and again with fresh troops and ever increasing numbers did the enemy assault; but each time to be thrown back broken and bleeding. "Hundreds of them," says Judson, "approached even within fifteen yards of our line, but they approached only to be shot down or hurled back covered with gaping wounds. It was a death grapple in

which assailant and assailed seemed resolved to win or fall in the struggle."

As soon as Colonel Vincent had discovered that this assault was coming, he dismounted, and sent an aid to General Barnes requesting immediate reinforcements. "Tell him," said he, "the enemy are coming in overwhelming force." When the enemy found himself spending his strength in futile attempts to carry the centre of Vincent's line, he moved over to the left and attacked with renewed vigor the Sixteenth Michigan. That regiment had a weaker position and was less protected than the rest of the line, and when the pressure upon it became heavy, it yielded somewhat to the current and was fast giving way, exposing that flank to sudden turning. At that instant, the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, of Weed's brigade, which had been sent to support and reinforce Vincent, came upon the field, and moved down to the wavering line. In doing so it was much exposed, receiving a volley by which the gallant O'Rourke, who commanded the regiment, was killed, and large numbers of the rank and file were laid low. Confusion followed, and it seemed for the moment that it, too, would give way. But Vincent, seeing the peril of the hour, rushed from point to point, threatening and encouraging by turns, and by the aid of his officers finally succeeded in bringing order out of confusion, and the enemy was again foiled. When once the line had become settled, and felt in a measure protected, it was invincible. The personal courage and activity of Vincent saved the brigade from what promised inevitable destruction. But his tireless intrepidity made him a mark for the enemy's sharpshooters, and he paid the forfeit with his life. He was standing upon a rock part way down the declivity, watching the movements of the enemy, when he was struck in the groin by a minié ball, and was borne helpless and bleeding with a mortal hurt from the field. He was succeeded by Colonel Rice, of the Forty-fourth, who on assuming command immediately passed along the line, encouraging the men to strike for their fallen leader a deadlier blow, and insisting that they must hold the position to the very last extremity.

In making his assaults thus far, the foe had done so with a

strong hand, his ranks having been well filled. But now they were visibly weakened, many having fallen, and many others having chosen secure positions behind rocks, were loth to leave them; some even climbed into the tree tops, and hid themselves in the thick foliage of the branches, keeping up from their concealments a most galling fire. But the enemy had not yet reached the left of the brigade line, and, finding the valley open, he determined to again marshal his forces and make one more resolute struggle for the mastery. Forming under cover of the wood, they advanced, and now with a fury apparently inspired by desperation. The Twentieth Maine met them, as had the other regiments, with a volley which had a staggering effect; but though fearful destruction followed the deadly missiles, the survivors rushed on unchecked, and were soon upon Chamberlain's men. In the haste of coming into position, they had neglected to fix bayonets; but clubbing their muskets and with the might of mad men, braining their assailants, these hardy sons of the forest beat back the foe, and finally succeeded in shaking them off. But now a new peril threatened. The enemy had been repulsed, though not destroyed. He was still defiant, and the left flank of the Twentieth was entirely unprotected and unsupported. Early in the fight, Colonel Chamberlain, seeing the danger to which he was exposed from this cause, had swung the left battalion around until it faced in the opposite direction to the other extremity of the brigade line. The enemy saw his advantage, and, immediately pushing through, vigorously attacked this battalion. Chamberlain called upon Captain Woodward for a company to support him in this dire extremity. This the Captain was unable, from paucity of his own numbers, to do, but sent word that he could stretch out his line, which relieved a part of Chamberlain's regiment, and enabled him to maintain his ground and to protect the flank. The enemy's bullets were now falling in the rear of the right of the brigade line, coming from exactly the opposite direction from what they had in the earlier part of the contest. But the force of the enemy's daring was by this time in a measure spent, and in fifteen minutes his fire began to slacken. Chamberlain now saw that his time had come, and ordering his left battalion to fix bayonets, he led it with the

greatest gallantry, and with inspiriting cheers—in which the voices of the whole brigade joined—in a counter-charge which swept the dispirited foe back in utter rout. At this juncture, a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves, also of the Fifth corps, which had been sent to the support of Vincent, charged up the hill and helped to swell the shout of victory. The enemy, believing that heavy reinforcements had arrived, gave up the contest, and Colonel Chamberlain, swinging his whole regiment around upon the front, cleared the valley between the Round Tops, his left sweeping the declivity of Round Top. Over five hundred prisoners were taken by this brigade alone, including two Colonels and fifteen other commissioned officers, and over a thousand stands of arms. That narrow valley was strewn with the dead and the wounded, mangled in every conceivable way in which relentless battle leaves its victims. Behind one single rock were found, after the battle, twenty-five dead bodies, many wounded, doubtless, having crawled behind it for shelter, and there yielded their lives.

The severely wounded, who were taken prisoners, were in the main boastful and defiant. The attacking column was principally composed of Alabama and Texan troops. They spoke in a manner dissatisfied with the result, which they had in no way anticipated. They acknowledged that they had been badly cut up; but said that only one brigade had yet been engaged, while there were two others behind them ready to follow up the assault. One experience, however, of that dark valley was enough, and no further advances were made to enter it.

No prouder victory was achieved on any part of that bloody field, nor one which more largely contributed to the accomplishment of the final triumph, than that of this small brigade of Vincent, composed of less than twelve hundred muskets, supported and aided by Weed's brigade and Hazlett's battery; but principally fought by this handful of men. No valor could have exceeded theirs. Their spirit is illustrated by an incident which occurred at a moment when the fight was at its climax. An overgrown, uncouth but resolute young man, belonging to company F, of the Eighty-third regiment, who had a sheltered position behind a rock, was noticed to rise up when he fired in such a manner as to

expose nearly his whole body. He was repeatedly cautioned, and called to, to "get down." Finally, irritated by the reprimand, he drew himself up to his full proportions, and swaying his brawny arm in an impressive gesture, at the same time calling upon God to witness, he exclaimed: "I am on the soil of old Pennsylvany now, and if they get me down they'll have to shoot me down." The feeling prevailed throughout the army that it was now on northern soil, and to the last man they would fight before they would yield an inch.

The losses upon the Union side in this struggle, on account of the shelter, was in numbers small in proportion to that inflicted on the enemy. But upon the officers the blow fell with cruel force. General Weed, who commanded the brigade which had come to the support of Vincent, received a mortal wound, and while Captain Hazlett, whose battery had been brought upon the summit with so much difficulty, was bending over his prostrate form, endeavoring to catch his last broken accents, he also was struck by the fatal bullet, and fell lifeless upon the gasping form of his dying chief. Thus fell Vincent, Weed, and Hazlett, the three chief commanders on the hill, and O'Rourke, the leader of a regiment, besides numbers of others of a less degree.

When we consider the small chance by which this hill was saved to the Union arms, and its vital importance to the integrity of the whole army, the inquiry strongly presses itself, Why was it left so late unoccupied, and why was the opportunity of grasping it allowed to remain open all the day long, and until its summit was casting fitful shadows? Is it answered that General Meade had given Sickles orders to occupy it, and that he supposed it was firmly held? This can hardly be accepted as a satisfactory answer. For, from the window of General Meade's head-quarters, Little Round Top is plainly seen, and by using his glass he could have verified the belief at any moment, or by means of an aid he could have examined each nook and cranny of the hill every half hour in the whole day. But General Sickles says when he was ordered to relieve General Geary, he proceeded to do so, and notified General Meade that Geary had been simply massed and not in position, that he had executed the first order, and was

awaiting further directions. Finally, says Sickles, "Not having received any orders in reference to my position, and observing, from the enemy's movements on our left what I thought to be conclusive indications of a design on their part to attack there, and that seeming to me to be our most assailable point, I went in person to head-quarters, and reported the facts and circumstances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders. I did not receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at head-quarters; and I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg."

The testimony of General Meade conflicts somewhat with this statement. He says: "I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, commanding the Third corps, directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the Second corps, commanded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock's left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. During the morning I sent a staff officer to inquire of General Sickles whether he was in position. The reply was returned to me that General Sickles said there was no position there. I then sent back to him my general instructions which had been previously given. A short time afterwards General Sickles came to my head-quarters, and I told him what my general views were, and intimated that he was to occupy the position that I understood General Hancock had put General Geary in, the night previous. General Sickles replied that General Geary had no position, as far as he could understand. He then said to me that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was, some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have some staff officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as, in his judgment, he should deem the most suitable. I answered, 'General Sickles, certainly, within the limits of the general instructions I have given to you; any ground within those

limits you choose to occupy I leave to you.' And I directed Brigadier-General Hunt, my Chief of artillery, to accompany General Sickles, and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his judgment." General Sickles held his corps back until the last moment, and at length, when his outposts had been driven in, and the enemy was about to attack, took what has been called the advanced position, which General Meade expressed his disapprobation of, when he came upon the ground. "I am of the opinion," says General Meade, "that General Sickles did what he thought was for the best; but I differed from him in judgment. And I maintain that subsequent events proved that my judgment was correct, and his judgment was wrong."

General Sickles, in his testimony, says upon this point: "I took up that position which is described in the report of General Halleck as a line from half to three-quarters of a mile in advance, as he says, and which, in his report, he very pointedly disapproves of, and which he further says I took up through a misinterpretation of orders. It was not through any misinterpretation of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and whichever it was, I took it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already stated, that it was approved of in general terms by General Hunt, of General Meade's staff, who accompanied me in the examination of it. I took up the line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which if the enemy had been allowed to take—as they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force—would have rendered our position on the left untenable; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us. I think that any General who would look at the topography of the country there would naturally come to the same conclusion."

Thus we perceive that in respect to the two positions in general, the opinions of Meade and Sickles are diametrically opposed to each other. But we should recollect that all this is testimony given after the event, when the questions at issue were under sharp discussion, when much feeling on the one side and on the

other existed, and when the opinions were naturally colored by prejudice. Enough is however brought to light by the reports made at the time, and by this testimony, to enable us to form an intelligent conclusion concerning the occupation of Little Round Top.

In his testimony, General Meade says, "his left [Sickles'] was to extend to Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable, to occupy it." Two facts are deducible from this statement; first, that this commanding position was visible from his head-quarters, and he was able for himself to have any moment determined whether it was occupied or not; and second, that he was in ignorance whether it was practicable to occupy it.

There are no principles of military strategy more fundamental, more apparent to even the casual observer, or more vital to the safety of an army when deployed in line of defensive battle, than these: first, that the flanks of the infantry should be firmly posted, with some natural or artificial protection; and second, that the flanks should be well guarded by cavalry, ready at all times to make a stand and to give notice of the movements of the enemy. Both these principles were violated in this instance. The whole left wing was unstable until the last moment, and the line was actually formed and the position finally taken, after the battle had begun, and Little Round Top, a fortress in itself, formed and fashioned by the fiat of the Almighty, ready for its armament and its defenders, was left entirely unoccupied until after the battle had begun to rage with great fury, and was finally saved from the clutches of the foe by the most determined and bloody fighting of troops which gained their position but five minutes in advance of their assailants. The cavalry, too, was removed just before the battle opened, and was left unsupplied at a time when it was most needed. It would seem as though the gates were swung wide open deliberately and purposely to allow the enemy to walk in.

Is it offered, in defence of the Commander-in-chief, that he had ordered Sickles to occupy this ground? This is not enough. It was his duty to know that it was occupied and made firm. Hour after hour passed, and he knew that it was *not* occupied;



Union Troops

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for he had the direct testimony of his senses, and Sickles was repeatedly informing him that he was not in position, both by messenger and in person, and begging that the chief, or some member of his staff, would examine the ground and give definite orders. To the last moment no such orders were given, and Sickles was finally compelled to take position upon his own responsibility, and by the testimony of General Meade himself, under a discretion which was accorded him. Sickles' forces were insufficient to cover his line and occupy Little Round Top; but he covered the front of that position and the approaches to it by causing his line to abut upon Round Top, which was impracticable for offensive or defensive purposes. Troops were at the disposal of Meade, with which Little Round Top might have been covered early in the day; for the Fifth corps had arrived at two o'clock in the morning within easy call. The responsibility of the non-occupation of this stronghold, so vital to the integrity of his position and the safety of his whole army, must rest with the Commander-in-chief, and it must ever remain an inexplicable mystery how he could have permitted the hours to pass,—after the bloody experience of the preceding day, knowing that the whole rebel army was close in upon his front,—with his left wing in the disorganized condition in which the opening of the battle found it.

Respecting the ordering away of the cavalry, no question has ever been made in the inquiries into the conduct of the battle. But it was no less a grave violation of principle, and should have received the severest censure. The fault cannot be imputed to General Pleasanton, who commanded the cavalry, for having given the order without the knowledge of his chief; for had such been the case, why was not Pleasanton at once cashiered, as he would have richly merited? As the latter received no censure, we must conclude that it was either the direct order of Meade, or that it received his sanction.

The enemy, in guarding his flank, exercised a commendable care, in marked contrast with the negligence of his opponent. The extreme right of his line was, from the nature of the country, exposed and weak. Accordingly, at the point where the Emmitts-

burg pike crosses the Seminary Ridge, which it does about three-quarters of a mile beyond the Peach Orchard, he built, as soon as he felt himself menaced, a strong and quite elaborate fortification with re-entrant angles so as to sweep the ground in all directions, and here he planted his heavy guns.

Leaving the citadel that guards the left of the Union line in the firm grip of the gallant men who so heroically defended it, turn now to the further conduct of the fight on Sickles' front. As soon as it was apparent that the enemy was intent on making a determined fight upon the Union left, realizing the danger which was threatening Sickles' thin line, General Meade exerted himself to the uttermost to succor these hard-pressed men. General Hancock, who had been called on for help, promptly sent an entire division composed of four brigades under General Caldwell. General Humphreys, though expecting every moment to be himself attacked, and having a difficult position to hold, detached one of his regiments, having previously parted with one of his brigades, and hurried it away, in response to the urgent appeals of the aides of both Sickles and Birney. The divisions of Barnes and Ayres of the Fifth corps were also brought up.

While Hood was making his desperate onslaught upon the defenders of Little Round Top, McLaws, with the aid of Anderson's division of Hill's corps, was making a no less determined, and far more successful assault upon Birney's right. It fell with the greatest weight upon that part of the line about the Peach Orchard; and here it was first broken. But the brigade of De Trobriand had originally been formed principally facing westward, and as the enemy advanced to follow up the retiring forces on his front at the Peach Orchard, De Trobriand was still able to maintain his position, and to do good execution. But the pressure soon became too great for him to withstand, and he was obliged to give ground. The enemy having forced his way in upon the wheatfield, was pressing upon his flank and rear. It was a critical moment. Instantly rallying the remnants of the Fifth Michigan and the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, and by the aid of General Birney, who brought the Seventeenth Maine and a New Jersey regiment under Colonel Burling into line, he made a determined

charge, and regained the lost ground and the stone wall which had afforded him protection. This was the last effort of this brigade, for it was shortly after relieved by Zook's brigade of Caldwell's division.

In the meantime, Barnes, with the divisions of Tilton and Sweitzer, had moved forward and taken position in a wood on the right of the wheatfield, Sweitzer upon the left and Tilton upon the right. The ground occupied by the latter was rocky and wooded, while the left extended into an open ravine. Barnes' division had scarcely gained its position, when the enemy was seen advancing up this ravine. In danger of being outflanked, Sweitzer wheeled the several regiments of his brigade to the left and rear, giving the advantage of three lines supporting each other. Sweitzer was thus able easily to hold his position. But Tilton, having been less fortunately posted, was unable to maintain his ground. This left Sweitzer in a perilous situation, and he likewise fell back. The rugged country to the west and south of the Peach Orchard was now the dark and bloody ground, and over it the tide of battle swayed with destructive force. The enemy had gained possession, and was doubtless settling down upon it to console himself for his grievous losses, when the division of Caldwell came to the rescue. With the brigades of Cross and Kelley in advance, supported by Brooke and Zook, Caldwell swept forward. No troops ever evinced greater valor, and the enemy was driven before them; but their losses were fearful, as the irregularities of the field enabled the enemy, who was concealed in advantageous positions, to rise up from unexpected quarters and pour in a most destructive fire. Indeed, the contest had been so long and stubbornly maintained, that the foe was becoming desperate and impatient of further resistance. The First brigade was commanded by the gallant Colonel Cross, of the Fifth New Hampshire, who, while leading his troops in the most intrepid manner, was slain. The situation was every moment becoming more and more complicated, as the enemy, having broken the line, was able to dispose his troops under cover so as to sweep the ground from several directions. The wheatfield and the broken surface to its west had become a slaughter-pen. As the second line, composed of the brigades of

Brooke and Zook, came up, it was discovered that a battery had been so posted by the enemy as to greatly annoy the Union troops. Determined to capture or silence it, Colonel Brooke led a charge of his brigade. But though it was vigorously made, and with the most unwavering intrepidity, Brooke soon found his flanks exposed to a withering fire, which, if continued, would annihilate his line, and he was forced to withdraw, himself receiving a severe wound.

The original position of Sickles, facing south, which had been held by Birney with such stubborn valor, had finally to be yielded, the supports which had been sent forward from the Second, Fifth, and Humphreys' division of the Third corps, being unable with all their strength to preserve it. As Caldwell's division was gradually retiring, having been engaged in the most deadly encounters, and having sustained severe losses, Ayres' division of the Fifth corps moved in, and though assailed with a fury that was appalling, it steadily fought its way forward, routing the enemy and succeeded in holding the important wooded ground in front and to the right of Little Round Top, which Sickles had regarded as so important to the retention of the field. In the midst of the desperate fighting, which like fiery billows swept over that devoted ground, General Sickles, who had exercised ceaseless vigilance and a tireless energy in maintaining the position and beating back the foe, fell, severely wounded, and was carried from the field, the command devolving upon General Birney.

While these struggles were continued in the wooded and broken ground which enveloped in its dark folds the little wheatfield, now tangled and torn, and blood-washed, as masses of living valor were borne over it, the line facing west, composed of Humphreys' division and a part of Graham's brigade, did not escape unscathed. Humphreys had sent out, early in the day, working parties who had levelled all the fences in his front, giving the opportunity for perfect freedom in manœuvring his troops, and, at a little after four o'clock, had taken position along the diagonal ridge on which runs the Emmittsburg pike. Little beyond occasional demonstrations had thus far occurred upon his front. But the time was rapidly approaching when the favorable moment for attack, directed by

the order of Lee, would come. At a little after six, Humphreys received notice from Birney that Sickles had fallen, and that he was in command of the corps, that he was about to fall back from his position facing south, which was nearly at right-angles to Humphreys' line, and requesting the latter also to fall back, so as to connect with his right. In other words, Humphreys and Graham were expected to swing back with Birney so as to keep the line intact. This was accomplished in tolerable order, Birney's men maintaining a resolute front, and gallantly checking any undue forwardness of the enemy in following up. But this movement left the right of Humphreys' division, where he clung to the Emmittsburg pike, in an exceedingly perilous position. The enemy were not slow in discovering it, and now pressed upon him with terrible earnestness. The interval between Humphreys' right and Hancock's left had been filled by the Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Eighty-second New York, and subsequently two other regiments, all from the Second corps, were hurried forward to the support of Humphreys' hard-pressed line. Humphreys says: "I was attacked on my flanks as well as on my front. I never have been under a hotter artillery and musketry fire combined. I may have been under a hotter musketry fire. For a moment, I thought the day was lost. I did not order my troops to fall back rapidly, because, so far as I could see, the crest in my rear was vacant, and I knew that when troops got to moving back rapidly, it was exceedingly difficult to stop them just where you wanted to stop them. At that moment I received an order to fall back to the Round Top ridge, which I did, slowly, suffering a very heavy loss."

As will be seen by an examination of the position in which Humphreys found himself at this juncture, he could have scarcely been in a worse condition to receive a determined attack. His division was almost in the shape of the side and the two ends of a parallelogram, and upon front and both flanks the enemy were rushing with the impetuosity of some demon guide. They were some of the best troops of Anderson's fresh division, which had escaped the fight of the preceding day, and had been held in hand through the long hours of that terrible struggle upon the extreme

left, ready to spring forward with the agility of a tiger leaping upon his prey. These were the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright. Posey and Mahone stood next, and then the division of Pender. It is asserted on the authority of a correspondent of the Richmond *Enquirer*, that these also had been ordered to advance. But as the movement of each brigade upon the rebel right was to be the signal for the next upon the left to move, the failure of Posey caused all the others to be withheld. The powerful brigade of Wright did come down with overwhelming force. Humphreys was a soldier by profession, and skilled in hard fighting, and to his cool courage and determination is due the preservation of his line as it retired to the Cemetery Ridge. So sudden was the onset, and so strong the pressure, that he was obliged to abandon three of his guns, the horses of which had all been killed.

But as the enemy came within range of the Second corps, crouched behind the low stone wall on the Cemetery Ridge, in their pursuit of Humphreys' retiring troops, an oblique and very destructive fire was poured in upon them, producing terrible slaughter. At a clump of trees, a little in advance of the Union line where a battery had been posted, the enemy had swarmed in considerable numbers, as they here found some protection from the rapid fire of the infantry. Here they had seized a brass piece from which the cannoniers had all been killed or driven away. Finding ammunition, they had loaded it and were turning it upon Owen's brigade, temporarily under command of General Webb. The regiments upon the front line were instantly ordered by Webb to charge and recapture the piece. With a gallantry habitual to that brigade, the order was executed, and after a sharp and sanguinary struggle, the enemy was routed and the piece retaken. It was instantly turned upon the retiring foe with deadly effect, helping them to make good time back to their lines.

The enemy felt keenly this last repulse; for when they saw Humphreys' line falling back, they believed the day was won, confidently anticipating that he would be unable to stay its backward course, and reform it so as to present any considerable opposition to their own victorious and impetuous assault. How great was their disappointment, the wails of their wounded, and the bitter

reproaches of the survivors against their comrades who failed to support them, but too plainly tells. The correspondent of the Richmond *Enquirer*, who was present upon this part of the field and witnessed the struggle, says: "We now had the key to the enemy's stronghold, and, apparently, the victory was won. McLaws and Hood had pushed their line well up the slope on the right; Wilcox had kept well up on his portion of the line; Wright had pierced the enemy's main line on the summit of McPherson's [Zeigler's] heights, capturing his heavy batteries, thus breaking the connection between their right and left wings. I said that, apparently, we had won the victory. It remains to be stated why our successes were not crowned with the important results which should have followed such heroic daring and indomitable bravery. Although the order was peremptory that all of Anderson's division should move into action simultaneously, Brigadier-General Posey, commanding a Mississippi brigade, and Brigadier-General Mahone, commanding a Virginia brigade, failed to advance. This failure of these two brigades to advance is assigned, as I learn upon inquiry, as the reason why Pender's division of Hill's corps did not advance—the order being, that the advance was to commence from the right, and be taken up along our whole line. Pender's failure to advance caused the division on his left—Heth's—to remain inactive. Here we have two whole divisions, and two brigades of another, standing idle spectators of one of the most desperate and important assaults that has ever been made on this continent—fifteen or twenty thousand men resting on their arms, in plain view of a terrible battle, witnessing the mighty efforts of two little brigades (Wright's and Wilcox's, for Perry had fallen back overpowered), contending with the heavy masses of Yankee infantry, and subjected to a most deadly fire from the enemy's heavy artillery, without a single effort to aid them in the assault, or to assist them when the heights were carried. . . . It was now apparent that the day was lost—lost after it was won—lost, not because our army fought badly, but because a large portion did not fight at all."

Had all the enemy's troops advanced, as is here shown that they were ordered to do, it is doubtful whether the Union line, disor-

ganized and broken as it was, and before the new and more contracted one had been fairly taken, would have been able to withstand the shock, and the impression of Humphreys, "For a moment I thought the day was lost," would have been realized. In addition to the reason here given by the rebel correspondent for the failure of Pender and Heth to move, there is another, far more weighty, which probably influenced them: After the rough handling they received from the First corps on the day before, it is probable they had little stomach for another fight.

There is no doubt that the successes which the enemy supposed he had gained here, by the unaided strength of one brigade, that of Wright, emboldened and encouraged him to make a second attempt at this very point on the following day.

Upon the fall of Sickles, General Hancock was ordered to turn over the command of his own corps to General Gibbon, and himself to assume the general supervision of the Second and Third corps. This he did, establishing his head-quarters midway between the Cemetery and Little Round Top, and proceeded to patch up the new line with such troops as were at hand. The divisions of Doubleday and Robinson, of the First corps, were brought up and posted to the left of the Second corps. Doubleday's diviison had been strengthened by ordering to it Stannard's brigade of Vermont troops some days before, but only joined on this day. The enemy had been repulsed before Doubleday reached the front; but he sent forward part of the Thirteenth Vermont under Colonel Randall, and the One Hundred and Forty-ninth and One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania regiments, which together rescued six pieces of artillery, that in retiring had been abandoned. The First Minnesota regiment also came up opportunely, which General Hancock led in person against a detachment of the enemy that was pushing through a part of the line under cover of a wood, and drove it back. General Williams, who had succeeded to the command of the Twelfth corps, ordered Ruger's division forward, to which Lockwood's Maryland brigade was attached, and put it in upon the left of the First corps troops. Williams also ordered Geary's division, with the exception of Green's brigade, over to the left; but, through some strange oversight in the direction of march, it never reached the point indicated.

The fighting upon the left continued with terrible earnestness until evening. Ayres' division of regulars was the last to advance into the mazes of this masquerade of death. Sickles, Barnes, Caldwell, and Ayres had gone out upon this ground in their pride of strength; but they had all been forced back finally by reason of the break at the Peach Orchard, where the enemy had penetrated, and had thus been able to flank every fresh reserve that had been sent against him; and for this cause Humphreys, upon the right, had finally been compelled to retire. All these disasters were the result of the loss of the key point, the little eminence at the Peach Orchard. An angle in the line of battle formed as was this, is intrinsically weak, inasmuch as the direct impact can be brought to bear upon it from two directions. But the same objection may be urged against the position of Steinwehr at the Cemetery. Could Sickles have taken this ground early in the day, and had lunettes and rifle-pits thrown up, he would have been invincible.

But though the advance position on the Emmittsburg pike had to be given up, the wooded ground in front of Round Top, from the occupation of which by the enemy Sickles feared so much, was held. It was just at dusk, and when Ayres, after having sustained severe losses and fought with the most determined valor, was retiring before a resolute and hopeful foe, that a brigade from Crawford's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, which he had formed upon the fringe of Little Round Top, came dashing through the low ground drained by Plum Run, and with a chorus peculiar to this noted body of men, went to his relief. Crawford had seized the brigade colors at the moment of moving, and, riding up and down the line, had called upon the men to make Pennsylvania their watchword, and to quail not upon its soil. McCandless, of the Second Reserve, commanded, and led them on. They had scarcely emerged from the hill, and begun to cross the low, swampy ground, when they were hailed by a shower of bullets. But to such a welcome had they been inured on many a gory field, and it only had the effect to quicken their onward pace. The rebels were ensconced behind a low stone wall at the edge of the wood. But the bayonets and bullets of the Reserves were

directed by hands too steady and resolute for successful resistance, and they were swept back. Under this stone wall McCandless formed his line, and threw out his skirmishers to the edge of the wheatfield.

This ended substantially the fighting for the day on this part of the field. The other brigade of the Reserve corps, under Fisher, as we have seen, went to the support of Vincent's and Weed's brigades, and during the night, with the Twentieth Maine in the lead, climbed to the summit of Round Top, and with the aid of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, established a line and erected a substantial stone breastwork from the loose boulders and broken fragments that cover the breast of the mountain. The enemy were at the westerly base of the hill, and were also fortifying, holding as far north as the Devil's Den, in the rocky cavern of which they took shelter.

CHAPTER VI.

FIGHTING ON THE RIGHT.

WHILE these momentous events of the battle were transpiring upon the left, the enemy made no less desperate and well-directed efforts to carry the right of the Union line. General Lee's order, as already noted, required that Ewell should "attack the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified." This was to be done simultaneously with the attack of Longstreet on the left. But Ewell did not move until the fierce fighting by Longstreet had been more than two hours in progress. This delay was evidently by design, as his corps had been in position and in entire readiness since the night before. The heat of the engagement on the left had thoroughly aroused the Union Commander, and he had hurried on corps after corps, and detachment after detachment, to the support of that wing. On the extreme right, a strong position had been taken and well fortified by the Twelfth corps. The position and fortification of that flank was such as to fulfil the principle in strategy to which reference has already been made, that the flanks of the infantry line should so rest as to be either by nature or by art made firm. But in his zeal to feed the left, the right flank was completely stripped, the whole of the Twelfth corps, with the exception of Greene's brigade of Geary's division, having been hurried away. Free course was thus given to the enemy to enter. This action seems the more inexplicable, inasmuch as the Sixth corps, the strongest in the whole army, had arrived on the ground at two P. M., two full hours before the fighting for the day had commenced, and it was neither used to

reinforce the left until the fighting had nearly ceased, nor was it put into the breastworks upon the right to supply the place made vacant by the withdrawal of the Twelfth. A worse blunder could not have been committed, for Greene's brigade was left hanging in the air, and would have been utterly routed, had a man of less nerve than Greene commanded, or troops less resolute and daring occupied that ground.

Ewell was not long in discovering the advantage offered him, and at a little before sunset, he put his corps in motion. It was composed of soldiers who had so often followed the indomitable and tireless Stonewall Jackson to victory.

The Union line, commencing at the Baltimore pike, extended around the breast of the Cemetery Hill, the artillery, Weiderick's and Ricketts' batteries, upon the summit, and the infantry, a part of the Eleventh corps, under cover of the stone walls. To the right of the Cemetery Hill is a little ravine or depression, marking the end of Cemetery and the beginning of Culp's Hill. Upon the little table-land, at this extremity of the latter, was posted Stevens' Maine battery, which had played so important a part in the action of the first day. His pieces looked across this ravine and the approaches from the town to Cemetery Hill. Just at his right commenced the heavy breastworks, built by Wadsworth, upon the very brow of Culp's Hill, overhanging the steep, rugged acclivity which reaches down almost to the bank of Rock Creek, that runs at its base. This breastwork was carried around the hill, and was taken up by Greene, whose right rested at a ravine that descends to a considerable wooded plateau. Greene had refused his right, and carried his breastwork back so as to protect his flank, and from which he could command the passage up this ravine—the ravine itself being left open. On the opposite side the breastworks were again taken up and carried around nearly to Spangler's Spring. But beyond this little ravine at Greene's right, no troops were in position.

Upon Benner's Hill, opposite to Cemetery Hill, Ewell had planted his artillery, which opened with great vigor when the battle commenced. But the guns on Cemetery Hill had no sooner got the range, than they speedily silenced it. A gentle-

man "residing near Gettysburg," as related by De Peyster, "on the road past Benner's, said to have been an eye-witness, stated that the Union batteries on Cemetery Ridge knocked the rebel batteries, on Benner's Hill, into *pi* in twenty minutes after the former got the range." The superiority of the Union guns here was no doubt largely due to the fact that they were protected by lunettes, while the rebel guns stood all uncovered. As soon as he discovered his artillery fire slackening, Ewell prepared his infantry to advance. The sun was already near his setting, and the evening shades were gathering. Lines of rebel troops were discernible from Cemetery Hill, away to the right of Culp's Hill, apparently moving to attack. Soon a small column was seen proceeding from the town, across the Union front, away towards Benner's Hill, as if to join the troops already there. Colonel Von Gilsa, whose brigade was posted at the foot of Cemetery Hill, detached a regiment, and sent it forward to observe the movements of this force, and what was passing farther to the right beyond his view. This regiment had not proceeded far, before there suddenly emerged from behind a hill to the east of the town, long lines of infantry formed for an assault, which moved onward in magnificent array. This isolated regiment could do nothing but hasten back to its position; but this grand column, reaching from near the town to Rock Creek, moved with the steadiness and precision of parade. They were the brigades of Hayes and Hoke, led by the famous Louisiana Tigers. The instant they emerged to view, Stevens to the right opened with all his guns, and Weiderick and Ricketts joined in the chorus. The slaughter was terrible. Ricketts charged his guns with canister, and with four shots per minute, was, at every discharge, hurling death and confusion upon their ranks. Stevens' fire was even more effective, as it enfiladed the enemy's line. As the rebels came within musket range, Howard's infantry, who had lain completely protected by the stone wall, poured in volley after volley, sweeping down the charging host. But that resolute body of men believed themselves invincible, and now, with the eyes of both armies upon them, they would not break so long as any were left to go forward. The stone walls were passed at a bound,

and when once among the Union men, Stevens was obliged to cease firing for fear of killing friend and foe alike, and Weiderick was unable to withstand the shock, his supports and his own men being swept back with a whirlwind's force. But Ricketts quailed not, upon whom the force of the blow now fell. "With an iron hand," says the chronicler of this battery, "he kept every man to his post and every gun in full play. The giving way of our line upon the left brought the Tigers upon his flank. Pouring in a volley from behind a stone wall that ran close to his left piece, they leaped the fence, bayonetted the men, spiked the gun, and killed or wounded the entire detachment, save three, who were taken prisoners. But the remaining guns still belched forth their double rounds of canister, the officers and drivers taking the places of the fallen cannoniers. The battery's guidon was planted in one of the earthworks, and a rebel Lieutenant was pressing forward to gain it. Just as he was in the act of grasping it, young Riggin, its bearer, rode up and shot him through the body, and seizing the colors, he levelled his revolver again, but ere he could fire, he fell pierced with bullets, and soon after expired. The rebels were now in the very midst of the battery, and in the darkness it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe. A struggle ensued for the guidon. It had fallen into the hands of the rebel. Seeing this, Lieutenant Brockway seized a stone and felled him to the ground, and the next instant the rebel was shot with his own musket. A scene of the wildest confusion ensued. The men at the batteries were outnumbered, and were being overpowered by a maddened and reckless foe. But still they clung to their guns, and with handspikes, rammers, and stones, defended them with desperate valor, cheering each other on, and shouting, 'Death on our own State soil, rather than give the enemy our guns.' At this critical moment, Carroll's brigade came gallantly to the rescue, and the enemy retreated in confusion. The men again flew to their guns, and with loud cheers gave him some parting salutes, in the form of double-shotted canister. Thus ended the grand charge of Early's division, headed by the famous Louisiana Tigers, who boasted that they had never before been repulsed in a charge. They came forward, 1700

strong, maddened with liquor, and confident of crushing in our line, and holding this commanding position. They went back barely 600, and the Tigers were never afterwards known as an organization."

But while this daring and desperate struggle was being fought out for the possession of Cemetery Hill, a no less persistent and far more formidable force was breaking in upon the extreme right flank. This was Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, led by the old Stonewall brigade which had given Jackson his sobriquet, full of the spirit of its old leader, and now that he was fallen nerved to strike for his sake. Johnson was supported by the division of Rodes. Crossing Rock Creek, which at this season is easily fordable at all points, the rebel line advanced through the forest which covers the whole plateau that spreads out at the base of the hill. The Union skirmishers who had been thrown out to the front were quickly driven in, and, following them up rapidly, the enemy soon came under fire from the breastworks where the brigade of Greene, and farther to the left the division of Wadsworth, were posted. Before this fire the rebels recoiled; but they were not long in discovering that the strong breastworks to Greene's right, built with much engineering skill and with great labor, were vacant, and with alacrity they sprang forward and occupied them unresisted. As has been already noted, when, on the evening of this day the pressure was at its height upon Sickles' front, Ruger's and Geary's divisions, with the exception of Greene's brigade of the latter, had been withdrawn from this flank, and sent to reinforce the left. They had not long been gone when this advance of the enemy was made, and these works fell into their hands. The principal resistance they encountered was from Greene; but they were confident of their ability to sweep him away, and take the whole Union line in reverse. Fortunately, Greene had caused his flank to be fortified by a very heavy work, which the make of the ground favored, extending some distance at right-angles to his main line. Against this the rebel commander sent his cohorts. The men behind it swept the assailants with swift destruction. Again and again did the rebels attack in front and flank, but as often as they approached they were stricken down and disappeared. To a

terrible ordeal was this little brigade of the intrepid Greene subjected; but he was a veteran soldier, and he made a most gallant fight, which saved the left flank of the army from disaster. Passing over the abandoned breastworks farther to the right, the enemy found nothing to oppose him, and pushed out through the woods in their rear, over the stone fences that skirt the fields farther to the south, and had nearly gained the Baltimore pike. Indeed, the reserve artillery and ammunition, and the head-quarters of General Slocum, the commander of the right wing of the army, were within musket range of his farthest advance.

But darkness had now come on, and Ewell was disposed to be cautious, lest he might fall into a trap. Had he known the advantage which was open to him, and all that we now know, he might, with the troops he had, have played havoc with the trains, and have set the whole army in retreat. But he was ignorant of the prize that was within his grasp. To break and drive the right flank of the Union line, occupied by Greene, was legitimate and proper work, and here he spent his strength, but in futile and vain efforts.

Why Slocum, who was particularly charged with the command of this part of the field, ever allowed these works to be entirely stripped of defenders, or why Meade, whose head-quarters were in sight of this natural stronghold, and the importance of which he must have become perfectly familiar with during the morning hours, when he was meditating an attack upon the enemy from that very ground, should have called them away, are questions which, if answered at all, must be by some new school of strategy.

It was fortunate for the Union army, that fast-coming darkness drew its curtain around the vulnerable parts everywhere spread out, and that under its cover opportunity was given to mend that which was broken and disjointed. Geary's division was ordered back to occupy its abandoned works, and having marched to a point opposite, on the Baltimore pike, was making for them directly across the fields, all unsuspicious of danger, when it was suddenly arrested by a volley from behind a stone wall, by which one officer and three men of the Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania were killed, and

ten wounded. Believing that he was being fired into by men of the First brigade, General Kane, who was in advance, withdrew to the pike, and marching up nearer the Cemetery Hill, again proceeded towards the breastworks, and after connecting with the right of Greene, sent forward skirmishers, who soon met the enemy, and then for the first time he realized that the foe, in strong force, was in full possession of all of the eastern part of Culp's Hill.

Geary immediately formed on the right of Greene, stretching out nearly at right-angles to the main line of battle, taking advantage of the ground which was here quite broken, covered with loose rocks and ledges, and a medium growth of forest trees. The men slept upon their arms, only disturbed by occasional firing of skirmishers. During the night, Ruger's division was brought back and posted upon the flank and rear of the enemy, and General Williams assumed chief command. At three o'clock on the morning of the 3d, objects could be seen moving cautiously about on the rebel line, and it soon became evident that the foe was preparing for a charge. General Kane was upon the alert, and quickly divined the purpose. His men were aroused, and the whole line was prepared for action. General Geary discerned the advantage which would be gained by opening the battle himself, instead of allowing the enemy to charge with the impression that he was surprising the Union line. Hence, at twenty minutes before four, he discharged his pistol, which was the signal for opening along his whole front. "The Confederate General Johnson's division led," says General Kane, in his official report, "followed by Rodes. The statement of our prisoners is, that they advanced in three lines, but they appeared to us only as closed in mass. Every advantage was taken of rock and tree and depression, on both sides, the lines being within close range, and the fight, for the most part, partook of the nature of sharpshooting on a grand scale. Occasionally the enemy formed in heavy lines and charged; but before they could reach the Union front, so terrible was the slaughter, that the survivors would not respond to the frantic appeals of their officers to advance."

As the day wore on, the heat from the fire and smoke of battle,

and the scorching of the July sun, became so intense as to be almost past endurance. Men were completely exhausted in the progress of the struggle, and had to be often relieved; but, revived by fresh air and a little period of rest, again returned to the front. "We ceased firing occasionally," says Kane, "for a minute or two, to induce the enemy to come out of advantageous positions, when they paid for their temerity; but with this exception, kept up a fire of unintermitting strength for seven hours."

As soon as it was light, and the position of the Union forces was sufficiently determined to fire with safety, the artillery, posted on little eminences to the rear, opened upon the points where the rebels were supposed to be, for friend and foe were hidden from view by the dark foliage of the wood. Whitelaw Reid, now Editor of the New York *Tribune*, who was upon the field throughout the last two days, as chronicler of the battle, says: "I had gone down the Baltimore pike at night, to find a resting-place. Coming up between four and five, I heard clearly on the right the old charging cheer. Once, twice, three times I counted it, as my horse pushed his way for less than a mile through the curious or coward throng that ebbed and flowed along the pike. Each time a charge was made, each time the musketry fire leaped out from our line more terrific than before, and still the ground was held. To the left and centre, firing gradually ceased. All interest was concentred on this fierce contest on the right; the rest of the line on either side was bracing itself for still more desperate work. From four to five, there was heavy cannonading also, from our batteries nearest the contested points, but the artillery fire diminished and presently ceased. The rebels made no reply; we were firing at random, and it was a useless waste of ammunition. A cloud of smoke curled up from the dark woods on the right; the musketry crash continued with unparalleled tenacity and vehemence, wounded men came back over the fields, a few stragglers were hurried out to the front, ammunition was kept conveniently near the line. In the fields to the left of the Baltimore pike stood the reserve artillery, with horses harnessed to the pieces, and ready to move on the instant. Cavalry, too, was drawn up in detachments here and there. Moved over already within supporting dis-

tance of Slocum's line stood a part of Sedgwick's corps, the reserve of to-day, ready for the emergency that seemed likely soon to demand it. . . . The Rodman guns on the hill [Powers', Slocum's head-quarters] were all manned, and the gunners were eager to try their range, but it still seemed useless. . . . As I rode down the slope and up through the wheatfields to Cemetery Hill, the batteries began to open again on points along our outer line. They were evidently playing on what had been Slocum's line of yesterday. The rebels, then, were still in our rifle-pits. Presently the battery on Slocum's Hill gained the long-sought permission, and opened, too, aiming apparently in the same direction. Other batteries along the inner line, just to the left of the Baltimore pike [McAllister's Hill], followed the signal, and as one after another opened up, till every little crest between Slocum's head-quarters and Cemetery Hill began belching its thunder, I had to change my course through the wheatfields to avoid our own shells. Still no artillery response from the rebels. Could they be short of ammunition? Could they have failed to bring up all their guns?"

To one conversant with the ground, it is now apparent why the enemy did not reply. The creek, the forest, and the steep acclivities, made it utterly impossible for him to move up his guns, and this circumstance constituted the weakness of his position, and the futility of his occupation of this part of the line. Could he have supported his advance with powerful artillery, he might have made a more serious break, and defied all attempts to rout him from this ground. But though he fought with a determined bravery well worthy the name of the old time leader, yet he gained no ground, and had sustained terrible losses. Unwilling to accept the hopelessness of their situation, or the possibility of ultimate failure, the rebel leaders gathered in their scattered strength and prepared to deliver a final charge, with such determined might as they confidently anticipated would utterly break down and scatter any force which could oppose them. The men were encouraged with the hope of victory, and were appealed to by the memories of other fields. Every incentive was employed to stimulate their zeal. The charge was made full upon the line held by Kane's

brigade. With little intermission, his men had been engaged since early dawn; but, though exhausted by fatigue and oppressive heat, they were as resolute and full of fight as at the first. There had been a lull in the battle, a brief respite, and the dense cloud of sulphurous smoke had lifted, giving place to a gust of sweet air. It was the calm that precedes the storm. Suddenly the quiet was broken by a yell bursting from thousands of lungs, and the next instant their grey lines emerged in sight, dashing madly on. Singularly enough, they were preceded a few yards by a rabid dog, with vengeful eyes and teeth, yelping and sounding defiance. They had scarcely come into easy musket range, when the men in blue along the line sprang to their feet and poured in a deliberate volley. The shock was terrible. The on-coming force was staggered, and for a moment sought shelter behind trees and rocks; but obedient to the voices of their officers they struggled on, some of the more desperate coming within twenty paces of the Union front. "It cannot be denied," says Kane, "that they behaved courageously." They did what the most resolute could do; but it was all in vain, for never were men more firmly rooted to the ground, and less in the mood to be torn from it than were Kane's forces. Broken and well-nigh annihilated, the survivors of the charge staggered back, leaving the ground strewn with their dead and desperately wounded. "Then did the shouts of victory," says a soldier, who bore a musket, and shared in the triumph, "resound and echo from all parts of the line on the right flank, telling our comrades miles away of the result, and Lee's discomfiture. Men cheered themselves hoarse, laughed, rolled themselves upon the ground, and threw their caps high in air, while others shook hands with comrades, and thanked God that the Star Corps had again triumphed."

Though this was the last of the enemy's determined assaults, a vigorous fusilade was kept up along his whole front. But now a cordon was being drawn about him, which was beginning to threaten his way of retreat. A brigade was thrown in upon his flank on Rock Creek, which sent a few well-directed volleys into his rear, and when, soon after, Geary charged from the front, the foe easily yielded to the pressure, and the breastworks were again

joyfully occupied, after a struggle rarely paralleled for prolonged severity. This flank was now secure; but the enemy still held a barricade in the immediate front of the breastworks, and kept a skirmish line well advanced, from which a deadly fire was directed upon any object which showed itself above the defences. Beyond this, no further offensive movements were made.

But, what a field was this! For three hours of the previous evening, and seven of the morning, had the most terrible elements of destruction known to modern warfare been wielded with a might and a dexterity rarely if ever paralleled. The wood in which the battle had been fought was torn and rent with shells and solid shot, and pierced with innumerable minié balls. Trees were broken off and splintered, and that entire forest, where the battle raged most furiously, was, on the following year, leafless, the stately but mute occupants having yielded up their lives with those whom they overshadowed. The ground, as it presented itself when the battle was over, bore a mournful spectacle. "We awoke early on the 5th," says the soldier above quoted, "as we had done on the three preceding mornings, and discovered that the foe had disappeared from our front. A number of us immediately sprang over the breastworks, and descended the hill towards the creek. Before advancing many paces, we came upon numberless forms clad in grey, either stark and stiff or else still weltering in their blood. It was the most sickening and horrible sight I had yet witnessed. Many of the dead bodies had lain here for twenty-four hours, and had turned to a purplish black, being greatly distended and emitting a horrible stench. Turning whichever way we chose, the eye rested upon human forms, lying in all imaginable positions, some upon their backs, others upon their faces, and others still upon their knees, the body supported against a rock. Not a few were killed while in readiness to discharge their pieces, the bodies still in position. Some of them had erected a slight protection of stone against the front and right flank fire, yet the fatal bullet reached them even there. We were surprised at the accuracy, as well as the bloody results of our fire. It was indeed dreadful to witness. Farther down the hill, we found Major Light, Assistant Adjutant-General on Ewell's staff, dead, as well

as his horse, which lay partly upon him. One of the rebel wounded informed us that he had been killed while superintending one of the advances made against us during the night. We turned from the sickening spectacle of the dead to the wounded, of whom there were many, all helpless; those who could be, having already been removed. To these we gave the contents of our canteens. Their haversacks were better filled than our own, for they had good bacon and pork, which they had foraged from the farmers of the Cumberland Valley." General Geary relates that while passing over the field after the battle, his attention was called to one of the enemy's killed who must have been an anomaly among men. The dead, after lying in the hot sun for a day, always appear distorted. But this man was nearly seven feet in stature, of giant proportions, and his body was completely covered with hair like an animal. He had apparently belonged to a Virginia organization, and had fallen in one of those desperate charges which the old Stonewall brigade had delivered. Of such commanding figure, his body was a target for the unerring rifles of Geary's men.

Thus ended the fighting upon the right, which, though interrupted by a few hours of darkness, and made to reach into two days, was really one battle; but in considering the influences which swayed the two commanders, the aspects of the field at the close of the second day should alone be regarded.

The results of that day on the part of the enemy were, in a measure, successful, but not to that extent which had been hoped. Longstreet had made his assault with great power. He had driven the Union line back from the Peach Orchard, and the rugged position to the south and east of it, and from the whole length of the Emmittsburg road, gaining ground nearly three-quarters of a mile in width at the centre, and running out to a point at either end. But he had failed to gain Little Round Top, which was the great advantage craved; and he had likewise been unable to grasp the wooded eminence to the right and front of Little Round Top, and the heavy wooded ground northeast of the wheatfield, which served as outposts to the citadel. At Cemetery Hill he had been signally repulsed, suffering severe losses and

gaining no advantage whatever. On the extreme Union right he had effected a lodgment, and had pushed forward in dangerous proximity to the very vitals of the army; but darkness fell before the fruits of the manœuvre could be gathered, and the night was sure to give opportunity for dispositions which would oust him from his already dear-bought advantage. The outlook was not, therefore, particularly encouraging. A good share of the potential force of his army had been spent, and on no part of the field had any real, substantial gain been made. In his official report, Lee says: "After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day." It will be seen that he does not speak in very strong terms of the results of the day's work, terming them "partial successes."

Curiosity is excited to know the feelings of the citizens of Gettysburg during these days of terror and destruction, as they were now entirely within the enemy's lines. Professor Jacobs, who gives many interesting experiences, says: "To us, however, who were at the time within the rebel lines, the result seemed doubtful; and gloomy forebodings filled our minds as we laid ourselves down, to catch, if possible, a little sleep. The unearthly yells of the exultant and defiant enemy had, during the afternoon, been frequently heard even amidst the almost deafening sounds of exploding cannon, of screaming and bursting shells, and of the continuous roar of musketry; and it seemed to us, judging from the character and direction of these mingled noises, that the enemy had been gaining essentially on our flanks. At about six P. M., it is true, we heard 'cheering' different from that which had so often fallen dolefully upon our ears; and some of the rebels said to each other, 'Listen! the Yankees are cheering.' But whilst this—which we afterwards found to have been the cheering of General Crawford's men as they charged down the face of Little Round Top—afforded us temporary encouragement,

the movement of Rodes' division, which we saw hurried forward on a double-quick for the purpose of uniting in a combined attack upon our right centre and flank, the incessant and prolonged musketry fire, and the gradual cessation of the reports of our artillery on Cemetery Hill, caused us to fear that our men had been badly beaten, and that our guns had either been captured or driven back from the advantageous position they had occupied. . . . The rebels returned again to our street at ten P. M., and prepared their supper, and soon we began to hope that all was not lost. Some of them expressed their most earnest indignation at the foreigners—the Dutchmen—for having shot down so many of their men. . . . We afterwards found the explanation of this indignation when we learned what had taken place that evening on the eastern flank of Cemetery Hill. Then again, soon after this, some were heard to say: 'The Yankees have a *good* position, and we must drive them out of it to-morrow.' This assured us that our men had been able to hold their position, and that our lines were unbroken. There seemed now to be an entire absence of that elation and boastfulness which they manifested when they entered the town on the evening of the 1st of July. Still later at night, one said to another in tones of great earnestness, 'I am very much discouraged,' from which we learned that the results of the day were not in accordance with their high expectations, although they said, during the evening, they had been driving us on our right and our left."

If such was the aspect at the rebel head-quarters and in the town, what was it within the Union lines? On the left severe fighting had occurred. Terrible losses had been sustained, and though driven back from the advanced line, a new one had been taken that was strong in itself throughout many of its parts, and had now been made doubly strong by art. It had the advantage of being much shorter than the first, and hence required a less number of men to hold it. At the centre, where Howard was, the killed and wounded were numerous, but not an inch had been lost, and there was very good assurance from the result of the mad attempt upon it, that such temerity would not be repeated. On the extreme right, works which had been left without a defender

had been occupied, the foe walking coolly in and taking undisputed possession. But the troops who were in position, and who had been struck by the enemy, held their own with a stubbornness and a heroism that will shed a halo over this part of the field, as long as the struggles of Gettysburg shall be recounted. Hence no ground, that was defended, even here had been lost. Could this ground, which had unopposed been occupied, be repossessed, and this slight break be repaired, the Union situation for delivering a defensive battle would be admirable. There had, indeed, been severe losses during the two days of fighting. The First corps, the Eleventh, the Third, parts of the Second and the Fifth, and one brigade of the Twelfth, had been subjected to the most terrible shocks, and at least a third of their numbers had been blotted out; but what remained were more defiant and full of stubborn valor than ever, and would everywhere make a gallant stand, while the whole of the Sixth corps, most of the Twelfth, and parts of the Second and Fifth were comparatively fresh.

But though this hopeful view in reality existed, there appears to have been entertained a despondent one at head-quarters. Just previous to the opening of the battle on the afternoon of the 2d, a council of corps commanders had been summoned, which, before proceeding to business, or even before all the officers had arrived, had been broken up by the roar of the artillery which heralded the fight. What the object of that meeting was, and what business would have been transacted, has never transpired. But later in the evening, and before the fighting had entirely subsided on the right, another council was held at which General Butterfield, General Meade's Chief of Staff, reports that the only question put was, "Whether our army should remain on that field and continue the battle, or whether we should change to some other position." The minutes of that council appear to have been lost; but the majority voted to stay and fight it out there, though General Newton is reported to have said that "he was not prepared to vote to leave it, but he wanted the council to understand that he had objections to it." "After the council had finished," says Butterfield, "General Meade arose from the table, and

remarked that in his opinion, Gettysburg was no place to fight a battle." General Meade in his supplementary testimony declares that the object of this council was not to consider the question of withdrawal, but, "first, whether it was necessary for us to assume any different position from what we then held; and secondly, whether, if we continued to maintain the position we then held, our operations the next day should be offensive or defensive."

With the exception of General Butterfield, General Hancock is the only officer who gives a clear and connected account of this council, though all agree, that such a question was propounded. General Hancock testifies: "There was a council held that evening at General Meade's head-quarters. All the corps commanders were sent for. I was present. Some of this fighting was going on at twilight, and after we had assembled. . . . After each corps commander had reported the actual condition of things along his front, the question was submitted to the council, General Meade being present, and General Butterfield questioning the members whether we should remain there or the army fall back to a better position—I understood with a view of protecting our supplies. One corps commander, I think it was General Newton, said he did not think the position of Gettysburg a very good one. General Gibbon, who was the junior officer, I believe, and voted first, said that he had not seen the entire ground, but he had great confidence in General Newton's military eye for these matters, and he voted in accordance with that view of the case, except that he objected to anything that looked like a retreat. I understood afterwards that General Newton really had the same view, and did not propose to make a retreat. But all the other commanders, I understood, said they wished to fight the battle there, and General Meade announced that to be the decision. The council then adjourned, and that was the last operation of the second day of the fight." This testimony of General Hancock may be taken as a correct statement of the business transacted. For offensive operations the field was not favorable, and if the enemy had succeeded in making a permanent lodgment in rear of the right wing, the position of the Union army would have been an anomalous one, calling for wise consideration. It was this

uncertainty in the mind of General Meade, and the desire to have the explanations of his corps commanders, who knew the ground each on his own part of the field much better than he himself could, that induced him to call the council. The question of staying or retiring involved in its discussion the information which he sought.

In the first grey of the morning of the 3d, opened the struggle for the mastery of the right, as has been already related, which ended in the complete rout of the enemy, and the re-establishment of that flank. From a little after ten, when the battle on this part of the line gradually died away, until after one P. M., there was a complete lull in the fighting. But it was apparent by the movement of troops and guns on the part of the enemy, which could be plainly detected from various points in the Union line, that preparations were in progress for another attack. Dispositions were accordingly made to meet the onset from whatever quarter it might come. Batteries were repaired and replaced, ammunition was brought up in convenient distance, and the infantry line was revised and strengthened. Nor was the cavalry idle. Kilpatrick, who had encountered Stuart at Hanover, was on the lookont for the latter as he returned from Carlisle. At Hunterstown, on the evening of the 2d, they had met and there ensued a warm artillery engagement in which the enemy was driven; Kilpatrick then moved over to the Baltimore pike, and was thence ordered on the morning of the 3d to the extreme left, where he was joined by Merritt, who had come up from Emmittsburg. It was here posted to guard against any flank movement in that direction. Gregg was sent out upon the right between the York and Bonaughtown roads, where he encountered the enemy and drove him back.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FINAL STRUGGLE.

SINCE the Union army had come into its present position, on the evening of the 1st of July, the rebel leader had exerted his utmost efforts to put it to rout. He had, with much skill and daring, attempted, first to break the left flank and gain that commanding ground. With equal pertinacity, he had striven to break and hold the left centre. On the right centre he had made a bold, yea, reckless attack, with some of the most daring troops in his army. Finally, he had sent the major part of a corps to fall upon the extreme right, where he made an entrance, and for more than twelve hours held it. But in all these operations he had been foiled, and for all the extravagant waste of the strength of his army, he had no substantial advantage to show. Unless he could strike his antagonist at some vital point, and send home the shaft, the battle to him was hopelessly lost, and he would no longer be able to remain on northern soil. To stand on the defensive, or attempt to manœuvre in presence of a victorious foe, would be fatal; for he had no supplies except what he foraged for.

He accordingly determined to hazard all on one desperate throw. He had one division, that of Pickett of Longstreet's corps, which had not yet been in the fight, having just come up to the front from Chambersburg. This, with other of the freshest and best of his troops, he determined to mass on his right centre, opposite the point where Wright's brigade had, the night before, made so gallant a charge on Humphreys' division, and, after having disposed all the artillery he could use to advantage on the

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two miles of line from which he would concentrate its fire, and had subjected the fatal spot on the Union line to a terrific cannonade, to hurl this mass of living valor upon that scourged, and as he hoped, shattered front, with the expectation of breaking through by the weight and power of the shock. To this end, artillery was brought up from the reserve and from his extreme left. The infantry was likewise gathered in, Pickett's division having a place between Anderson's and Heth's of Hill's corps, Hill being charged with supporting Pickett when the time of action should come, and Longstreet over all.

On the Union side, the space from which artillery could be used was much shorter than that which the enemy held, and hence a proportionately less number of pieces was brought into play. On the right, commencing with Cemetery Hill, was Major Osborne with the batteries of Ricketts, Weiderick, Dilger, Bancroft, Eakin, Wheeler, Hill, and Taft. But few of these, however, from their location, could be used to advantage. Next him, directly in front of Meade's head-quarters, commencing at Zeigler's Grove, and extending south along Hancock's front, was Major Hazzard with the batteries of Woodruff, Arnold, Cushing, Brown, and Rorty. Still further to the left, reaching down to the low ground where, by training the guns obliquely to the right, a raking fire could be delivered on the assaulting lines, were the batteries of Thomas, Thompson, Phillips, Hart, Sterling, Rock, Cooper, Dow, and Ames, under Major McGilvray. Away to the left, on the summit of Little Round Top, were those of Gibbs and Rittenhouse. "We had thus," says General Hunt, Chief of artillery, "on the western crest line, seventy-five guns, which could be aided by a few of those on Cemetery Hill." From eighty to ninety guns were hence in position for effective service. Later, when the enemy's infantry charged, Fitzhugh's, Parson's, Weir's, Cowan's, and Daniel's batteries were brought up to reinforce the line and take the place of disabled and unserviceable guns. Of infantry, there was the division of Robinson of the First corps at Zeigler's Grove, and to his left were the divisions of Hays and Gibbon of the Second corps, and that of Doubleday of the First corps. Still farther to the left were Caldwell of the Second corps, and parts of the Third, Fifth, and Sixth corps.

At about one o'clock P. M., the enemy, having perfected all his plans, made the attack. Silence, for more than two hours, had reigned, when, of a sudden, 150 guns were run to the front. No sooner were they planted and sighted, than from their mouths tongues of flame leaped forth throughout the whole lurid circumference, and the ground rocked as in the throes of an earthquake. For an instant, the air was filled with a hissing, bursting, fiery cloud, and a torrent, as if suddenly let loose in mid-sky, hitherto all glorious and serene, descended, in its death-dealing mission, upon the long lines of the living crouched below. Nor was it the casual dash of a fitful April day; but in steady torrents it descended. The Union guns were not unprepared, and from eighty brazen throats the response was made, in tones

"That mocked the deep-mouthed thunder."

The Union infantry officers had cautioned their men to hug closely the earth, and to take shelter behind every object which could afford them protection, well knowing that this cannonade was only the prelude to an infantry attack. The enemy's infantry was out of harm's reach. But notwithstanding every precaution was taken to shelter the Union troops, the destruction was terrible. Men were torn limb from limb, and blown to atoms by the villanous shells. Horses were disembowelled, and thrown prostrate to writhe in death agonies. Caissons, filled with ammunition, were exploded, cannon rent, and steel-banded gun-carriages knocked into shapeless masses. Solid shot, Whitworth, chain-shot, shrapnell, shells, and every conceivable missile known to the dread catalogue of war's art, were ceaselessly hurled upon that devoted ground. Major Harry T. Lee relates an incident that occurred while lying prostrate near General Doubleday, whose aid he was, which illustrates the indifference with which one long schooled in military duty may come to look upon the most appalling dangers. The General, having been busy manœuvring his troops, had had no dinner. He had already had two horses killed, and having thrown himself upon the ground, had pulled from his pocket a sandwich, which he was about to eat, when a huge missile from one of the enemy's guns struck the ground within a few feet of his

head, deluging his sandwich with sand. Coolly turning to the Major, he remarked, "That sandwich will need no pepper," and immediately proceeded with his lunch.

Scarcely had the battle opened, ere the powerful missiles began to fall in the very midst of the little farmhouse where General Meade had made his head-quarters. As the shots began to strike about him, the General came to the door and told the staff who were in waiting, that the enemy manifestly had the range of his quarters, and that they had better go up the slope fifteen or twenty yards to the stable. "Every size and form of shell," says Mr. Wilkinson, in his correspondence from the field to the New York *Times*, "known to British and American gunnery, shrieked, moaned, and whistled, and wrathfully fluttered over our ground. As many as six in a second, constantly two in a second, bursting and screaming over and around the head-quarters, made a very hell of fire that amazed the oldest officers. They burst in the yard—burst next to the fence, on both sides garnished as usual with the hitched horses of aids and orderlies. The fastened animals reared and plunged with terror. Then one fell, then another. Sixteen lay dead and mangled before the fire ceased, still fastened by their halters, which gave the impression of being wickedly tied up to die painfully. These brute victims of cruel war touched all hearts. Through the midst of the storm of screaming and exploding shells, an ambulance, driven by its frenzied conductor at full speed, presented to all of us the marvellous spectacle of a horse going rapidly on three legs. A hinder one had been shot off at the hock. A shell tore up the little step at the head-quarters cottage, and ripped bags of oats as with a knife. Another soon carried off one of its two pillars. Soon a spherical case burst opposite the open door. Another ripped through the low garret. The remaining pillar went almost immediately to the howl of a fixed shot that Whitworth must have made. During this fire, the horses at twenty and thirty feet distant were receiving their death, and soldiers in Federal blue were torn to pieces in the road, and died with the peculiar yells that blend the extorted cry of pain with horror and despair."

For an hour and three-quarters this angry storm continued.

During this space, which seemed an age to the unhappy victims upon whom it beat, the enemy had delivered a ceaseless fire. General Howe, an accomplished soldier, testifies: "I have never heard a more furious cannonade, nor one where there was greater expenditure of ammunition on both sides." The Union guns did not, however, continue to answer the whole time; but, that the guns might have time to cool, and ammunition be saved for the emergency which was sure to follow, the order was given to cease firing. "I ordered them," says General Hunt, Chief of artillery, "commencing at the Cemetery, to slacken their fire and cease it, in order to see what the enemy were going to do, and also to be sure that we retained a sufficient supply of ammunition to meet, what I then expected, an attack. At the same time, batteries were ordered up to replace those guns which had been damaged, or which had expended too much ammunition."

The enemy, perhaps interpreting this silence in part to the accuracy and telling effect of his fire, soon after ordered his own to cease. And now was discovered the indications of the part which his infantry was to play. Just in front of the rebel fortified line, which was concealed from view by a curtain of wood, a mass of infantry suddenly appeared, and were quickly marshalled in battle array. Pickett's fresh division was formed in two lines, Kemper and Garnett leading, supported by Armistead, with Wilcox and Perry of Hill's corps upon his right, so disposed as to protect his flank, and Pettigrew commanding Heth's division, and Trimble with two brigades of Pender, also of Hill's corps, for a like purpose upon his left. Thus compactly formed, presenting as it were three fronts, this powerful body, estimated at 18,000 men, moved forward to the assault.

> "Firm paced and slow a horrid front they form,
> Still as the breeze but dreadful as the storm."

No obstacle intervened to prevent the sight of the enemy's formation and advance by nearly the entire Union line, so that the dullest private, alike with the General, saw plainly from the start the cloud that was gathering over him. Each as he grasped his weapon felt that the impact of that well-wrought and high-tempered

mass would be terrible. Was there strength enough in that thin line against which it was hurrying to withstand the dreadful shock, and send it back in fatal rebound?

The position of that portion of Hays' troops, commencing near Bryan's well, just south of Zeigler's Grove, was favorable for resistance. For a shelving rock crops out along the ridge, three or four feet in height, looking towards the Emmittsburg pike, upon the crest of which, extending a quarter of a mile, is a low stone fence, composed of loose boulders, and behind this, affording very good shelter, they were lying. To the left of Hays the fence makes a sharp angle jutting out towards the pike, for a few rods, when the same low stone fence, surmounted by a single rail, continues on towards the left along the ridge which gradually falls away, and at the plain it is met by a post-and-rail fence, in front of which a slight rifle-pit had been thrown up. Commencing at the angle and extending south was General Owen's brigade, now temporarily commanded by General Webb, comprising the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania, Owen's own,—composed mostly of Irishmen, whose fighting qualities had been proved in many desperate conflicts, and who had received the commendations of Kearny, and Sumner, and Hooker, upon the Peninsula for their gallantry,—the Seventy-first, originally recruited and led by the gallant Edward D. Baker, untimely cut off at Ball's Bluff, since commanded by Wistar, the friend and associate of Baker, and now by Colonel R. Penn Smith; and the Seventy-second, Colonel Baxter. The two former were upon the front, the latter held in reserve, in a second line just under the hill to the rear. To the left of this brigade were Hall and Harrow, and General Doubleday, who that day, in addition to Stone's (now Dana's), and Rowley's, had Stannard's brigade of Vermont troops, of which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth were present for duty. Doubleday had put the One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania and the Twentieth New York State militia upon the front, with the remainder in two lines in rear, except Stannard's men, whom he had thrown out to a little grove several rods in advance of the whole line, where they were disposed to resist a front attack.

As the rebel infantry began to move forward, its direction was

such that Pickett's centre would strike Stannard; but when half the distance had been passed over, the column suddenly changed direction, and, moving by the left flank till it had come opposite Owen's brigade, again changed front and moved forward. Whether this manœuvre was premeditated, or whether the discovery of Stannard's position and strong front, or the fire of the batteries away to the Union left, caused this veering of the rebel line, is uncertain. Unfortunately for the enemy, when he made this turn, Wilcox, who commanded the right flanking column or wing, instead of moving to the left with Pickett, kept straight on, leaving Pickett's right uncovered, and open to a flank attack. Fortunately for the Union side, Stannard was thrown out a considerable distance in front, so that when Pickett came forward, Stannard was precisely in the right place to deliver a telling fire full upon Pickett's exposed flank. Unfortunately again for the enemy, Pettigrew's men, who formed Pickett's left flanking column, were raw troops who were ill fitted to stand before the storm which was to descend upon them, and had been frightfully broken and dispirited in the first day's fight. But Pickett's own men were of the best, and they moved with the mien of combatants worthy of the steel they confronted, obedient to their leader's signal, and ready to go as far as who goes farthest.

This infantry column had no sooner come within cannon range, than the batteries to the right and left opened with solid shot, but, as it came nearer, shells, shrapnell and canister were poured upon it in unstinted measure. Never was a grander sight beheld upon a battle-field than that of this devoted body of men, unflinching in their onward march, though torn by the terrible fire of artillery, and executing with the utmost precision the evolutions of the field. As they came within musket range the Union infantry, who had reserved their fire, poured it in with deadly effect. So decimated was the front line that for an instant it staggered, but, recovering itself, and being closely supported by the second, moved on. When it came near, the fire was returned: but to what effect? The Union men were crouching behind the stone wall on the shelving rock, and few bullets could reach them. Nothing daunted, the enemy kept boldly on, crossed the Emmittsburg pike, and

rushed madly upon that part of the line where the Sixty-ninth and Seventy-first regiments were. Two or three rods to the rear of this was a little clump of small forest trees on the very summit of the ridge. Towards this they rushed as though it had been the mark set for them to reach. Cushin's guns, which stood just in rear of the Sixty-ninth, had been for the most part disabled, the gunners having all been killed or wounded; but two of these were still serviceable, and the men of the Sixty-ninth and Seventy-first had wheeled them down to the stone wall within the front line, and here they were worked with terrible effect. Unchecked by the fire, the enemy pushed resolutely forward. Just before this, Colonel Smith, with the right wing of the Seventy-first, had retired a few rods and taken position behind the wall coming in from the right, where his men would be less exposed to the fierce fire of canister of the Union artillery in its immediate rear, and where it could act with greater effect. The left wing, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kochersperger, in conjunction with the Sixty-ninth, hugged closely the stone wall, and continued to pour in death-dealing rounds with frightful rapidity. But the enemy, discovering that a portion of the wall was vacant, rushed over. This caused the flank to be exposed, and Kochersperger, with two companies of the Sixty-ninth, swung back in order to protect it. The struggle was now desperate and hand to hand. A stalwart and determined rebel soldier, having reached the wall behind which the left of the Sixty-ninth still clung, called out to James Donnelly of company D to surrender, levelling his musket in readiness to fire. "I surrender," cried Donnelly, and suiting the action to the word, felled him to the earth with the barrel of his gun. Donnelly was at the time but a youth of eighteen. Corporal Bradley, of the same company, while attempting to beat back an infuriated rebel, had his skull crushed in by a single blow. Rebel flags waved upon the wall within the Union line. General Armistead, who led one of Pickett's front brigades, reached the farthest point of the enemy's advance, and with his hand upon a Union gun near the little grove, while under the shadow of the flags of his brigade, fell mortally wounded. But still only a small breach had been made, and that had been left in part by design. The vigor and power of

the blow had been robbed of its blighting effect long before it had reached the vital point of the Union line. As the column moved past the grove where Stannard's brigade had been thrust out in front by Doubleday, Stannard suddenly formed the Thirteenth and Sixteenth regiments at right-angles to the main Union line, facing northward, and poured in a withering enfilading fire. This Pickett's troops were able to withstand but a few minutes, and over 2000 of them laid down their arms and were conducted to the rear. On Pickett's left a like disaster befell. For Pettigrew, with his green and already decimated levies, quailed before the terrific fire of Hays' men, and a number fully as large was swept in from that wing. The front centre of Pickett's own men continued the struggle through mere desperation. But no equal body of troops could have effected a lodgment there, or done more than had these. For the Union line, though slightly broken upon its front, was in a situation, unaided, to have beaten back the assailants, the Seventy-second regiment being but a few paces in rear of the little cluster of trees which marked the farthest rebel advance, and was in condition to have made a stubborn resistance. But beyond the original lines, the moment it was seen that the enemy was about to strike at this point, supports were hurried forward. The brigades of Hall and Harrow, the Nineteenth Massachusetts, the One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania, the Twentieth New York State militia, and the Forty-second of the line, being in close proximity, had reached the threatened ground, and stood four lines deep, ready to receive the foe, had he pushed his advantage.

The struggle was soon over, the greater portion of the living either surrendering or staggering back over the prostrate forms of the dead and the dying, which strewed thickly all that plain. In the few moments during which the contest lasted, by far the greater part of that gallant division that marched forth "in all the pride and circumstance of glorious war," had disappeared. Four thousand five hundred of them were prisoners, many more were wounded and weltering in their blood, and a vast number were stiff and stark in death.

The brigades of Wilcox and Perry, as already noticed, thrown off to the right, failing to move with Pickett's division, having



Union Troops ——
Rebel Troops ——

MAP OF THE

sheltered themselves for the moment, no sooner saw that Pickett had gone forward and penetrated the Union line than they moved up to assault farther to the south. The Union guns opened upon them; yet they kept on until they had reached a point within a few hundred yards of the front. But now Stannard was again in position to do great damage upon the flank of the passing column. Ordering the Sixteenth and a part of the Fourteenth into line again at right angles to the main line, but now facing south, he attacked upon the exposed flank. The enemy made but feeble resistance, a large number being taken prisoners, and the rest saving themselves by flight.

Thus ended the grand charge, perhaps as determined, deliberate, and impetuous as was ever made on this continent. It was undertaken in the confident anticipation of success and hope of victory. It resulted in the almost utter annihilation of this fine body of men, with no advantage whatever to the assailants. As an example of the futility, and at the same time the accuracy of their fire, it may be stated as an observation of the writer, made soon after the battle, that the splashes of the leaden bullets upon the shelving rock and the low stone wall along its very edge, and behind which were Hancock's men, for a distance of half a mile, were so thick, that one could scarcely lay his hand upon any part of either the wall or the rock without touching them. All this ammunition was, of course, thrown away, not one bullet in a thousand reaching its intended victim.

The field where this charge was made was of such a character and so situated that the greater part of both armies, as well as the population of the town, could behold it. When the terrible preliminary cannonade was in progress, the gravest apprehensions must have been excited in every Union breast; for, while the rebel infantry were all out of harm's way, the Union infantry were in the very mouth of it. But if apprehensions were aroused by the cannonade, what must have been the dismay inspired by the sight of the terribly compacted force which followed it? How with bated breath did each await the issue? The view from many parts of the town was perfect, and the progress of the charge was followed with eager gaze. Dr. Humphrey, surgeon of the Bucktail

(Stone's) brigade, remained with the wounded on the field of the first day's conflict, and was a prisoner during the second and third days of the battle. He was assigned to duty in a hospital established at the Catholic church, situated on the very summit of the hill on which the town of Gettysburg is built. A rebel Major, who was in charge of the hospital, had been jubilant over what he believed were triumphs of his army in the first and second days of the battle. Everything was represented to be moving on most gloriously for his side. Sickles' corps, and all that had been sent to his help, had been completely demolished and driven out of sight, according to his representations. The Doctor had no means of knowing anything to the contrary, other than that the fire of the Union guns indicated them to be now substantially where they were at the first. It is probable that the rebel file actually believed that they were gaining ground, and that they would ultimately carry the day. They admitted, however, that the Yankees had a good position, and were making a fair fight.

When the great cannonade and grand charge came to be delivered on the afternoon of the third day by Pickett's division, so elated was this rebel Major that he invited Dr. Humphrey up into the belfry of the church to witness it. The prospect here was unsurpassed. Round Top and the Peach Orchard were in full view, and all the intermediate space, disclosing the Union and rebel lines throughout nearly their whole extent. When the awful cannonade had ceased, and the infantry in three lines with skirmishers and wings deployed, stretching away for a mile and a half, and moving with the precision of a grand parade, came on, the spectacle was transcendently magnificent. At sight of that noble body of men the joy and exultation of the rebel Major knew no bounds. "Now you will see the Yanks run." "What can stand before such an assault?" "I pity your poor fellows, but they will have to get out of the way now." "We shall be in Baltimore before to-morrow night," and exclamations of similar import were constantly uttered as he rubbed his hands in glee, and danced about the narrow inclosure. With measured tread the lines went forward. They came under fire of the artillery. They staggered, but quailed not. They met the storm of the in-

fantry, but still they swept on. As the work became desperate, the Major grew silent; but manifested the deepest agitation. Great drops of perspiration gathered on his brow, and when, finally, that grand body of men went down in the fight, and were next to annihilated, with a storm of black rage depicted on his countenance, he left the belfry without uttering a word. So desperate had he become that the Doctor says he dared not speak to him, though his inclination to cheer was almost beyond control.

"As our eye," says Professor Jacobs, who also watched the charge from the town, "runs over these grounds, we can yet call vividly to mind the appearance of this fan-shaped mass, as we saw it on the day of battle, moving over towards our line with the intention of penetrating it, like a wedge, and reaching our rear. . . . In a few moments a tremendous roar, proceeding from the simultaneous discharge of thousands of muskets and rifles, shook the earth; then, in the portion of the line nearest us, a few, then more, and then still more rebels, in all to the number of about two hundred, were seen moving backwards towards the point from which they had so defiantly proceeded; and at last two or three men carrying a single battle-flag, which they had saved from capture, and several officers, on horseback, followed the fugitives. The wounded and dead were seen strewn amongst the grass and grain; men with stretchers stealthily picking up and carrying the former to the rear; and officers for a moment contemplating the scene with evident amazement, and riding rapidly towards the Seminary Ridge. . . . So sudden and complete was the slaughter and capture of nearly all of Pickett's men, that one of his officers, who fell wounded amongst the first on the Emmittsburg road, and who characterized the charge as foolish and mad, said that when, in a few moments afterwards, he was enabled to rise and look about him, the whole division had disappeared as if blown away by the wind."

The victory here was signal and complete; and it was gained at a much less cost in killed and wounded than were many of the operations on other parts of the field. Generals Hancock and Gibbon were wounded, but not seriously. Of Pickett's three brigade commanders, Armistead was mortally wounded, and left in

the Union lines; Kemper was severely wounded; and Garnett was killed. Fourteen of his field officers, including Williams, Mayo, Callcott, Patton, Otey, Terry, Hunton, Allen, Ellis, Hodges, Edmunds, Aylett, and Magruder, were either killed or wounded, only one of that rank escaping unhurt.

General Lee had confidently counted on success in this final conflict, and so sure was he that the Union army would be put to rout, that he sent out his cavalry well supported by infantry, upon both flanks, to fall upon its rear and intensify the confusion. But the Union cavalry were on the alert, and ready to receive them. General David McM. Gregg upon the right, at the moment the artillery fire slackened on the front and Pickett began his charge, discovered the enemy's cavalry, under Hampton, advancing on the Bonaughtown road, with the evident intent of forcing its way through and gaining the Union flank and rear. The Third Pennsylvania cavalry was upon the skirmish line, and first felt the shock. Gregg's main line was well in hand; and when the skirmishers, after a brave resistance, were driven in, he met Hampton, who charged in close column of squadrons, with Custar's Michigan brigade—his Wolverines, as Custar termed them—while the skirmishers rallied and charged upon his flanks. The enemy started with drawn sabres; but according to their individual habits, many dropped them and took their pistols, while the Union men used the sabre alone. After a hard fight, in part hand to hand, the rebels were driven back with severe loss. A more skilful or triumphant sabre charge is rarely witnessed.

While this was passing on the right, a no less stubborn, but far more daring and desperate engagement was in progress on the Union left. Kilpatrick had been sent early to operate upon that wing of the army, and had been busily engaged during most of the day, the enemy manifesting considerable activity in that direction. Finally, towards evening, when the clangor of battle upon the centre was at its height, Kilpatrick, aroused by the noise of the fray, ordered in the brigades of Farnsworth and Merritt. Robinson's brigade of Hood's division was upon the rebel front, well posted behind fences and rugged ground, and supported by the cavalry of Stuart; but Farnsworth, who led, charged with the

sabre, driving the foe from his shelter, and pressed forward up to the very mouths of the rebel guns. Here Farnsworth was killed, and many of his officers and men were killed or wounded, and the line was compelled to fall back, sustaining severe losses. Merritt pressed from the Union left and made a gallant fight; but the rebel guns were too numerous and too well posted to be overcome, and Kilpatrick was obliged to call in his shattered ranks, and brace himself for any attempt of the enemy to follow and in turn become the assailants. The rebel column, however, by this time had little stomach for further offensive demonstrations.

A little later, and soon after the repulse of Pickett, McCandless' brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves was ordered by Meade to advance from the stone wall behind which it had taken shelter on the evening previous, across the wheatfield on its front, and drive out the enemy who were annoying it. A gun upon the crest of an elevation a thousand yards distant had proved quite destructive, and to capture it McCandless manœuvred his command. With little loss he seized the gun and two caissons by its side. The flag of the Fifteenth Georgia, and three hundred prisoners were also taken, and six thousand muskets were collected.

But the enemy was now becoming thoroughly aroused to the peril of his situation, and having gathered in his forces, he retired to the line of Seminary Ridge, and fell to fortifying. He feared a countercharge by a heavy Union force, and made every preparation to meet it.

General Meade, finding in the course of the artillery fire that the enemy apparently had the range of his head-quarters, moved over to Power's Hill, where he occupied the head-quarters of General Slocum; but, soon after his arrival there, finding that the signal officer whom he had left at his old head-quarters had abandoned it, and fearing that his staff would fail to find him, he returned. On the way back he could plainly distinguish by the sound that the enemy's infantry charge was in progress. By the time he had reached his head-quarters the battle was virtually decided, and the enemy repulsed. He accordingly rode up on to the crest of the ridge, and as he went, met the prisoners going to the rear, who had been captured in the fight.

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There was some firing after he reached the summit, by which his own horse and that of his son were shot. It appears that as soon as the survivors of the assaulting column began to retire, the rebel artillery opened and delivered a hot fire, to cover the retirement of the troops, which was kept up for some moments, and it was from this that the General and his son lost their horses. Meade rode over to Little Round Top, where he ordered the advance of Crawford's troops for the purpose of preparing the way for an immediate assault. But in his testimony he says: "The great length of the line, and the time required to carry these orders out to the front, and the movement subsequently made before the report given to me of the condition of the forces in the front and left, caused it to be so late in the evening as to induce me to abandon the assault which I had contemplated."

The enemy along his whole line showed signs of trepidation, and was undoubtedly apprehensive of an attack. In the town itself the rebel wounded were gathered up and sent to the rear as rapidly as possible. At midnight his troops were aroused and drawn up in two lines along the streets, where they stood under arms as if awaiting a charge. The position here, and indeed throughout the whole of Ewell's line, was weak and exposed. Lee accordingly withdrew it, and by three o'clock on the morning of the 4th, Ewell's entire corps had disappeared from Gettysburg, and had taken position on the Seminary heights. Here the men were put to work, and during the day heavy breastworks were erected. Indeed, the best and strongest fortifications constructed by either army on the Gettysburg field were those built by the enemy on this day between the Chambersburg and Mummasburg pikes, and those at the other extremity of the rebel line, where that line strikes the Emmittsburg road. The position along all this ridge, naturally defensible, was made secure.

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CHAPTER VIII.

THE RETREAT OF LEE.

GENERAL LEE was now satisfied that a further attempt to maintain the contest would be fruitless, and consequently determined to yield to the inevitable, and make good his retreat. And now was seen the great strategic advantage to him of the possession of Gettysburg; for he was able to control the shortest routes to the Potomac. Had the Fairfield road been under the control of the Union army, Lee's retreat could have been cut off. But his army lying across the two shortest roads leading to Williamsport, he was able to retire without the danger of serious interruption. In his report, Lee says: "Owing to the strength of the enemy's position, and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field, were ordered to Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield." This was the most direct road. But the wounded who could bear transportation were started back during the night of the 3d; and all day long of the 4th the two roads—the one by Fairfield and the other by Chambersburg, until the mountain was passed, and thence by Greenwood and Waynesborough—were incessantly filled with the trains.

As already noticed, Colonel Stone, of the Bucktail brigade, was wounded severely in the action of the first day, and fell into the enemy's hands. His Adjutant-General, Captain John E. Parsons,

afterwards Colonel of the One Hundred and Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania regiment, unwilling to desert his bleeding chief, remained to care for him, and was also a prisoner. During the rest of the battle, he was kept under guard at a rebel hospital. In the following letter he records the varying hopes and fears by which his bosom was swayed as the dreadful hours wore on, and points out the first intimations which he interpreted as evidence that victory had at last crowned the Union arms: "On the morning of the 2d of July," he says, "I obtained permission from the rebel General Hood to move Colonel Stone, and to remain with him. With the assistance of two soldiers, we carried him on a stretcher to a stone farmhouse, a half mile to the rear, and some 200 yards to the north of the Baltimore pike. We found the house deserted by the family and in a sad condition; portions of the floor torn up for plunder, the beds ripped open and feathers scattered over the house, and the hand of the spoiler visible on every side. We found a soldier of the Iron brigade in the house, mortally wounded. He died by our side that night.

"During the afternoon of the 2d, the house was taken possession of by the Surgical corps of Hayes' brigade, 'Louisiana Tigers,' as their Brigade Hospital. The desperate charges made by this brigade, on the evening of the 2d, brought ambulance after ambulance of their wounded to the hospital. I could gather nothing satisfactory from their surgeons or their wounded as to the result of the day; but they were in good spirits and appeared sanguine of success in the end. Some of the officers who were slightly wounded said to me that they were certain of success, and had marked out on their pocket-maps the line of march to Baltimore, Washington, Philadelphia, and New York. On the evening of the 3d, however, they seemed depressed in spirits, which first gave me the intimation of our victory. On the morning of the 4th, they commenced to haul to the rear all of their wounded that were able to be removed. Then I was satisfied that our army was victorious, and that the enemy was getting ready to retreat. When I asked some of the officers who were so sanguine only the day before why they were hauling their wounded back, they said it was only to a place where water was more abundant. But their defeat was

obvious on all sides. Depressed in spirits, and demoralized in manner, they hurriedly took their departure, and next morning at daylight I found that the whole rebel army, except a light line of cavalry, had fled, leaving our hospital and the houses and barns about us filled with the worst of their wounded. By nine o'clock the cavalry line withdrew, concentrated on the Chambersburg pike in front of our hospital, and took their departure, followed in a short time by our cavalry. Colonel Stone was taken in an ambulance to Gettysburg, and our surgeons took charge of the rebel wounded. Both the Colonel and myself were treated kindly by the surgeons and officers at the hospital. A portion of the rebel army passed our hospital in their retreat."

The condition of the rebel army was now such that its Commander's best efforts were required to save it. The great thoroughfares on the direct line to Williamsport, it is true, were his, and by judicious dispositions and prompt action, he had a good prospect of bringing it off; but the longer he delayed, the more precarious his situation became; for, while his own force was constantly dwindling, the Union army was in a fair way to receive important accessions, the militia in the Cumberland Valley and at Harrisburg, and troops from the James being already on the way. General Imboden, who had been sent by Lee with his independent mixed command of cavalry and mounted infantry, for the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and had come up into Pennsylvania by the way of McConnellsburg, had arrived on the field at Gettysburg a little after noon of the 3d, at the moment when the last grand charge was in full tide. His men were fresh, and to him Lee called, and entrusted the removal of the wounded. Imboden has published an account of the doings of that night of horrors, in which he labored to carry back to Virginia such as could, and, though in a dying state, would be removed:

"When night closed upon the grand scene," he says, "our army was repulsed. Silence and gloom pervaded our camps. We knew that the day had gone against us, but the extent of the disaster was not known except in high quarters. The carnage of the day was reported to have been frightful, but our army was not in retreat, and we all surmised that with to-morrow's dawn would come

a renewal of the struggle; and we knew that if such was the case, those who had not been in the fight would have their full share in its honors and its dangers. All felt and appreciated the momentous consequences of final defeat or victory on that great field. These considerations made that, to us, one of those solemn and awful nights that every one who fought through our long war sometimes experienced before a great battle. Few camp fires enlivened the scene. It was a warm summer's night, and the weary soldiers were lying in groups on the luxuriant grass of the meadows we occupied, discussing the events of the day, or watching that their horses did not straggle off in browsing around.

"About eleven o'clock a horseman approached and delivered a message from General Lee, that he wished to see me immediately. I mounted at once, and accompanied by Lieutenant McPhail of my staff, and guided by the courier, rode about two miles toward Gettysburg, where half a dozen small tents on the roadside were pointed out as General Lee's head-quarters for the night. He was not there, but I was informed that I would find him with General A. P. Hill, half a mile farther on. On reaching the place indicated, a flickering, solitary candle, visible through the open front of a common tent, showed where Generals Lee and Hill were seated on camp stools, with a county map spread upon their knees, and engaged in a low and earnest conversation. They ceased speaking as I approached, and after the ordinary salutations, General Lee directed me to go to his head-quarters and wait for him. He did not return until about one o'clock, when he came riding along at a slow walk and evidently wrapped in profound thought. There was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of his staff was about. The moon was high in the heavens, shedding a flood of soft silvery light, almost as bright as day, upon the scene. When he approached and saw us, he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount. The effort to do so betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I stepped forward to assist him, but before I reached him he had alighted. He threw his arm across his saddle to rest himself, and fixing his eyes upon the ground, leaned in silence upon his equally weary horse, the two

forming a striking group, as motionless as a statue. The moon shone full upon his massive features, and revealed an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine countenance before, in any of the vicissitudes of the war through which he had passed. I waited for him to speak until the silence became painful and embarrassing, when, to break it and change the current of his thoughts, I remarked in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue:

"'General, this has been a hard day on you.'

"This attracted his attention. He looked up and replied mournfully:

"'Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,' and immediately relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude. Being unwilling again to intrude upon his reflections, I said no more. After a minute or two he suddenly straightened up to his full height, and turning to me with more animation, energy, and excitement of manner than I had ever seen in him before, he addressed me in a voice tremulous with emotion, and said:

"'General, I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's division of Virginians did to-day in their grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been supported, as they were to have been—but for some reason, not yet fully explained to me, they were not—we would have held the position they so gloriously won at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would have been ours.'

"After a moment he added in a tone almost of agony:

"'Too bad! *Too bad!!* Oh! too bad!!!'

"I never shall forget, as long as I live, his language, and his manner and his appearance and expression of mental suffering. Altogether, it was a scene that a historical painter might well immortalize had one been fortunately present to witness it. In a little while he called up a servant from his sleep to take his horse; spoke mournfully, by name, of several of his friends who had fallen during the day; and when a candle had been lighted, invited me alone into his tent, where, as soon as we were seated, he remarked: 'We must return to Virginia. As many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home. I have sent for you because your

men are fresh, to guard the trains back to Virginia. The duty will be arduous, responsible, and dangerous, for I am afraid you will be harassed by the enemy's cavalry. I can spare you as much artillery as you require, but no other troops, as I shall need all I have to return to the Potomac by a different route from yours. All the transportation and care of the wounded will be entrusted to you. You will recross the mountain by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williamsport, by any route you deem best, without halting. There rest and feed your animals, then ford the river, and make no halt till you reach Winchester, where I will again communicate with you.' As I was about leaving to return to my camp, he came out of his tent and said to me in a low tone:

"I will place in your hands, to-morrow, a sealed package for President Davis, which you will retain in your own possession till you are across the Potomac, when you will detail a trusty commissioned officer to take it to Richmond with all possible dispatch, and deliver it immediately to the President. I impress it upon you, that, whatever happens, this package must not fall into the hands of the enemy. If you should unfortunately be captured, destroy it.' . . . Shortly after noon, the very windows of heaven seemed to have been opened. . . . The storm increased in fury every moment. Canvas was no protection against it, and the poor wounded, lying upon the hard, naked boards of the wagon-bodies, were drenched by the cold rain. Horses and mules were blinded and maddened by the storm, and became almost unmanageable. The roar of the winds and waters made it almost impossible to communicate orders. Night was rapidly approaching, and there was danger that in the darkness the confusion would become worse confounded. About four P. M. the head of the column was put in motion and began the ascent of the mountain. After dark I set out to gain the advance. The train was seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road. It was moving rapidly, and from every wagon issued wails of agony. For four hours I galloped along, passing to the front, and heard more—it was too dark to see—of the horrors of war than I had witnessed from the battle of Bull Run up to that day. In the wagons were men wounded and mutilated in

every conceivable way. Some had their legs shattered by a shell or minié ball; some were shot through their bodies; others had arms torn to shreds; some had received a ball in the face, or a jagged piece of shell had lacerated their heads. Scarcely one in a hundred had received adequate surgical aid. Many had been without food for thirty-six hours. Their ragged, bloody, and dirty clothes, all clotted and hardened with blood, were rasping the tender, inflamed lips of their gaping wounds. Very few of the wagons had even straw in them, and all were without springs. The road was rough and rocky. The jolting was enough to have killed sound strong men. From nearly every wagon, as the horses trotted on, such cries and shrieks as these greeted the ear:

"'O God! why can't I die?'

"'My God! will no one have mercy and kill me, and end my misery?'

"'Oh! stop one minute, and take me out and leave me to die on the roadside.'

"'I am dying! I am dying! My poor wife, my dear children! what will become of you?'

"Some were praying; others were uttering the most fearful oaths and execrations that despair could wring from them in their agony. Occasionally a wagon would be passed from which only low, deep moans and sobs could be heard. No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. On, on; we must move on. The storm continued and the darkness was fearful. There was no time even to fill a canteen with water for a dying man; for, except the drivers and the guards, disposed in compact bodies every half mile, all were wounded and helpless in that vast train of misery. The night was awful, and yet in it was our safety, for no enemy would dare attack us when he could not distinguish friend from foe. . . . It was my sad lot to pass the whole distance from the rear to the head of the column, and no language can convey an idea of the horrors of that most horrible of all nights of our long and bloody war. . . . After a good deal of harassing and desultory fighting along the road, nearly the whole immense train reached Williamsport a little after the middle of the day. . . . The dead were selected from the train—for many had perished on the way—

and were decently buried. Straw was obtained on the neighboring farms; the wounded were removed from the wagons and housed; the citizens were all put to cooking, and the army surgeons to dressing wounds."

Imboden was unable to obey the instructions of Lee, to pause only to feed his beasts at Williamsport, and then ford the river and push on to Winchester; for the sudden rains of the previous day had converted the Potomac into a raging torrent, giving it a tide of ten or twelve feet above the fording stage; and during the absence of the enemy, General French, who was stationed at Frederick, had sent up an expedition which had partially destroyed the pontoon bridge. Imboden, accordingly, parked his train, consisting of ten thousand animals and all the wagons, and disposed of the wounded about the town. Until some portion of the rebel army should come, he knew that his situation was precarious. He had twenty-two field guns and one Whitworth siege piece. These he planted most advantageously upon the hills just above the town, and held his troops, about three thousand in number, in readiness to repel an attack. On the morning of the 6th, Buford and Kilpatrick approached, and made vigorous demonstrations, dismounting their men and assaulting with great determination. But Imboden's artillery, which was skilfully distributed and effectively served, proved formidable, and by concentrating his forces upon the point attacked, made himself more than a match for the assaulting column. Towards evening Fitz-Hugh Lee with a powerful body came to the relief of Imboden, followed closely by Stuart, and the Union forces were obliged to withdraw. The rebel infantry soon after began to arrive, and all further demonstrations were futile.

As has been noticed, General Meade, the moment the result of the grand charge of Longstreet on the afternoon of the 3d was decided, had ridden to the left of the line, and ordered a demonstration there with the intent to put in a heavy force and assault the rebel position, but the troops were slow in moving, and before they could be got ready, it was too late to make the attempt. Several officers have since testified that they favored such an attack, and strongly advised General Meade to make one. General

Hancock says: "I think that our lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a great victory. I was very confident that the advance would be made. General Meade told me before the fight, that if the enemy attacked me he intended to put the Fifth and Sixth corps on the enemy's flank; I, therefore, when I was wounded and lying down in my ambulance, and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would put in the Fifth and Sixth corps, I believed he would win a great victory. I asked him afterwards, when I returned to the army, what he had done. He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and moved so slowly that nothing was done before night."

It is possible that an instant advance by a strong column, had one been in readiness, might have broken the rebel line. But the probabilities were against it. There were, at most, but about 18,000 men in the enemy's assaulting column in the grand charge. Where was the rest of the rebel army? Principally concentrated upon Seminary Ridge, a good defensible position, running over with artillery at every point. The very best dispositions had doubtless been made of all but Longstreet's attacking force that it was possible to make to meet any such counter assault as would naturally be anticipated. Hence there is little doubt that a direct assault upon that line would have proved to the Union side as disastrous as had that of Longstreet to the rebel.

During the evening and night of the 3d, the enemy's line on Seminary Ridge was greatly strengthened. Ewell's entire corps was drawn in and placed behind it, and ample security taken for defending every point. It was a position nearly as strong by nature as that where the Union army was planted. It is true that the rebel army had suffered severely. But so had the Union. Feeling himself strong in his position, Meade courted attack. May we not believe that Lee, with a similar sense of security, would have welcomed a Union advance? This view, reasoning upon the knowledge which the Union commander then had, had a strong warrant, and is doubtless that which influenced General Meade in withholding an attack. By information since obtained,

we learn that such was the fact. Swinton, in his "Army of the Potomac," gives the testimony of General Longstreet, who said to him: "I had Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged; I had a heavy force of artillery; I should have liked nothing better than to have been attacked, and have no doubt I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received."

But while Lee was invincible for the moment, he had no preparation for holding out any length of time. Accordingly, as soon as darkness had closed in on the evening of the 4th, the main body of his army was put in motion towards Williamsport, leaving only a strong rear guard to hold the Union forces in check should they attempt to follow, and before morning was beyond the reach of its pursuers, taking the two shortest roads which he completely controlled. Lee himself, with his staff, had started at a little after midnight of the 3d, breakfasting on the morning of the 4th near C. Mussleman's house on the Fairfield road.

In the Union camp, on the evening of the 4th, a council of war was called, at which the four following questions were propounded: "Shall this army remain here?" "If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive?" "Do you deem it expedient to move towards Williamsport through Emmittsburg?" "Shall we pursue the enemy, if he is retreating, on his direct line of retreat?" Birney, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren voted in favor of remaining until there was unmistakable evidence that the enemy was really on the retreat. Newton, Pleasanton, and Slocum were for moving at once; and Howard was doubtful. The council was unanimous in favor of moving by the left flank, instead of following the direct route taken by the enemy, only sending cavalry supported by a small infantry force to operate upon his rear. Two reasons impelled to this last decision: first, the condition always imposed upon the Army of the Potomac, to cover Washington and Baltimore in addition to fighting the enemy; and second, to follow on the track of the foe would have no advantage, as the enemy, having the direct, short route to the Potomac, and having a night's march the start, was sure to reach there before either his flanks or his rear could be attacked to much effect, a strong rear guard

being at all times ready to make a stubborn resistance. His trains being already there, or at least well out of the way, and the roads all clear for his infantry, one night's march was ample to preclude all possibility of overtaking it, or of bringing it to bay.

As soon as it became apparent, on the morning of the 5th, that the enemy was retreating, the Sixth corps, which had been held in reserve, and, so far as fighting was concerned, was fresh, though worn down with rapid marching, was put upon the pursuit on the Fairfield route. At the Fairfield pass the column was halted, as Sedgwick did not deem it advisable to attack here, the enemy holding a strong position where he could easily repel many times his number. Accordingly, Neill's brigade of infantry was detached, and with the cavalry followed the direct line of retreat by the Fairfield road, as did also another cavalry force by the Cashtown route, while the rest of the Sixth corps moved on through Boonsboro, and after crossing a little stream near the latter place, took up a position near Funkstown.

The main body of the army remained at Gettysburg during the 5th, and large details were made to gather up the wounded and bury the dead. On the 6th the army moved, halting a day at Middletown for needed supplies; and, after crossing South Mountain, and passing Boonsboro, came up with the enemy on the 12th, who had formed upon a line extending from Hagerstown to Downiesville, which he had fortified. Lee had been unable to cross the Potomac, on account of its swollen condition. Finding that his trains and wounded could not be got over, nor moved higher up without great danger, he determined to defend himself there; and though to fight a battle, with a raging and impassable river at one's back, is not an alternative to be chosen, it was one into which he was forced. The ground favored his designs, and immense labor was bestowed to make it defensible and safe. On the evening of the 12th, the Union army having by this time come up, a council of officers was held, at which all voted against an attack except two. Accordingly the blow was withheld, and the 13th was given to reconnoitring. The result of that examination was such as to induce Meade to order the

whole army to move up on the following morning at daylight with a view of assaulting. But during the night of the 13th, Lee commenced to withdraw, Ewell's corps fording the stream, and Longstreet and Hill crossing upon the pontoon bridge which had been reconstructed from parts of the old one recovered, and others improvised. The stream was still at high tide, and Ewell's men found much difficulty in stemming it; but they "linked arms, and thus interlaced and steadied, forded the river in mass, nearly shoulder deep, with the loss of but three men."

Lee says, in his report, that the crossing was not completed until one P. M., when the bridge was removed. If any considerable force did remain so late as this, he manœuvred to preserve a strong front and foiled every attempt of the Union troops to injure him.

The management of the battle of Gettysburg, on the part of the opposing armies, has been the subject of sharp criticism. It is right, yea, it is the duty of a people who maintain military schools, and pretend to defend their flag by force of arms, to question closely the conduct of every battle, by the light of the established principles of military science, and endeavor to detect the errors committed, as well as the exemplification of meritorious conduct. It is only by such a critical search, that the useful lessons of the past may be garnered.

MAJ. GEN. HENRY W. SLOCUM

CHAPTER IX.

THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE.

THE Battle of Gettysburg, as an agency in determining the result of the contest between the Government and its assailants, was the most important of the war. It was the beginning of the end. That little crown of saplings which Pickett made the mark towards which his troops were to aim, and which a part of them did actually reach, has been styled the "high-water mark of the Rebellion." The star which, to that moment, had appeared in the ascendant, began to pale and move to its setting. Though in a military view many of its features are open to question, its lessons are not the less important.

Lee has been blamed for being dilatory on the first day. He had undoubtedly sent Hill forward on that morning to seize and hold Gettysburg, and seems not to have been aware that Union troops were there in much force, though he could not have been ignorant of the fact that a corps of the Union infantry was, on the night of the 30th, near at hand. He no doubt anticipated that the arrival of Ewell upon the flank of the Union line would be ample for effecting the complete overthrow of the small Union force assembled. Anderson's division of Hill's corps rested all day at Cashtown, in hearing of, and in plain view of the battle. But Hill no doubt considered that he had as many troops on the field as he could use to advantage, and expected at every fresh onset that the First corps would yield. But the obstinacy of that intrepid body of men disappointed his most sanguine expectations, and delayed his progress in possessing the town till near nightfall. The rebel commander seems to have done all

that a prudent officer, regarding all the chances, could have been expected to do. It was the unlooked-for and unsurpassed valor of that First corps which balked his plans; for how could a body of eight thousand men, reduced finally to less than three, be expected to stand up nearly the whole day against twenty thousand, in an open field fight?

Lee is also severely censured for not having pressed his advantage on the evening of the 1st, after the First and Eleventh corps had been driven from before the town. "The attack," says Lee, in his official report, "was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops." But what were the prospects of success, had Ewell attacked? It is not probable that either Lee or Ewell would have held back, had a flattering promise of victory been presented. A direct assault upon the front and face of Cemetery Hill would assuredly have been attended by a bloody repulse. There was no point, commencing with the Baltimore pike and extending half way around on Culp's Hill, where one could have been made with any better hope of success; for the guns of Stevens and the division of Wadsworth completely covered that ground, which afforded excellent opportunities for defence. Ewell might have pushed in, past Wadsworth's right, over Rock Creek and through the dense forest, as he did on the following evening; but it was difficult ground, and entirely unexplored; besides, the Twelfth corps was just then coming up on the Baltimore pike, and could have at once been wheeled into position to have met any advance from that quarter. Were the prospects any better on the Union left? Had Ewell advanced in that direction, he would first have had to encounter the cavalry of Buford, drawn out so as to completely cover that flank, with his artillery admirably posted for terrible execution, his skirmishers dismounted, and line of battle formed in such beautiful order, that it drew forth from that able soldier, General Warren, when he came upon the field, exclamations of admiration. He would, in addition, have come immediately under the fire of Steinwehr's guns on Cemetery Hill, which would have completely enfiladed his lines. But had he been successful in passing Stein-

wehr's guns, and routing the hero Buford, he would then have found Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in position, upon a line stretching away to Round Top, and behind Geary was the balance of the entire Twelfth corps, and the Third corps, General Sickles, already beginning to arrive. So that on whatever side Ewell had chosen to have attacked he would have been repulsed.

A criticism is also made against the rebel leader, that his attacks on the 2d were disjointed and incoherent, and they have been compared to a balky team swaying back and forth upon a swingle-tree. On the contrary, they seem to have been made with rare skill. It was apparently a misfortune to him that the day had not been a few hours longer; but he made his attacks as soon as he could get his troops into position. His first effort was to brush away Ward's brigade, so as to open the way to Round Top. The obstinacy of Ward's men foiled this first attempt. It was necessary, before a second was made, that heavy attacks should be delivered along the whole line to the Peach Orchard, to prevent reinforcements being sent to Ward, which had been really despatched by De Trobriand, and to draw attention from the grand object of the fight, the possession of Round Top. The second attempt was successful, Hood breaking through Ward's line, but only to find Vincent in position on the very mount itself, which he had hoped to seize; and Lee was again foiled. The constant sending of Union reinforcements into the slaughter-pen above and around the wheatfield necessitated constant fighting by the enemy, as he had seized the Peach Orchard, the key to the position, from which he could easily repulse every force sent against him, and where he could inflict far greater loss than he himself sustained. Hill withheld his attack until he saw Birney's line crumble and Humphreys' division fearfully exposed, and then made his determined assault at the very moment when he could with absolute certainty inflict the greatest damage, and gain the most signal success. Had Wright, at the moment when he made his successful charge, and had a number of Union guns turned upon their former possessors, been supported by the troops which Hill had ordered to go, the result would, without much doubt, have effected the complete rout of the Union army. This should

be considered the crisis when the rebel army came nearest to a triumph, and where the failure, at the exact instant, of Posey, Mahone and Pender to advance, cost Lee the battle. As soon as it was discovered that these operations had failed, and before troops could arrive from other parts of the field to stay his course, Ewell attacked on the extreme rebel left, and here delay was not a disadvantage; for the troops which had all the day been in position upon that part of the field, and which would have given him a bloody reception, had, a few moments before, been withdrawn to reinforce other portions of the line, and Ewell was left unopposed to overrun that part of the field; so that the delay was to him a positive advantage. The only part of the line which received any help from timely reinforcement that delay set at liberty, was where Carroll's brigade went to the aid of Howard. But this support would no doubt have been spared to go, if the Tigers had charged at the instant that Hill did on the left. Ewell has been blamed for not pushing his advantage further, on the night of the 2d; but he was unable, on account of the creek, the forest, and the rugged nature of the ground, to take his artillery with him, and it would not have been safe to have advanced further without it, as troops could have turned upon him from all quarters, and the reserve artillery on Power's Hill would have easily reached him the instant he came in sight. The probabilities are, therefore, that he would not have got off with his troops without losing heavily in captures, had he done so.

Finally, Lee has been roundly berated for having made the last grand charge at all, and if he did make it, for having made it with so weak a column. It must be confessed that no one of his operations on the Gettysburg field shows so great a lack of insight into the conditions upon which he was acting, and reflects so little credit upon his military skill as this. But he had been led to take a hopeful view of the result of a heavy blow at this point, by the success which had attended the charge of a single brigade here on the day before, that of Wright. If so weak a column can accomplish so great results, what may we not expect from the assault of a body many times more powerful, fresh for the work, ably led, and preluded by an artillery fire that the world

has rarely seen paralleled, was the problem that was presented before him; and although he must have been sanguine of success, or he would never have ordered it, yet he must have contemplated it with the deepest solicitude, and only adopted it as his last desperate chance. But he failed to appreciate at its full value the fact that the field was nearly a level plain between the two lines, and that the instant his infantry crossed their works they came under view and concentrated fire of a full half of the Union army. Had the column been composed of thirty thousand instead of fifteen or eighteen, the result could not have been other than it was; for before they could have crossed that mile and a quarter of space, and reached the Union lines, they would have been so nearly annihilated as to have had little force remaining; and had any considerable body made a lodgment, the major part of the Union army could have been there to meet it, and it would have resulted in a grand hand-to-hand combat in which the Union men would have sold their lives dearly, and to the last one. Lee put in as many men as he could afford to do, and more would have been of no avail, the whole Union army being within a fifteen minutes' run of the place, most of it within five, and their resolution was beyond parallel in the history of warfare. This last act of Lee must ever be regarded as the one which had the least promise of success, and one the least defensible on sound principles of military tactics.

As an offensive battle, Gettysburg will be esteemed as one, on the whole, well fought on the part of the rebel leader. Had Lee, after the first day, sat down upon Seminary Ridge, and manœuvred to induce the Union side to have attacked, and have kept a portion of his cavalry busy foraging in his rear, he might possibly have gained such an advantage as to have secured a temporary triumph. It would have been fatal for him to have waited very long, for troops were being gathered up and sent to the Union side from all quarters, and in a few days he would have been too weak to have fought even a defensive battle. On the other hand, had he succeeded in bringing on an immediate battle, and been successful, he could never have long maintained his triumph, or have long remained on Northern soil. It is doubtful if he could

have reached either Baltimore or Washington; for there would have still been an Army of the Potomac, a force at Harper's Ferry of 10,000, 36,000 in the Department of Washington, 25,000 militia at Harrisburg, an army upon the James, and besides, the whole North was full of men, who at the first tocsin of disaster, would have flocked to the Union standard.

In considering the conduct of the Union commander, many palliating circumstances must be allowed to have weight. He was, in the first place, pitted against a veteran soldier, who had almost from the first commanded the Army of Northern Virginia —an army which had been formed and moulded under his eye, and which he had led to triumph on numberless fields—whose men had implicit confidence in him, amounting to a blind infatuation, and who was surrounded by a corps of Lieutenants of rare ability, sincerely devoted to their chief, and impelled by one idea—at all hazards beat the foe. Meade, on the other hand, had only been three days at the head of the army, had never exercised an independent command before, and had only led a division in battle, the Fifth corps at Chancellorsville not having been seriously engaged. His army was dispirited by frequent defeats, and the corps and division commanders, for political and other reasons, were far from being that homogeneous body that clasped hands about the rebel chieftain.

Nevertheless, Meade was a soldier by profession, and it is just that his management of the battle should be subjected to discussion upon the principles that govern that profession. The lessons which the battle should furnish can never be appreciated or learned until it be examined without fear or favor, and with a desire to discover what were its real phases.

The first error which Meade committed was in allowing his corps to become so widely scattered, that at the moment of opening the battle the two extremes were over thirty miles apart. In the presence of an enemy, or in close proximity to him, it would have been a sound principle to have kept the infantry in as compact a body as possible. It is true that Meade seems to have been marching under the impression that the enemy was pushing for, or actually crossing the Susquehanna. But he

should have held his army so in hand that he would at any time have been prepared for a change in the enemy's plans, and not have been bound to this one theory. Nothing was more likely than that the enemy would do precisely what he did do, when he found the Union army moving in close upon his flank, intent on fighting him. It is unfortunate, at the least, that Meade should have been so deficient in scouts and spies as to have been so long ignorant of the enemy's intention to concentrate at Gettysburg, and to have first learned it through the Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, telegraphed from Harrisburg to Washington and from Washington back to the field. Could that knowledge have reached him twelve hours earlier, the order of march would have been essentially modified, and the two corps would not then have been thrust forward into the jaws of the enemy without the power to support them.

On the first day, it was unfortunate that the circular which he sent out was a circular and not an order; for while he and a part of his corps commanders regarded it as having the force of an order, others of them understood it to have no effect other than an intimation. It was of so mixed a character that two could scarcely understand it alike. For, while it indicated a purpose to fall back and concentrate on Pipe Creek, it still declared that contingencies might arise in which it would become expedient to fight from the present position. Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday, Howard, and Sickles when he learned that the battle was on, believed that such contingencies had arisen, while Meade himself ignored that part of his circular entirely, and clung to the part which would carry his army back to Pipe Creek, where he could leisurely prepare himself to fight. It would seem that he never forgave Doubleday and Howard for holding on at Gettysburg and fighting the whole day, instead of retiring and allowing him to carry out his preconceived plan. Technically and morally, Doubleday and Howard were undoubtedly right. In doing as they did, they obeyed the strict orders of Meade, and they avoided the demoralizing effect of running from the face of the enemy. As the battle resulted, it may be looked upon as almost a direct interposition of Providence. Meade was slow in going to the field, because he doubtless be-

lieved that the left wing would finally fall back, and then he would concentrate as he had intended. Both Slocum and Sickles were morally culpable for not going to the assistance of the forces engaged at Gettysburg on the first day, Slocum having full warrant for doing so in the orders and circulars of Meade, and Sickles having early in the day been ordered up by Reynolds, and having no valid excuse for disregarding the summons. But here again that unfortunate circular comes to the surface, and is allowed to outweigh every other consideration.

When General Meade had become satisfied that Gettysburg was a suitable place to fight the battle, he showed great energy and skill in concentrating his army, and bringing up his remote corps. It was not until seven o'clock on the evening of the 1st that he came to this decision. It was after eight o'clock before the Sixth corps got the order to move, and having to go from Manchester by the way of Westminster, had thirty-four full miles to make, and yet it arrived at two of the following afternoon. All the rest of his army was practically on the field at two in the morning.

General Hancock assumed command as the two broken corps came back through the town on the afternoon of the 1st, and as troops from other corps began to arrive. His dispositions were skilfully made, and it was the firm front he was able at once to present that staid the hand of the enemy and made it impossible for him to push further his advantage.

Meade's examination of the field on the morning of the 2d must have been extremely superficial and partial—a grave error. He appears to have been strongly impressed with the belief that the enemy would attack him upon the right, and to that part of the field he must give his exclusive attention. He, accordingly, put the whole of the Twelfth corps there with orders to fortify it thoroughly, and during the forenoon held the Fifth corps in reserve near by, intending also to put the Sixth in there as soon as it should arrive. It may be that the experience of other fields had taught him to expect that the tactics of the enemy would bring him upon that flank. At Beaver Dam Creek, Malvern Hill, Bull Run, Antietam, and Chancellorsville, the enemy had moved upon

the Union right flank, and he may have anticipated that the same manœuvre would here be repeated. When he found the enemy slow in opening the battle, he himself decided to attack from that side. But after his engineer and General Slocum, who was to lead the assault, had reported the ground impracticable for an advance, he seems to have become dissatisfied with the field, and despondent, and the conviction is forced upon us from his own conduct and sayings, and the testimony of a number of his officers, that he meditated changing to ground better suited for offensive operations; not necessarily to Pipe Creek, but to the first ground which he could find adapted to manœuvring his army.

In consequence of his mind being occupied with this idea, he appears to have neglected to look to his left, or to make the necessary preparations for a defensive battle. According to the testimony of Sickles, he discredited the idea of the enemy attacking him upon that side, lightly remarking, when the dangers to which that part of the line was exposed were urged, that Generals always believe that their positions are the ones in most danger, and up to the very moment when the battle opened, he seems to have been busy with other schemes, and to have given little or no attention to preparation for an attack from that quarter. The consequence was that when the battle opened his troops were not in position, and were actually pushed out to the ground which they occupied under fire. To the repeated importunities of Sickles for orders, and for him to go personally upon the ground, he turned a deaf ear, and even refused to send his engineer, General Warren, who was certainly the person of all others most suitable to represent him in the decision of such a question.

It seems the more strange that he should have neglected to make his dispositions upon the left strong, as Hancock, in making his report upon the advantages of this ground for a battle, had particularly pointed out that, as being the weak part, and liable to be turned. It may be thought that the blame of this unpreparedness was due to the failure of Sickles to take the position assigned him. But this explanation is in no way satisfactory. Meade was early informed that Sickles was in trouble about his position, and by repeated messages was kept advised that the left of his line was not

fixed and in readiness for battle. Sickles was evidently very solicitous about his formation. He saw that the ground in a direct line from the Cemetery Ridge to Round Top was unsuitable, being low and marshy, commanded by ground to the front of it, and to the left was a screen of wood and rocky surface that it would be dangerous to allow the enemy to take, the altitude being considerably greater at the Peach Orchard than either Seminary or Cemetery lines opposite. Sickles undoubtedly sincerely desired to get the true position, but still, to satisfy his chief and have his approval of whatever ground he should take. When, therefore, Meade observed the solicitude of Sickles, and knew that he was liable at any moment to be attacked, it would appear that as a wise commander, knowing that a great battle was imminent, and intent on gaining a victory, he would not have rested until he had either thoroughly inspected every inch of the ground himself, or through his engineers, and have, early in the day, had his lines accurately traced and fortified, so far as was practicable, and the troops and their supports in position.

But what are the facts? Until the very opening of the battle, nearly four o'clock in the afternoon, he remained at his headquarters, situated near the centre of the field, from whence nearly every part was visible, with no preparation made to meet one of the most powerful and persistent assaults ever delivered on any field. His Lieutenant, Sickles, tired of waiting, and learning from his skirmishers, who had been engaged since nine o'clock in the morning beyond the Emmittsburg road, and from his own observation, that the enemy was massing upon his left and evidently preparing for a determined attack, took up the ground which he deemed the best, which with his small corps he was barely able to cover, and the battle opened before he was entirely in possession, the guns having been pushed forward upon that part which was the key to the whole position—the Peach Orchard—after the enemy had opened fire. The responsibility of this delay can never be shifted from the shoulders of General Meade. He had had the whole day until four o'clock to decide on and fortify his line, and he was fully aware up to the last moment that the troops were not in position, and that no works were being thrown up for their pro-

tection. If the short line, which he claims he intended Sickles should take, was the one to be occupied, it needed much labor in fortifying through the swampy ground at the head of Plum Run. If the advance, or long line, which Sickles did take, then the key to the position—the Peach Orchard—should certainly have been fortified, as it was much exposed, though commanding. A little work with the spade on this knoll would have rendered it impregnable.

But the culpability of the delay in taking and fortifying this line, or whatever one was to be adopted, is more than matched by the failure to hold Little Round Top. It was discovered by Warren, Meade's engineer, some time after the battle had begun, and when the enemy was rushing with the force of the tornado to seize it, that it was entirely destitute of defenders, and that, moreover, it was a place of strength and importance. He also, for the first time, now discovered that artillery could be used from its summit to good advantage, and also that it was practicable to bring guns upon it. But why were these discoveries left to be made after the battle had begun? Was not the advantage of that stronghold as apparent at six, or eight, or ten in the morning as at five in the afternoon? It was finally occupied and held, but more by chance, or the overruling hand of Providence, than by any skill or strategy of the General.

The idea has been advanced that Longstreet, in moving as he did, behind the screen of forest trees on Oak Ridge to the extreme Union left, was not designing to fight, but was preparing to march away upon the Union rear, to capture Meade's trains, and make conquest of Baltimore and Washington; and that he was arrested by the opportune advance and attack of Sickles. But there is no evidence that such was the design, and every consideration of military strategy is against it. Longstreet had but two of his divisions with him, and the other had not been ordered up, and was not soon expected. Lee was too good a general to divide his army in the face of a united opponent, and allow himself to be destroyed piecemeal. Besides, there were troops enough in Washington to have held Longstreet in check until other armies could come up, if not to have beaten him. No! Longstreet was moving to do precisely

what he attempted to do, to capture Little Round Top and the wooded rugged ground in its immediate front, and had he not been attacked and arrested by the timely offensive of Sickles, he would doubtless have effected his purpose, and the battle would have been fought out on other ground.

When Meade finally awoke to the fact that the enemy was determined to fight, he aroused himself to the uttermost, and pushed forward supports with a lavish hand. The Fifth corps, which had been resting since two that morning within a short distance of the field, and had come up in rear of Cemetery Hill during the forenoon, was sent over; portions of the Second, nearly the whole of the Twelfth, and portions of the Sixth, which began to arrive at two in the afternoon, were pushed forward, and every part of Sickles' attenuated front was strengthened and patched. But now his zeal to establish his left was as excessive as in the morning it had been wanting. For when Sickles lost the Peach Orchard, the attempt to hold the parts of the line which were commanded and enfiladed from that key position was futile. With the loss of this, had Meade contracted his line to the ground in front of Round Top held by Crawford and Wheaton, on the night of the 2d, and drawn in Humphreys' to the Cemetery Ridge before he was attacked and forced back, and then acted purely on the defensive, thousands of killed and wounded would have been saved, and his position upon the left centre would not have been placed in jeopardy. But instead of this, brigade after brigade, and division after division were thrust out through the wheatfield and over the wooded ground to the west and south of it, where the enemy rested in ambush to cut them down as fast as they came, and made that ground a slaughter-pen, with no advantage in the end.

Not only was an injudicious use made of the troops thus hurried forward, but more than could by any possibility be used were called; and the strange error was committed of stripping the breastworks upon Culp's Hill, and entirely denuding his right flank, a vital part of his line, a portion of those very troops, as if in mockery of his infatuation, and impelled by fate, marching far out of their way, and never reaching the field where it was intended

to use them. In the presence of the great peril, he seems to have lost the equipoise of his faculties. When, finally, he had the whole of the Fifth and Sixth, all but one brigade of the Twelfth, two divisions of the First, and a considerable part of the Second transferred to the left in support of the Third, leaving but one brigade of the Twelfth, and one small division each of the First and the Eleventh north of the Baltimore pike, then it was that the enemy attacked that weak and partially denuded line, at two points, with a fury and a determination almost past belief. The abandoned works where should have been the left flank of the army, fell into the enemy's hands; but, thanks to the intrepid valor of the few troops left upon that line, the foe was bloodily repulsed in his first assault, and held at bay in the other, and a great disaster was averted. And here again the hand of Providence seems to have been interposed. For the nature of the ground was such that the enemy could bring no artillery with him upon the right flank, and without it he was robbed of his fighting arm. Could he have planted himself upon that rugged eminence with artillery, he might have fought as from a fortress, and bade defiance to his assailants.

The error, we might be pardoned a stronger word, of removing almost the entire right wing, and leaving a strong position, which had been well fortified, and was vital to the integrity of the entire army, does not alone rest with the Commander-in-chief. The responsibility must be shared by General Slocum. Slocum was in command of the right wing. He knew thoroughly the ground, for he had reconnoitred it during the morning hours with a view of making an attack from it, and had regarded it of so much importance as to thoroughly fortify it. He should never have consented to the withdrawal of those troops without remonstrance; and a vigorous protest from him would have prevented it. Or, if they were taken, he should not have rested till he had found troops, even though exhausted ones, to have taken their place. Men were not wanting; for the whole Sixth corps was up and at hand. A single brigade would have held it. But it seemed as though the heads of the army were turned, and all grown giddy together.

But with the setting of the sun on the evening of the 2d, the supremacy in generalship, which had been with the enemy, gravitated to the Union side. The dispositions of the artillery on commanding eminences bearing upon the enemy on Culp's Hill, for repelling an advance and driving him out, were admirable, and the marshalling of the infantry was no less judicious and skilful. There was none of that stripping of troops from one part of the line and rushing them in superabundance to another, which had so blotted and shadowed the conduct of the preceding day. But there was an equipoise and a self-assurance, as of a General who felt the full command of his faculties, that is refreshing and inspiring to contemplate. The manœuvres for regaining the lost ground were dexterously conducted, and would have soon resulted in the capture of large numbers of the foe had he not made a timely retreat.

During the morning of the 3d, every arm of the service was kept in full tide. The cavalry was in strength, vigilant and active on either flank; the artillery was repaired and posted in abundance, well supplied with ammunition, and the infantry lines were everywhere strong, with ample supports well in hand to meet any emergency. When, therefore, that supreme effort of the foe came on the afternoon of the 3d, it was met and repulsed without weakening any other part of the line, and in the spirit of a master. Another and another such assault on whatever part it might have come would have been welcomed with as determined a front as was this.

Several Union Generals give it as their opinion in their testimony that if Meade had immediately ordered a countercharge with a strong column, the enemy might have been routed and his army destroyed. But such an opinion is in no case supported by any convincing reasons. The enemy was well prepared to meet a countercharge, in good position and behind breastworks. He had been prodigal of his ammunition; but Lee and Longstreet were too cool and calculating to have squandered all and not have saved enough to repel any assault that could have been made; besides, Longstreet expressly testifies that he was in readiness, and would

have counted such an assault as a rare piece of good fortune. The very same condition which made it easy for the Union forces to repulse Longstreet, would have been in that officer's favor had an attack been made upon him. It was the fact that the ground between the two lines was perfectly open, enabling either side to see and prepare to meet a charge from the very moment of starting, and that in the whole distance to be passed over the advancing troops would be exposed to a destructive fire, certain to annihilate them, that rendered it impossible for either party to make a front attack with any prospect of success.

Maintaining his position firmly during the night of the 4th and day of the 5th, there was no hope of advantage by direct attack. When the night of the 5th came, Lee was able to withdraw, under cover of darkness, without fear of molestation. There was only left a rear-guard which on the morning of the 6th it was possible to reach. To fight a rear-guard is always a bootless task; for while it presents only a small front, it can, by falling back gradually and taking strong positions, inflict great slaughter upon the attacking party, which must expose itself in approaching; and even if it is overpowered and captured, it is in itself so insignificant as to be of small account.

To have followed Lee's rear-guard, then, would have cost an expenditure of blood not warranted by the fruits which gave promise of being gathered. Having complete control of the two shortest routes to the Potomac and one night the start, Lee was able to reach it without molestation, except such as the cavalry could interpose, which was inconsiderable. Considering the situation in which the two armies were relative to the roads leading to the Potomac, it was no lack of generalship on the part of Meade in allowing Lee to make unmolested the transfer; for it was inevitable, one night sufficing to put the major part beyond the reach of the pursuing army. Once safely at the Potomac, Lee might have crossed immediately had the river been fordable, or had his bridges been in position; but these were gone and the waters were at flood. His only alternative, therefore, was to fortify, which he had ample time to do, the hours of one night being enough.

Meade might have followed by the direct roads over which the enemy had gone, whereby he would have saved several days. But it would have been of no avail, as he would have found the enemy fortified, had he made the march with as much expedition as the enemy himself. But he seems to have considered his instructions to cover Washington and Baltimore of as much importance while following a beaten foe, as in facing one in full strength.

When Meade came again to confront the enemy, he found him in strong position and ready for a fight. Had Meade attacked, he would have met the fate of Magruder at Malvern Hill or Burnside at Fredericksburg. It has been asserted that Lee was deficient in ammunition at Williamsport, and that a resolute attack would have insured success; but such was not the fact. Meade says in his testimony: "I had reason to believe that ammunition trains had been brought from Winchester, and crossed on the ferry at Williamsport for the supply of General Lee's army. . . . I had positive information that ammunition trains had been ferried across at Williamsport;" and General Imboden, in the article above quoted, says: "This would have been fatal to us, but for the opportune arrival at the critical moment of an ammunition train from Winchester. The wagons were ferried across to our side as soon as possible, and driven on the field in a gallop." This was on the morning of the 6th, so that when Meade came on the 12th, there was no lack of ammunition for all arms.

There was only one contingency in which Meade can with justice be blamed for not attacking at Williamsport. General Lee says in his report: "Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport, those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads, the troops did not reach the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until one P. M., when the bridge was removed." As at Gettysburg Lee held his front firmly until the evening of the 5th, giving no opportunity to attack with a prospect of success, and then retired under the cover of darkness, so here at Williamsport he held his impregnable ground until dark of the 13th, and again disappeared

under the shelter of the night. But if it be true that any considerable part of his army was on the north bank at daylight of the 14th, Meade is guilty of negligence for not knowing it and attacking. It was the only occasion he had of striking a successful blow. But the probability is that only a small number of the enemy's troops remained at that time in the morning when Meade could have got his forces forward to the points of attack, and then only the opportunity of fighting a rear-guard would have been presented.

CHAPTER X.

NUMBERS ENGAGED.

MUCH diversity of opinion has prevailed respecting the numbers engaged at Gettysburg, and the casualties on the part of the enemy. The rebels were accustomed in stating the forces brought into battle, to give the muskets actually carried in the ranks, instead of the names found on the rolls, while the Union leaders estimated their strength according to the latter basis, which was rarely less than a third, sometimes a half, more than the muskets actually borne. General Hooker, who was remarkably successful in keeping himself informed of the enemy's numbers as well as their designs, says: "With regard to the enemy's force, I had reliable information. Two Union men had counted them as they passed through Hagerstown, and, in order that there might be no mistake, they compared notes every night, and if their counts differed they were satisfactorily adjusted by compromise. In round numbers Lee had 91,000 infantry, and 280 pieces of artillery; marching with that column were about 6000 cavalry. It will be remembered that a portion of the enemy's cavalry crossed the Potomac below Edward's Ferry, and went into Maryland to join Ewell between me and Washington; this column numbered about 5000 men." General Meade says: "I think General Lee had about 90,000 infantry, from 4000 to 5000 artillery, and 10,000 cavalry." This would give an aggregate of one hundred and four or five thousand of all arms.

Longstreet says that "there were at Gettysburg 67,000 bayonets; or above 70,000 of all arms." Lee was obliged to leave

MAJOR-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK

John Sedgwick

MAJ-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK.

strong guards all the way from Winchester to Gettysburg; besides, it is reported by the inhabitants, that the country was full of rebel stragglers, and when they heard that a great battle was in progress, believed that the rebel army was not half of it up.

According to the testimony of Butterfield, the strength of the Union army, as shown by returns made on the 10th of June, was 78,255, thus distributed: First corps, 11,350; Second, 11,361; Third, 11,898; Fifth, 10,136; Sixth, 15,408; Eleventh, 10,177; Twelfth, 7925. To this should be added two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve corps, some 4000 men, which joined the Fifth, Lockwood's Maryland brigade of 2500 that was attached to the Twelfth, Stannard's Vermont brigade, whose time of service had nearly expired, of 2500 more, which joined Doubleday's division of the First corps, and 12,000 cavalry, which would give a gross sum of 99,000 men. The force of 11,000 under French at Harper's Ferry and at Frederick, though under General Meade's orders, never joined the army of the Potomac in Pennsylvania, and had no part nor lot in the battle, never having come nearer the field than Frederick, and should not, therefore, be taken into the account. These 99,000 represent the numbers borne upon the rolls, but by no means show the true numbers standing in the ranks. In this record the First corps is credited with 11,350; but we know that on the morning of the 1st of July it could muster but 8200. If the difference in all the corps between the number borne upon the rolls and the number present to go into battle was as great as in this, the sum total of the army was reduced to 72,000.

General Meade testifies: "I think the returns showed me, when I took command of the army, amounted to about 105,000 men; included in those were the 11,000 of General French, which I did not bring up, which would reduce it down to about 94,000. Of that 94,000 I was compelled to leave a certain portion in the rear to guard my baggage trains. . . . I must have had on the field at Gettysburg but little short of 300 guns; and I think the report of my Chief of artillery was that there were not more than two batteries that were not in service during that battle." General Meade

may have omitted in this estimate some portion of troops who joined him after receiving command of the army, probably those of Stannard and Lockwood.

The estimates of the numbers of Lee's army by both Hooker and Meade are substantially the same. They make the aggregate vary from 105,000 to 107,000. After allowing for straggling, and for troops not up, the statement of Longstreet of the number actually upon the Gettysburg field tallies very nearly with these figures; for applying the same rule which we did above to the Union numbers, we have 76,300. But there may have been, and probably was, more straggling on the rebel than on the Union side.

We may therefore fairly conclude that Lee crossed the Potomac with something over 100,000 men, and actually had upon the field in the neighborhood of 76,300, and Meade, rejecting the forces of French, with something less than 100,000, and went into battle with about 72,000.

But in neither army was there at any one time this number of effective troops on the field. On the first day, Doubleday had but 8200 infantry and 2200 horse, and when Howard came he brought an addition of 7410, making a total of 17,810, while the enemy had four divisions which could not have been less than 30,000.

On the second day the whole rebel army was up, with the exception of Pickett, Stuart and Imboden, whose several strengths subtracted from the gross sum would leave 63,800 upon the field, nearly all of whom were hotly engaged. On the Union side, the whole strength was up before the close of the day's work; but the Sixth corps, having marched thirty-four miles, was unserviceable, was not used, and was practically off the field, as was also Buford's division of cavalry, which was ordered away to Westminster before the battle began. Deducting these from the Union aggregate, it would leave a force actually on the field of barely 59,000.

On the third day Lee had his whole force, with the exception of the small body of Imboden, on the field, as did the Union commander.

But on no day are the estimates here given veritable; for the two armies represented quantities that were constantly varying, the losses during every moment of the actual fighting being very great. On the first day the losses of dead and wounded were greater on the rebel than on the Union side, while the loss by capture was somewhat greater on the Union. On the second day the losses by killed and wounded were nearly equal, with but few prisoners on either side. On the third day the enemy lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, very heavily, while on the part of the Union it was an extremely economical fight, only a small portion of the army being engaged, and these under cover, so that the casualties were comparatively light.

The losses, in the aggregate, on both sides in the three days of fighting were immense. On the Union side, General Meade says in his official report, they "amounted to 2834 killed, 13,709 wounded, and 6643 missing, in all 23,186." Of the rebel losses no accurate report has been made. General Lee says: "It is not in my power to give a correct statement of our casualties, which were severe, including many brave men, and an unusual proportion of distinguished and valuable officers." It is estimated that the loss to the enemy in killed was 5500; though Mr. Samuel Weaver, who was charged with removing the Union dead to the National Cemetery, places the number considerably higher. He says: "In searching for the remains of our fallen heroes, we examined more than 3000 rebel graves. . . . I have been making a careful estimate, from time to time, as I went over the field, of rebel bodies buried on this battle-field and at the hospitals, and I place the number at not less than 7000 bodies." General Meade reports 13,621 rebel prisoners taken. Of the number of rebel wounded it is impossible to form a correct judgment. Many were left on the field and along the roadside, all the way from Gettysburg to Williamsport, and large numbers were taken back in the trains to Virginia. If we place the killed at 5500, and allow five wounded to one killed, which is about the usual proportion, we have 27,500 wounded. A. H. Guernsey, the author of "Harper's Pictorial History of the War," after the most patient research and careful observation estimates the rebel loss in killed,

wounded and prisoners at Gettysburg at 36,000 men. "The entire loss," he says, "to this army during the six weeks, from the middle of June, when it set forth from Culpeper to invade the North, to the close of July, when it returned to the starting point, was about 60,000." General Meade reports the capture of three cannon, forty-one standards, and 25,000 small arms.

On the rebel side, Major-Generals Hood, Pender, Trimble, and Heth were wounded, Pender mortally; Brigadier-Generals Barksdale and Garnett were killed, and Semmes mortally wounded. Brigadier-Generals Kemper, Armistead, Scales, G. T. Anderson, Hampton, J. M. Jones, and Jenkins were also wounded, Archer was taken prisoner, and Pettigrew was wounded and subsequently killed in the action at Falling Waters.

In the Union army, Major-General Reynolds, and Brigadier-Generals Vincent, Weed and Zook were killed. Major-Generals Sickles, Hancock, Doubleday, Gibbon, Barlow, Warren, and Butterfield, and Brigadier-Generals Graham, Paul, Stone, Barnes, and Brooke were wounded, General Sickles losing a leg.

A great triumph had been achieved by the Union arms. But at what a cost! and what a spectacle did that field present! Amidst "the thunder of the captains, and the shouting," thousands of the gallant and brave, who three days before had marched as joyfully as the boldest, had been stricken down, and had poured out their life-blood like water; and thousands, cold in death, were scattered on every conceivable part of that gory field.

Professor Jacobs, in his "Later Rambles," says: "For several days after the battle, the field everywhere bore the fresh marks of the terrible struggle. The soil was yet red with the blood of the wounded and slain, and large numbers of the dead of both armies were to be seen lying in the place where the fatal missiles struck them. . . . The work of interring 9000 dead, and removing about 20,000 wounded to comfortable quarters, was a herculean task. The rebel army had left the most of their dead lying unburied on the field, as also large numbers of their badly wounded, and had fled for safety. . . . There was considerable delay in properly interring the corpses that lay on the field of

battle. It was only after rebel prisoners, who had been taken in the vicinity after the battle, were impressed into this service, especially into that of covering up the bodies of their fallen comrades, that the work was finally completed. Whilst some of these prisoners went into this work with reluctance and murmuring, others did it cheerfully, saying, 'It is just what we have compelled the Yankees to do for us!' Although the field was thoroughly searched, the dead were not all discovered until it was impossible to perform for them what humanity, under other circumstances, would have demanded. In front of Little Round Top, amongst huge rocks, lay all summer long the decaying bodies of half a dozen or more of rebels, who had probably belonged to Hood's division, and, having been wounded on July 2d, in their desperate effort to take Little Round Top, may have crept into the open spaces between these rocks for shelter or for water. There they died undiscovered, and when found they were so far gone in decomposition that they could not be removed. And such also was the position in which they lay that it was impossible to cover them with earth.

"Great surprise is sometimes expressed by visitors because they do not find so many graves as they had expected to see. 'You tell us,' say they, 'that there were about 3500 Union, and about 5500 rebel soldiers killed in this battle; but we do not see so many graves. Where were they buried?' The answer has uniformly been, 'The whole ground around Gettysburg is one vast cemetery.' The men are buried everywhere. When they could conveniently be brought together, they were buried in clusters of ten, twenty, fifty, or more; but so great was their number, and such the advanced stage of decomposition of those that had lain on the field for several days during the hot weather of July, together with the unavoidable delay, that they could not be removed. In gardens and fields, and by the roadside, just where they were found lying, a shallow ditch was dug, and they were placed in it and covered up as hastily as possible. The ground is, consequently, all dotted over with graves; some fields contain hundreds of places indicating by the freshly turned up earth, and perhaps by a board, a shingle, a stick, or stone, that

the mortal remains of a human being lie there. . . . Rose's farm, especially a wheatfield, and Sherfy's peach orchard, were points of desperate and bloody contest. The wheatfield was strewn with rebel dead, and one grave near Rose's garden alone contains 400 of them. . . . Their remains will probably never be removed from the spot they now occupy, and doubtless in future time the plough will turn up their crumbling bones, together with the remnants of the weapons they used in the atrocious warfare. The vicinity of Gettysburg will thus remain a vast charnel-house, and for years to come will be visited by mourning friends."

A few weeks after the battle the writer passed over the field. It was not difficult then to trace the lines of the two armies, for the grass and even the turf was completely worn away for a considerable breadth throughout their whole extent. Cartridge-boxes, knapsacks, bayonet-sheaths, haversacks, coats, caps, and tin cartridge-cases were scattered in profusion over the whole ground, and trodden into the mud which the rains of the fourth day caused. None of the dead had then been removed, and they lay as they were left by the burying parties of the two armies. Many had never been moved from the places where they fell; all the burial they received being a little earth thrown upon them, and where earth could not be got, loose stones and fragments of rocks were used. As the rains came the earth was washed off, and in many places the extremities of the limbs were exposed. At one point, in front of Little Round Top, was a boot with the leg in it just as it had been torn from the body. Dead horses still lay thick on all parts of the field. The citizens had piled rails around some and burned them. Near the grove where stood Stannard's brigade was a pool of stagnant water, in which were the carcasses of nine horses.

The roar of artillery, and the sulphurous smoke ascending heavenward, had scarcely told that the battle was on before the agents of the Sanitary Commission began to arrive upon the field with stores for the hospitals. Dr. Steiner, in charge of two wagons, well loaded, left Frederick on the 29th of June. One of them, accompanied by Dr. McDonald and the Rev. Mr. Scandlin, fell into the hands of the enemy, and these gentlemen, bound on

errands of mercy and heavenly consolation to the wounded of friend and foe alike, were taken to Richmond, where they were subjected to the hard lot of rebel imprisonment, from the effect of which Mr. Scandlin died. He was a protegé of Father Taylor, of Boston, the sailor's friend; was a native of England, and had served in the British navy. He received his professional education at the theological school in Meadville, Pennsylvania. His treatment by the enemy is one of the foul stains upon the conduct of the rebel authorities. The other wagon reached the field on the evening of the first day. "As soon," says Dr. Steiner, "as the wounded began to come in, I started out with the wagons to distribute the stores. We reached five different hospitals, which were all we were able to find that night, and early in the morning three others, which exhausted our stores. We were just in time to do the most good possible, as the government wagons had been sent back ten miles, and many of the hospitals were not supplied with material sufficient for immediate use. These stores consisted of concentrated beef soup, stimulants, crackers, condensed milk, concentrated coffee, corn starch, farina, shirts, drawers, stockings, towels, blankets, quilts, bandages, and lint, articles in immediate need among the suffering." Other supplies came by the way of Westminster, and before the railroad was open to Gettysburg, twelve wagon loads had been brought up.

The work of this commission, from long experience, was efficiently done. Every part was thoroughly systematized, and reached to the inmates of the most insignificant hospitals. Not the least useful was the system of visitation, which had for its object examination into the wants of the inmates, and the making complete lists of the names of the wounded, which were forwarded to Washington, enabling the authorities to promptly and intelligently answer any inquiries made there respecting them. Of the hospitals on the rebel line there were those of the divisions of Hood, McLaws, Anderson, Early, and Johnson, on the Fairfield road; of Johnson, on the Hunterstown; of Heth, at Pennsylvania College; of Rodes, on the Mummasburg road; of Pickett, on the Chambersburg; of Pender, on the Cashtown, containing in all 5452 wounded. On the Union side the hospital of the First corps was divided, part

being in the town, and the remainder two and a half miles out on the Baltimore pike, and contained 260 rebel and 2779 Union wounded; that of the Second corps was on the banks of Rock Creek, and contained 1000 rebel and 4500 Union; of the Third corps, near the junction of White and Rock Creeks, and contained 250 rebel and 2550 Union; of the Fifth corps, in three divisions, and contained 75 rebel and 1400 Union; of the Sixth corps, also in three divisions, and contained 300 Union; of the Eleventh corps, at George Spangler's, and contained 100 rebel and 1900 Union; of the Twelfth corps, at the house of George Bushman, and contained 125 rebel and 1131 Union, an aggregate of 14,860. Of these there were 7262 rebel, being the desperately wounded, all others having been removed, or gone back with the retreating columns.

As the Union army was obliged to follow immediately the fleeing enemy, but a limited number of medical officers could be left upon the field, and but few rebel surgeons remained behind. At first these were severely tasked; but volunteers soon began to arrive, many of the most eminent physicians of the country flocking to the field, and freely giving their services. "The labor," says J. H. Douglas, associate secretary of the Sanitary Commission, "the anxiety, the responsibility imposed upon the surgeons after the battle of Gettysburg, were from the position of affairs greater than after any other battle of the war. The devotion, the solicitude, the unceasing efforts to remedy the defects of the situation, the untiring attentions to the wounded upon their part, were so marked as to be apparent to all who visited the hospitals. It must be remembered that these same officers had endured the privations and fatigues of the long forced marches with the rest of the army; that they had shared its dangers, for one medical officer from each regiment follows it into battle, and is liable to the accidents of war, as has been repeatedly and fatally the case; that its field hospitals are often, from the changes of the line of battle, brought under the fire of the enemy, and that, while in this situation, these surgeons are called upon to exercise the calmest judgment, to perform the most critical and serious operations, and this quickly and continuously. The battle ceasing, their labors continue. While other

officers are sleeping, renewing their strength for further efforts, the medical are still toiling. They have to improvise hospitals from the rudest materials, are obliged to make 'bricks without straw,' to surmount seeming impossibilities. The work is unending both by day and by night, the anxiety is constant, the strain upon both the physical and mental faculties unceasing. Thus after this battle, operators had to be held up while performing the operations, and fainted from exhaustion, the operation finished. One completed his labors to be seized with partial paralysis, the penalty of his over-exertion. While his duties are as arduous, his exposure as great, and the mortality from disease and injury as large as among staff officers of similar rank, the surgeon has no prospect of promotion, of a brevet, or an honorable mention to stimulate him. His duties are performed quietly, unostentatiously. He does his duty for his country's sake, for the sake of humanity. The consciousness of having performed this great duty is well nigh his only, as it must ever be his highest, reward. The medical corps of the army is well deserving this small tribute."

Whoever has followed the phases of this battle must have been impressed with the stubborn valor displayed on both sides by the common soldiers. The dauntless resolution exhibited in the attacks made it a terribly bloody and destructive conflict, and the unyielding and resolute front of the defence brought victory. But there was no possibility of achieving on either side such sweeping and complete triumphs as are recorded of wars in other countries, and in other days, in a contest between two armies where the common soldiers were of such a temper and in such earnest as were these.

It is a sad spectacle to see the manhood of two, claiming to be Christian peoples, thus march out to a field, like trained pugilists, and beat, and gouge, and pummel each other, until one or the other, from exhaustion, must yield. It is revolting and sickening, and it is hoped that the day will come when disputes arising among nations may be settled by conference, as two reasonable and upright men would decide a difference, governed by the golden rule, instead of resorting to blows where right and justice must be subordinate to brute force. But in a great battle like that which we

have been considering, it is not the soldiers themselves who are responsible; but the parties which make the quarrel. Hence, while the mind revolts at the scenes of destruction which the field discloses, the immediate actors are not to be held accountable. They go in obedience to the dictates of duty and of patriotism, and while they may indulge no personal hatred toward those who for the time they call enemies, they must in battle inflict the greatest possible injury upon them.

In all ages the highest honors have been reserved for those who have fought the battles of their country. And this is right. For if there is any deed in the power of a mortal which can sway the feelings or soften the heart, it is that of one man laying down his life for another. The breast heaves, and the eye is suffused with tears at the spectacle of Pythias putting his life in jeopardy only for his friend, and to how many souls have come the agonies of repentance, and the joys of sins forgiven in contemplation of the Saviour dying upon the cross. There is a halo of glory hovering about the profession of arms. It has its seat in the sacrifice of self, which is its ruling spirit. The man who stands upon the field of battle and faces the storm of death that sweeps along, whether he merely puts his life thus in jeopardy, or is actually carried down in death, torn and mangled in the dread fight, is worthy of endless honors; and though we may class the deed with the lowest of human acts, prompted by a hardihood which we share with the brutes, and in which the most ignorant and besotted may compete with the loftiest, yet it is an act before which humanity will ever bow and uncover. Who that walked that field of carnage, and beheld the maimed and mangled, and him cold in death, could withhold the tribute of honor and respect? for, could he make that dying soldier's lot his own, or that of his nearest and dearest friend, he would only then justly realize the sacrifice.

When, therefore, the friends of the dead came sorrowing to seek their lifeless remains, they were struck with horror at the imperfect manner in which the burials had been executed. No one was more strongly impressed with the duty of immediately providing for the proper interment of these fallen patriots than Governor


MAP OF
THE GROUNDS
OF THE
SOLDIER'S NATIONAL CEMETERY,
GETTYSBURG, PA.
Baltimore Turnpike.
Taneytown Road.
1. UNKNOWN.
2. ILLINOIS.
3. VIRGINIA.
4. DELAWARE.
5. RHODE ISLAND.
6. NEW HAMPSHIRE.
7. VERMONT.
8. NEW JERSEY.
9. WISCONSIN.
10. CONNECTICUT
11. MINNESOTA.
12. MARYLAND.
13. U. S. REGULARS.
14. UNKNOWN.
15. MAINE.
16. MICHIGAN.
17. NEW YORK.
18. PENNSYLVANIA.
19. MASSACHUSETTS.
20. OHIO.
21. INDIANA.
22. UNKNOWN.
23. MONUMENT
24. GATE-HOUSE.
25. FLAGSTAFF, 300.
PHOTO-LITH BY TAYLOR & SMITH 143 S. FOURTH ST., PHILA.

Curtin, the Executive of Pennsylvania. He intrusted the business of maturing a plan to Mr. David Wills, of Gettysburg. Acting under the instruction of the Governor, this gentleman purchased a plot of some seventeen acres on Cemetery Hill, adjoining the village cemetery on the north and west, where the centre of the Union line of battle had rested, and where the guns of Steinwehr and the men of the Eleventh corps fought. The eighteen States whose troops gained the battle joined in this enterprise. By an Act of the Legislature, the title to the ground was vested in the State of Pennsylvania, in trust for all the States having dead buried there, and a corporate body was created, consisting of one from each State, to serve without pay, to whom its care was intrusted, the expense to be borne in proportion to the representation in Congress.

The work of laying out the grounds and suitably adorning them was performed by an eminent landscape gardener, William Saunders. His suggestions upon the subject, accompanying the drawings, were eminently just. The great disparity in the number of the dead from the different States to be interred demanded a plan that should obviate criticism as to preference in position. To this end a semicircular form was adopted, the head of every body pointing towards a common centre, which should be made the site for the monument. "The prevailing expression," he says, "of the Cemetery should be that of simple grandeur. Simplicity is that element of beauty in a scene that leads gradually from one object to another, in easy harmony, avoiding abrupt contrasts and unexpected features. Grandeur, in this application, is closely allied to solemnity. Solemnity is an attribute of the sublime. The sublime in scenery may be defined as continuity of extent, the repetition of objects in themselves simple and commonplace. We do not apply this epithet to the scanty tricklings of the brook, but rather to the collected waters of the ocean. To produce an expression of grandeur we must avoid intricacy and great variety of parts, more particularly must we refrain from introducing any intermixture or meretricious display of ornament. The disposition of trees and shrubs is such that will ultimately produce a considerable degree of landscape effect. Ample spaces of lawn are provided. These will form vistas, as seen from the drive, showing the monu-

ment and other prominent points. . . . As the trees spread and extend, the quiet beauty produced by these open spaces of lawn will yearly become more striking."

A contract was entered into with F. W. Biesecker for disinterring the dead and reinterring their remains in their last resting-place, a work which was commenced on the 27th of October, 1863, and completed on the 18th of March following. The whole number thus buried was 3575. The entire work was done under the superintendence of Samuel Weaver, who executed his arduous trust with great care and judgment. "Through his untiring and faithful efforts, the bodies in many unmarked graves have been identified in various ways. Sometimes by letters, by papers, receipts, certificates, diaries, memorandum books, photographs, marks on the clothing, belts, or cartridge-boxes, have the names of the soldiers been discovered. Money and other valuables have frequently been found, which, when the residence of the friends is known, have been immediately sent to them. Those not returned are carefully packed up and marked, and every effort will be made to find the friends of the deceased, and place these articles in their possession. Words would fail to describe the grateful relief that this work has brought to many a sorrowing household! A father, a brother, a son has been lost on this battle-field, supposed to be killed, but no tidings whatever have the bereaved friends of him. Suddenly, in the progress of this work, his remains are discovered by sure marks, letters, probably photographs, and they are deposited in a coffin with care, and buried in this very appropriate place, on the battle-field where he fell, the Soldiers' National Cemetery."

Of the condition in which the remains were found Mr. Weaver says: "Where bodies were in heavy clay soil, or in marshy places, they were in a good state of preservation. Where they were in sandy, porous soil, they were entirely decomposed." Of the articles found upon the bodies of the dead, the following may be cited as examples: "G. W. Sprague, the grape-shot that killed him, two knives, two rings and comb;" "James Kelley, company K, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania regiment, ambrotype, sixty cents, comb, medal;" "Unknown, pocket-book, and hair of father, mother,

sister and brother." Of the entire number interred, 3575, Maine had 104; New Hampshire, 49; Vermont, 61; Massachusetts, 158; Rhode Island, 14; Connecticut, 22; New York, 867; New Jersev 78; Pennsylvania, 535; Delaware, 15; Maryland, 22; West Virginia, 11; Ohio, 131; Indiana, 80; Illinois, 6; Michigan, 175; Wisconsin, 73; Minnesota, 56; U. S. Regulars, 139; Unknown, 979. Several of the Western States had but few troops in the Army of the Potomac, and hence their loss was correspondingly small, while New York, which had the greatest number, suffered most severely. The Cemetery is enclosed on the south, west, and north sides by a solid wall of masonry, surmounted with a heavy dressed coping stone, and on the east by an iron fence separating it from the village cemetery. The design for a monument by J. G. Batterson, of Hartford, Connecticut, was adopted by the commissioners, after an examination of a large number submitted. "The whole rendering of the design is intended to be purely historical, telling its own story, with such simplicity that any discerning mind will readily comprehend its meaning and purpose. The superstructure is sixty feet high, and consists of a massive pedestal, twenty-five feet square at the base, and is crowned with a colossal statue representing the Genius of Liberty. Standing upon a three-quarter globe, she raises with her right hand the victor's wreath of laurel, while with the left she gathers up the folds of our national flag, under which the victory has been won. Projecting from the angles of the pedestal are four buttresses, supporting an equal number of allegorical statues, representing respectively WAR, HISTORY, PEACE, and PLENTY. *War* is personified by a statue of the American soldier, who, resting from the conflict, relates to History the story of the battle which this monument is intended to commemorate. *History*, in listening attitude, records with stylus and tablet the achievements of the field, and the names of the honored dead. *Peace* is symbolized by a statue of the American mechanic, characterized by appropriate accessories. *Plenty* is represented by a female figure, with a sheaf of wheat and fruits of the earth, typifying peace and abundance as the soldier's crowning triumph. The panels of the main die between the statues are to have inscribed upon them such inscriptions as

may hereafter be determined. The main die of the pedestal is octagonal in form, panelled upon each face. The cornice and plinth above are also octagonal, and are heavily moulded. Upon this plinth rests an octagonal moulded base bearing upon its face, in high relief, the National arms. The upper die and cap are circular in form, the die being encircled by stars equal in number with the States whose sons contributed their lives as the price of the victory won at Gettysburg."

By the unanimous voice of the agents of the several States, Edward Everett, the eminent orator, statesman and publicist, was invited to deliver an oration upon the occasion of the consecration of the grounds. In his note accepting the invitation Mr. Everett said: "The occasion is one of great importance, not to be dismissed with a few sentimental or patriotic common-places. It will demand as full a narrative of the events of the three important days as the limits of the hour will admit, and some appropriate discussion of the political character of the great struggle of which the battle of Gettysburg is one of the most momentous incidents." The ceremonies occurred on the 19th of November, at which time the address, modelled upon the plan sketched in the above sentence, was delivered in presence of the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, the Ministers of France and Italy, the French Admiral, the Governors of many States, Members of Congress, and a vast concourse of citizens, among whom were many representatives of the Army and Navy. "One of the most sad and impressive features of the solemnities," says Mr. Wills, "was the presence, in the procession and on the grounds, of a delegation of about fifty wounded soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, from the York Hospital. These men had been wounded in the battle of Gettysburg, and were present in a delegation to pay this just tribute to the remains of their fallen comrades. During the exercises their bronzed cheeks were frequently suffused with tears."

Mr. Everett's oration was one of the most eloquent and well-wrought of his many addresses on important events in the national history which have made his name illustrious. The opening passages were in his peculiar vein, and are so beautiful, so apt, and



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so ornate, that they will ever be recalled with delight: "Standing beneath this serene sky, overlooking these broad fields, now reposing from the labors of the waning year, the mighty Alleghenies dimly towering before us, the graves of our brethren beneath our feet, it is with hesitation that I raise my poor voice to break the eloquent silence of God and Nature. But the duty to which you have called me must be performed;—grant me, I pray you, your indulgence and your sympathy. It was appointed by law in Athens that the obsequies of the citizens who fell in battle should be performed at the public expense, and in the most honorable manner. Their bones were carefully gathered up from the funeral pyre, where their bodies were consumed, and brought home to the city. There, for three days before the interment, they lay in state, beneath tents of honor, to receive the votive offerings of friends and relatives,—flowers, weapons, precious ornaments, painted vases (wonders of art, which, after two thousand years, adorn the museums of modern Europe),—the last tributes of surviving affection. Ten coffins of funeral cypress received the honorable deposit, one for each of the tribes of the city, and an eleventh in memory of the unrecognized, but not therefore unhonored dead, and of those whose remains could not be recovered. On the fourth day the mournful procession was formed: mothers, wives, sisters, daughters led the way; and to them it was permitted by the simplicity of ancient manners, to utter aloud their lamentations for the beloved and the lost; the male relatives and friends of the deceased followed; citizens and strangers closed the train. Thus marshalled, they moved to the place of interment in that famous Ceramicus, the most beautiful suburb of Athens, which had been adorned by Cimon, the son of Miltiades, with walks and fountains and columns,—whose groves were filled with altars, shrines, and temples,—whose gardens were kept forever green by the streams from the neighboring hills, and shaded with the trees sacred to Minerva and coeval with the foundation of the city,—whose circuit enclosed

> 'The olive Grove of Academe,
> Plato's retirement, where the Attic bird
> Trilled his thick warbled note the summer long;'—

whose pathways gleamed with the monuments of the illustrious dead, the work of the most consummate masters that ever gave life to marble. There, beneath the overarching plane trees, upon a lofty stage erected for the purpose, it was ordained that a funeral oration should be pronounced by some citizen of Athens, in the presence of the assembled multitude.

"Such were the tokens of respect required to be paid at Athens to the memory of those who had fallen in the cause of their country. For those alone who fell at Marathon a peculiar honor was reserved. As the battle fought upon that immortal field was distinguished from all others in Grecian history for its influence over the fortunes of Hellas,—as it depended upon the event of that day whether Greece should live, a glory and a light to all coming time, or should expire like the meteor of a moment,—so the honors awarded to its martyr-heroes were such as were bestowed by Athens on no other occasion. They alone of all her sons were entombed upon the spot which they had forever rendered famous. Their names were inscribed upon ten pillars, erected upon the monumental tumulus which covered their ashes (where, after 600 years, they were read by the traveller Pausanias) and although the columns, beneath the hand of time and barbaric violence, have long since disappeared, the venerable mound still marks the spot where they fought and fell—

> 'That battle-field where Persia's victim horde
> First bowed beneath the brunt of Hella's sword.'

"And shall I, fellow-citizens, who, after an interval of twenty-three centuries, a youthful pilgrim from the world unknown to ancient Greece, have wandered over that illustrious plain, ready to put off the shoes from off my feet, as one that stands on holy ground,—who have gazed with respectful emotion on the mound which still protects the dust of those who rolled back the tide of Persian invasion, and rescued the land of popular liberty, of letters, and of arts, from the ruthless foe,—stand unmoved over the graves of our dear brethren who so lately, on three of those all-important days which decide a nation's history,—days on whose issue it depended whether this august republican Union, founded

by some of the wisest statesmen that ever lived, cemented with the blood of some of the purest patriots that ever died, should perish or endure,—rolled back the tide of an invasion not less unprovoked, not less ruthless, than that which came to plant the dark banner of Asiatic despotism and slavery on the free soil of Greece? Heaven forbid! And could I prove so insensible to every prompting of patriotic duty and affection, not only would you, fellow-citizens, gathered many of you from distant States, who have come to take part in these pious offices of gratitude,—you, respected fathers, brethren, matrons, sisters, who surround me,—cry out for shame, but the forms of brave and patriotic men, who fill these honored graves, would heave with indignation beneath the sod."

A single clause from the peroration will illustrate the happy manner in which, with a few master strokes, he glorified the field and the dead who there fell, whose last resting-place he was aiding to consecrate: "The spots on which they stood and fell; these pleasant heights; the fertile plain beneath them; the thriving village, whose streets so lately rang with the strange din of war; the fields beyond the Ridge, where the noble REYNOLDS held the advancing foe at bay, and, while he gave up his own life, assured by his forethought and self-sacrifice the triumph of the two succeeding days; the little streams which wind through the hills on whose banks in after times the wondering plowman will turn up, with the rude weapons of savage warfare, the fearful missiles of modern artillery; Seminary Ridge, the Peach Orchard, Cemetery, Culp, and Wolf Hill, Round Top, Little Round Top, humble names, henceforward dear and famous,—no lapse of time, no distance of space shall cause you to be forgotten."

The dedicatory address was reserved to President Lincoln, who, after the conclusion of Mr. Everett's oration, delivered the following:

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation so conceived, and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great

battle-field of that war. We are met to dedicate a portion of it as the final resting-place of those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But in a larger sense we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus far so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion,—that we here highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain, that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

Short and simple in sentiment and structure, it is yet a most impressive and appropriate piece of composition. So well does it embody the thought which seemed struggling for utterance in every breast, that a word added to or subtracted from it, would mar its harmony and faultless conception. But, however perfect its formation, its delivery was more solemn and impressive than is possible to conceive from its perusal. Major Harry T. Lee, who was one of the actors in the battle, and who was present upon the platform at the dedication, says that the people listened with marked attention throughout the two hours that Mr. Everett spoke; that his oration was finished, grand, lofty, though as cold and unimpassioned as the marble which pressed the forms of the sleeping dead; but that when Mr. Lincoln came forward, and with a voice burdened with emotion, uttered these sublime words, the bosoms of that vast audience were lifted as a great wave of the sea; and that when he came to the passage, "The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here," there was not a dry eye, and he seemed bewailing the sad fate of men, every one of whom was his brother.

When he had concluded, Mr. Everett stepped forward, and taking him by the hand, said in a manner which showed how

fully he felt what he uttered: "Ah! Mr. Lincoln, I would gladly give all my forty pages for your twenty lines." The *Westminster Review*, one of the most dignified and scholarly of the English quarterlies, said of this address: "His oration at the consecration of the burial ground at Gettysburg has but one equal, in that pronounced upon those who fell during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, and in one respect it is superior to that great speech. It is not only more natural, fuller of feeling, more touching and pathetic, but we know with absolute certainty that it was really delivered. Nature here really takes precedence of art, even though it be the art of Thucydides."

The monument above described was completed in 1868. It is of granite procured from Westerly, Rhode Island. The four figures about the base, and the colossal one upon the summit, are of marble and were cut in Italy. The whole was constructed by Mr. Batterson, the designer. The names of the dead are not inscribed on the monument, but on granite headstones, which mark the place where each reposes. Dedicatory services were held upon the ground on the 1st of July, 1869, when General Meade delivered a brief address, Governor O. P. Morton, of Indiana, an oration, and Bayard Taylor an ode. General Meade alluded in touching words to the bereaved by that battle, and earnestly urged, in conclusion, the propriety and the duty of gathering the remains of the Confederate dead and giving them burial in some suitable ground to be devoted to that special purpose, justly observing that the burial originally was from necessity very imperfect. Mr. Morton described briefly the course of the battle, and traced the progress of freedom since the memorable era of 1776, deducing the conclusion that the triumph of the Union cause was due to its devotion to the principles of liberty. Mr. Taylor dwelt in a chaste and well-conceived poetic vein upon the fruits which should be gathered from the struggle, and concluded in these fitting lines:

> "Thus in her seat secure,
> Where now no distant menaces can reach her,
> At last an undivided freedom pure,
> She sits, the unwilling world's unconscious teacher;

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Miller would never rest till that battery was his." The order to fix bayonets and charge was promptly given, and Miller, placing himself at the head of the column, led on. Darkness overshadowed all—as the battle was fought from sundown to midnight —except as the blaze of the guns lit up the field. The slaughter was fearful; but that coveted eminence was scaled, the guns captured, and turned on the foe. That heroic exploit was the turning point in the battle, and at midnight the British retired, leaving the Americans masters of the field. Tears would fill the eyes of Burns, and his brawny figure heave with emotion, as he told the words of his brave old leader, and described the fiery ardor of his General.

Burns remained upon the frontier through two winters, and until peace was declared. He enlisted with the first for the war with Mexico, and after drilling and patiently awaiting orders, was in the end sorely disappointed to receive notice that his company could not be accepted. He was a member of the militia in Newtown, commanded by Weanausel, John and Jonathan Wynkoop. When the Hon. Edward McPherson, then member of Congress from the Gettysburg district, and since Clerk of the House, formed his company for three months' service, at the opening of the rebellion, Burns shouldered his musket, and putting himself in the ranks marched to the camp at West Chester. When it came to be mustered into the service of the United States, however, he was rejected on account of his age and sent home. But the quiet little town of Gettysburg was too small for a man like Burns, and he travelled on foot to Hagerstown, joining the wagon train. Near the close of May, he was sent to Frederick with a fresh supply of animals, and soon after, his fidelity being appreciated, he was made police officer of the wagon camp. He was at the battle of Falling Waters; and when the booming of the cannon and the rattle of musketry were borne to his ears, he gave his whip to another, exclaiming, "They may want me over there," and started for the field; but before he reached it Jackson had been routed. He remained in the column of Banks after the departure of Patterson, until winter set in, a period of seven months, when he was again sent home.



John L. Burns

His fellow-townsmen, reverencing his patriotic impulses, and thinking that by giving him employment in which he should feel responsibility he might be kept from the field, at the borough election in the spring of 1862, chose him constable. This had the desired effect, and until the invasion of the State he devoted himself diligently to his official duties. At one period of his life Burns had been given to dissipation; but in later years he was not only a disciple of temperance, but of strict total abstinence, and never was a man more earnest and consistent in his professions. The unlawful sale of alcoholic liquors found in him an uncompromising foe.

On Sunday, June the 21st, preceding the great battle, Captain John Scott, with fourteen men, among whom was Burns, went out fourteen miles into the mountains, on the Chambersburg road, for the purpose of bushwhacking the enemy; but met Union scouts and were turned back. On Friday, the 26th, Early came with his division to Gettysburg, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and Burns, perhaps showing himself a little too officious, was taken prisoner and held in custody until Sunday, when the rebel leader departed on his way to York. The fiery spirit of Burns could illy brook this vile durance and insult to his authority as a civil officer, and we may imagine him ready to answer in the language of the resolute constable in a village of the old Bay State, when a bully threatened to shake him, "You may shake; but remember, if you shake me, you shake the whole State of Massachusetts." Towards evening of that same Sunday, Burns caught a rebel chaplain, George Gwin, riding with messages from Ewell to Early, and a trooper, and locked them up in the Gettysburg jail. On the following day he seized one of White's guerillas, who gave the name of Talbut, and him, also, he held fast in jail. Buford with his cavalry came on Tuesday, and after resting an hour in the streets, moved out to McPherson's farm and encamped. The appearance of the old flag and the veterans of Buford brought joy to the old man's heart. Hitherto he had been single-handed in facing the whole rebel army. He hailed with satisfaction the van of the Army of the Potomac, coming to his support. On the following morning came Reynolds, leading the First corps. Burns was on

the alert; yet he was a man who never meddled with any business except his own and kept aloof from the General's cavalcade; but when hailed by Reynolds on his return from his interview with Buford, and asked to point out a near way to get through the outskirts of the town to meet the head of his column, Burns joyfully performed the office. When the leading division came on, and the pioneers, obedient to the order of Reynolds, were levelling the fences through the fields to open a way to Seminary Ridge, Burns was at hand, and the flashing of their bright axes in the morning sunlight made an indelible impression upon him. Burns could never restrain his enthusiasm in describing this scene; but would spring to his feet and swing his arms as though handling one of those shining implements and laying low the fences before him.

Going back towards his own home he met two wounded soldiers of Buford's command returning to town. "Ah, my lads," says Burns, "your guns are needed over yonder; but you are bleeding, and are to weak to carry them; give one of them to me." This the soldier addressed resolutely refused. The other, more accurately discerning the old man's spirit, said to his companion, "Give it to him. You can't use it." "What do you want to do with it?" asked the soldier. "Shoot the d——d rebels," was the old man's curt reply. It was given, and filling his pockets with cartridges, he hurried forward and came upon the Union line where Stone's brigade was hotly engaged. He was first accosted by Major Chamberlain of the One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania, with, "Old man, where are you going?" "I want a chance," said Burns. "A chance for what?" "To shoot," replied the old man, his eye fired with excitement and his whole frame swayed with emotion. Chamberlain referred him to Colonel Wister. To the question if he could be allowed to fight, Wister replied, "Yes, and I wish there were many more like you. But you have no ammunition." "Yes, I have," said Burns, slapping his pockets. "Do you know how to shoot?" "Give me a chance," cried Burns, "and I will show you whether I can shoot or not." "You may have a chance," said the Colonel, "but this open ground is no place for an old man like you. Go over to the

woods with the Iron Brigade, where you can have some shelter." He went as directed, and joining the Seventh Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Callis, opened upon the rebels. But the wood did not suit him. He wanted a fair unobstructed view, and went to a fence in the open ground. Among his acquaintances he had always been known as a dead shot. He was now in no haste to create smoke; but awaiting his opportunity, he fired only when he saw something that he could hit. He watched especially for men mounted, and many a saddle was emptied. His unerring aim attracted the attention of the soldiers and officers of the Seventh, and Colonel Callis sent him a fine silver-mounted rifle that had been captured from the enemy in the battle of Antietam. Away across Willoughby Run was seen an officer riding a beautiful gray horse. He came on, leading his men with the utmost gallantry. He was pointed out to Burns, and that beautiful charger was soon seen galloping riderless over the field, and the old hero was saluted by three cheers from the soldiers who were watching him. At one o'clock there was a lull in the battle and he lay down upon the grass to rest. On looking about he was startled by seeing a hand lying on the ground that had been torn from the body by some terrible missile; but the body whose pulsations had warmed it was nowhere to be seen. When the battle was renewed he went again earnestly to work. The enemy, strong and well supported, pushed forward fearlessly, while the Union force had but one thin line, and that now fearfully decimated. Burns took little care of his person, and he was finally struck in the side by two musket shots that eventually produced a rupture; but still he would not yield. Again he was struck, now on the buckle of his belt, the shock bending him nearly double, and for a few moments he could not speak; but he recovered himself, and might then have retired with honor and safety, the brigade with which he had been fighting having already gone. But now the enemy were coming nearer, and his chances for shooting were rapidly improving, and he stood at his post firing away until the rebel line was close upon him, when he received a severe wound in the arm, an artery being severed, from which the hemorrhage came near proving fatal, and another in his leg, the limb being com-

pletely paralyzed, and he could do no more—neither retire nor even stand. His first thought was to divest himself of every appearance of a combatant, well knowing that he could not hope for mercy with the evidences of having participated in the fight found upon him. He accordingly threw away his gun, and the four cartridges which still remained in his pocket he buried, digging for the purpose with his pocket-knife. Weakened by the loss of blood, he soon became oblivious, and when the final charge of the enemy was made he was insensible, and was passed for dead. At about six o'clock in the evening a sergeant and six men engaged in gathering the wounded, attracted by the strange sight of an old gray-headed man in his ordinary dress, bleeding from numerous ghastly wounds, approached and stood spell-bound before him. After a moment's silence they turned him upon his side, and seeing that he was still alive, inquired, "How came you here?" My wife," answered Burns, "was taken suddenly sick this morning, and I started off from the town to cross this field in search of a girl who lives out beyond here to come and take care of her and was caught between the two lines, and as you see am badly wounded." "I believe he is an old liar," said the sergeant; "but he will never harm us any more," and passed on, leaving him in his misery. He then dragged himself along on the grass to where two dead rebels and a Union man with thigh all crushed by a cannon shot were lying. Not long after burying parties came and covered his three dead companions with earth where they lay, to whom he repeated the story of hunting a girl; but they were alike incredulous. He finally fell asleep and rested till eleven, when he was awakened by the tramping of a sergeant posting his guards. It had been raining and he was chilled. He called to the guard for a drink of water, which was given him, and a blanket in which he wrapped himself.

At dawn he heard the cocks crowing and saw a guard not far off, towards whom he began to roll and pull himself along. An officer approached and told him to get to a hospital. By great exertions and with excruciating pain—for his clothing was stiff and rasped the lips of the undressed wounds—he reached a little log-house and pulled himself upon the cellar door, when his strength

failed him and he fainted, and it was some time before he recovered. He was taken up and carried into the loft of the house, which was full of wounded. Seeing his exhausted condition, he was offered some blackberry wine by the good woman, but he stubbornly refused it from a rigid sense of his duty in view of his pledge to total abstinence. He sent a message to an old friend who lived near to come and take him back to the town; but before he arrived, a neighbor, Anthony Sullivan, was returning with his family, and laying Burns gently in the wagon carried him to his own home, arriving at about two o'clock on the afternoon of the 2d of July. The report had spread that he was killed, he having been last seen badly wounded, and it was with a thrill of joy and relief to a heart burdened with anxiety and grief that he was met at the cottage door by his wife. But his home was now a hospital crowded with mutilated soldiers. A place was made for him in an upper room, and his wounds were dressed by the surgeon in charge, a Major of the Confederate army from North Carolina. As General Ewell was passing his window, the doctor asked Burns if he had ever seen the General, and kindly raised him up to look out. Burns gazed an instant, and then, as though not impressed with the General's appearance, exclaimed: "Humph! the old booger has only one leg, and has to be strapped on his horse." On Friday a Captain and a Lieutenant visited the house, and approaching him inquired, "Well, old man, how did you come wounded?" Again he had recourse to the story of the sick wife. "But who shot you? your own men or ours?" "I can't tell that," said Burns, "I could get no farther than the Union line, and when I was wounded I sat down and could not get back until brought in by my neighbor." But this did not satisfy his questioner, who, as appears, had been enlightened respecting Burns' case by some of the townspeople, and gruffly responded, "Look here, old man, didn't you take a gun from a soldier out on the street here, Wednesday morning?" "Yes, I did." "Well, what did you say when you took it?" "Why, I said a heap of things. Folks say a heap of things in these times." "Didn't you say that you was going out to shoot some of the d——d rebels?" Burns was helpless and in the power of his enemies, but his spirit was

undaunted, and he promptly and resolutely responded, "Yes, I did say just that thing." His questioners had but one argument remaining. They silently left the house, and procured two riflemen, who, going into a chamber on the opposite side of the street, took deliberate aim at the old man as he lay helpless upon his couch. The missiles penetrated the bed under him, just missing his body. Realizing that their purpose was to kill him, he rolled upon the floor and crawled into the next room. Supposing that he was under the bed they fired several shots, and hearing nothing concluded they had effected their design. But now the last charge had been delivered, and the day had gone hopelessly against the foe. At three o'clock on Saturday morning guards came and aroused all—quietly removing the wounded—the trains being already in full retreat.

The story of old John Burns, his courage in the battle, his almost miraculous escape from death by wounds and the assassin's bullets, soon spread through the whole land, and he was hailed as the HERO OF GETTYSBURG. Not the Generals who had conducted the battle were regarded with greater interest, nor was there a stronger desire felt to behold them. He was brought upon the platform at great public gatherings in Philadelphia, and other large cities, and he was made to pass in triumph like the heroes of old. On one occasion in Philadelphia, as he was being conducted through the crowd, an aged woman rushed forward, and grasping his coat, exclaimed: "Troth, mon, if I caan't shake you by the hand I'll shake your old coat." None felt a greater interest in the veteran than Mr. Lincoln, and no sooner had he arrived in Gettysburg on the day of the consecration of the National Cemetery, than he inquired for Burns, and expressed a desire to see him. Citizens immediately went to bring him. They found him at his home, and when told that Mr. Lincoln had sent for him, he was apparently incredulous as to the regularity of the call, and replied, "If anybody wants to see me let him come here." But he was finally convinced and was taken along. After a pleasant interview, in which the President showed him very marked attention, the whole company started for the church, where there was to be a public reception. As the procession was ready to move, Mr. Lincoln

sought Mr. Burns, and walked with him arm in arm through the streets. Burns visited Washington, and was received by the President, the Secretary of War, and other officials of the Government with special honor; Congress and the Legislature of Pennsylvania voted him pensions, and the Senate of the latter made him one of its officers, a position which he held for several years. He was mentioned with admiration by the press of other countries, and poetry has woven for him an enduring chaplet.

As age came upon him, and the furrows deepened on his face, his body indeed gave token of yielding; but the spirit was still fresh. He delighted in the society of children, and danced gayly with them as he hummed the air which in the days long ago had guided the feet of the maiden whom he led in sportive measure. Nor could age temper his love of martial glory. He was never quite satisfied with the fight at Gettysburg, especially on that first day, when the Union forces were obliged to yield their position. He never mentioned the subject without expressing the wish that the rebels would come once more, believing that if the battle was to be fought over again he could do better. He manifested great reluctance to speak of his wounds, and only after repeated importunities could he be induced to show his scars, which disclose how horrible must have been his mutilation. After the death of his wife, which occurred in 1868, he was very lonely, had no regular home, and was much cast about. While in Harrisburg, in the winter of 1870, he had a paralytic stroke, and was carried to his lodgings. An Irishman, a stranger, was employed to take care of him. During the night Burns got the impression—whether well or ill founded—that the Irishman was trying to rob him. He attempted to draw up his right hand, but that would not obey the impulse. The left, however, was still free, with which he hit the fellow such a powerful blow over the eyes as to send him sprawling upon the floor.

With all his heroism, Burns was not without a spark of superstition. It may have been a relic of family or national tradition, or a constitutional trace of morbid religious sentiment, with which he was thoroughly imbued. He believed in apparitions. He was on one occasion passing through the woods where in the battle he

had fought. It was summer, and the foliage was upon the forest as then. He was alone, no human being within call, when suddenly there appeared before him a Confederate soldier, dressed in gray, with slouched hat, gun and accoutrements,

> A figure
> Armed at point, exactly, cap-à-pie.

"He was," says Burns, "a man of immense proportions, and the very image of the one whom I had seen there on the day of the battle, at the very spot, and in the exact attitude." "Did you speak to it?" we asked. "No, sir, I did not. It beckoned me to come towards him, but I turned and left the ground as rapidly as I could, and have never been on that field since. I could face them alive and respond to their challenge, but when the dead men come back, I am not in for that style of warfare." "But, Mr. Burns, you do not really believe that it was a ghost, do you?" Shaking his head as if still in awe of the apparition, and with solemn and mysterious mien, he exclaimed, "Ah, ha! You tell if you can."

Burns was a man of strict fidelity, one in whom unlimited trust could be placed, who looked with utter abhorrence upon corruption in political as in private life. He was full of the milk of human kindness, of tenderness and compassion, quickly moved to tears at the recital of suffering and distress. He was not only strictly devoted to his professions of temperance, and his pledges as a Good Templar, but was a devout Christian—an honest man. He died on the 4th of February, 1872, and was buried in Evergreen Cemetery, near the resting-place of the dead in that great battle in which he acted so heroic a part. Time may bring other men to stand in future emergencies; but none will come with a truer heart than that which beat in the bosom of John L. Burns, the HERO OF GETTYSBURG.

Our artist has admirably produced the rugged features of the old hero, and Bret Harte, in his characteristic way, has thus vividly portrayed him in song:

> Have you heard the story that gossips tell
> Of Burns of Gettysburg?—No? Ah, well!

Brief is the glory that hero earns,
Briefer the story of poor John Burns:
He was the fellow who won renown,—
The only man who didn't back down
When the rebels rode through his native town;
But held his own in the fight next day. . . .

I might tell how, but the day before,
John Burns stood at his cottage door,
  Looking down the village street,
Where in the shade of his peaceful vine,
He heard the low of his gathered kine,
And felt their breath with incense sweet;
Or, I might say, when the sunset burned
The old farm gable, he thought it turned
The milk, that fell in a babbling flood
Into the milk-pail, red as blood:
Or how he fancied the hum of bees
Were bullets buzzing among the trees.
But all such fanciful thoughts as these
Were strange to a practical man like Burns,
Who minded only his own concerns,
Troubled no more by fancies fine
Than one of his calm-eyed, long-tailed kine,—
Quite old-fashioned and matter of fact,
Slow to argue, but quick to act.
That was the reason, as some folks say,
He fought so well on that terrible day. . . .

Just where the tide of battle turns,
Erect and lonely stood Old John Burns.—
  How do you think the man was dressed?
He wore an ancient long buff vest,
Yellow as saffron,—but his best;—
  And, buttoned over his manly breast,
Was a bright blue coat, with a rolling collar,
And large gilt buttons,—size of a dollar,—
With tails that country folk called "swaller."
He wore a broad-brimmed, bell-crowned hat,
White as the locks on which it sat.
Never had such a sight been seen
For forty years on the village green,
Since Old John Burns was a country beau,
And went to the "quilting" long ago.
Close at his elbows all that day
  Veterans of the Peninsula,

Sunburnt and bearded, charged away;
And striplings downy of lip and chin,—
Clerks that the Home Guard mustered in,—
Glanced, as they passed, at the hat he wore,
Then at the rifle his right hand bore;
And hailed him from out their youthful lore
With scraps of a slangy *répertoire;*
"How are you, White Hat?" "Put her through!"
"Your head's level," and "Bully for you!"
Called him "Daddy," begged he'd disclose
The name of the tailor who made his clothes,
And what was the value he set on those;
While Burns, unmindful of jeer and scoff,
Stood there picking the rebels off,—
With his long brown rifle, and bell-crowned hat,
And the swallow-tails they were laughing at.

'Twas but a moment, for that respect
Which clothes all courage their voices checked;
And something the wildest could understand
Spake in the old man's strong right hand;
And his corded throat, and lurking frown
Of his eye-brows under his old bell-crown;
Until, as they gazed, there crept an awe
Through the ranks in whispers, and some men saw,
In the antique vestments and long white hair,
The Past of the Nation in battle there;
And some of the soldiers since declare
That the gleam of his old white hat afar,
Like the crested plume of the brave Navarre,
That day was their oriflamme of war.

So raged the battle. You know the rest;
How the rebels, beaten and backward pressed,
Broke at the final charge, and ran:
At which John Burns—a practical man—
Shouldered his rifle, unbent his brows,
And then went back to his bees and cows.

That is the story of Old John Burns;
This is the moral the reader learns:
In fighting the battle, the question's whether
You'll show a hat that's white, or a feather.

INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLE.

ONE of the first thoughts which seizes the home population when it is known that an enemy is approaching, is of hiding the valuables. Where to secrete becomes a serious study, and ingenuity is tasked to its utmost; for soldiers, after a little practice, acquire great skill in searching for hidden treasures. It is said that Sherman's bummers could smell the whereabouts of a watch, though it were hidden in a swamp five miles off. They had an uncontrollable propensity for running their bayonets into every ash-pile and heap of rubbish which they came upon, and the very barrel of meal which contained the treasures was sure to be overturned. Feather-beds were ripped open, fires were extinguished and the ashes hauled from the hearth, false bottoms of drawers, chairs, and trunks were unloosed, and the very pumps were unpacked and wells made to disclose their secrets.

When the legions of Lee began to show themselves to the people of Gettysburg across the South Mountain, and their white tents to cover all the plains below, it became evident that the town would fall in the track of the invader, and the inevitable labor of secreting began. It chanced that an old man who kept a plain farmer's inn had just laid in a heavy invoice of choice liquors. He knew that in the event of a great army occupying the town, or even passing through it, his stock would be sacrificed. Nor was it so much the loss of his liquors that he dreaded; for he realized that the effect of strong drink was to deprive men of reason and all self-control or decency, and he shuddered at the thought of a soldiery infuriated with the fiery demon. He was, accordingly, incited to use his best resources in devising some plan to put his store beyond their grasp. It was too late to re-

ship it to Baltimore, and the only alternative was to dispose of it on the premises. After anxiously revolving many an ingenious scheme, he finally settled upon this: going to his garden as soon as the shadows of evening had fallen, he dug a deep long trench, into which he rolled his precious but dangerous treasures. He then covered the earth neatly over them, and smoothing it down in the most careful manner, proceeded to plant the newly stirred ground to cabbage plants, as if in hope of a profitable crop of this savory esculent. When all was done, and in the morning-light he regarded his night's work with complacency, he bethought himself of calling in one of his neighbors to admire his fine patch. The neighbor came, saw, and commended; but had no suspicion. This was regarded as a fortunate omen. But he must needs have some excuse for having no liquors. To this end he had saved out a few gallons of each of the poorer brands, and pouring these into several empty barrels rolled them into an obscure corner of his inner cellar, and piled his potatoes over them.

Amidst the din and turmoil of that terrible day, when, ploughed by shot and shell, the First and Eleventh corps were obliged to yield the ground which they had heroically held, and fall back rapidly through the town, the rebels came. They poured through all the streets, and levelling the fences, filled the enclosures. No house nor private apartment was secure from their intrusion. The inn and the cabbage patch were no exceptions. One of the first questions when they came upon the premises was:

"Where's the liquor?"

Looking very serious, the host answered that his stock was entirely exhausted.

"That will do for the marines," exclaimed one, "but it's too thin for us. We have travelled."

So saying he cocked his musket, and, levelling it at the old man's head, told him to show where the liquor was, or he would have no time to say his prayers. Regarding this a very careless way to handle fire-arms, and believing discretion the better part of valor, he led the way to the innermost cellar, and taking down the elaborately piled-up barricades, and removing great bars and bolts, commenced levelling the potatoes. The soldiers, eager for

a sip, lent him a helping hand. Finally the barrels were reached and the moiety of the liquor brought to light. The foil was complete. No further search was made nor questions asked.

Patiently during those hot July days, while the booming of cannon and the tramp of the armies resounded and shook the dwellings of the city, and the volumes of sulphurous smoke obscured the sun in the mid-day heavens, the old man toiled in cultivating his cabbage plants, hoeing the same ground again and again. The rebels were constantly passing, their line of battle running just in front of his premises, and were frequently in and out of his house; but they had no suspicion of his secret. Finally came that terrible cannonade on the afternoon of the third day, when the trembling fled to their cellars for safety, when the very earth quaked, and the stoutest held his breath, followed by the rush of armed thousands, and the clash as of giants! Gradually the sound of battle died away, and as the shadows of evening began to lengthen, the timid stole forth from their hiding-places; when, lo! a marked change was apparent. The rebels, who before had been so boastful and jubilant, had suddenly become reticent, and their faces were lengthened like the shadows. The night passed and the morning came, and oh! what a joyful morning! The rebels had departed, the soldiers of the Union with their star-lit banners were advancing, and the cabbage was no longer an object of cultivation!

A PRIVATE of the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania regiment was on the picket line on the night of the 3d of July, 1863, at Gettysburg. His attention was attracted by the cries and piteous moans of a wounded rebel in his front. For some time he heard the calls and passed them in silence, well knowing that he could not leave his post without forfeiting his honor, and that the instant he advanced he might be fired on by the rebel pickets on his front. Filled with a soldier's generous sympathy he could not hear those groans unmoved. Finally his manhood got the better of his discretion as he exclaimed to his companion, "I cannot stand this," and taking a canteen of water, and a little cordial which he had in a vial, he determined to go to the assistance of the suffering man. Crawling stealthily along on the ground, he

had advanced over a third of the distance when a flash in front told that he was discovered, and the next instant the hot blood was coursing down his body. Staunching the flow as he best could, he lay quietly for a while, and then began to move back and reached his post. He was found on the following morning, cold in death, but still grasping his musket.

JENNIE WADE, the heroine of Gettysburg, who sacrificed her young life in that great contest, will ever be regarded with tender emotions. When on the morning of the 1st of July, 1863, the battle opened, and the weary and wounded came pouring into town, this girl, with a heart moved to all tender accord, began to bake bread for the fainting and famished soldiers. When the day was ended, and the Union army was forced to abandon the place to the enemy with a great multitude of wounded, recognizing in them a common humanity, she continued her devoted labors. In the progress of the battle, the house where she was at work came in exact range between the two lines. She was admonished to leave, but she refused to heed the injunction, and continued to prosecute her labor of love and noble self-sacrifice. The battle raged furiously, and as the one side or the other surged to and fro over the plain, more imminent became her danger; but she was blind to the portents of destruction, and deaf to the awful voice of the storm, while the savory loaves steadily issued from her hands. In an evil hour, as the conflict came near and more near, an enemy's bullet pierced her pure breast, and she sank in death, pouring out her life-blood while ministering to the victims of the strife. Nearly coincident with her fall, a rebel officer high in rank perished near her dwelling, and his comrades prepared for him a coffin; but before it was completed, the enemy was obliged to retire, and the form of the maiden was laid therein in place of the rebel. A ballad, signed E. S. T., lamenting her fate and recounting in romantic strain her saintly deeds, soon after made its appearance, from which the following extract is given:

Beside a little streamlet, that sparkled clear and bright,
Reflecting back in beauty the morning's rosy light,
There stood a little cottage, so humble yet so fair,
You might have guessed a fairy had found a refuge there.

There bloomed the sweet syringos, there blushed the roses red,
And there the stately lily its rarest perfume shed;
Within that humble cottage there dwelt a maiden fair,
And those who knew pronounced her the fairest flower there.

But to that lowly dwelling there came, one summer's morn,
The muttering of the thunder, which told the coming storm:
"Fly to your country's rescue!" the rousing tocsin said,
"And sweep the base invaders to slumber with the dead."

And Jennie's father heard it; her lover heard it too;
And those intrepid freemen asked not what they should do;
They had no thought of keeping a coward watch at home,
While sweeping through their country the rebel foes did come.

So calling to his daughter, the hardy yoeman said; . . .
"I hear, my darling Jennie, the rebel foeman's tread;
And ere the strife is ended, I may be with the dead;
May God in mercy keep you, and every blessing send,
And should I fall, in William you'll find a faithful friend."

"And I, my darling Jennie," the gallant William said,
"May in the coming conflict be numbered with the dead;
And yet," with trembling accents, and misty eyes said he,
"I only fear, my treasure, lest harm should come to thee."

"Fear not for me," she answered; "but I will breathe a prayer,
That God will guide and cherish the lives to me so near;
And when the conflict's over, come to this home so dear,
And I will wait to welcome, and bless your coming here."

The summer days went gliding in golden circles by,
And Lee's impetuous army to Gettysburg drew nigh;
The fierce and bloody conflict swept through that region fair,
Yet still heroic Jennie dwelt in the cottage there.

And while her heart was aching lest those she loved were dead,
Her plump and rosy fingers moulded the soldiers' bread.
"Fly! fly! heroic maiden," a Union soldier said,
"For through this vale there sweepeth a double storm of lead."

Then spoke the fearless Jennie, "I fear not for my life,
My father and one other are in that deadly strife;
I may not fight beside them, but ne'er shall it be said,
While they were battling for me I feared to bake their bread."

Loud and more loud thundered the crimson tide of war,
And thick and fast the bullets swept through the summer air,
And one (some fury sped it) pierced Jennie's faithful breast,
And laid its throbbing pulses for evermore to rest.

The bloody day was over, and thousands slept there dead,
Who on that summer morning swept by with martial tread;
Among them Jennie's father in death's embraces lay,
But William passed unwounded through all that fearful day.

And so with hurried footsteps he sought the cottage door,
But oh! no Jennie met him with welcome as of yore.
He crossed the humble threshold, then paused in horror there;
There lay his heart's best treasure—so cold, so still, so fair!

"Oh God!" he cried in anguish, "what fiend hath done this deed?
Would I had died in battle, ere I had seen her bleed:
Alas! alas! my darling! no words of welcome come,
For cold in death sweet Jennie awaits for me at home.

"For this (oh! hear me heaven) my eye shall never fail,
My hand be true and steady to guide the leaden hail:
A force more strong than powder each deadly ball shall urge—
The memory of the maiden who died at Gettysburg."

And now all bravely battling for freedom and for life,
Whene'er the bugle soundeth to call him to the strife,
He remembers that fair maiden, all cold and bloody laid,
And strikes with dread precision, as he thinks of JENNIE WADE.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

GENERAL MEADE'S OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

GENERAL:—I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of this army during the month of July, including details of the battle of Gettysburg, which have been delayed by failure to receive the reports of the several corps and division commanders, who were severely wounded in battle.

On the 28th of June I received orders from the President, placing me in command of the army of the Potomac. The situation of affairs was briefly as follows: The Confederate army, which was commanded by General R. E. Lee, was estimated at over one hundred thousand strong. All that army had crossed the Potomac river and advanced up the Cumberland Valley. Reliable intelligence placed his advance thus: Ewell's corps on the Susquehanna, Harrisburg, and Columbia; Longstreet's corps at Chambersburg; and Hill's corps between that place and Cashtown.

The 28th of June was spent in ascertaining the positions and strength of the different corps of the army, but principally in bringing up the cavalry which had been covering the rear of the army in its passage over the Potomac, and to which a large increase had just been made from the force previously attached to the defences of Washington.

Orders were given on this day to Major-General French, commanding at Harper's Ferry, to move with seven thousand men to occupy Frederick, and the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, with the balance of his force, estimated at four thousand, to remove and escort public property to Washington.

On the 29th the army was put in motion, and on the evening of that day it was in position, the left at Emmittsburg and the right at New Windsor. Buford's division of cavalry was on the left flank, with his advance at Gettysburg. Kilpatrick's division was in the front at Hanover, where he encountered this day General Stuart's Confederate cavalry, which had crossed the Potomac at Seneca Creek, and passing our right flank, was making its way towards Carlisle, having escaped Gregg's division, which was delayed in taking position on the right flank by the occupation of the roads by a column of infantry.

On the 30th the right flank of the army was moved up to Manchester, the left still being at Emmittsburg, or in that vicinity, at which place three corps, First, Eleventh, and Third, were collected under the orders of Major-General Reynolds.

General Buford having reported from Gettysburg the appearance of the enemy on the Cashtown road in some force, General Reynolds was

directed to occupy Gettysburg. On reaching that place, on the first day of July, General Reynolds found Buford's cavalry warmly engaged with the enemy, who had debouched his infantry through the mountains on Cashtown, but was being held in check in the most gallant manner by Buford's cavalry. Major-General Reynolds immediately moved around the town of Gettysburg, and advanced on the Cashtown road, and without a moment's hesitation deployed his advanced division and attacked the enemy, at the same time sending orders for the Eleventh corps, General Howard, to advance as promptly as possible.

Soon after making his dispositions for attack, Major-General Reynolds fell mortally wounded, the command of the First corps devolving on Major-General Doubleday, and the command of the field on Major-General Howard, who arrived about this time (half-past eleven A. M.) with the Eleventh corps, then commanded by Major-General Schurz. Major-General Howard pushed forward two divisions of the Eleventh corps to support the First corps, now warmly engaged with the enemy on a ridge to the north of the town, and posted his Third division, with three batteries of artillery, on the Cemetery Ridge, on the south side of the town.

Up to this time the battle had been with the forces of the enemy debouching from the mountains on the Cashtown road, known to be Hill's corps. In the early part of the action the success was on the enemy's side. Wadsworth's division of the First corps, having driven the enemy back some distance, captured numerous prisoners, among them General Archer of the Confederate army.

The arrival of reinforcements to the enemy on the Cashtown road, and the junction of Ewell's corps coming in on the York and Harrisburg roads, which occurred between one and two o'clock P. M., enabled the enemy to bring vastly superior forces against both the First and Eleventh corps, outflanking our line of battle, and pursuing it so severely that, about four o'clock P. M., Major-General Howard deemed it prudent to withdraw these two corps to the Cemetery Ridge, on the south side of the town, which operation was successfully accomplished—not, however, without considerable loss in prisoners, arising from the confusion incident to portions of both corps passing through the town, and the men getting confused in the streets.

About the time of the withdrawal, Major-General Hancock arrived, whom I had despatched to represent me on the field, on hearing of the death of General Reynolds. In conjunction with Major-General Howard, General Hancock proceeded to post the troops on Cemetery Ridge, and to repel an attack that the enemy made on our right flank. This attack was not, however, very vigorous; the enemy, seeing the strength of the position occupied, seemed to be satisfied with the success he had accomplished, desisting from any further attack this day.

About seven o'clock P. M. Major-Generals Slocum and Sickles, with the Twelfth corps and a part of the Third, reached the ground and took part on the right and left of the troops previously posted. Being satisfied by reports received from the field that it was the intention of the

enemy to support, with his whole army, the attack already made, and reports from Major-Generals Hancock and Howard on the character of the position being favorable, I determined to give battle at this point, and early in the evening first issued orders to all corps to concentrate at Gettysburg, directing all trains to be sent to the rear at Westminster at eleven P. M. first.

I broke up my head-quarters, which till then had been at Taneytown, and proceeded to the field, arriving there at one A. M. of the 2d. So soon as it was light I proceeded to inspect the position occupied and to make arrangements for posting the several corps as they should reach the ground. By seven A. M. the Second and Fifth corps, with the rest of the Third, had reached the ground, and were posted as follows: The Eleventh corps retained its position on Cemetery Ridge, just opposite to the town; the First corps was posted on the right; the Eleventh on the elevated knoll connecting with the ridge and extending to the south and east, on which the Twelfth corps was placed, the right of the Twelfth corps resting on a small stream at a point where it crossed the Baltimore pike, and which formed on the right flank of the Twelfth something of an obstacle.

Cemetery Ridge extended in a westerly and southerly direction, gradually diminishing in elevation till it came to a very prominent ridge called Round Top, running east and west. The Second and Third corps were directed to occupy the continuation of Cemetery Ridge on the left of the Eleventh corps; and the Fifth corps, pending the arrival of the Sixth corps, was held in reserve. While these dispositions were being made, the enemy was massing his troops on an exterior ridge, distant from the line occupied by us from a mile to a mile and a half. At two P. M. the Sixth corps arrived, after a march of thirty-two miles, which was accomplished from nine P. M. of the day previous. On its arrival being reported, I immediately directed the Fifth corps to move over to our extreme left, and the Sixth to occupy its place as a reserve for the right.

About three P. M. I rode out to the extreme left to await the arrival of the Fifth corps and post it, when I found that Major-General Sickles, commanding the Third corps, not fully apprehending my instructions in regard to the position to be occupied, had advanced, or rather was in the act of advancing his corps some half mile or three-quarters of a mile in the front of the line of the Second corps on a prolongation of which it was designed his corps should rest.

Having found Major-General Sickles, I was explaining to him that he was too far in the advance, and discussing with him the propriety of withdrawing, when the enemy opened upon him with several batteries in his front and his flank, and immediately brought forward columns of infantry, and made a vigorous assault. The Third corps sustained the shock most heroically. Troops from the Second corps were immediately sent by Major-General Hancock to cover the right flank of the Third corps, and soon after the assault commenced.

The Fifth corps most fortunately arrived, and took a position on the

left of the Third, Major-General Sykes commanding, immediately sending a force to occupy Round Top Ridge, when a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperate but unsuccessful efforts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third corps, under Major-General Birney (Major-General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority in numbers of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanced position, General Birney was counselled to fall back and reform, behind the line originally desired to be held.

In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth corps, Major-General Sedgwick, and a part of the First corps, to which I had assigned Major-General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second corps, were all brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with a gallant resistance of the Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy, who retired in confusion and disorder about sunset, and ceased any further efforts on our extreme left.

An assault was, however, made about eight P. M. on the Eleventh corps, from the left of the town, which was repelled by the assistance of troops from the Second and First corps. During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements. During their absence the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of Geary's division of the Twelfth corps, advanced and occupied part of the line.

On the morning of the 3d of July, General Geary having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary, reinforced by Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth corps, maintained his position and inflicted very severe losses on the enemy.

With this exception, our lines remained undisturbed till one P. M. on the 3d, when the enemy opened from over one hundred and twenty-five guns, playing upon our centre and left. This cannonade continued for over two hours, when, our guns failing to make any reply, the enemy ceased firing, and soon his masses of infantry became visible, forming for an assault on our left and left centre.

An assault was made with great firmness, directed principally against the point occupied by the Second corps, and was repelled with equal firmness by the troops of that corps, supported by Doubleday's division and Stannard's brigade of the First corps. During this assault, both Major-General Hancock, commanding the left centre, and Brigadier-General Gibbon, commanding the Second corps, were severely wounded. This terminated the battle, the enemy retiring to his lines, leaving the field strewed with his dead and wounded, and numerous prisoners in our hands.

Buford's division of cavalry, after its arduous service at Gettysburg on the 1st, was, on the 2d, sent to Westminster to refit and guard our trains.

Kilpatrick's division, that on the 29th, 30th, and 1st had been successfully engaging the enemy's cavalry, was, on the 3d, sent out on our extreme left, on the Emmittsburg road, where good service was rendered in assaulting the enemy's line and occupying his attention. At the same time General Gregg was engaged with the enemy on our extreme right, having passed across the Baltimore pike and Bonaughtown road, and boldly attacked the enemy's left and rear.

On the morning of the 4th the reconnoissances developed that the enemy had drawn back his left flank, but maintained his position in front of our left, apparently assuming a new line parallel to the mountain. On the morning of the 5th it was ascertained that the enemy was in full retreat by the Fairfield and Cashtown roads. The Sixth corps was immediately sent in pursuit on the Fairfield road, and the cavalry on the Cashtown road, and by Emmittsburg and Monterey Passes.

The 5th and 6th of July were employed in succoring the wounded and burying the dead. Major-General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth corps, having pushed on in pursuit of the enemy as far as Fairfield Pass in the mountains, and reporting that pass as very strong, and one in which a small force of the enemy could hold in check and delay for a considerable time any pursuing force, I determined to follow the enemy by a flank movement, and accordingly leaving McIntosh's brigade of cavalry and Neill's brigade of infantry to continue harassing the enemy, I put the army in motion for Middletown, Maryland.

Orders were immediately sent to Major-General French, at Frederick, to reoccupy Harper's Ferry, and to send a force to occupy Turner's Pass in South Mountain. I subsequently ascertained that Major-General French had not only anticipated these orders in part, but had pushed his cavalry force to Williamsport and Falling Waters, where they destroyed the enemy's pontoon-bridge and captured its guard. Buford was at the same time sent to Williamsport and Hagerstown.

The duty above assigned to the cavalry was most successfully accomplished, the enemy being greatly harassed, his trains destroyed, and many captures in guns and prisoners made. After halting a day at Middletown to procure necessary supplies and to bring up trains, the army moved through South Mountain, and by the 12th of July was in front of the enemy, who occupied a strong position on the heights of Marsh Run, in advance of Williamsport. In taking this position, several skirmishes and affairs had been had with the enemy, principally by cavalry, from the Eleventh and Sixth corps. The 13th was occupied in making reconnoissances of the enemy's position and preparations for attack; but on advancing on the morning of the 14th, it was ascertained that he had retired the night previous by a bridge at Falling Waters and a ford at Williamsport.

The cavalry in pursuit overtook the rear guard at Falling Waters, capturing two guns and numerous prisoners. Previous to the retreat of the enemy Gregg's division of cavalry had crossed at Harper's Ferry, and coming up with the rear of the enemy at Charlestown and Shepherdstown, had a spirited contest, in which the enemy was

driven to Martinsburg and Winchester, and pressed and harassed in his retreat.

Pursuit was resumed by a flank movement of the army, crossing the Potomac at Berlin and moving down Loudon Valley. Cavalry were immediately pushed into the several passes of the Blue Ridge, and having learned from scouts of the withdrawal of the Confederate army from the lower valley of the Shenandoah, the Third corps, Major-General French in advance, was moved into Manassas Gap, in the hope of being able to intercept a portion of the enemy. The possession of the gap was disputed so successfully as to enable the rear guard to withdraw by way of Strasburg, the Confederate army retiring to the Rapidan. Position was taken with this army on the line of the Rappahannock, and the campaign terminated about the close of July.

The result of the campaign may be briefly stated in the defeat of the enemy at Gettysburg, their compulsory evacuation of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and withdrawal from the upper valley of the Shenandoah, and the capture of three guns, forty-one standards, and thirteen thousand six hundred and twenty-one prisoners. Twenty-four thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight small arms were collected on the battle-field.

Our own losses were very severe, amounting, as will be seen by the accompanying return, to two thousand eight hundred and thirty-four killed, thirteen thousand seven hundred and nine wounded, and six thousand six hundred and forty-three missing—in all twenty-three thousand one hundred and eighty-six.

It is impossible, in a report of this nature, to enumerate all the instances of gallantry and good conduct which distinguished our success on the hard-fought field of Gettysburg. The reports of corps commanders and their subordinates, herewith submitted, will furnish all information upon this subject. I will only add my tribute to the heroic bravery of the whole army, officers and men, which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, enabled the crowning victory to be obtained, which I feel confident the country will never cease to bear in grateful remembrance.

It is my duty, as well as my pleasure, to call attention to the earnest efforts and co-operation on the part of Major-General D. N. Couch, commanding the department of the Susquehanna, and particularly to his advance of four thousand men under Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, who joined me at Boonsboro, just prior to the withdrawal of the Confederate army. In conclusion, I desire to return my thanks to my staff, general and personal, to each and all of whom I was indebted for unremitting activity and most efficient assistance.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF GENERAL MEADE.

The attention of General Meade having been called to some inaccuracies in his report pertaining to operations of the Twelfth corps, by General Slocum, he addressed a note to the General-in-chief of the army, asking to be allowed to recall the original and substitute the following: During the heavy assaults on our extreme left, the First division and

Lockwood's brigade of the Twelfth corps, were sent as reinforcements, as already reported. Two brigades of Geary's division (Second) of this corps were also detached for this purpose, but did not arrive at the scene of action, owing to having mistaken the road. The detachment of so large a portion of the Twelfth corps, with its temporary commander, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, left the defences of the line previously held to the remaining brigade of the Second division, commanded by General Greene, who held the left of the Twelfth corps, now become the extreme right of the army. The enemy perceiving the withdrawal of our troops, advanced and attacked General Greene with great vigor, who, making a gallant defence, and being soon reinforced by portions of the First and Eleventh corps, contiguous to him, succeeded in repulsing all the efforts of the enemy to dislodge him. After night, on the return of the detachments sent to the left, it was found that the enemy were occupying portions of the line of breastworks thrown up by the Twelfth corps. Brigadier-General Williams in command immediately made arrangements by the disposition of his artillery, and instructions to both divisions, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Geary and Ruger, to attack the enemy at daylight, and regain the position formerly occupied by the corps. In the meantime the enemy brought up strong reinforcements, and at early daylight a spirited contest commenced, which continued till after ten A. M., the result of which was the repulse of the enemy in all his attempts to advance, and his final abandonment of the position he had taken the evening before. During the contest Shaler's brigade, Sixth corps, was sent to reinforce the Twelfth corps. With this exception the line remained undisturbed.

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE'S OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

GENERAL:—I have the honor to submit the following outline of the recent operations of this army for the information of the department: The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac.

It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army therein, commanded by General Hooker; and that, in any event, that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and possibly to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formations of new combinations, and the preparations that they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success.

Actuated by these and other important considerations that may hereafter be presented, the movement began on the 3d of June. McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps left Fredericksburg for Culpeper Court House, and Hood's division, which was encamped on the Rapidan, marched to the same place. They were followed on the 4th and 5th by Ewell's corps, leaving that of A. P. Hill to occupy our lines at Fredericksburg.

The march of these troops having been discovered by the enemy on the afternoon of the 5th, on the following day he crossed a force, amounting to about one army corps, to the south side of the Rappahannock, on a pontoon-bridge laid down near the mouth of Deep Run. General Hill disposed his command to resist their advance, but as they seemed intended for the purpose of observation rather than attack the movements in progress were not arrested. The forces of Longstreet and Ewell reached Culpeper Court House by the 8th, at which point the cavalry, under General Stuart, was also concentrated.

On the 9th a large force of the Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords, and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the enemy

was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands.

General Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, had been ordered to advance towards Winchester to co-operate with the infantry in the proposed expedition into the lower valley, and at the same time General Imboden was directed, with his command, to make a demonstration in the direction of Romney, in order to cover the movement against Winchester, and prevent the enemy at that place from being reinforced by the troops on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both of these officers were in position when General Ewell left Culpeper Court House on the 16th.

Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, he detached Rodes' division to Berryville, with instructions, after dislodging the force stationed there, to cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac. With the divisions of Early and Johnson, General Ewell advanced directly upon Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town on the 13th. On the same day the troops at Berryville fell back before General Rodes, retreating to Winchester. On the 14th General Early stormed the works at the latter place, and the whole army of General Milroy was captured or dispersed. Most of those who attempted to escape were intercepted and made prisoners by General Johnson. Their leader fled to Harper's Ferry with a small party of fugitives.

General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, entering the latter place on the 14th, where he took seven hundred prisoners, five pieces of artillery and a considerable quantity of stores. These operations cleared the valley of the enemy, those at Harper's Ferry withdrawing to Maryland Heights. More than four thousand prisoners, twenty-nine pieces of artillery, two hundred and seventy wagons and ambulances, with four hundred horses, were captured, besides a large amount of military stores. Our loss was small. On the night that Ewell appeared at Winchester the Federal troops in front of A. P. Hill, at Fredericksburg, recrossed the Rappahannock, and the next day disappeared behind the hills of Stafford.

The whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the line of the Rappahannock, pursuing the roads near the Potomac, and no favorable opportunity was offered for attack. It seemed to be the purpose of General Hooker to take a position which would enable him to cover the approaches to Washington City. With a view to draw him further from his base, and at the same time to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with instructions, left Fredericksburg for the valley as soon as the enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court House on the 15th, and advancing along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. His force had been augmented while at Culpeper by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division.

The cavalry under General Stuart was thrown out in front of Longstreet to watch the enemy, now reported to be moving into Loudon.

On the 17th his cavalry encountered two brigades of ours, under General Stuart, near Aldie, and was driven back with loss. The next day the engagement was renewed, the Federal cavalry being strongly supported by infantry, and General Stuart was in turn compelled to retire. The enemy advanced as far as Upperville, and then fell back. In these engagements General Stuart took about four hundred prisoners and a considerable number of horses and arms.

In the meantime a part of General Ewell's corps had entered Maryland, and the rest was about to follow. General Jenkins, with his cavalry, who accompanied General Ewell, penetrated Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg. As these demonstrations did not have the effect of causing the Federal army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already reached the valley.

General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains, and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced. By the 24th the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be in supporting distance, and Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former crossed at Williamsport, and the latter at Shepherdstown. The columns reunited at Hagerstown, and advanced thence into Pennsylvania, encamping near Chambersburg on the 27th.

No report had been received that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information. In order, however, to retain it on the east side of the mountains after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communication with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, General Ewell had been instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg, to cross the South Mountains. Early's division was detached for this purpose, and proceeded as far east as York, while the remainder of the corps proceeded to Carlisle.

General Imboden, in pursuance of the instructions previously referred to, had been actively engaged on the left of General Ewell during the progress of the latter into Maryland. He had driven off the forces guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, destroying all the important bridges on that route from Cumberland to Martinsburg, and seriously damaged the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He subsequently took position at Hancock, and after the arrival of Longstreet and Hill at Chambersburg, was directed to march by way of McConnellsburg to that place.

Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; on the night of the 29th information was received from a scout that the Federal army having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our com-

munications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountain. Accordingly Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle.

General Stuart continued to follow the movements of the Federal army south of the Potomac after our own had entered Maryland, and in his efforts to impede its progress advanced as far eastward as Fairfax Court House. Finding himself unable to delay the enemy materially, he crossed the river at Seneca, and marched through Westminster to Carlisle, where he arrived after General Ewell had left for Gettysburg. By the route he pursued, the Federal army was interposed between his command and our main body, preventing any communication with him until his arrival at Carlisle.

The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal army been known. The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of the 1st of July. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a large force, with which two of his divisions became engaged. Ewell coming up with two of his divisions by the way of the Heidlersburg road joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about five thousand prisoners and several pieces of artillery.

He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and positions of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy; but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains.

At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.

The remainder of Ewell's and Hill's corps having arrived, and two divisions of Longstreet's, our preparations were made accordingly. During the afternoon intelligence was received of the arrival of General Stuart at Carlisle, and he was ordered to march to Gettysburg, and take position on the left. A full account of these engagements cannot be given until the reports of the several commanding officers shall have been received, and I shall only offer a general description. The preparations for attack were not completed until the afternoon of the 2d.

The enemy held a high and commanding ridge along which he had massed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied the left of our line, General Hill the centre, and General Longstreet the right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position, from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground, on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack.

After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day. Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the position gained by him the day before. The general plan of attack was unchanged, except that one division and two brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet.

The enemy in the meantime had strengthened his lines with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d, and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his batteries; but our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and after a most determined and most gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage, and fall back to their original positions with severe loss. The conduct of the troops was all that I could desire or expect, and they deserved success so far as it can be deserved by heroic valor and fortitude. More may have been required of them than they were able to perform, but my admiration of their noble qualities, and confidence in their ability to cope successfully with the enemy, has suffered no abatement from the issue of this protracted and sanguinary conflict.

Owing to the strength of the enemy's position and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field, were ordered to Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4000 prisoners. Nearly 2000 had previously been paroled, but the enemy's numerous wounded that had fallen into our hands after the first and second days' engagements were left behind.

Little progress was made during that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th. The march was continued during that day without interruption by the enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the afternoon, when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. Part of our train moved by the road through Fairfield, and the rest by way of Cashtown, guarded by General Imboden. In passing through the mountains, in advance of the column, the great length of the train exposed them to attack by the enemy's cavalry, which captured a number of wagons and ambulances; but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport without serious loss.

They were attacked at that place on the 6th by the enemy's cavalry, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden. The attacking force was subsequently encountered and driven off by General Stuart, and pursued for several miles in the direction of Boonsboro. The army after an arduous march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th, and morning of 7th of July.

The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains that had fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Maryland, as to be unfordable. Our communications with the south side were thus interrupted, and it was difficult to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty being enhanced by the high water impeding the working of the neighboring mills. The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to await at Williamsport the subsiding of the river and the construction of boats, as the pontoon-bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed.

The enemy had not yet made his appearance, but as he was in condition to obtain large reinforcements, and our situation for the reasons above mentioned was becoming daily more embarrassing, it was deemed advisable to recross the river. Part of the pontoon-bridge was recovered, and new boats built, so that by the 13th a good bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Waters.

The enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines. Our preparations being completed, and the river, though still deep, being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south on the night of the 13th. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport. Those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads, the troops did not reach the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until one P. M., when the bridge was removed. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was attended with no loss of material except a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through the deep mud. Before fresh horses could be sent back for them the rear of the column had passed.

During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find them in the obscurity of the night, and these with some stragglers fell into the hands of the enemy.

Brigadier-General Pettigrew was mortally wounded in an attack made by a small body of cavalry, which was unfortunately mistaken for our own, and permitted to enter our lines. He was brought to Bunker Hill, where he expired in a few days afterward. He was a brave and accomplished officer and gentleman, and his loss will be deeply felt by the country and the army. The following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the vicinity of which it encamped for several days. The day after its arrival, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, which had crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, advanced towards Martinsburg. It was attacked by General Fitz Lee, near Kearneysville, and defeated with heavy loss, leaving its dead and many of its wounded on the field.

Owing to the swollen condition of the Shenandoah river, the plan of operations which had been contemplated when we recrossed the Potomac could not be put in execution, and before the waters had subsided the movements of the enemy induced me to cross the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock, which was accordingly done.

As soon as the reports of the commanding officers shall be received, a more detailed account of these operations will be given, and occasion will then be taken to speak more particularly of the conspicuous gallantry and good conduct of both officers and men. It is not yet in my power to give a correct statement of our casualties, which were severe, including many brave men, and an unusual proportion of distinguished and valuable officers. Among them I regret to mention the following general officers: Major-Generals Hood, Pender and Trimble, severely, and Major-General Heth slightly wounded.

General Pender has since died. This lamented officer has borne a distinguished part in every engagement of this army, and was wounded on several occasions while leading his command with conspicuous gallantry and ability. The confidence and admiration inspired by his courage and capacity as an officer were only equalled by the esteem and respect entertained by all with whom he was associated, for the noble qualities of his modest and unassuming character. Brigadier-Generals Barksdale and Garnett were killed, and Brigadier-General Severns mortally wounded, while leading their troops with a courage that always distinguished them. These brave officers and patriotic gentlemen fell in the faithful discharge of duty, leaving the army to mourn their loss and emulate their noble examples.

Brigadier-Generals Kemper, Armistead, Scales, G. T. Anderson, Hampton, J. M. Jones and Jenkins, were also wounded. Brigadier-General Archer was taken prisoner. General Pettigrew, though wounded at Gettysburg, continued in command until he was mortally wounded near Falling Waters. The loss of the enemy is unknown, but from observations on the field and his subsequent movements it is supposed that he suffered severely.

OFFICIAL ORDERS, CIRCULARS, AND NOTICES OF GENERAL MEADE.

A.—CIRCULAR OF MEADE TO HIS CORPS COMMANDERS, June 30, 1863.

The commanding general requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe; our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars are involved. The army has fought well heretofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty this hour.

B.—CIRCULAR OF MEADE TO HIS CORPS COMMANDERS, June 30, 1863.

The commanding general has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed.

Three corps, 1st, 3d, and 11th, are under the command of Major-General Reynolds, in the vicinity of Emmittsburg, the 3d corps being ordered up to that point. The 12th corps is at Littlestown. General Gregg's division of cavalry is believed to be now engaged with the cavalry of the enemy near Hanover Junction.

Corps commanders will hold their commands in readiness at a moment's notice, and upon receiving orders to march against the enemy, their trains (ammunition wagons excepted) must be parked in the rear of the place of concentration.

Ammunition wagons and ambulances will alone be permitted to accompany the troops. The men must be provided with three days' rations in haversacks, and with sixty rounds of ammunition in the boxes and upon the person.

Corps commanders will avail themselves of all the time at their disposal to familiarize themselves with the roads communicating with the different corps.

C.—NOTICE OF BUFORD TO REYNOLDS, GETTYSBURG, June 30, 1863. 10.30 P. M.

The reserve brigade, under General Merritt, is at Mechanicstown, with my trains. General Pleasanton wrote he would inform me when he relieved it. To-day I received instructions saying it would picket towards Hagerstown and south.

I am satisfied that A. P. Hill's corps is massed just back of Cashtown, about nine miles from this place. Ponder's division of this (Hill's) corps came up to-day, of which I advised you, saying "the enemy in my front was increased." The enemy's pickets (infantry and artillery) are within four miles of this place, at the Cashtown road. My parties have returned that went north, northwest and northeast, after crossing the road from Cashtown to Oxford in several places. They heard nothing of any force having passed over it lately. The road, however, is terribly infested with prowling cavalry parties. Near Heidlersburg, to-day, one of my parties captured a courier of Lee's; nothing was found on him. He says Ewell's corps is crossing the mountains from Carlisle, Roach's division being at Petersburg in advance. Longstreet, from all I can learn, is still behind Hill.

I have many rumors and reports of the enemy advancing upon me from towards York. I have to pay attention to some of them, which causes me to overwork my horses and men. I can get no forage or rations—am out of both. The people give and sell the men something to eat, but I can't stand that way of subsisting. It causes dreadful straggling. Should I have to fall back, advise me by what route.

D.—ORDERS OF MEADE FOR THE MARCH OF THE ARMY ON July 1, ISSUED June 30, 1863.

Head-quarters at Taneytown.
Third corps to Emmittsburg.
Second corps to Taneytown.
Fifth corps to Hanover.
First corps to Gettysburg.
Eleventh corps to Gettysburg (or supporting distance).
Sixth corps to Manchester.
Twelfth corps to Two Taverns.

Cavalry to front, and flank well out in all directions, giving timely notice of operations and movements of the enemy.

All empty wagons, surplus baggage, useless animals, and implements of every sort to Union bridge, three miles from Middleburg; a proper officer from each corps with them. Supplies will be brought up there as soon as practicable. The general relies upon every commander to put his column in the lightest possible order.

The telegraph corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line,

and all commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and Hanover.

Staff officers report daily from each corps, and with orderlies to leave for orders. Prompt information to be sent into head-quarters at all times. All ready to move to the attack at any moment.

The commanding general desires you to be informed that from present information Longstreet and Hill are at Chambersburg, partly towards Gettysburg; Ewell at Carlisle and York. Movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.

General Couch telegraphs, 29th, his opinion that enemy's operations on Susquehanna are more to prevent co-operation with this army than offensive. The general believes he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army, and assume position for offensive or defensive, as occasions require, and give rest to the troops.

It is not his desire to wear the troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus unfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform.

Vigilance, energy, and prompt response to the orders from head-quarters are necessary, and personal attention must be given to reduction of impediments. The orders and movements from these head-quarters must be carefully and confidentially preserved, that they do not fall into the enemy's hands.

E.—Circular of Meade to Corps Commanders, issued from Taneytown, July 1, 1863.

From information received the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz., the relief of Harrisburg and the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia beyond the Susquehanna.

It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impediments, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe creek.

For this purpose General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and, after crossing Pipe creek, deploy towards Middleburg. The corps at Emmittsburg will be withdrawn, by way of Mechanicsville, to Middleburg, or, if a more direct route can be found, leaving Taneytown to their left, to withdraw direct to Middleburg.

General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and Two Taverns and withdraw them *via* Union Mills, deploying one

to the right and one to the left after crossing Pipe creek, connecting on the left with General Reynolds, and communicating his right to General Sedgwick at Manchester, who will connect with him and form the right.

The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances. Whenever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will at once be communicated to these head-quarters and to all adjoining corps commanders.

The 2d corps, now at Taneytown, will be held in reserve, in the vicinity of Uniontown and Frizelburg, to be thrown to the point of strongest attack, should the enemy make it. In the event of these movements being necessary, the trains and *impedimenta* will all be sent to the rear of Westminster.

Corps commanders, with their officers commanding artillery, and the divisions, should make themselves thoroughly familiar with the country indicated, all the roads and positions, so that no possible confusion can ensue, and that the movement, if made, be done with good order, precision, and care, without loss, or any detriment to the morale of the troops.

The commanders of corps are requested to communicate at once the nature of their present position, and their ability to hold them in case of any sudden attack at any point by the enemy.

This order is communicated that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack if made in strong force upon any portion of our present position. Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions.

The artillery reserve will, in the event of the general movement indicated, move to the rear of Frizelburg, and be placed in position, or sent to corps, as circumstances may require, under the general supervision of the chief of artillery.

The chief quartermaster will, in case of the general movement indicated, give directions for the orderly and proper position of the trains in rear of Westminster. All the trains will keep well to the right of the road in moving, and in case of any accident, requiring a halt, the team must be hauled out of the line, and not delay the movements.

The trains ordered to Union Bridge, in these events will be sent to Westminster. General head-quarters will be, in case of this movement, at Frizelburg.

General Slocum as near Union Mills as the line will render best for him.

General Reynolds at or near the road from Taneytown to Frizelburg.

The chief of artillery will examine the line and select positions for artillery. The cavalry will be held on the right and left flanks after the movement is completed; previous to its completion, he will, as now directed, cover the front and exterior lines well out.

The commands must be prepared for a movement, and, in the event of the enemy attacking us on the ground indicated herein, to follow up any repulse.

The chief signal officer will examine the line thoroughly and at once. Upon the commencement of this movement, extend telegraphic communications from each of the following points to general head-quarters, near Frizelburg, viz.: Manchester, Union Mills, Middleburg, and the Taneytown road.

All true Union people should be advised to harass and annoy the enemy in every way; to send in information, and taught how to do it —giving regiments by number of colors, number of guns, generals' names, &c.; all their supplies brought to us will be paid for, and not fall into the enemy's hands.

Roads and ways to move to the right and left of general line should be studied, and thoroughly understood. All movements of troops should be concealed, and our dispositions kept from the enemy. Their knowledge of these dispositions would be fatal to our success, and the greatest care must be taken to prevent such an occurrence.

F.—Communication of Meade to Reynolds, First Corps, July 1, 1863.

The telegraphic intelligence received from General Couch, with the various movements reported from Buford, seem to indicate the concentration of the enemy either at Chambersburg, or at a point situated somewhere on a line drawn between Chambersburg and York, through Heidlersburg, and to the north of Gettysburg.

The commanding general cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack, until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position.

If the enemy is concentrated to the right of Gettysburg, that point would not, at first glance, seem to be a proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the general is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its character either for an offensive or defensive position. The number of the enemy are estimated at about 92,000 infantry, with 270 pieces of artillery, and his cavalry from six to eight thousand. Our numbers ought to equal it, and with the arrival of General French's command, which should get up tomorrow, exceed it, if not too much weakened by straggling and fatigue.

The general having just assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does.

General Humphreys, who is at Emmittsburg with the 3d corps, the general considers an excellent adviser as to the nature of the country for

defensive or offensive operations. If near enough to call him to consultation with you, please do so, without interference with the responsibilities that devolve upon you both. You have all the information which the general has received, and the general would like to have your views.

The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received.

G.—MEADE TO SEDGWICK, SIXTH CORPS, July 1, 1863.

I am directed by the commanding general to state that it would appear from reports just received that the enemy is moving in heavy force on Gettysburg (Ewell from Heidlersburg, and Hill from Cashtown Pass), and it is not improbable he will reach that place before the command under Major-General Reynolds (the 1st and 11th corps), now on the way, can arrive there. Should such be the case, and General Reynolds finds himself in the presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check, and fall slowly back. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the circular of to-day will be occupied to-night. Should circumstances render it necessary for the commanding general to fight the enemy to-day, the troops are posted as follows for the support of Reynolds's command, viz.: On his right at "Two Taverns," the 12th corps; at Hanover, the 5th corps; the 2d corps is on the road between Taneytown and Gettysburg; the 3d corps is at Emmittsburg.

This information is conveyed to you that you may have your corps in readiness to move in such direction as may be required at a moment's notice.

H.—MEADE TO HANCOCK OF SECOND CORPS, July 1, 1863—1.10 P. M.

The major-general commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed, or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz.: the 11th, 1st, and 3d, at Emmittsburg. If you think the ground and position there a suitable one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

LATER—1.15 P. M.

Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move.

I.—BUFORD TO PLEASANTON, July 1, 1863—20 minutes past 3.

GENERAL PLEASANTON: I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction. A tremendous battle has been raging since 9½ A. M., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town; the enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person.

We need help now.

K.—HANCOCK TO MEADE, GETTYSBURG, July 1, 1863—5.25 P. M.

GENERAL: When I arrived here an hour since I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right, which will protect the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the 3d corps not having yet reported, but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the meantime Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. General G. will see this despatch. The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops. I will communicate in a few moments with General Slocum, and transfer the command to him.

Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.

General Warren is here.

L.—MEADE TO SYKES OF FIFTH CORPS, July 1, 1863—7 P. M.

The major-general commanding directs that you move up to Gettysburg at once upon receipt of this order, if not already ordered to do so by General Slocum. The present prospect is that our general engagement must be there. Communicate with General Slocum, under whose directions you are placed by the orders of this morning. The general had supposed that General Slocum would have ordered you up.

M.—MEADE TO SEDGWICK COMMANDING SIXTH CORPS, TANEYTOWN, July 1, 1863—7½ P. M.

The major-general commanding directs me to say that a general battle seems to be impending to-morrow at Gettysburg. That it is of the

utmost importance that your command should be up. He directs that you stop all trains, or turn them out of the road, that impede your progress. Your march will have to be a forced one to reach the scene of action, where we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence. If any shorter road presents itself, without difficulty in getting up, you will use your discretion in taking it, and report the facts to these head-quarters.

General Sykes has been ordered up from Hanover to Gettysburg, and General Slocum from Littletown, and General Hancock's corps from here. The whole army is there (Gettysburg), or under way for that point. The general desires you to report here in person without delay the moment you receive this. He is waiting to see you here before going to the front. The trains will all go to Westminster and Union Bridge, as ordered.

N.—Order of July 2, supposed about 10 A. M.

The staff officers on duty at head-quarters will inform themselves of the positions of the various corps—their artillery, infantry, and trains—sketch them with a view to roads, and report them immediately, as follows:

3d corps, Colonel Schriver.
2d corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Davis.
1st corps, Lieutenant Perkins.
12th corps, Lieutenant Oliver.
5th corps, Captain Cadwalader.

It is desired to know the roads on or near which the troops are, and where their trains lie, in view of movements in any direction, and to be familiar with the head-quarters of the commanders.

TELEGRAMS TO AND FROM THE FIELD.

ORDER OF WAR DEPARTMENT, June 27, 1863.

By direction of the President, Major-General Joseph Hooker is relieved from command of the army of the Potomac, and Major-General George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army and the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it.

GENERAL ORDERS, MEADE TO HIS ARMY, June 28, 1863.

By direction of the President of the United States I hereby assume command of the army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises nor pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., June 28, 1863.

The order placing me in command of this army is received. As a soldier I obey it, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it. Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can only now say that it appears to me I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle. I would say that I trust that every available man that can be spared will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force.

So soon as I can post myself up I will communciate more in detail.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, June 28, 1863.

I fully concur in your general views as to the movements of your army. All available assistance will be given you. General Schenck's troops outside of the line of defences will move as you may direct. General Couch is also directed to co-operate with you, and to move his forces as you may order. It is most probable that Lee will concentrate his forces this side of the Susquehanna.

In regard to supplies of horses, &c., I send herewith a copy of a telegram to General Schenck on the 25th.

HALLECK TO COUCH, AT HARRISBURG, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1863.

You will co-operate as far as possible with General G. G. Meade, who now commands the army of the Potomac, and who is authorized to assume the general command of all troops within the sphere of his operations. This authority embraces your command. Any information of enemy's movements in your vicinity will be immediately telegraphed to General Meade.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1863.

A brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry has crossed the Potomac near Seneca creek, and is making for the railroad to cut off your supplies. There is another brigade of rebel cavalry south of the Potomac which may follow. We have no cavalry here to operate against them. General Hooker carried away all of General Heintzelman's cavalry.

MEADE TO HALLECK (in cipher), FREDERICK, June 28, 1863.

Despatch received in relation to crossing of enemy's cavalry at Seneca creek. Have ordered two brigades and batteries to proceed at once in search and pursuit.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1863.

It is reported here that the supplies at Edwards' ferry, and returning by the canal, are left unprotected. If so, Lee's cavalry will probably destroy them. It is reported that Lowell's battalion of cavalry, left at Poolesville, was sent to Sandy Hook, contrary to my orders. If so, there is not a cavalry picket on the line of the Potomac below Edwards' ferry, and we have none here to send out.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, June 28, 1863—1 P. M.

Am I permitted, under existing circumstances, to withdraw a portion of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, provided I leave sufficient force to hold Maryland heights against a coup-de-main?

Reliable intelligence leads to the belief that Stuart has crossed at Williamsport, and is moving towards Hagerstown, in the rear of Lee's army, and all accounts agree in giving Lee so large a force that I cannot believe he has left any considerable body on the south side of the Potomac. Please give me your views fully.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, June 28, 1863—2 P. M.

To organize with efficiency the cavalry force now with this army I require three brigadier-generals. General Pleasanton nominates Captain Farnesworth, 8th New York cavalry; Captain George A. Custar, 5th New York cavalry; Captain Wesley Merritt, 2d cavalry. Can these officers be appointed?

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1863.

It is just reported that your train of one hundred and fifty wagons has been captured by Fitzhugh Lee near Rockville. Unless cavalry are sent to guard your communications with Washington they will be cut off. It is reported here that there is still a considerable rebel force south of the Potomac.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1863.

The garrison at Harper's Ferry is under your orders. You can diminish or increase it as you think the circumstances justify.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., June 28, 1863.

I would recommend that General Schenck increase the force at Ellicott's Mills, with orders to hold that bridge, and also the Relay Junction, at all hazards. The 6th New York State militia were ordered to be returned to General Schenck from Monocacy bridge; also a section of artillery there. They should have started to-day.

MEADE TO HALLECK, June 28, 1863—3 P. M.

Your despatch concerning capture of one hundred and fifty wagons received. Two brigades of cavalry, with artillery, had already been sent in pursuit of Lee. Colonel Lowell has been directed to return to

Poolesville. Do you consider the information at all to be depended upon concerning a force of the enemy south of the Potomac? All our information here tends to show that Lee's entire army passed through Hagerstown, the rear passing yesterday morning.

MEADE TO HALLECK, June 28, 1863.

The following statement has been furnished me. It is confirmed by information gathered from various other sources regarded as reliable. I propose to move this army to-morrow in the direction of York:

"Thomas McCamron, blacksmith, a good man, from Hagerstown, left there on horseback at 11 A. M. to-day. Rebel cavalry came first, a week ago last Monday, General Jenkins having 1200 mounted infantry, said to be picked men from Jackson's men, and three or four hundred cavalry of his own. The cavalry went back and forth out of Pennsylvania, driving horses and cattle. The first infantry came yesterday a week ago—General Ewell's men; he came personally last Saturday, and was at the Catholic church, Sunday, with General Rhodes and two other generals. On Monday he left in the direction of Green-castle, in the afternoon, Rhodes having left the same morning. Rebel troops have passed every day, more or less, since; some days only three or four regiments or a brigade, and some days (yesterday, for instance) all of Longstreet's command passed through, except two brigades. Saw Longstreet yesterday; he and Lee had their head-quarters at Mr. Grover's, just beyond town limits, towards Greencastle, last night, and left there this A. M. at 8 o'clock. Think A. P. Hill went through last Tuesday. Heard from James D. Roman, prominent lawyer and leading confederate sympathizer, who was talking in the clerk's office last night; said that their officers reported their whole army 100,000 strong, now in Maryland or Pennsylvania, except the cavalry. Mr Logan, register of wills, and Mr. Preston, very fine men, in Hagerstown, have taken pains to count the rebels, and could not make them over 80,000. They counted the artillery; made it 275 guns. Some of the regiments have only 175 men; two that I saw 150 men. Largest regiment that I saw was a Maryland regiment, and that was about 700; don't think their regiments would range 400. Great amount of transportation; great many wagons captured at Winchester; horses in good condition. Ewell rides in a wagon. Two thousand comprise the mounted infantry and cavalry. Saw Wilcox's brigade wagons yesterday or day before. Saw Kershaw's wagons in town yesterday. Kershaw's brigade is in McLaw's division, Longstreet's corps. Know Hood and Armstead; have passed through Hood's division and Armstead's brigade. Pickett's division is in Longstreet's corps. The Union men in Hagerstown would count them and meet at night. Officers and men in good condition; say they are going to Philadelphia. Lots of confederate money; carry it in flour barrels, and give $5 for cleaning a horse, $5 for two shoes on a horse, rather than fifty cents United States money.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1853.

I doubt if there is any large force south of the Potomac; probably a few thousand cavalry—enough to render it necessary to have a strong rear-guard to protect the trains and picket the river.

Lowell's cavalry was ordered on the latter duty, but removed (contrary to my positive order), which exposed your trains. We have no cavalry here except what we have picked up from Pleasanton's command.

SECRETARY STANTON TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1863.

I have just seen (at the telegraph office) your despatch to General Halleck respecting the appointment of brigadier-generals. The officers you name shall be appointed brigadiers to-morrow morning, and you can assign them commands at once on that assurance. The letters of appointment will be forwarded to your care.

MEADE TO HALLECK, June 28, 1863.

General Steinwehr, from the Mountain House, South mountain, reports that his scouts inform him that 5000 of Stuart's cavalry passed through Williamsport yesterday afternoon. General Sedgwick, on the march up from Poolesville, reports that 3000 of the enemy's cavalry, with some artillery, are in his rear. This is communicated to you for your information. My impression is that Stuart has divided his forces, with a view of harassing our right and left flanks.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., June 28—9 P. M.

Your despatch received. Colonel Lowell, as soon as your wishes were known, was ordered and will be left, and I shall intrust to him, through you, the guarding of the river.

There seems to be no doubt that three thousand of the enemy's cavalry have been on our right, between us and Washington, to-day. My intention is now to move to-morrow on three lines to Emmittsburg and Westminster, having the army on the road from Emmittsburg through Westminster, or as near there as we can reach. This movement is based upon what information we have here of the enemy's movements.

The army to-night is as follows: 1st, 2d, 11th, and 12th corps, with artillery reserve, within a few miles of Frederick; the 3d corps towards New Market, and expecting to reach there to-night.

I have not decided yet as to the Harper's Ferry garrison.

I should like to have your views as to the movement proposed.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, June 29, 1863—9 A. M.

GENERAL: Upon assuming command of the army, and after carefully considering the position of affairs and the movements of the enemy, I have concluded as follows:

To move to-day on towards Westminster and Emmittsburg; and the army is now in motion for that line, placing two corps (1st and 11th) at Emmittsburg; two corps (3d and 12th) at Taneytown; (1) 2d corps at Frizelburg; (1) 5th corps at Union; 6th corps at New Windsor—my cavalry guarding my flanks and rear. If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do. I have ordered the abandonment of Harper's Ferry—a detachment of not more than 3000 to proceed with the property by canal to Washington, and strengthen your force there against any cavalry raid. The remainder to move up and join me.

The line to Frederick from Baltimore by rail will necessarily be abandoned while I move forward.

I shall incline to the right towards the Baltimore and Harrisburg road, to cover that and draw supplies from there, if circumstances permit it; my main objective point being, of course, Lee's army, which, I am satisfied, have all passed on through Hagerstown towards Chambersburg. My endeavor will be, in my movements, to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail.

The cavalry force between me and Washington (as soon as I can learn sufficiently of their movements to pursue and fight them without wasting the necessary force by useless movements) will be engaged by my cavalry. Stuart's cavalry, from my best information, have divided into two columns—one on my right, between me and Baltimore, and one on my left, through Hagerstown to join their army. My main point being to find and fight the enemy, I shall have to submit to the cavalry raids around me in some measure.

The section of artillery and small force of cavalry sent from here to Baltimore have been ordered to fall back from Poplar Springs and join General Pleasanton's force on my right, their route having been intercepted by the enemy's cavalry.

I have hastily made up this despatch to give you the information. Telegraph communication having been cut off, I have no opportunity to receive a reply to mine asking your advice as to these movements, and upon my best judgment proceed to execute them.

I can, at present, give no orders as to General Schenck's department in Baltimore, or the Potomac in my rear; neither can I, in the absence of telegraphic communication, and on account of the great distance of General Couch, exercise any influence, by advice or otherwise, concerning the co-operation of that force. These circumstances are beyond my control.

I send this by courier, with the hope and expectation that it will reach you safely.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 29, 1863.

Since my last telegram I have heard from Lowell's cavalry at Rockville. The rebel cavalry which destroyed the train left Brookville early this morning, apparently for the direction of Ellicott's Mills. They have with them the captured mules and part of the wagons. Your cavalry may be able to cut them off. Fry's cavalry will be added to Lowell's, but they are too weak to do much.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 29, 1863.

I have delayed answering your telegram of nine P. M., received after midnight, in hopes of ascertaining something more of rebel forces on the Potomac. But there is nothing further that is reliable. The cavalry force in our front is said by some to be two and by others three brigades, with seven pieces of artillery.

So far as I can judge, without a better knowledge of the enemy's positions, your proposed movements seem good.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 30, 1863.

Your plan of operations is approved. I have just received your second despatch by the hands of an orderly. I write no fuller for obvious reasons.

FRENCH TO HALLECK, SANDY HOOK, June 30, 1863.

I could not telegraph yesterday. The immense amount of stores here cannot be removed under at least ten days. I shall be obliged to have General Elliott's brigade, thirty-three hundred men, with artillery and engineer company. I commenced this morning to destroy ammunition; some of the heavy guns will have to be left. I am in readiness to move with the remainder of my force, but will await your instructions. I cannot communicate with head-quarters army of the Potomac.

HALLECK TO COUCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 30, 1863.

Every possible effort should be made to hold the enemy in check on the Susquehanna till General Meade can give him battle. I have no direct communication with General Meade, but he wishes you to be in readiness to act in concert with him. You will probably be able to learn his movements from the country people. He will be close on the enemy's right and rear.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 30, 1863.

If you abandon Harper's Ferry, ordnance stores must not be destroyed. Such destruction can be justified only by absolute necessity.

Forces have been sent up the canal to ascertain its condition. It is reported that all your stores and pontoons on the canal have been destroyed, and the canal much injured.

FRENCH TO HALLECK, SANDY HOOK, June 30, 1863—3.30 P. M.

I have no orders, except from General Butterfield, which urge the movement of these troops within a few days as a necessity for the army of the Potomac.

The removal of this property must be covered by a large force, as the road is perfectly commanded. As for defending the property, all that is required is an order not to abandon, or something definite from some source. My instinct has placed me on the road for the army, with 5000 untried men. I leave over 3000 men who came from Winchester, ready to take the rear at the first alarm. If I am to be held responsible for the evacuation of Maryland Heights, it should be given me reasonably. I cannot communicate with head-quarters army of the Potomac.

MEADE TO HALLECK, June 30—4.30 P.M.

Head-quarters Taneytown. Two (2) corps between Emmittsburg and Gettysburg, one at Littlestown, one at Manchester, one at Union Mills, one between here and Emmittsburg, one at Frizelburg. Pennsylvania Reserves cannot keep up; still in rear. General Lockwood with the troops from Schenck, still behind. These troops cannot keep up with the marches made by the army.

Our reports seem to place Ewell in the vicinity of York and Harrisburg. The cavalry that crossed the Seneca ford have passed up through Westminster and Hanover, some six to eight thousand strong. The people are all so frightened that accurate information is not to be obtained.

I shall push on to-morrow in the direction of Hanover Junction and Hanover, when I hope by the 2d of July to open communication with Baltimore by telegraph and rail, to renew supplies. I fear I shall break down the troops by pushing on much faster, and may have to rest a day. My movement, of course, will be governed much by what I learn of the enemy. The information seems to place Longstreet at Chambersburg, and A. P. Hill moving between Chambersburg and York. Our cavalry drove a regiment out of Gettysburg this A. M. Our cavalry engaged with Stuart at Hanover this A. M.; result not yet known.

COUCH TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, PA., June 30, 1863.

As telegraphed previously, part of the rebel force, if not all, have fallen back towards Chambersburg, passing Shippensburg last night in great haste. I expect every moment to hear that my cavalry, under General Smith, has reoccupied Carlisle.

My latest information is that Early, with his 8000 men, went towards Gettysburg or Hanover, saying they expected to fight a great battle there. At Carlisle they said they were not going to be outflanked by Hooker.

STANTON TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, June 30, 1863—11.30 P. M.

The following despatch has just been received, which, although you may be informed on the subject, I have ordered to be sent to you by express. It is proper you should know that General French this morning evacuated Maryland Heights, blowing up his magazine, spiking the large cannon, and destroying surplus stores. A telegram from him received this evening indicates that he is still at Sandy Hook, waiting orders, and doubtful what he should do with his force. Please instruct him what you wish him to do:

THOMAS A. SCOTT TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, PA., June 30, 1863.

Lee is falling back suddenly from the vicinity of Harrisburg, and concentrating all his forces. York has been evacuated. Carlisle is being evacuated. The concentration seems to be at or near Chambersburg; the object, apparently, a sudden movement against Meade, of which he should be advised by courier immediately. A courier might reach Frederick by way of Western Maryland Railroad to Westminster. This information comes from T. A. Scott, and I think it reliable.

THOMAS A. SCOTT TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, July 1, 1863—12.45 A. M.

Information just received, 12.45 A. M., leads to the belief that the concentration of the forces of the enemy will be at Gettysburg rather than at Chambersburg. The movement on their part is very rapid and hurried. They returned from Carlisle in direction of Gettysburg, by way of the Petersburg pike. Firing about Petersburg and Dillstown this P. M. continued some hours. Meade should by all means be informed and prepared for a sudden attack from Lee's whole army.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1863.

The movements of the enemy yesterday indicate his intention to either turn your left or to cover himself by the South mountain and occupy Cumberland valley. Do not let him draw you too far to the east.

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, MD., July 1, 1863—1.30 P. M.

I think there is no rebel force whatever between General Meade and myself. I sent up General Kane last evening to Westminster with an escort, and two couriers in the night with despatches.

Lee, I think, is either massing his troops or making a general retreat toward Cumberland valley. Most likely the former. They are so near that I shall not be surprised if a battle comes on to-day. I will look to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad to Frederick.

MEADE TO STANTON, July 1, 1863—7 A. M.

Despatches of 12.30 P. M. received. French was ordered to send three thousand of his force to Washington, with all his property, then to move up and join me with the balance.

MEADE TO HALLECK, NINE MILES EAST OF MIDDLEBURG, July 1, 1863—7 A. M.

Despatch of General Couch and General Haupt received. My positions to-day are: One corps at Emmittsburg, two at Gettysburg, one at Taneytown, one at "Two Taverns," one at Manchester, one at Hanover. These movements were ordered yesterday, before receipt of advices of Lee's movements. Our cavalry, under Kilpatrick, had a handsome fight yesterday at Hanover. He reports the capture of one battle-flag, a Lieutenant-Colonel, one Captain, forty-five privates, with fifteen or twenty of the enemy killed.

The point of Lee's concentration, and the nature of the country when ascertained, will determine whether I attack him or not. Shall advise you further to day, when satisfied that the enemy have fully withdrawn from the Susquehanna. If General Couch has any reliable force, I shall call upon him to move to aid me.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 1, 1863—12 M.

Despatch sent last night giving my position at Emmittsburg, Gettysburg, and Hanover. Ewell is marching at Heidlersberg; A. P. Hill is massed behind the mountains at Cashtown; Longstreet somewhere between Chambersburg and the mountains. The news from my advance has answered its purpose. I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one. A battle-field is being selected to the rear, on which the army can be rapidly concentrated, on Pipe creek, between Middleburg and Manchester, covering my depot at Westminster. If I am not attacked, and can secure reliable intelligence, have reason to believe I can attack with reasonable degree of success, I

will do so; but at present, having relieved the pressure on the Susquehanna, I am looking to the protection of Washington and fighting my army to the best advantage.

1 P. M.—The enemy are advancing in force on Gettysburg, and I expect the battle will begin to-day.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1863.

Yours of 12 M. received. Your tactical arrangements for battle seem good, so far as I can judge from my knowledge of the character of the country. But in a strategic view are you not too far east, and may not Lee attempt to cut you off from Frederick? Please give your full attention to this suggestion.

Lowell's cavalry was sent this morning to escort the stores from Harper's Ferry. This will relieve General French to obey your orders. The destruction of unguarded property on the canal along the Potomac has been terrible.

Will not Frederick become a better base of supplies than Westminster? In anticipation of this I have directed General Schenck to guard that road as well as he can.

I have asked General Couch to co-operate with you as far as possible, but I fear very little reliance can be placed in his troops in an emergency.

MEADE TO COUCH, July 1, 1863.

The enemy are advancing on Gettysburg—Hill from Cashtown, Ewell from Heidlersberg. Can you throw a force in Ewell's rear, to threaten him, and at the same time keep your line of retreat open? If you can, do so.

HALLECK TO COUCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1863.

There seems to be a strong probability of a battle not far from Emmittsburg. It is hoped that you will assist General Meade by operating on the enemy's left flank or left rear, towards Gettysburg.

COUCH TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, July 1, 1863.

Despatch received. I have sent out a force in direction of Carlisle. It has been attacked by a body of cavalry, at least, and just now things do not look well.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1863.

Arrangements have been made to run an express train to Westminster every three hours. Copies of all despatches will also be sent to Frederick, and by messenger to you from that point.

MEADE TO HALLECK, *via* FREDERICK, July 1, 1863—8 P. M.

The 1st and 11th corps have been engaged all day in front of Gettysburg. The 12th, 3d, and 5th have been moving up, and all, I hope, by this time, on the field. This leaves only the 6th, which will move up to-night. General Reynolds was killed this morning, early in the action. I immediately sent up General Hancock to assume command. A. P. Hill and Ewell are certainly concentrating. Longstreet's whereabouts I do not know. If he is not up to-morrow, I hope, with the force I have concentrated, to defeat Hill and Ewell; at any rate, I see no other course than to hazard a general battle. Circumstances during the night may alter this decision, of which I will try to advise you.

I have telegraphed Couch that if he can threaten Ewell's rear from Harrisburg, without endangering himself, to do so.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 11 A. M. 2d), BALTIMORE, July 2, 1863.

The following despatch found on the body of a soldier killed June 30, 4½ miles from Glen Rock:

June 29, 1863.

Upon assuming command of the army, and after carefully considering the position of affairs and the movements of the enemy, I have concluded as follows: To move to-day towards Westminster and Emmittsburg—and the army is now in motion for that line—placing two corps, 1st and 11th, at Emmittsburg; two corps, 3d and 12th, at Taneytown; one corps, 2d, at Frizelburg; one corps, 5th, at Union; 6th corps at New Windsor; my cavalry guarding my flanks and rear. If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do.

I have ordered the abandonment of Harper's Ferry. A detachment of not more than 3000 to proceed with the property, by canal, to Washington, and strengthen your forces there against any cavalry raid; the remainder to move up and join me. The line from Frederick to Baltimore by rail will necessarily be abandoned. While I move forward I shall incline to the right towards the Baltimore and Harrisburg road, to cover that and draw supplies from there, if circumstances permit it; my main objective point being, of course, Lee's army, which, I am satisfied, has all passed on through Hagerstown towards Chambersburg. My endeavor will be in my movements to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail.

The cavalry force between me and Washington, as soon as I can learn sufficiently of their movement to pursue and fight without wasting the necessary force for useless movements, will be engaged by my cavalry. Stuart's cavalry, from my best information, have divided into two columns—one on my right, between me and Baltimore; one on my left, through Hagerstown, to join their army. My main point being to find

and fight the enemy, I shall have to submit to the cavalry raids around me in some measure.

The sections of artillery and small force of cavalry sent from here to Baltimore have been ordered to fall back from Poplar Springs and join General Pleasanton's force on my right, their route having been intercepted by the enemy's cavalry.

I have hastily made up this despatch to give you the information, Telegraphic communication having been cut off, I have no opportunity to receive a reply to mine asking your advice as to these movements, and upon my best judgment I proceed to execute them. I can at present give no orders as to General Schenck's department in Baltimore, or the Potomac in my rear; neither can I, in the absence of telegraphic communication and on account of the great distance of Couch, exercise any influence, by advice or otherwise, concerning the co-operation of that force. These circumstances are beyond my control. I send by this courier with the hope and expectation that it will reach you safely. Head-quarters to-night are at Middleburg, three miles from Uniontown and thirteen from Westminster. There is rail communication from Baltimore to Westminster.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 10.20 A. M., 3d), July 2, 1863—3 P. M.

I have concentrated my army at this place to-day. The 6th corps is just coming in, very much worn out, having been marching since 9 P. M. last night.

The army is fatigued. I have to-day, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I having a strong position for defensive. I am not determined as yet on attacking him till his position is more developed. He has been moving on both my flanks apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed attacking to allow the 6th corps and parts of other corps to reach this place and rest the men. Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster. I will endeavor to advise you as often as possible. In the engagement yesterday the enemy concentrated more rapidly than we could, and toward evening, owing to the superiority of numbers, compelled the 11th and 1st corps to fall back from the town to the heights this side, on which I am now posted. I feel fully the responsibility resting on me, but will endeavor to act with caution.

MEADE TO COUCH (Received 1.30 P. M., 2d), BALTIMORE, MD., July 2, 1863.

Following was found on the body of a Union soldier, killed June 30, 1863, 4½ miles from Glen Rock:

TANEYTOWN, MD., June 30, 1863—11 A. M.

I am in position between Emmittsburg and Westminster, advancing upon the enemy. The enemy hold (A. P. Hill) Cashtown pass, between Gettysburg and Chambersburg. Their cavalry, three to five brigades, are on my right, between me and the Northern Central.

My force is tolerably well concentrated, moving with all the speed that the roads and physique of the men will bear. I am without definite and positive information as to the whereabouts of Longstreet and Ewell. The latter I presume to be in front of you. The army is in good spirits, and we shall push to your relief, or the engagement of the enemy, as circumstances and the information we receive during the day, and on the marches, may indicate as most prudent and most likely to lead to ultimate success. I am anxious to hear from you and get information of the dispositions of the enemy and his movements, as far as you know them. If you are in telegraphic communication, or otherwise, with Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, I should like supplies and shoes to be accumulated, to be thrown to me on the line of the Northern Central, or the Susquehanna, as circumstances may require, or my movements may make most advisable.

Please communicate my despatch to the general-in-chief. My communications with him are interrupted by the cavalry of the enemy on my right. Can you keep the enemy from crossing the river?

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, July 2, 1863.

I have positive intelligence of one brigade (and two are reported) of rebel cavalry crossing at Williamsport to-day, and taking the direct road to Greencastle and Chambersburg. They were from 11 A. M. to 4 P. M. crossing. My informant saw what he understood to be a brigade of about twenty-five hundred, with five pieces of artillery. They told him the commander was General Jones.

HALLECK TO COUCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 3, 1863.

As Lee is concentrating his forces near Gettysburg against Meade, all your available forces should be thrown forward to the assistance of our main army. Probably this assistance can be best rendered by moving rapidly on Lee's left flank, compelling him to make detachments.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 5.10 P. M. 3), July 3, 1863—8 A. M.

The action commenced again at early daylight upon various parts of the line. The enemy thus far have made no impression upon my position. All accounts agree in placing the whole army here. Prisoners report Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's forces much injured yesterday, and many general officers killed. General Barksdale's (Mississippi) dead body is

within our lines. We have sent off thus far 1600 prisoners, and a small number yet to be started. I have given certain instructions to General French which he will telegraph you.

The despatches from you yesterday, owing to disappearance of telegraph operator, Caldwell, are here in cipher, unintelligible.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 5.15 P. M., 3d), July 2, 1863—11 P. M.

The enemy attacked me about 4 P. M. this day, and after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded; among the former are Brigadier General Paul Zook; and among the wounded, Generals Sickles, Barlow, Graham, and Warren slightly. We have taken a large number of prisoners. I shall remain in my present position to-morrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character.

MEADE TO COUCH (Received 5.35 P. M.), July 3, 1863—8.30 A. M.

I presume you are advised of condition of affairs here by copies of my despatches to general-in-chief. The result of my operations may be the withdrawal of the rebel army. The sound of my guns for these three days, it is taken for granted, is all the additional notice you need to come on. Should the enemy withdraw, by prompt co-operation we might destroy him. Should he overpower me, your return and defence of Harrisburg and the Susquehanna is not at all endangered.

MEADE TO COUCH (Received 5.35 P. M.), July 3, 1863.

Telegraph despatches reach me through Baltimore and Frederick. My cavalry have been at Berlin. The country between this and you is probably clear of all but stragglers, your easy prey. Your officers could communicate with me now *via* Hanover and Taneytown.

MEADE TO FRENCH (Received 6.45 P. M.), FREDERICK, July 3, 1863.

Major-General HALLECK:—I submit a telegram just received from head-quarters army of the Potomac. W. H. FRENCH, *Major-General.*

NEAR GETTYSBURG, July 3, 1863—7 A. M.

General FRENCH:—General Meade desires me to say that the enemy attacked us vigorously yesterday and was repulsed on all sides. The conflict is apparently renewed to-day, and we have retained our position. Should the result of to-day's operations cause the enemy to fall back towards the Potomac, which you would probably learn by scouts and

information from Hagerstown, etc., before you would be advised from here, he desires you will reoccupy Harper's Ferry and annoy and harass him in his retreat. It may be possible for you now to annoy and cut his communication with any cavalry or light-marching infantry you have; of this you can judge. If the result of to-day's operations should be our discomfiture and withdrawal, you are to look to Washington, and throw your force there for its protection. You will be prepared for either of these contingencies should they arise. Communicate a copy of these instructions to the general-in-chief for his information. Acknowledge.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, *Major General, Chief of Staff.*

HALLECK TO COUCH (Received 8.30 P. M.), WASHINGTON, D. C., July 3, 1863.

I have received General Meade's telegram to you of 8.30 A. M. His call for assistance should not pass unheard.

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, MD., July 3, 1863.

I have reliable information that the rebels have a pontoon bridge across the Potomac at Falling Waters, which is two or three miles below Williamsport. The bridge is protected by artillery on the Virginia side.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 11 P. M.), July 3, 1863—12.30 P. M.

At the present moment all is quiet. Considerable firing, both infantry and artillery, has taken place in various parts of our line; but no development of the enemy's intention. My cavalry has been pushing the enemy on both my flanks and keeping me advised of any effort to outflank me. We have taken several hundred prisoners since morning.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 6.10 A. M., 4th), July 3, 1863—8.35 P. M.

The enemy opened at 1 P. M. from about one hundred and fifty guns concentrated upon my left centre, continuing without intermission for about three hours, at the expiration of which time he assaulted my left centre twice, being upon both occasions handsomely repulsed with severe loss to him, leaving in our hands nearly three thousand prisoners; among the prisoners Brigadier-General Armistead and many colonels and officers of lesser rank. The enemy left many dead upon the field and a large number of wounded in our hands. The loss upon our side has been considerable. Major-General Hancock and Brigadier-General Gibbon were wounded. After the repelling of the assault, indications leading to the belief that the enemy might be withdrawing, an armed re-

connoissance was pushed forward from the left and the enemy found to be in force. At the present hour all is quiet; my cavalry have been engaged all day on both flanks of the enemy, harassing and vigorously attacking him with great success, notwithstanding they encountered superior numbers, both cavalry and infantry. The army is in fine spirits.

MEADE TO COUCH (Received 8.40 A. M., July 4), July 3, 1863—9.57 P. M.

You will be apprised of my operations through my despatch to the general-in-chief. I do not think Lee will attack me again; but am as yet uncertain whether he will assume a defensive attitude and await an attack from me, or whether he will withdraw down the Cumberland valley, holding strongly the mountain passes, which I understand he has fortified. Should the former be the case, I will apprise you of the fact as soon as I am certain of it, and I then desire you either to form a junction with me, or, if in your judgment the same can be done without jeoparding the safety of your command, attack him. Should I be satisfied that he is retreating, I shall then move down on this side of the mountain, and wish you to pursue him as rapidly as possible down the valley.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 9 A. M., July 4), July 3, 1863.

I would respectfully request that Colonel Strong Vincent, 83d Pennsylvania regiment, be made a brigadier-general of volunteers for gallant conduct on the field yesterday. He is mortally wounded, and it would gratify his friends as well as myself. It was my intention to have recommended him with others should he live. Among the general officers wounded to-day I omitted to mention in previous despatch Major-General Butterfield and Major-General Doubleday, not seriously.

STANTON TO MEADE (Received 10.05 A. M.), WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4, 1863.

According to your request, Colonel Vincent has been appointed brigadier-general for gallant service on the field. This department will rejoice to manifest honor and gratitude to you and your gallant comrades in arms.

GENERAL ORDERS—NEAR GETTYSBURG, July 4, 1863.

The commanding general, in behalf of the country, thanks the army of the Potomac for the glorious result of the recent operations.

Our enemy, superior in numbers and flushed with the pride of a successful invasion, attempted to overcome or destroy this army. Utterly baffled and defeated, he has now withdrawn from the contest.

The privations and fatigues the army has endured, and the heroic courage and gallantry it has displayed, will be matters of history to be ever remembered. Our task is not yet accomplished, and the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader.

It is right and proper that we should, on suitable occasions, return our grateful thanks to the Almighty Disposer of events, that in the goodness of his providence he has thought fit to give victory to the cause of the just.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 4, 1863—Noon.

The position of affairs is not materially changed since my last despatch, 7 A. M. The enemy apparently has thrown back his left, and placed guns and troops in position in rear of Gettysburg, which we now hold. The enemy has abandoned a large number of his killed and wounded on the field. I shall require some time to get up supplies, ammunition, etc., rest the army, worn out by long marches and three days' hard fighting. I shall possibly be able to give you a return of our captures and losses before night, and return of the enemy's killed and wounded in our hands.

HAUPT TO HALLECK, HANOVER, July 4, 1863—4 P. M.

I have just returned from Littlestown; bridge repaired; trains with wounded following. Saw Captain Fry, of General Sickles' staff. Have arranged to bring General Sickles by special train to Washington. General Meade's head-quarters said to be nine miles from Littlestown, on Taneytown road. I am now starting towards Gettysburg to repair road and telegraph. Captain Fry reports that Pleasanton sent a note to General Sickles last evening, saying that he had routed and driven the enemy; reported that Longstreet and Hill both wounded and prisoners; that 3000 prisoners passed through Littlestown this morning; that we are in possession of Gettysburg, and that Lee is retreating by Chambersburg road. I give these reports as I get them from Captain Fry. They may not be correct. No firing heard to-day. Telegraph from General Meade just received by courier says enemy retreated from Gettysburg at 3 A. M. He will follow when rations are received for men and horses.

HAUPT TO HALLECK, HANOVER JUNCTION, July 4, 1863.

All the supplies offered for transportation of Westminster branch have been sent forward, and sidings at Relay are clear. Our arrangements

work well. Transportation of the wounded should be sent *via* Westminster to fill return cars; I have so requested. Our men rebuilt entirely the bridge at this junction (three spans of about forty feet) this morning. They expect to reach York to-morrow night. The reconstruction of the N. C. entire at this time may not be an imperative military necessity; but as my corps would not be otherwise employed, it is best to do it. I will endeavor to secure for you, when I reach Hanover, more rapid communication by telegraph with Gettysburg.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 7.20 P. M.), July 4, 1863—7 A. M.

This morning the enemy has withdrawn his pickets from the positions of yesterday. My own pickets are moving out to ascertain the nature and extent of the enemy's movement. My information is not sufficient to decide its character yet, whether a retreat or manœuvre for other purpose.

FRENCH TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, July 4, 1863—8 P. M.

An expedition sent out by me last night has just returned, having entirely destroyed the pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Williamsport, capturing the guard, a lieutenant and thirteen (13) men.

MEADE TO COUCH (Received 10.40 P. M.), July 4, 1863—8.30 A. M.

I send herewith the duplicate of despatch sent last evening.

"The enemy has withdrawn from his positions occupied for attack. I am not yet sufficiently informed of the nature of his movements. He was repulsed yesterday in his attack upon me. You will therefore be governed by the instructions heretofore sent you; until I get further information I cannot decide as to the character of the movements or the enemy's intentions."

HALLECK TO FRENCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

The forces here from Harper's Ferry, with two batteries of artillery, and some troops from Baltimore, can be sent to you at Frederick, should General Meade desire that disposition of them. Should he deem it preferable, they can be sent back by Poolesville to Point of Rocks. Please communicate immediately with General Meade, and get his instructions. I have had no communication from him since yesterday morning.

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, July 5, 1863.

To get my troops to Frederick quick and fresh to-morrow, I will send them by railroad; will send you report when I have started them. I think I can send over three thousand pretty good men.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

You will assume the general command of such of General Couch's forces as are operating in the field, and direct their movements as you may deem best. It seems to me that they should connect with your right flank.

I think that the troops sent here from Harper's Ferry, and a part of the forces now in Baltimore, could join General French, and be available for your operations. Four small regiments from North Carolina have reached Baltimore. I am waiting an answer from my despatch sent through General French this morning, in regard to reinforcing him as above indicated. So long as your movements cover Baltimore and Washington from Lee's main army, they are in no danger from any force the enemy may detach for a raid.

We have heard nothing from you since yesterday morning, and are anxious to learn more of the results of your brilliant fighting.

COUCH TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, July 5, 1863—3 P. M.

Ruffenspagers is in Franklin township one and a half mile west of Arendtsville, on the road to Cashtown and Chambersburg. A cavalry force went from Loudon this morning toward Williamsport. Colonel Price, 12th Pennsylvania cavalry, commanding forces in the mountains west of Chambersburg. I hope to have my advance near Cashtown and Arendtsville.

FRENCH TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., July 5, 1863—3 P. M.

Your despatch of this date is just received. Meade's instructions to me require the force sent back from Harper's Ferry. No time is to be lost. Buford is passing through to-day. I have destroyed the bridge at Williamsport, and am fortifying the South Mountain passes. Lee, it is reported, has massed at Chambersburg, and will rest his right on the river at Williamsport. Should he find his passage there impracticable, as the river is rising, he will endeavor to seize the passes. I have one good brigade holding them. I also hold the Monocacy bridge, and have only a few unreliable infantry in reserve. Should you send me reinforcements, they should come direct by railroad. The cavalry is broken down. I have issued a proclamation for horses, and will remount as fast as they are brought in. It was reported to me that artillery was being placed on the heights at Shepherdstown ford, and a bridge in readiness to swing across. Buford will visit that place to-night.

To reoccupy Maryland heights will require time, and probably the holding for a while the opposite side of the river. The enemy can get nothing by having them, and a small force without a depot would be a *cul de sac*.

I have just received the following despatch from head-quarters army of the Potomac, dated July 4, 10.30 A. M.:

"More recent developments may indicate that the enemy may have retired to take a new position and await an attack from us. The general commanding countermands his despatch requiring you to reoccupy Maryland heights and seize the South Mountain passes, resuming the instructions of July 3, making your movements contingent upon those of the enemy."

Received 2 P. M.—Latest despatch, July 5—7 A. M. "The enemy appear to be in full retreat, and you can act upon the contingencies provided in previous despatches. I will therefore require the reinforcements."

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 4.15 P. M., 5th), July 4, 1863—10 P. M.

No change of affairs since despatch of 12 noon. I make a reconnoissance to-morrow, to ascertain what is the intention of the enemy. My cavalry are now moving towards the South Mountain pass, and should the enemy retreat, I shall pursue him on his flank. A proposition, made by General Lee under flag of truce, to exchange prisoners, was declined by me.

MEADE TO FRENCH, July 5—6 P. M.

The major-general commanding directs that you proceed immediately and seize and hold the South Mountain with such force as in your judgment is proper and sufficient to prevent the enemy seizing it to cover his retreat. With the balance of your force reoccupy Maryland heights, and operate upon the contingency expressed yesterday in regard to the retreat of the enemy. Buford will probably pass through South Mountain to-morrow P. M. from this side.

HALLECK TO SCHENCK, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

You will immediately send to Frederick to report to Major-General French all troops in Baltimore already not necessary to man the fortifications.

HALLECK TO FRENCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

Reinforcements from Baltimore and Washington re-ordered to report to you. Send your orders to Monocacy Junction whether they are to go to Frederick and towards Harper's Ferry.

MEADE TO FRENCH, July 5, 1863—8 P. M.

A column of enemy's cavalry, probably covering flank on far South Mountain pass, passed through Emmittsburg about daylight this morning, bound, as they say, for Frederick. Notify Buford, and be prepared.

MEADE TO HALLECK (Received 8.40 P. M. in cipher), July 5, 1863—8.30 A. M.

The enemy retired, under cover of the night and heavy rain, in the direction of Fairfield and Cashtown. All my available cavalry are in pursuit on the enemy's left and rear. My movement will be made at once on his flank *via* Middletown and South Mountain pass. I cannot give you the details of our captures in prisoners, colors, and arms. Upwards of twenty battle-flags will be turned in from one corps. I cannot delay to pick up the *debris* of the battle-field, and request that all these arrangements may be made by the departments. My wounded, with those of the enemy in our hands, will be left at Gettysburg. After burying our own dead, I am compelled to employ citizens to bury the enemy's. My head-quarters will be to-night at Creagerstown. Communication received from General Smith, in command of three thousand men, on the march from Carlisle towards Cashtown.

Field return last evening gives me about fifty-five thousand effective men in the ranks, exclusive of cavalry, baggage guards, ambulance attendants, etc. Every available reinforcement is required, and should be sent to Frederick without delay.

HALLECK TO KELLEY (WEST VA.), WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

Send forward your forces in hand, and order the others to follow as rapidly as possible.

HALLECK TO MEADE (Received 9.30 P. M.), WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

Your movements are perfectly satisfactory. Your call for reinforcements to Frederick has been anticipated. Call to you all of Couch's force.

HALLECK TO SCHENCK, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

Send everything forward to Frederick, except the usual garrison of Baltimore. The enemy is in retreat. Baltimore is in no possible danger. Give General Meade all the aid in your power.

HALLECK TO HEINTZELMAN, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

All cavalry detachments from the army of the Potomac should be sent immediately to Frederick, by Rockville.

The movement of troops ordered this afternoon should be pushed forward as rapidly as possible.

HALLECK TO KELLY, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1863.

Do everything in your power to capture or destroy Lee's trains, which will endeavor to cross at Williamsport or Falling Waters. His army is in full retreat.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 5, 1863.

Among the several officers killed is General Farnsworth, of our cavalry, not before mentioned. Rebel General Kemper killed, Pender and Johnson wounded.

MEADE TO FRENCH, July 5, 1863.

Your despatches received. Major-General Halleck has been requested to throw the forces spoken of to Harper's Ferry by rail at once. Lose no time in occupying the passes—intrench and hold them. General head-quarters will be at Frederick to-morrow P. M. The canal and rail can supply troops at Harper's Ferry.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 5, 1863—6. P M.

I send copies of all my despatches since yesterday A. M. My army is all in motion. I shall be at Frederick to-morrow night.

I desire the forces mentioned in your despatch to Major-General French to be thrown to Harper's Ferry by rail as soon as possible. I shall so instruct Major-General French. It is of importance to get possession of South Mountain passes and Maryland heights.

MEADE TO FRENCH, July 5, 1863—6 P. M.

"The Major-General commanding directs that you proceed immediately and seize and hold the South Mountain passes with such force as in your judgment is proper and sufficient to prevent the enemy's seizing them to cover his retreat. With the balance of your force reoccupy Maryland heights, and operate upon the contingency expressed yesterday in regard to the retreat of the enemy. Buford will probably pass through South Mountain to-morrow P. M., from this side.

FRENCH TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., July 6, 1863.

The river is high and cannot be forded at Shepardstown or Williamsport. The enemy is sending his wounded across in flats.

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, July 6, 1863.

There are now in the field with General Meade all the available troops remaining of my corps; under General French, ten thousand (10,000) besides three thousand and nine hundred (3900) sent to him to-day; under General Briggs, fifteen hundred (1500) or more with General Lockwood, and near three thousand (3000) of Milroy's men now up at Bloody run, making an aggregate of over eighteen thousand (18,000) in my own department. I propose, with your permission, to leave here to proceed to-day to Frederick, or wherever the troops may be, to assume the command of them under General Meade. It appears to be my right, and I trust you will approve my doing so.

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, July 6, 1863—9 A. M.

Nearly everything I have available here is now started, leaving nothing but limited garrisons and guards in the three old forts. I shall have ordered to General French's command in a few hours an aggregate of three thousand nine hundred men. I send the eightieth, forty-fifth, and fifty-first Massachusetts infantry, the ninth and tenth Maryland infantry, second Long Island infantry, seventh New York militia, first Connecticut cavalry, battery C, first Pennsylvania artillery, twelve rifled guns. I have substituted some New York militia for the seventh New York in Fort Federal Hill. The ninth and tenth Maryland are new and incomplete six months regiments. May I suggest, if it has not already been ordered, that Brigadier-General Kelly might advance with good effect from New Creek and on the railroad.

HALLECK TO SCHENCK, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 6, 1863.

It is deemed proper that your head-quarters should remain for the present in Baltimore. All troops in the field are under General Meade's orders, and will be assigned and moved as he may direct.

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, July 6, 1863.

I have already reported to you this morning the troops I send from here. Everything mentioned in my despatch has gone forward except the Eastern Shore Maryland volunteers, about five hundred strong, which I am getting in from along the Northern Central railroad, and the Connecticut cavalry, the detachment of which I am getting in, and which will number about one hundred. I expect to start the Eastern Shore regiment at one P. M. The fragments of eighty-seventh Pennsyl-

vania, fifty-three in number, I will send at the same time. They are instructed now to move directly on the cars to Harper's Ferry, unless otherwise ordered by Major-General French.

HALLECK TO MEADE AND FRENCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 6, 1863.

It is just reported here that the bridge at Harper's Ferry was left intact when General French's command abandoned that place. If so, it gives Lee a good crossing, unless it be occupied by us in strong force. No time should be lost in throwing troops into Maryland heights.

HALLECK TO COUCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 6, 1863.

Major-General Meade has authority to command and direct the movements of all troops of your department. His orders will be obeyed.

COUCH TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, July 6, 1863.

Your despatch received. General Meade's wishes, recommendations, and instructions have been carried out so far as practicable. I have directed that a copy of cipher despatches to him be sent to you for your information.

As I prominently mentioned that officer for his present position, it may be inferred that I would show no lukewarmness in carrying out his orders.

MEADE TO COUCH, *via* HANOVER, July 6, 1863.

I cannot get very reliable intelligence of the enemy's movements. My belief is they are in retreat to the Potomac. A captured despatch to a rebel cavalry officer, dated July 5th, says Longstreet is moving through Tock mountain, and orders him to picket roads to Emmittsburg, and to report to Longstreet at Tock mountain, and Ewell at Fairfield. Sedgwick, with his corps, is pushing them at Fairfield; other corps are in support. I have delayed my flank movement until I am positively satisfied they are retreating to the Potomac. I hope to-day *some time* to determine this.

FRENCH TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., July 6, 1863.

I had the bridge named in your despatch of this date thoroughly destroyed yesterday. As soon as I can reinforce the important passes I will reoccupy the heights—probably to-night. There is no force there.

HALLECK TO MEADE AND FRENCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 6, 1863.

Fifteen hundred cavalry left here this forenoon on Rockville and Frederick turnpike. They are detachments from the army of the Potomac, remounted. You can send orders to them on the road to move as you deem best.

Elliott's command, with two new batteries, left by railroad this morning.

MEADE TO HALLECK, GETTYSBURG, July 6, 1863—2 P. M.

Yesterday I sent General Sedgwick with the 6th corps in pursuit of the enemy towards Fairfield and a brigade of cavalry towards Cashtown. General Sedgwick's report indicating a large force of the enemy in the mountains, I deemed it prudent to suspend the movement to Middletown until I could be certain the enemy were evacuating Cumberland valley.

I find great difficulty in getting reliable information, but from all I can learn, the enemy is retreating, very much crippled and hampered with his trains. General Sedgwick reports that the gap at Fairfield was very formidable and would enable a small force to hold my column in check for a long time. I have accordingly resumed the movement to Middletown, and I expect by to-morrow night to assemble the army in that vicinity. Supplies will be then provided, and as soon as possible I will cross South Mountain and proceed in search of the enemy. Your despatch requiring me to assume the general command of the forces in the field under General Couch has been received. I have nothing of the position or strength of his command, except the advance under General Smith which I ordered here, and which I desire should furnish a necessary force to guard this place while the enemy is in the vicinity.

A brigade of infantry and one of cavalry, with two batteries, will be left to watch the enemy at Fairfield, and to follow them whenever they evacuate the gap. I shall send general instructions to General Couch to move down the Cumberland valley as far as the enemy evacuate it, and keep up communication with me; but from all the information I can obtain I do not rely on any active co-operation in battle with this force. If I can get the army of the Potomac in hand in the valley, and the enemy have not crossed the river, I shall give him battle, trusting, should misfortune overtake me, that sufficient number of my force, in connection with what you have in Washington, would reach that place so as to render it secure.

General Trimble, of the confederate army, was found to-day wounded just outside Gettysburg. General Kempse was found mortally wounded in the road to Fairfield, and a large number of wounded, estimated at several thousand. Generals Heth, Wade Hampton, Jenkins and Pinder, are reported wounded. The losses of the enemy were no doubt very great and he must be proportionately crippled. My head-quarters will be here to-night, and to-morrow I expect to be at Frederick.

My cavalry have been attacking the enemy on both flanks, inflicting as much injury as possible.

MEADE TO COUCH, GETTYSBURG, July 6, 1863—6 P. M.

The general-in-chief has directed me to assume the general command of all the troops you have in the field. This, in view of my ignorance of the number, organization and position of your troops, is a very difficult matter. Lee, from all I can learn, is withdrawing towards Hagerstown and Williamsport. I propose to move *via* Middletown and South mountain, and if the condition of the roads and the implements in his way should delay him I may have an opportunity of attacking him. In this you can co-operate either by directly reinforcing me by moving down the valley, establishing communication with my army, or your movement may be confined, as I previously desired it to be, to a simple demonstration on these points. I do not wish to hamper you with instructions, but leave to your knowledge of your troops and of the necessity the defence of the Susquehanna. I think I have inflicted such injury on Lee that he will hardly contemplate another demonstration against Harrisburg; still, if I have to meet with disaster, such a contingency should be held in view. I would like your opinion, with the remark that all the assistance I can get will be not only needed, but most gratefully received. General Smith being very near me, I have ordered him to this place, where a force should be left to cover our withdrawal and protect the hospitals and public property. If you can spare Smith I should like to have him so soon as the movements of the enemy indicate a force to be no longer necessary at this point. My head-quarters to-night will be here; to-morrow night at Frederick. The army is in motion now.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 6, 1863—8 P. M.

I shall be very glad to have the four regiments from No. 9, now at Baltimore, which you propose to add to General French's command. They should be put in marching order with shelter tents.

FRENCH TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, July 7, 1863—12 M.

Troops sent here for immediate service should have at least their haversacks and cartridge-boxes filled, which was not the case with those from Baltimore; hence a delay.

COUCH TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, July 7, 1863.

It is reported to me positively that the enemy intend occupying Maryland heights until they recross the river. Please send copy to General Meade.

HALLECK TO MEADE AND FRENCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 7, 1863.

What force has been sent to Maryland heights, and how many have reached there? It seems to me at the present to be a most important point, and should be held with force sufficient to prevent its occupation by the enemy. Should his crossing above be impossible, he will probably attempt to take and hold that position till he can make the passage.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 7, 1863.

I have received from the President the following note, which I respectfully communicate.

"We have certain information that Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July. Now, if General Meade can complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over."

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 7, 1863.

The enemy surrendered Vicksburg to General Grant on the 4th of July.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 7, 1863.

It gives me great pleasure to inform you that you have been appointed a brigadier-general in the regular army, to rank from July 3, the date of your brilliant victory at Gettysburg.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 7, 1863—4 P. M.

An officer of the cavalry from the front reports the enemy's army occupying Hagerstown and Williamsport, and guarding their artillery and train, which they cannot cross. So soon as my command is supplied and their trains up I shall move.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., July 7, 1863—3.10 P.M.

General Buford reports that he attacked Williamsport yesterday, but found it guarded by a large force of infantry and artillery. Heavy forces were coming into Williamsport all night. French having destroyed their bridges, the river being unfordable, they are crossing in country flatboats—a slow operation. My army will be assembling tomorrow at Middletown; I will immediately move on Williamsport.

Should the enemy succeed in crossing the river before I can reach him, I should like to have your views of subsequent operations—whether to follow up the army in the valley or cross below or near Washington.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., July 7, 1863—4 P. M.

I have received your despatch announcing my appointment as a brigadier-general in the regular army. Please convey to the President my grateful thanks for this honor, and receive for yourself my thanks for the kind manner you have conveyed its notification.

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, July 7, 1863—4 P. M.

Maryland heights are at present occupied by Kenley's brigade, 1700 men. Three thousand additional men and two batteries of artillery left here this morning for that place. No indication of the enemy this side of Williamsport and Hagerstown. The bridge at Harper's Ferry was rendered impassable at both sides by General French.

MEADE TO COUCH, FREDERICK, MD., July 7, 1863—4.40 P. M.

An order was sent this morning to General Smith to continue the pursuit of the enemy to the best advantage, and not to go to Gettysburg. The Potomac river is bank full at Williamsport, and there is no bridge. General Buford attempted to take Williamsport yesterday; the enemy's infantry compelled him to retire. There are a good many wagons at Williamsport. Troops and wagons are being ferried over very slowly in two flat-boats. The main army of the enemy has not crossed, and must fight us before he can.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 7, 1863.

You have given the enemy a stunning blow at Gettysburg. Follow it up and give him another before he can cross the Potomac. When he crosses, circumstances will determine whether it will be best to pursue him by the Shenandoah valley or this side of the Blue Ridge. There is strong evidence that he is short of artillery ammunition, and, if vigorously pressed, he must suffer.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 7, 1863.

I have seen your despatch to General Couch of 4.40 P. M. You are perfectly right. Push forward and fight Lee before he can cross the Potomac.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 8, 1863—8 A. M.

I desire to have the commission of major-general conferred on Brigadier-General A. A. Humphreys, that he may act as my chief of staff. Can this be done?

MEADE TO HALLECK, FREDERICK, MD., July 8, 1863.

I have ordered General Nagle, with the eight (8) regiments of his command, to Harper's Ferry, to reinforce General Kenley, and to assume command. This will make a force of between six and seven thousand men. He is directed to hold his command in readiness to move forward to my support, if required. I have also sent a bridge train there with an engineer party, the bridge to be thrown over only when any command, cavalry or others, should arrive there to cross. I leave the seventh New York regiment and a battery of six pieces to defend their depot against any raids.

HALLECK TO COUCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 8, 1863.

Your views in regard to repair of railroad are approved.

I think all the available forces in your department should be thrown forward to assist General Meade. They can be of no use at present elsewhere.

HALLECK TO SCHENCK, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 8, 1863.

Send to General Meade the two New York regiments *en route*, and everything else you can spare.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 8, 1863.

There is reliable information that the enemy is crossing at Williamsport; the opportunity to attack his divided forces should not be lost. The President is urgent and anxious that your army should move against him, by forced marches.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 8, 1863.

Brigadier-General Humphreys has been made major-general, as you requested.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 8, 1863—2 P. M.

General Couch from scouts learns that the train at Williamsport is crossing very slowly. So long as the river is unfordable the enemy can-

not cross. My cavalry reports that they had a fight at Funkstown, through which they drove the enemy to Hagerstown, when a large infantry force was seen. From all I can gather, the enemy extend from Hagerstown to Williamsport, covering the march of their train.

Their cavalry and infantry pickets are advanced to the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg pike, on general line of the Antietam. We hold Boonsboro', and our pickets, four miles in front towards Hagerstown, are in contact with the enemy's pickets. My army is assembling slowly; the rains of yesterday and last night have made all roads but pikes almost impassable; artillery and wagons are stalled. It will take time to collect them together. A large portion of the men are barefooted; shoes will arrive at Frederick to-day, and will be issued as soon as possible.

The spirit of the army is high; the men are ready and willing to make every exertion to push forward; the very first moment I can get the different commands, the artillery and cavalry, properly supplied and in hand, I will move forward. Be assured I most earnestly desire to try the fortunes of war with the enemy on this side of the river, hoping through Providence and the bravery of my men to settle the question; but I should do wrong not to frankly tell you of the difficulties encountered.

I expect to find the enemy in a strong position, well covered with artillery, and I do not desire to imitate his example at Gettysburg, and assault a position where the chances were so greatly against success; I wish, in advance, to moderate the expectations of those who, in ignorance of the difficulties to be encountered, may expect too much. All that I can do under the circumstances I pledge this army to do.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 8, 1863—3 P. M.

My information as to the crossing of the enemy does not agree with that just received in your despatch. His whole force is in position between Funkstown and Williamsport. I have just received information that he has driven my cavalry force in front of Boonsboro'. My army is and has been making forced marches short of rations and barefoot; one corps marched yesterday and last night over thirty miles. I take occasion to repeat that I will use my utmost effort to push forward this army.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 8, 1863.

Do not understand me as expressing any dissatisfaction. On the contrary, your army has done most nobly. I only wish to give you opinions formed from information received here. It is telegraphed from near Harper's Ferry that the enemy have been crossing for the last two days. It is also reported that they have a bridge across. If Lee's army is so divided by the river, the importance of attacking the part on this side

is incalculable. Such an opportunity may never occur again. If, on the contrary, he has massed his whole force on the Antietam, time must be taken also to concentrate your forces. Your opportunities for information are better than mine.

General Kelly was ordered some days ago to concentrate at Hancock and attack the enemy's right. General Brooks is also moving from Pittsburg to reinforce Kelly. All troops arriving from New York and Fort Monroe are sent directly to Harper's Ferry, unless you order differently. You will have forces sufficient to render your victory certain. My only fear now is that the enemy may escape by crossing the river.

COUCH TO HALLECK, HARRISBURG, July 8, 1863.

SIR: I intend going to Chambersburg in the morning, leaving my office here for the present. Troops are thrown into the valley as fast as the railroad can do it, which, at present, is not more than 3000 for 24 hours. About ten regiments have been equipped in two days.

I shall use my judgment in the manner of effecting a junction with Meade, having in view the peculiar kind of force under my command, endeavoring to keep the advantage of the mountains in my favor, trusting that I can be of some use to him in his great efforts. Fear is expressed that the New York troops will not march over the line. A great many of them march as though they would halt if danger threatens in front. I hope for the best.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1863.

If no arrangement was made between you and General Lee for the exchange and parole of prisoners of war by designating places of delivery, as provided in seventh article of cartel, no parole given by the troops of either army is valid. Please answer if any such agreement was made.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 9, 1863—11.30 A. M.

In answer to your despatch of 9.40, I have to state that General Lee made a proposition to me for an exchange of prisoners on the field of Gettysburg, which I declined accepting.

MEADE TO HALLECK, MIDDLETOWN, July 9, 1863—11 A. M.

The army is moving in three columns, the right column having in it three corps. The line occupied to-day with the advance will be on the other side of the mountains, from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville. Two

corps will march without their artillery, the animals being completely exhausted—many falling on the road. The enemy's infantry were driven back yesterday evening from Boonsboro'—or, rather, they retired, on being pressed—towards Hagerstown. I am still under the impression that Lee's whole army is between Hagerstown and Williamsport, with an advance at Middleburg, on the road to Greencastle, observing Couch. The state of the river and the difficulty of crossing has rendered it imperative on him to have his army, artillery, and trains ready to receive my attack. I propose to move on a line from Boonsboro' towards the centre of the line from Hagerstown to Williamsport, my flank looking to the river, and my right towards the mountains, keeping the road to Frederick in my rear and centre. I shall try to keep as concentrated as the roads by which I can move will admit, so that, should the enemy attack, I can move to meet; and if he assumes the defensive, I can deploy, as I think proper. I transmit a copy of despatch sent to General Smith, at Waynesboro'; one of like tenor was sent to General Couch. The operations of both these officers should be made to conform to mine. They can readily ascertain my progress from scouts and by the movements of the enemy; and if the forces under them are of any practical value, they could join my right flank and assist in the attack. My cavalry will be pushed to-day all to the front, on the right and left, and I hope will collect information. It is with the greatest difficulty that I can obtain any reliable information of the enemy. I send a despatch received this morning from General Neil, in command of a brigade of infantry and cavalry, who followed the retreat of the enemy through Fairfield, and effected a junction with General Smith at Waynesboro'. A copy of my despatch to General Smith is also sent you. When I speak of two corps having to leave their batteries behind them, I should have stated that they remained at Frederick to get new horses and shoe the others, and that they will rejoin their corps this P. M. The object of the remark was to show the delay. I think the decisive battle of the war will be fought in a few days. In view of its momentous consequences, I desire to adopt such measures as in my judgment will tend to insure success, even though these may be deemed tardy.

11.30 A. M.

A deserter has just been brought within our lines, who reports the enemy's army all between Hagerstown and Williamsport; that they have brought up a bridge from Winchester, which is now thrown across at Williamsport; that they are using this bridge not to cross their forces, but to bring over supplies; that the men are in fair spirits, and the talk among them is, they must try it again. This deserter says he belongs to the artillery of Stuart's command. I send the information for what it is worth.

MEADE TO W. F. SMITH UNDER COUCH, July 9—9 A. M.

The army will occupy the line from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville to-day. The army, both men and horses, is very much exhausted, and cannot

advance as rapidly as desired. Although the information respecting the position of the enemy is not very definite, yet he is believed not to have crossed any large part of it over the Potomac, but to be concentrating it between Hagerstown and Williamsport. Under these circumstances definite instructions cannot be sent to you. You will look to the security of your command. Join this army when you can do so with security, unless the operations of General Couch require you to unite with him. Definite instructions will be sent you as soon as practicable. Although highly desirable that General Neil should rejoin his corps, yet he must be governed by your instructions.

GEN. NEIL TO MEADE, LIGHT DIVISION, July 9, 1863.

SIR: Baldy Smith is here with his command. Colonel Gregg, with brigade of cavalry, who leaves for Boonsboro' to-night, will send this. A scout brings information that Lee has one corps intrenched on the Williamsport pike from Hagerstown, another on the Boonsboro' pike, and Early is said to be up towards Middleburg (*quien sabe*), between Greencastle and Hagerstown. The news of the capture of Vicksburg is confirmed. Have sent a cavalry reconnoissance towards Hagerstown this morning. It has not returned. Since writing the above have felt the enemy's pickets with a regiment of cavalry at a bridge four or five miles from Hagerstown. They are very stubborn. We drove them away, but they returned as we retired. General Smith is in with his mixed command; am delighted to have the benefit of his counsel and advice. We are all right, but watch Early's division on my right towards Middleburg.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1863.

The evidence that Lee's army will fight north of the Potomac seems reliable. In that case you will want all your forces in hand. Kelley is collecting at Hancock. I have directed him to push forward, so as to take part in the coming battle. Brooks's militia refuse to cross the Pennsylvania lines. Everything I can get here will be pushed on to Harper's Ferry, from which place you can call them in to your left.

Don't be influenced by any despatch from here against your own judgment; regard them as suggestions only. Our information here is not always correct.

Take any horses or supplies you can find in the country. They can be settled for afterwards.

Would it not be well to fortify the Hagerstown gap through the South Mountain as a point of support?

HALLECK TO KELLEY (WEST VA.), WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1863.

If Lee gives battle don't be absent, but come in and help General Meade gain a victory. A battle is not far off.

HALLECK TO SCHENCK, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1863.

Can't you squeeze out some more troops to send to Harper's Ferry? Try it. Baltimore and the railroads are perfectly safe. Every available man should be sent to assist General Meade. There are more troops to arrive at Baltimore, which can be used there should it be necessary. In the meantime everything possible must be sent to the front. There is another big battle pending.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1863.

Two full regiments and two complete batteries are ordered to leave here to-night. Three brigades are on their way, and may be expected to-morrow or the day after. They will be sent to Harper's Ferry unless you wish otherwise.

I shall do everything in my power to reinforce you. I fully appreciate the importance of the coming battle.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 9, 1863—5 P. M.

I transmit herewith a copy of instructions this moment sent to General Naglee at Harper's Ferry:

"Organize the reinforcements in brigades as fast as they arrive, and send them to join the left of the army through Rohrersville, seeing that they have haversacks and three days' rations. First secure a garrison of three or four thousand men to garrison Maryland heights against a *coup de main.*"

SCHENCK TO HALLECK, BALTIMORE, July 9, 1863.

The 17th New York, two hundred and ninety-nine (299), and the 18th, one hundred and sixty strong, have just arrived. They are perfectly raw, not filled out. I will supply them ammunition, rations, etc., and get them off by daylight to Frederick or Harper's Ferry. After General Naglee reported here, we overhauled the 43d Massachusetts infantry, and the result was that I got off yesterday two hundred of the men with their officers, to go to General French, and sent three hundred of them to Boston.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 10, 1863—9 A. M.

Means of transportation and supplies required by the reinforcements of this army being at Frederick, it would facilitate their junction with the army if the reinforcements were sent to Frederick instead of Harper's Ferry.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1863.

You can stop at Frederick the reinforcements ordered to Harper's Ferry. Those ordered hereafter will be directed to Frederick, as you request. I fear the three additional brigades may not reach here before to-morrow night.

MEADE TO HALLECK, NEAR MOUNTAIN HOUSE, July 10, 1863.

In consequence of the very efficient service and the material aid rendered to me by the cavalry during my recent operations, I would esteem it a personal favor if the President would assign Major-General Pleasanton to the command of the cavalry corps, the position I found him in when I assumed command.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 10, 1863—10 P. M.

The information received to-day indicates that the enemy occupy positions extending from the Potomac, near Falling Waters, through Downsville to Funkstown, and to the northeast of Hagerstown, Ewell's corps being to the northeast of Hagerstown, Longstreet at Funkstown, and A. P. Hill on their right. These positions they are said to be intrenching. I am advancing on a line perpendicular to the line from Hagerstown to Williamsport, and the army will this evening occupy a position extending from the Boonsboro' and Hagerstown road at a point one mile beyond Beaver creek to Bakersville, near the Potomac. Our cavalry advanced this morning, drove in the enemy's cavalry on the Boonsboro' pike to within a mile of Funkstown, when the enemy displayed a large force, and opened a fire from heavy guns, (twenty-pounders). I shall advance cautiously on the same line to-morrow until I can develop more fully the enemy's force and position upon which my future operations will depend. General Smith is still at Waynesboro.' A despatch was received from him at that place this morning. Instructions similar to those of yesterday were sent to him.

HALLECK TO MEADE, SCHENCK, AND COUCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1863.

It has been understood and agreed between Colonel Ludlow and Mr. Ould, agents for exchange of prisoners, that paroles not given as prescribed in section seven of the cartel, after May 22, are to be considered as null and void, and that the officers and men of the respective parties paroled not in accordance with that section of the cartel will be returned to duty without exchange. They will be so returned to duty.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1863.

I think it will be best for you to postpone a general battle till you can concentrate all your forces, and get up your reserves and reinforcements. I will push on the troops as fast as they arrive. It would be well to have staff officers at the Monocacy to direct the troops arriving where to go, and to see that they are properly fitted out. They should join you by forced marches. Beware of partial combats. Bring up and hurl upon the enemy all your forces, good and bad.

MEADE TO SMITH AND NEIL, NEAR MOUNTAIN HOUSE, July 10, 1863.

There is an abundance of rations at Gettysburg. You have wagons. If more are needed make requisitions on Captain Rankin, at Gettysburg, or impress them from the country people. While in your present position you must supply yourself from Gettysburg. No further instructions can be sent to you than to occupy the enemy to the best advantage in your front, and be prepared to join us or General Couch, as the movements of the enemy will permit or may require. We are advancing to-day. Our left to-night will be at Bakersville, and our right on the Boonsboro' and Hagerstown road between Antietam and Beaver creek.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 11, 1863.

Your telegram in relation to General Pleasanton has been shown to the Secretary of War. There is no intention to supersede him in command of the cavalry. General Stoneman remains here. There is, however, an objection to any formal order at present.

The three brigades are arriving. Assign them and their officers as you may deem best, without regard to present or former organizations.

MEADE TO HALLECK, ANTIETAM CREEK, July 11, 1863—4 P. M.

The line of this army was advanced cautiously this morning in the direction stated in yesterday's despatch, and at this time its right rests on the road from Smoketown to Funkstown, about two miles from the latter—the line crossing the Antietam, passing through Jones's cross-roads, the left being near Wash run. Strong reconnoissances of infantry are being pushed out toward Funkstown, on the left bank of the Antietam, towards the same point on the right bank, and on the road from Sharpsburg to Funkstown ; at the same time cavalry force is pushing out on the left on the Boonsboro' and Williamsport road, and on the right towards Hagerstown from Chewsville and Leitersburg. The cavalry on the Chewsville road advanced without opposition to within a short dis-

tance (about a mile and a half) of Hagerstown. The cavalry force in the direction of Leitersburg and that advancing towards Williamsport have not yet been heard from. Everything indicates that the enemy is massing between Hagerstown and Williamsport, and from various sources it is stated that they are intrenching.

From the representations of General Spinola, that the nine-months' men of his command could not be relied upon, as their time had nearly expired, and my own experience of troops under such circumstances, I have directed the regiments of his brigade to be posted in the rear. Troops of this character can be of little service unless they are pledged to serve beyond their terms of enlistment, and the supplies they consume and the space they occupy on the lines of communication can be illy spared; besides their presence may have an injurious effect upon other troops. I do not, therefore, desire to be reinforced by such troops, unless they have pledged themselves to remain beyond their terms of service, and until I can dispense with their services.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 11, 1863.

The nine months men told me that they were willing to serve through this crisis under any one but General Spinola, but would not serve under him, as they regarded him as worthless. You are authorized to relieve him and send him away.

COUCH TO MEADE, CHAMBERSBURG, July 12, 1863—12.30 P. M.

It is reported that the rebels crossed a good many horses yesterday at Williamsport, swimming the river, and that fourteen flats were nearly completed yesterday. I can't find out that any large force of the enemy are at Fairview.

My second division will move down so soon as my provisions are up.

MEADE TO COUCH, July 12, 1863.

My troops occupied Hagerstown this morning, the enemy retiring towards Williamsport before them. The enemy are intrenched on a line one mile and a half from Hagerstown, in the direction of dam number four on the river. The road is open to you to Hagerstown.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 12, 1863—4.30 P. M.

Upon advancing my right flank across the Antietam this morning the enemy abandoned Funkstown and Hagerstown, and my line now

extends from the later place to Fairplay. The advance of the cavalry on the right showed the enemy to be strongly posted on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, about a mile and a half from Hagerstown. On the left the cavalry advance showed them to be in position back of St. James College and at Downsville. Their position runs along the high ground from Downsville to near Hagerstown. This position they are prospecting. Batteries are established on it. It is my intention to attack them to-morrow unless something intervenes to prevent it, for the reason that delay will strengthen the enemy and will not increase my force.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 13, 1863—5 P. M.

In my despatch of yesterday I stated that it was my intention to attack the enemy to-day unless something intervened to prevent it. Upon calling my corps commanders together and submitting the question to them, five out of six were unqualifiedly opposed to it under these circumstances, in view of the momentous consequences attendant upon a failure to succeed. I did not feel myself authorized to attack until after I had made more careful examination of the enemy's position, strength, and defensive works. These examinations are now being made.

So far as completed they show the enemy to be strongly prospected on a ridge running from the rear of Hagerstown, past Downsville, to the Potomac. I shall continue these reconnoissances with the expectation of finding some weak point, upon which, if I succeed, I shall hazard an attack. General Smith, with the advanced division of General Couch's forces, has arrived here to-day; but from the organization and condition of these troops and the short time they have to serve, I cannot place much reliance upon them.

Difficulties arising with the troops sent me, whose terms of service are about expiring, respecting the dates at which they expire, I beg to be informed by the department upon that head respecting each such regiment sent me.

HALLECK TO KELLEY, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1863.

Move up upon the enemy's flank and rear, and attack and harass him wherever you can. If you can reach his crossing annoy him as much as possible.

HALLECK TO COUCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1863.

You telegraph to General Meade that you cannot move for want of transportation. Take it wherever you can find it; and if you cannot find any, go without it, and live on the country. Don't stop at trifles at this crisis, but prove yourself equal to the emergency.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1863.

Yours of 5 P. M. is received. You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment. Make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Reinforcements are pushed on as rapidly as possible. Don't let the enemy escape.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 14, 1863—11 A. M.

On advancing my army this morning, with a view of ascertaining the exact position of the enemy, and attacking him if the result of the examination should justify me, I found on reaching his lines that they were evacuated. I immediately put my army in pursuit; the cavalry in advance at this period. My forces occupy Williamsport, but I have not yet heard from the advance on Falling Waters, where it is reported he crossed his infantry on a bridge. Your instructions, as to further movements in case the enemy is entirely across the river, are desired.

COUCH TO HALLECK, CHAMBERSBURG, July 14, 1863—9.30 A. M.

General Meade has declined to take the responsibility of ordering my forces to join him. Smith's division is with him. Dana's division, twelve thousand strong, will probably be at Greencastle to-night. I have notified General Meade that it will be at his disposal.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1863.

The enemy should be pursued and cut up wherever he may have gone. This pursuit may or may not be upon the rear or flank, as circumstances may require. The inner flank towards Washington presents the greatest advantages. Supply yourself in the country as far as possible. I cannot advise details, as I do not know where Lee's army is, nor where are your pontoon bridges.

I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army, without another battle, has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1863.

Should you cross at Berlin or below Harper's Ferry, your supplies for the time can be sent by Baltimore and Ohio railroad. General Meigs

will therefore recall General Haupt and railroad brigade to repair the Manassas road, so that supplies can meet you by Thoroughfare Gap or Warrenton, should you require them there.

Telegraph condition of things.

HALLECK TO KELLEY, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1863.

General Meade telegraphs that enemy's main army has crossed at Falling Waters. If so, you should also cross to act on his flank. If any forces are still on north side, try and cut them up.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 14, 1863—2.30 P. M.

Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President (conveyed in your despatch of 1 P. M. this day) is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 14, 1863—3 P. M.

My cavalry now occupy Falling Waters, having overtaken and captured a brigade of infantry, fifteen hundred (1500) strong, two (2) guns, two caissons, two battle-flags, and a large number of small arms. The enemy are all across the Potomac.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 14, 1863—3.30 P. M.

The difficulty of supplying the army in the valley of the Shenandoah, owing to the destruction of the railroad, has decided me to move by Berlin.

I shall pursue and harass the retreat of the enemy with my cavalry.

KELLEY TO HALLECK, WILLIAMSPORT, MD., *via* CHERRY RUN, July 14, 1863—3.30 P. M.

Just arrived. Find that the enemy crossed the river during the night and early this morning. River now rising rapidly.

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1863.

My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved.

MEADE TO HALLECK, July 14, 1863—8.30 P. M.

My cavalry have captured five hundred prisoners, in addition to those previously reported. General Pettigrew, of the Confederate army, was killed this morning in the attack on the enemy's rear-guard. His body is in our hands. A division of my cavalry crossed the river at Harper's Ferry to-day, who will pursue and harass the retreat of the enemy and give me information of his movements. General Kelley, with an infantry force, and Averell's cavalry have reached Williamsport. Am I authorized to detain him here to watch the Potomac, while I move to Berlin?

HALLECK TO MEADE, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 15, 1863.

Official information is received that Port Hudson unconditionally surrendered to General Banks on the 8th instant, thus opening the Mississippi river.

UNION REGIMENTS

ENGAGED AT GETTYSBURG.

CONNECTICUT.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Fifth	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
Fourteenth	Second, Smyth	Second, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Seventeenth	Second, Ames	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Howard.
Twenty-seventh	Fourth, Brooke	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Twentieth	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.

DELAWARE.

First	Second, Smyth	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Second	Fourth, Brooke	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.

ILLINOIS.

Eighth Cavalry	First, Gamble	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Twelfth Cavalry	First, Gamble.	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Eighty-second	First, Von Amsburg	Third, Schurz	Eleventh, Howard.

INDIANA.

Eighth Cavalry	First, Gamble	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Fourteenth	First, Carroll	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Twentieth	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Twenty-seventh	Third, Colgrove	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.

MAINE.

Third	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Fourth	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Fifth	Second, Bartlett	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Sixth	Third, Russell	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Seventh	Third, Neill	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Tenth	Three companies at Twelfth Corps' Head-quarters.		
Sixteenth	First, Paul	Second, Robinson	First, Newton.
Seventeenth	Third, DeTrobriand	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Nineteenth	First, Harrow	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Twentieth	Third, Vincent	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.

MARYLAND.

First P. H. B. Vols	Second, Lockwood	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
First E. S. Vols	Second, Lockwood	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
Third	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
First	First, Carr	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Second	Third, Colgrove	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
Seventh	Second, Eustis	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Ninth	Second, Sweitzer	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Tenth	Second, Eustis	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Eleventh	First, Carr	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Twelfth	Second, Baxter	Second, Robinson	First, Newton.
Thirteenth	First, Paul	Second, Robinson	First, Newton.
Fifteenth	First, Harrow	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Sixteenth	First, Carr	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Eighteenth	First, Tilton	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Nineteenth	Third, Hall	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Twentieth	Third, Hall	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Twenty-second	First, Tilton	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Twenty-eighth	Second, Kelley	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Thirty-second	Second, Sweitzer	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Thirty-third	Second, Smith	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
Thirty-seventh	Second, Eustis	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.

MICHIGAN.

First	First, Tilton	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Third	Third, DeTrobriand	First, Ward	Third, Sickles.
Fourth	Second, Sweitzer	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Fifth	Third, DeTrobriand	First, Ward	Third, Sickles.
Seventh	Third, Hall	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Sixteenth	Third, Vincent	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.

MINNESOTA.

First	Harrow	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Second	Third, Burling	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Fifth	Fourth, Cross	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Twelfth	First, Carr	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.

NEW YORK.

Fifth Cavalry	First, Farnsworth	Third, Kilpatrick	Pleasanton.
Sixth Cavalry	Second, Devin	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Eighth Cavalry	First, Gamble	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Ninth Cavalry	Second, Devin	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Tenth	Second, Smyth	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Fourteenth N. Y. S. M.	Second, Cutler	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Twentieth	First, Rowley	Third, Doubleday	First, Newton.
Twenty-seventh	First, Costar	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
Thirty-ninth	Third, Willard	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Fortieth	Third, DeTrobriand	First, Ward	Third, Sickles.
Forty-first	First, Von Gilser	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Schurz.
Forty-second	Third, Hall	Third, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Forty-third	Third, Neill	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Forty-fourth	Third, Vincent	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Forty-fifth	First, Von Amsburg	Third, Schurz	Eleventh, Howard.
Forty-ninth	Third, Neill	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Fifty-second	Third, Zook	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Fifty-fourth	First, Von Gilser	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Schurz.
Fifty-seventh	Third, Zook	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Fifty-eighth	Second, Kryzanowski	Third, Schimmelphennig	Eleventh, Schurz.
Fifty-ninth	Third, Hall	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Sixtieth	Third, Greene	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Sixty-first	Fourth, Cross	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Sixty-second	Third, Nevins	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Sixty-third	Second, Kelley	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Sixty-fourth	Fourth, Brooke	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Sixty-fifth	First, Shaler	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Sixty-sixth	Third, Zook	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Sixty-seventh	First, Shaler	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Sixty-eighth	First, Von Gilser	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Howard.
Sixty-ninth	Second, Kelley	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.

NEW YORK—*Continued.*

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Seventieth, First Excelsior	Second, Brewster	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Seventy-first, Second Excelsior	Second, Brewster	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Seventy-second, Third Excelsior	Second, Brewster	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Seventy-third, Fourth Excelsior	Second, Brewster	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Seventy-fourth, Fifth Excelsior	Second, Brewster	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Seventy-sixth	Second, Cutler	First, Wadsworth	Third, Doubleday.
Seventy-seventh	Third, Neill	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Seventy-eighth	Third, Greene	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Eighty-second	First, Harrow	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Eighty-third	Second, Baxter	Second, Robinson	First, Doubleday.
Eighty-sixth	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Eighty-eighth	Second, Kelley	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Ninety-fourth	First, Paul	Second, Robinson	First, Doubleday.
Ninety-fifth	Second, Cutler	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Ninety-seventh	Second, Baxter	Second, Robinson	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Second	Second, Greene	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Fourth	First, Paul	Second, Robinson	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Seventh	Third, Colgrove	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Eighth	Second, Smyth	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Eleventh	Third, Willard	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Nineteenth	Second, Kryzanowski	3d, Schimmelphennig	Eleventh, Schurz.
One Hundred and Twentieth	Second, Brewster	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Twenty-first	Second, Bartlett	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
One Hundred and Twenty-second	First, Shaler	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
One Hundred and Twenty-third	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Twenty-fourth	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Twenty-fifth	Third, Willard	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Twenty-sixth		Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Thirty-fourth	First, Costar	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
One Hundred and Thirty-sixth	Second, Smyth	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
One Hundred and Thirty-seventh	Third, Greene	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Fortieth	Third, Ward	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
One Hundred and Forty-fifth	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Forty-sixth	Third, Weed	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
One Hundred and Forty-seventh	Second, Cutler	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Forty-ninth	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Fiftieth	Second, Lockwood	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Fifty-fourth	First, Costar	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
One Hundred and Fifty-seventh	First, Von Amsburg	Third, Schurz	Eleventh, Howard.

NEW JERSEY.

First	First, Torbet	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Second	First, Torbet	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Third	First, Torbet	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Fourth	Guarding Reserve Army Train.		
Fifth	Third, Burling	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Sixth	Third, Burling	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Seventh	Third, Burling	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Eighth	Third, Burling	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Eleventh	First, Carr	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Twelfth	Second, Smyth	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Thirteenth	Third, Colgrove	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
Fifteenth	First, Torbet	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.

OHIO.

First Cavalry	First, Farnsworth	Third, Kilpatrick	Pleasanton.
Fourth	First, Carroll	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Fifth	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Seventh	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Eighth	First, Carroll	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.
Twenty-fifth	Second, Ames	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Howard.
Twenty-ninth	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Fifty-fifth	Second, Smyth	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
Sixty-first	First, Von Amsburg	Third, Schurz	Eleventh, Howard.
Sixty-sixth	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Seventy-third	Second, Smith	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
Seventy-fifth	Second, Ames	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Howard.
Eighty-second	Second, Kryzanowski	3d, Schimmelphennig	Eleventh, Schurz.
One Hundred and Seventh	Second, Ames	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Howard.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Sixth Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Seventeenth Cavalry	Second, Devin	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Eighteenth Cavalry	First, Farnsworth	Third, Kilpatrick	Pleasanton.
Twenty-third	First, Shaler	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Twenty-sixth	First, Carr	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Twenty-eighth	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Twenty-ninth	Second, Kane	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Forty-sixth	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
Forty-ninth	Third, Russell	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Fifty-third	Fourth, Brooke	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancook.
Fifty-sixth	Second, Cutler	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Fifty-seventh	First, Graham	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Sixty-first	Third, Neill	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Sixty-second	Second, Sweitzer	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Sixty-third	First, Graham	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Sixty-eighth	First, Graham	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Sixty-ninth	Second, Webb	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Seventy-first	Second, Webb	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Seventy-second	Second, Webb	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
Seventy-third	First, Costar	Second, Steinwehr	Eleventh, Howard.
Seventy-fourth	First, Von Amsburg	3d, Schimmelphennig	Eleventh, Schurz.
Seventy-fifth	Second, Kryzanowski	3d, Schimmelphennig	Eleventh, Schurz.
Eighty-first	First, Cross	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Eighty-second	First, Shaler	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Eighty-third	Third, Vincent	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
Eighty-eighth	Second, Baxter	Second, Robinson	First, Newton.
Ninetieth	Second, Baxter	Second, Robinson	First, Newton.
Ninety-first	Third, Weed	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Ninety-third	Third, Nevin	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Ninety-fifth	Second, Bartlett	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Ninety-sixth	Second, Bartlett	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Ninety-eighth	Third, Nevin	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Ninety-ninth	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Second	Second, Nevin	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
One Hundred and Fifth	First, Graham	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Sixth	Second, Webb	Second, Gibbon	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Seventh	First, Paul	Second, Robinson	First, Newton.
One Hundred and Ninth	Second, Kane	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Tenth	Third, De Trobriand	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Eleventh	Second, Kane	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Fourteenth	First, Graham	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Fifteenth	Third, Burling	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Sixteenth	Second, Kelley	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Eighteenth	First, Tilton	First, Barnes	Fifth, Sykes.
One Hundred and Nineteenth	Third, Russell	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
One Hundred and Twenty-first	First, Biddle	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Twenty-eighth	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Thirty-ninth	Third, Nevin	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
One Hundred and Fortieth	Third, Zook	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Forty-first	First, Graham	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
One Hundred and Forty-second	First, Biddle	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Forty-third	Second, Dana	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Forty-fifth	Fourth, Brooke	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Forty-seventh	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
One Hundred and Forty-eighth	First, Cross	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Forty-ninth	Second, Stone	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Fiftieth	Second, Stone	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Fifty-first	First, Biddle	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Fifty-third	First, Von Gilser	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Howard.
One Hundred and Fifty-fifth	Third, Weed	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.

PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES.

First	First, McCandless	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Second	First, McCandless	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Fifth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Sixth	First, McCandless	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Ninth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Tenth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Eleventh	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Twelfth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
First Rifles	First, McCandless		

RHODE ISLAND.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Second	Third, Eustis	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.

UNITED STATES REGULARS.

First Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Second Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Fifth Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Second	Second, Burbank	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Third	First, Day	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Fourth	First, Day	[illegible]	[illegible]

SECOND DIVISION CAVALRY CORPS.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.
First Pennsylvania	First, McIntosh	Second, Gregg.
Third Pennsylvania	First, McIntosh	Second, Gregg
First New Jersey	First, McIntosh	Second, Gregg.
First Massachusetts	First, McIntosh	Second, Gregg
First Maine	Second, Gregg (J. I.)	Second, Gregg
Tenth New York	Second, Gregg (J. I.)	Second, Gregg.
Sixteenth Pennsylvania	Second, Gregg (J. I.)	Second, Gregg.
Fourth Pennsylvania	Second, Gregg (J. I.)	Second, Gregg.
Eighth Pennsylvania	Third, Huey	Second, Gregg
First Maryland	Third, Huey	Second, Gregg.
Sixth Ohio	Third, Huey	Second, Gregg
Second New York	Third, Huey	Second, Gregg.

[illegible]	First, Meredith	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Seventh	First, Meredith	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Twenty-sixth	Second, Kryzanowski	Third, Schimmelphennig	Eleventh, Schurz.

UNION ARTILLERY.

MAINE.—Second, Fifth and Sixth Regiments.
NEW HAMPSHIRE.—First Regiment.
MASSACHUSETTS.—Fifth and Ninth Regiments.
RHODE ISLAND.—First Regiment.
CONNECTICUT.—Second Regiment.
NEW YORK.—First New York Volunteers, First, Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth and Fifteenth Independent Batteries.
NEW JERSEY.—First Regiment.
PENNSYLVANIA.—First Regiment, Fourth Independent Battery.
OHIO.—First Regiment.
MARYLAND.—First Regiment.
WEST VIRGINIA.—First Regiment.
UNITED STATES.—First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Regiments.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Sixth Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Seventeenth Cavalry	Second, Devin	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Eighteenth Cavalry	First, Farnsworth	Third, Kilpatrick	Pleasanton.
Twenty-third	First, Shaler	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Twenty-sixth	First, Carr	Second, Humphreys	Third, Sickles.
Twenty-eighth	First, Candy	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Twenty-ninth	Second, Kane	Second, Geary	Twelfth, Williams.
Forty-sixth	First, McDougall	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
Forty-ninth	Third, Russell	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Fifty-third	Fourth, Brooke	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
Fifty-sixth	Second, Cutler	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Fifty-seventh	First, Graham	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Sixty-first	Third, Neill	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	First, Caldwell	Second, Hancock.
One Hundred and Forty-ninth	Second, Stone	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Fiftieth	Second, Stone	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Fifty-first	First, Biddle	Third, Rowley	First, Doubleday.
One Hundred and Fifty-third	First, Von Gilser	First, Barlow	Eleventh, Howard.
One Hundred and Fifty-fifth	Third, Weed	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.

PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES.

First	First, McCandless	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Second	First, McCandless	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Fifth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Sixth	First, McCandless	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Ninth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Tenth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Eleventh	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
Twelfth	Third, Fisher	Third, Crawford	Fifth, Sykes.
First Rifles	First, McCandless		

RHODE ISLAND.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Second	Third, Eustis	Third, Wheaton	Sixth, Sedgwick.

UNITED STATES REGULARS.

First Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Second Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Fifth Cavalry	Merritt	First, Buford	Pleasanton.
Second	Second, Burbank	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Third	First, Day	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Fourth	First, Day	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Sixth	First, Day	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Seventh	Second, Burbank	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Tenth	Second, Burbank	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Eleventh	Second, Burbank	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Twelfth	First, Day	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Fourteenth	First, Day	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes.
Seventeenth	Second, Burbank	Second, Ayres	Fifth, Sykes

UNITED STATES SHARPSHOOTERS.

First	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.
Second	Second, Ward	First, Birney	Third, Sickles.

VERMONT.

First Cavalry	First, Farnsworth	Third, Kilpatrick	Pleasanton.
Second	Second, Grant	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Third	Second, Grant	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Fourth	Second, Grant	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Fifth	Second, Grant	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Sixth	Second, Grant	Second, Howe	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Twelfth	Third, Stannards	Third, Doubleday	First, Newton.
Thirteenth	Third, Stannards	Third, Doubleday	First, Newton.
Fourteenth	Third, Stannards	Third, Doubleday	First, Newton.
Fifteenth	Third, Stannards	Third, Doubleday	First, Newton.
Sixteenth	Third, Stannards	Third, Doubleday	First, Newton.

WEST VIRGINIA.

First Cavalry	First, Farnsworth	Third, Kilpatrick	Pleasanton.
Second	First, Carroll	Third, Hays	Second, Hancock.

WISCONSIN.

Second	First, Meredith	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Third	Third, Colgrove	First, Ruger	Twelfth, Williams.
Fifth	Third, Russell	First, Wright	Sixth, Sedgwick.
Sixth	First, Meredith	First, Wadsworth	First, Doudleday.
Seventh	First, Meredith	First, Wadsworth	First, Doubleday.
Twenty-sixth	Second, Kryzanowski	Third, Schimmelphennig	Eleventh, Schurz.

UNION ARTILLERY.

MAINE.—Second, Fifth and Sixth Regiments.
NEW HAMPSHIRE.—First Regiment.
MASSACHUSETTS.—Fifth and Ninth Regiments.
RHODE ISLAND.—First Regiment.
CONNECTICUT.—Second Regiment.
NEW YORK.—First New York Volunteers, First, Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth and Fifteenth Independent Batteries.
NEW JERSEY.—First Regiment.
PENNSYLVANIA.—First Regiment, Fourth Independent Battery.
OHIO.—First Regiment.
MARYLAND.—First Regiment.
WEST VIRGINIA.—First Regiment.
UNITED STATES.—First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Regiments.

CONFEDERATE REGIMENTS
ENGAGED AT GETTYSBURG.

ALABAMA.

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Third	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.
Fourth	Law	Hood	Longstreet.
Fifth Battalion	Archer	Heth	Hill.
Fifth	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.
Sixth	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.
Eighth	Wilcox	Anderson	Hill.
Ninth	Wilcox	Anderson	Hill.
Tenth	Wilcox	Anderson	Hill.
Eleventh	Wilcox	Anderson	Hill.
Twelfth	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.
Thirteenth	Archer	Heth	Hill.
Fourteenth	Wilcox	Anderson	Hill.
Fifteenth	Law	Hood	Longstreet.
Twenty-sixth	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.
Forty-fourth	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.
Forty-seventh	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.
Forty-eighth	O'Neal	Rodes	Ewell.

ARKANSAS.

Third	Robertson	Hood	Longstreet.

GEORGIA.

Second Battalion	Wright	Anderson	Hill.
Second	Benning	Hood	Longstreet.
Third	Wright	Anderson	Hill.
Fourth	Doles	Rodes	Ewell.
Seventh	Anderson	Hood	Longstreet.
Eighth	Anderson	Hood	Longstreet.
Ninth	Anderson	Hood	Longstreet.
Tenth	Semmes	McLaws	Longstreet.
Eleventh	Anderson	Hood	Longstreet.
Twelfth	Doles	Rodes	Ewell.
Thirteenth	Gordon	Early	Ewell.
Fourteenth	Thomas	Pender	Hill.
Fifteenth	Benning	Hood	Longstreet.
Sixteenth	Wofford	McLaws	Longstreet.
Seventeenth	Benning	Hood	Longstreet.
Eighteenth	Wofford	McLaws	Longstreet.
Twentieth	Benning	Hood	Longstreet.
Twenty-first	Doles	Rodes	Ewell.
Twenty-second	Wright	Anderson	Hill.
Twenty-fourth	Wofford	McLaws	Longstreet.
Twenty-sixth	Gordon	Early	Ewell.
Thirty-first	Gordon	Early	Ewell.
Thirty-fifth	Thomas	Pender	Hill.
Thirty-eighth	Gordon	Early	Ewell.
Forty-fourth	Doles	Rodes	Ewell.
Forty-fifth	Thomas	Pender	Hill.
Forty-eighth	Wright	Anderson	Hill.
Forty-ninth	Thomas	Pender	Hill.

GEORGIA—*Continued.*

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Fiftieth	Semmes	McLaws	Longstreet.
Fifty-first	Semmes	McLaws	Longstreet.
Fifty-third	Semmes	McLaws	Longstreet.
Fifty-ninth	Anderson	Hood	Longstreet.
Sixtieth	Gordon	Early	Ewell.
Sixty-first	Gordon	Early	Ewell.
Cobb's Legion	Wofford	McLaws	Longstreet.
Phillip's Legion	Wofford	McLaws	Longstreet.

FLORIDA.

Second	Perry	Anderson	Hill.
Fifth	Perry	Anderson	Hill.
Eighth	Perry	Anderson	Hill.

LOUISIANA.

First	Williams	Johnson	Ewell.
Second	Williams	Johnson	Ewell.
Fifth	Hayes	Early	Ewell.
Sixth	Hayes	Early	Ewell.
Seventh	Hayes	Early	Ewell.
Eighth	Hayes	Early	Ewell.
Ninth	Hayes	Early	Ewell.
Tenth	Williams	Johnson	Ewell.
Fourteenth	Williams	Johnson	Ewell.
Fifteenth	Williams	Johnson	Ewell.

MARYLAND.

First Battalion	Stewart	Johnson	Ewell.

MISSISSIPPI.

Second	Davis	Heth	Hill.
Eleventh	Davis	Heth	Hill.
Twelfth	Posey	Anderson	Hill.
Thirteenth	Barksdale	McLaws	Longstreet.
Sixteenth	Posey	Anderson	Hill.
Seventeenth	Barksdale	McLaws	Longstreet.
Eighteenth	Barksdale	McLaws	Longstreet.
Nineteenth	Posey	Anderson	Hill.
Twenty-first	Barksdale	McLaws	Longstreet.
Forty-second	Davis	Heth	Hill.
Forty-eighth	Posey	Anderson	Hill.

NORTH CAROLINA.

First	Stewart	Johnson	Ewell.
Second	Ramseur	Rodes	Ewell.
Second Battalion	Daniels	Rodes	Ewell.
Third	Stewart	Johnson	Ewell.
Fourth	Ramseur	Rodes	Ewell.
Fifth	Iverson	Rodes	Ewell.
Sixth	Hoke	Early	Ewell.
Seventh	Lane	Pender	Hill.
Eleventh	Pettigrew	Heth	Hill.
Twelfth	Iverson	Rodes	Ewell.
Thirteenth	Scales	Pender	Hill.
Fourteenth	Ramseur	Rodes	Ewell.
Sixteenth	Scales	Pender	Hill.
Eighteenth	Lane	Pender	Hill.
Twentieth	Iverson	Rodes	Ewell.
Twenty-first	Hoke	Early	Ewell.
Twenty-second	Scales	Pender	Hill.
Twenty-third	Iverson	Rodes	Ewell.
Twenty-sixth	Pettigrew	Heth	Hill.
Twenty-eighth	Lane	Pender	Hill.
Thirtieth	Ramseur	Rodes	Ewell.
Thirty-second	Daniels	Rodes	Ewell.
Thirty-third	Lane	Pender	Hill.

NORTH CAROLINA—*Continued.*

Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Thirty-fourth	Scales	Pender	Hill.
Thirty-seventh	Lane	Pender	Hill.
Thirty-eighth	Scales	Pender	Hill.
Forty-third	Daniels	Rodes	Ewell.
Forty-fifth	Daniels	Rodes	Ewell.
Forty-seventh	Pettigrew	Heth	Hill.
Fifty-second	Pettigrew	Heth	Hill.
Fifty-third	Daniels	Rodes	Ewell.
Fifty-seventh	Hoke	Early	Ewell.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

First	McGowan	Pender	Hill.
Second	Kershaw	McLaws	Longstreet.
Third	Kershaw	McLaws	Longstreet.
Seventh	Kershaw	McLaws	Longstreet.
Eighth	Kershaw	McLaws	Longstreet.
Twelfth	McGowan	Pender	Hill.
Thirteenth	McGowan	Pender	Hill.
Fourteenth	McGowan	Pender	Hill.
Fifteenth	Kershaw	McLaws	Longstreet.
Orr's Rifles	McGowan	Pender	Hill.
First	Archer	Heth	Hill.
Seventh	Archer	Heth	Hill.
Fourteenth	Archer	Heth	Hill.

TENNESSEE.

First	Archer	Heth	Hill.
Seventh	Archer	Heth	Hill.
Fourteenth	Archer	Heth	Hill.

TEXAS.

First	Robertson	Hood	Longstreet.
Fourth	Robertson	Hood	Longstreet.
Fifty-first	Robertson	Hood	Longstreet.

VIRGINIA.

First	Kemper	Pickett	Longstreet.
Second	Walker	Johnson	Ewell.
Third	Kemper	Pickett	Longstreet.
Fourth	Walker	Johnson	Ewell.
Fifth	Walker	Johnson	Ewell.
Sixth	Mahone	Anderson	Hill.
Seventh	Kemper	Pickett	Longstreet.
Ninth	Armistead	Pickett	Longstreet.
Tenth	Stuart	Johnson	Ewell.
Eleventh	Kemper	Pickett	Longstreet.
Twelfth	Mahone	Anderson	Hill.
Fourteenth	Armistead	Pickett	Longstreet.
Sixteenth	Mahone	Anderson	Hill.
Twenty-second Battalion	Brokenborough	Heth	Hill.
Twenty-third Battalion	Stuart	Johnson	Ewell.
Twenty-fourth	Kemper	Pickett	Longstreet.
Twenty-fifth	Jones	Johnson	Ewell.
Twenty-seventh	Walker	Johnson	Ewell.
Thirty-first	Smith	Early	Ewell.
Thirty-third	Walker	Johnson	Ewell.
Thirty-eighth	Armistead	Pickett	Longstreet.
Fortieth	Brokenborough	Heth	Hill.
Forty-first	Mahone	Anderson	Hill.
Forty-second	Jones	Johnson	Ewell.
Forty-seventh	Mahone	Anderson	Hill.
Forty-eighth	Jones	Johnson	Ewell.
Forty-ninth	Smith	Early	Ewell.
Fiftieth	Jones	Johnson	Ewell.
Fifty-second	Jones	Johnson	Ewell.
Fifty-third	Armistead	Pickett	Longstreet.
Fifty-fifth	Brokenborough	Heth	Hill.
Fifty-seventh	Armistead	Pickett	Longstreet.
Sixty-first	Mahone	Anderson	Hill.

CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY, BY BATTERIES.

Blout's.
Brander's.
Brook's.
Carlton's.
Carpenter's.
Caskie's.
Carter's.
Cunningham's.
Dement's.
Eshleman's.
Frazer's.
Fry's.
Garber's.
Graham's.
Green's.
Happ's.
Hart's.
Johnson's.
Jordan's.
Latham's.
Lewis'.
Macon's.
McCarthy's.
McGraw's.
Manly's.
Mauvin's.
Millege's.
Miller's.
Moody's.
Norcum's.
Page's.
Parker's.
Patterson's.
Ranie's.
Reese's.
Reilly's.
Rhett's.
Rice's.
Richardson's.
Smith's.
Stribling's.
Tanner's.
Taylor's.
Vozatt's.
Ward's.
Watson's.
Wingfield's.
Woolfolk's.
Zimmerman's.

LIST OF NAMES

OF SOLDIERS BURIED IN THE SOLDIERS' NATIONAL CEMETERY, GETTYSBURG, PA.

COMPILED FROM RECORDS OF THE CEMETERY.

MAINE.

SECTION A.

NOTE.—The figures before each name designate the number of grave.

1. Corp. Frank Devereux, Company K, 16th Regt.
2. Unknown.
3. George D. Marston, I, 16th.
4. Unknown—Supposed 16th.
5. E. Bishop.
6. W. H. Lowe, E, 19th.
7. Corp. Alfred P. Waterman, D, 19th.
8. Serg. Alex. W. Lord, C, 19th.
9. Serg. William E. Barrows, I, 19th.
10. Unknown, 19th.
11. Serg. Chandler F. Perry, I, 19th.
12. Louira A. Kelley, D, 19th.
13. Unknown, 19th.
14. Charles W. Collins, A, 19th.
15. Corp. Austin Hanson, F, 17th.
16. Isaiah V. Eaton, D, 4th.
17. Frank Fairbrother, G, 16th.
18. Corp. Robert T. Newell, D, 19th.

SECTION B.

1. Samuel L. Dwelley, Company D, 17th Regt.
2. Frank Coffin, B, 19th.
3. James T. Neal, K, 19th.
4. Loring C. Oliver, K, 19th.
5. Samuel B. Shea, K, 19th.
6. Corp. Hollis F. Arnold, H, 19th.
7. Serg. Jesse A. Dorman, H, 19th.
8. George E. Hodgdon, C, 19th.
9. Charles J. Carroll, G, 19th.
10. Ruel Nickerson, E, 19th.
11. Henshai C. Thomas, D, 19th.
12. John F. Carey, I, 19th.
13. Moses D. Emery, B, 17th.
14. Fessenden M. Mills, C, 17th.
15. Joseph A. Roach, D, 3d.
16. Allen H. Sprague, E, 3d.
17. John S. Gray, D, 4th.

SECTION C.

1. George F. Johnson, Company K, 4th Regiment.
2. —— ickels, G.
3. Corp. George W. Jones, B, 17th.
4. Serg. Eben S. Allen, D, 3d.
5. Ira L. Martin, H, 17th.
6. John F. Shuman, K, 4th.
7. Unknown, 3d.
8. Corp. Bernard Hogan, D, 17th.
9. Lieut. George M. Bragg, F, 4th.
10. 1st Serg. Thomas T. Rideout, F, 19th.
11. James Robbins, D, 19th.
12. Serg. Enoch C. Dow, E, 19th.
13. Serg. W. S. Jordon, G, 20th.
14. Frank B. Curtis, F, 20th.
15. Elfin J. Foss, F, 20th.
16. Lieut. W. L. Kendall, G, 20th.

SECTION D.

1. Samuel O. Hatch, Company K, 17th Regiment.
2. 1st Serg. Isaac N. Lathrop, H, 20th.
3. Benjamin W. Grant, F, 20th.
4. Corp. Samuel C. Davis, B, 17th.
5. Royal Rand, H, 17th.
6. Charles E. Herriman, E, 19th.
7. Corp. George H. Willey, H, 19th.
8. Wm. H. Huntington, B, 16th.
9. Harrison Pullen, G, 16th.
10. Edward Cunningham, L, 1st Cavalry.
11. Monroe Quint, B, 17th.
12. Alsbury Luce, F, 3d.
13. Corp. Eben Farrington, H, 3d.
14. Unknown, 20th.

MAINE—Section E.

1. Unknown, Company —, 20th Regiment.
2. Goodwin S. Ireland, H, 20th.
3. Unknown, 20th.
4. Orrin Walker, K, 20th.
5, 6, 7. Unknown, 20th.
8. Corp. Wm. S. Hodgdon, F, 20th.
9. Corp. Mellville C. Day, G, 20th.
10. 1st Serg. Charles W. Steel, H, 20th.
11, 12, 13, 14. Unknown, 20th.

Section F.

1. Capt. G. D. Smith, Company I, 19th Regiment.
2. Joseph D. Simpson, A, 20th.
3. Moses Davis, C, 20th.
4. Corp. Samuel C. Brookings, H, 19th.
5. Corp. W. K., 20th.
6. 1st Serg. Geo. S. Noyes, K, 20th.
7. Unknown, 20th.
8. Michael Rariden, K, 4th.
9. Sullivan Luce, 5th Battery.
10. W. H. Smith, K, 7th.
11. Wm. H. Day, F, 17th.
12. R. Finch, E, 17th.
13. Crosby R. Brookings, G, 4th.

Section G.

1. Albion B. Mills, Company E, 16th Regiment.
2. Corp John Merriam, D, 19th.
3. Abijah Crosby, C, 19th.
4. Corp. Richard Sculley, K, 7th.
5. Corp. Amos H. Cole, F, 3d.
6. John W. Jones, B, 3d.
7. Serg. Major Henry S. Small, 3d.
8. Corp. J. L. Little, A, 3d.
9. Calvin H. Burdin, I, 3d.
10. Capt. John C. Keen, K, 3d.
11. Serg. Nelson W. Jones, I, 3d.
12. J. Bartlett.

Total, 104.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Section A.

1. William H. Spring, Company A, 2d Regiment.
2. Charles A. Moore, C, 2d.
3. E. J. Plummer, A, 2d.
4. Corp. Stephen H. Palmer, I, 2d.
5. Charles P. Buzzell, E, 12th.
6. Roland Taylor, G, 5th.
7. S. R. Green, A, 5th.
8. John Henderson, F, 2d.
9. Serg. G. A. Jones, E, 2d.
10. George S. Vittum, F, 2d.
11. Lieut. E. Dascomb, G, 2d.
12. Charles A. Talhour, D, 2d.
13. Cornelius Cleary, H, 2d.
14. James Hawkins, I, 12th.
15. John Totten, A, 2d.
16. Joseph M. Chesley, E, 2d.
17. Unknown, 2d.
18. Unknown.

Section B.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Unknown.
7, 8. Unknown, 2d Regiment.
9. Unknown.
10, 11. Unknown, 2d.
12, 13, 14, 15, 16. Unknown.

Section C.

1, 2, 3. Unknown.
4, 5, 6. Unknown, 2d Regiment.
7. John Taylor, E, 12th.
8. Kendall W. Cofran, H, 2d.
9. Joseph Bond, Jr., E, 5th.
10. Oscar D. Allen, E, 5th.
11, 12. Supposed.
13. Charles T. Kelley, H, 12th.
14. Unknown.
15. Bartlett Brown, E.

Total, 49.

VERMONT.

Section A.

1. Unknown, M. M.
2. Joseph Ashley, Company C, 16th Regiment.
3. Charles W. Ross, G, 14th.
4. Corp. Charles E. Mead, G, 14th.
5, 6, 7. Unknown, 14th.
8. Martin J. Cook, D, 16th.
9. Joseph M. Martin, D, 16th.
10. William E. Green, G, 14th.
11, 12. Unknown, 14th.
13. Dyer Rogers, D, 14th.
14. Unknown, 14th.
15. Albert A. Walker, D, 14th.
16. Corp. Charles Morse, Jr., A, 16th.
17. Garrett L. Roseboom, D, 14th.
18. Ira Emery, Jr., (removed,)A, 16th.
19. William O. Doubleday, H, 14th.
20. Andrew E. Osgood, H, 13th.
21. Corp. George L. Baldwin, F, 14th.
22. G. F. Simmons, 13th.
23. Sylvanus A. Winship, C, 16th.
24. Serg. Moses P. Baldwin, C, 16th.
25. Serg. Major Henry H. Smith, 13th.
26. Corp. Ira E. Sperry, L, 1st Cavalry
27. John L. Marshall, K, 4th.
28. Serg. Thomas Blake, A, 13th.
29. Corp. Michael M'Enery, A, 13th.

VERMONT—SECTION B.

1. Lieut. William H. Hamilton, Co. I, 14th Regt.
2. William G. Jeffrey, A, 1st.
3. W. Fletcher, D, 13th.
4. William March, D, 13th.
5. Orson S. Carr, E, 13th.
6. Pliny F. White, E, 14th.
7. Antoine Ash, C, 2d.
8. Charles W. Whitney, E, 13th.
9. Benjamin N. Wright, I, 13th.
10. Lester L. Baird, H, 14th.
11. Richard C. Archer, B, 14th.
12. Corp. Henry C. White, E, 16th.
13. Zenal C. Lamb, C, 16th.
14. John Dyer, D, 16th.
15. Unknown, 1st Cavalry
16. Unknown.
17. Unknown, 1st Cavalry.
18. Corporal —— Warren, 1st Cavalry.
19. Rufus D. Thompson, L, 1st Cavalry.
20. Merrick J. Dorolery, D, 16th.
21. Joel J. Smith, C, 1st Cavalry.
22, 23, 24. Unknown, 1st Cavalry.
25, 26. Unknown.
27. Willard M. Pierce, I, 16th.

SECTION C.

1. Unknown.
2, 3. Unknown, M. M.
4. Edmond P. Davis, Company H, 16th Regiment.
5. Phillip Howard, A, 16th.

TOTAL, 61.

MASSACHUSETTS.

SECTION A.

1. Arthur Murphy, 9th Battery.
2. John W. Verity, 5th Battery.
3. Edward Frothingham, 5th Battery.
4. John Crasson, 9th Battery.
5. Henry C. Burrill, Company H, 20th Regiment.
6. Thomas Kelly, A, 20th.
7. George Lucas, D, 20th.
8. Alios Kraft, C, 20th.
9. T. R. Gallivan, F, 20th.
10. M. Kinarch, H, 20th.
11. E. Barry, G, 20th.
12. Serg. George Jœckel, B, 20th.
13. Patrick O'Keefe, F, 20th.
14. Thomas Downey, E, 20th.
15. Corp. James Somerville, E, 20th.
16. William Inch, D, 20th.
17. Augustus Deitling, C, 20th.
18. Serg. George F. Cate, A, 20th.
19. Clemens Wiessensee, B, 20th.
20. Patrick Quinlin, F, 20th.
21. G. C. Plant, A, 20th.
22. Hugh Blain, H, 20th.
23. Patrick Manning, D, 20th.
24. John M'Clarence, F, 20th.
25. John Dippolt, B, 20th.
26. Hiram B. Howard, D, 20th.
27. Eugene M'Laughlin, F, 20th.
28. Corp. John Burke, K, 20th.
29. Alexander Aiken, D, 20th.
30. James Lane, F, 20th.
31. George F. Fales, of Boston, D, Excelsior of N. Y.
32. George S. Wise, D, 13th.
33. Michael Laughlin, K, 13th.
34. Edwin Field, B, 13th.
35. John M. Brock, H, 13th.
36. Frank A. Gould, K, 13th.
37. Corp. Prince A. Dunton, H, 13th.
38. John Flye, K, 13th.
39. Serg. Edgar A. Fiske, E, 13th.

SECTION B.

1. Charles Traynor, Company I, 2d Regiment.
2. William T. Bullard, A, 2d.
3. John Joy, H, 2d.
4. Philo H. Peck, G, 2d.
5. Stephen Cody, I, 2d.
6. Richard Seavers, I, 2d.
7. George Bailey, I, 2d.
8. Andrew Nelson, D, 2d.
9. John Deer, D, 2d.
10. Corp. Gordon S. Wilson, G, 2d.
11. Joseph Furbur, G, 2d.
12. Col. Corp. Rupert J. Saddler, D, 2d.
13. Frederick Maynard, D, 2d.
14. Patrick Hoey, A, 2d.
15. Serg. Leavitt B. Durgin, A, 2d.
16. Corp. William Marshall, C, 2d.
17 Corp. Ruel Whittier, B, 2d.
18. James T. Edmands, I, 2d.
19. John E. Farrington, H, 2d.
20. Peter Conlan, B, 2d.
21. Sidney S. Prouty, A, 2d.
22. F. Goetz, C, 2d.
23. Corp. Theodore S. Butters, I, 2d.
24. David B. Brown, I, 2d.
25. William H. Ela, D, 2d.
26. James A. Chase, C, 2d.
27. Charles Keirnan, F, 2d.
28. Andrew Moore, F, 1st.
29. Lieut. Henry Hartley, E, 1st.
30. Frederick S. Kettel, E, 1st.
31. George Golden, B, 1st.
32. David H. Eaton, B, 1st.
33. Jacob Kesland, B, 1st.
34. Serg. Edward J. M'Ginnis, C, 1st.
35. J. Matthews, B, 1st.
36. Serg. William Kelren, E, 1st.
37. Corp. Henry Evans, A, 1st.

SECTION C.

1. J. L. Johnson, Company K, 11th Regiment.
2. Joseph Marshall, K, 11th.
3. James E. Butler, D, 11th.
4. Michael Doherty, A, 11th.
5. Lucius Staples, A, 11th.
6. Corp. Edwin F. Trufant, F, 11th.
7. Corp. C. R. T. Knowlton, H, 11th.
8. Serg. William Sawtell, E, 11th.
9. J. S. Rice, K, 11th.
10. Sumner A. Davis, K, 11th.

MASSACHUSETTS—SECTION C—*Continued.*

11. Francis T. Flint, H, 11th.
12. John Brodie.
13. Serg. William Carr, I, 12th.
14. George F. Lewis, H, 12th.
15. Hardy P. Murray, K, 12th.
16. Corp. T. H. Fenelon, G, 32d.
17. William D. Hudson, H, 32d.
18. Barney Clark, G, 32d.
19. Serg. James M. Haskel, A, 32d.
20. Alvin W. Lamb, A, 32d.
21. William F. Baldwin, B, 32d.
22. Henry T. Wade, E, 32d.
23. Corp. William L. Gillman, K, 32d.
24. Daniel Stoddard, F, 32d.
25. Corp. Nathaniel Mayo, F, 32d.
26. T. J. Healey, G, 32d.
27. James H. Leavens, I, 32d.
28. Serg. Gorham Coffin, A, 19th.
29. Serg. Joseph Ford, K, 19th.
30. Edward Roche, E, 19th.
31. Corp. Thomas W. Tuttle, I, 19th.
32. Jeremiah Wells, H, 19th.
33. Charles Gurney, E, 37th.
34. E. Bassamunson, B, 37th.
35. Elisha Covill, E, 37th.

SECTION D.

1. Serg. Henry C. Ball, Company F, 15th Regt.
2. John Marsh, B, 15th.
3. Michael Flinn, G, 15th.
4. O. Stevens, D, 15th.
5. Geo. W. Cross, E, 15th.
6. Joseph Bardsley, I, 15th.
7. Francis Santum, I, 15th.
8. Francis A. Lewis, A, 15th.
9. George E. Burns, G, 15th.
10. George L. Bass, B, 15th.
11. Serg. Edward B. Rollins, A, 15th.
12. John Grady, I, 15th.
13. N. B. Bicknell, C, 11th.
14. Pierce Harvey, 15th.
15. G. Lambert, F, 15th.
16. Calvin S. Field, B, 22d.
17. John Hickey, C, 28th.
18. John Caswell, G, 28th.
19. Serg. Edward Mooney, D, 28th.
20. Joseph Beal, I, 33d.
21. C. H. Pierce, E, 33d.
22. Unknown.
23. Geo. Hills, of New Bedford.
24. Corp. Patrick Scannel, B, 19th.
25. Serg. Alonzo J. Babcock, H, 2d.
26. Corp. Jules B. Allen, D, 33d.
27. Calvin Howe, I, 33d.
28. E. Howe, H, 33d.
29. Jeremiah Danforth, C, 19th.
30. Charles A. Trask, K, 13th.
31. Charles H. Wellington, K, 13th.
32. Daniel Holland, D, 19th.
33. P. W. Price, C, 28th.
34. George Lawton, H, 16th.
35 J. Coakley, A, 19th.

SECTION E.

1. G. P. Roundey.
2. J. B. Nincent, Company G, 22d Regiment.
3. Unknown.
4. James Crampton, K, 3d.
5. John F. Moore, K, 22d.
6. C. H. Reed, H, 15th.
7. John T. Bixby, H, 15th.
8. S. Hindeman, 15th.
9. G. F. Leonard, 13th.

SECTION F.

1. 1st Lieut. Sumner Paine, Co. —, 20th Regiment.
2. Lieut. J. H. Parkins, E, 37th.
3. Lieut. Sherman S. Robinson, 19th.

TOTAL, 158.

RHODE ISLAND.

SECTION A.

1. Ira Bennet,* Battery B, 1st Artillery.
2. David B. King, B, 1st.
3. John Zimmila, A, 1st.
4. Corp. Ernest Simpson, E, 1st.
5. John Greene, B, 1st.
6. John Higgins, A, 1st.
7. Alvin Hilton,† E, 1st.
8. Francis H. Martin,‡ E, 1st.
9. Patrick Lannegan, A, 1st.
10. Charles Powers, Company C, 2d Regiment.

SECTION B.

1. William Beard, Battery E, 1st Artillery.
2. Corp. Henry H. Ballou, B, 1st.
3. Alfred C. Gardner, B, 1st.
4. Corp. Wm. Jones, B, 1st.

TOTAL, 14.

* Temporarily transferred from the 19th Maine Regiment of Infantry.
† Was temporarily attached to this Battery, from 20th Regiment, Indiana Volunteers.
‡ Was temporarily attached to this Battery, from 99th Pennsylvania Volunteers.

CONNECTICUT.

SECTION A.

1. Corp. William E. Wilson, Co. D, 27th Regt.
2. Corp. Joseph Puffer, I, 14th.
3. William D. Marsh, G, 14th.
4. Moses G. Clement, G, 14th.
5. S. Carter, A, 15th.
6. Edward B. Farr, F, 27th.
7. Michael Confrey, F, 27th.
8. John D. Perry, F, 20th.
9. Bernard Mulvey, I, 20th.
10. Frank J. Benson, C, 17th.
11. Joseph S. Whitlock, C, 17th.

SECTION B.

1. Alfred H. Dibble, Company G, 14th Regiment.
2. Nelson Hodge, I, 14th.
3. James Cassidy, C, 20th.
4. Corp. Joel C. Dickerman, I, 20th.
5. Corp. Charles H. Roberts, F, 20th.
6. Daniel H. Purdy, C, 17th.
7. James Flynn, E, 17th.
8. Corp. ——— Williams, D, 20th.
9. John W. Metcalf, F, 17th.
10. William Cannels.

SECTION C.

1. Patrick Dunn, Company D, 27th Regiment.

TOTAL, 22.

NEW YORK.

SECTION A.

1. L. Vangorder, Company E, 20th Regt., S. M.
2. G. H. Babcock, E, 20th, S. M.
3. ——— Easter, K, 14th, S. M.
4. E. B. Miller, D, 146th.
5. William Millard, F, 14th, S. M.
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Unknown, 14th, S. M.
14. George A. Atkin, D, 14th, S. M.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19. Unknown, 147th.
20. John Wood, B, 76th.
21. Unknown, 147th.
22. Serg. Lawrence Hennessy, F, 94th.
23, 24. Unknown, 157th.
25. Henry Kellog, G, 157th.
26. Joseph Pharett, E, 157th.
27, 28, 29, 30. Unknown, 157th.
31. J. A. Casad, I, 137th.
32. Unknown.
33. Venerable Wesley, B, 137th.
34. Ira Martin, Jr., K, 137th.
35. John Nickels, B, 149th.
36. William Besimer, D, 137th.
37. Corp. William Miller, 137th.
38. Unknown.
39. John Barrey, B, 1st, Artillery.
40. Serg. Benjamin F. Elliott, F, 2d, S. M.
41. L. W. M'Clelland, D, 20th, S. M.
42. Thomas James, A, 42d.
43. I. Heimbacker, B, 39th.
44. R. Snyder, E, 125th.
45. John K. Philips, F, 126th.
46. Marx Englert, I, 108th.
47. Unknown, 111th.
48. H. Burch, K, 111th.
49. Unknown, 111th.
50. Edmund Stone, Jr. (color bearer), D, 64th.
51. Francis W. Howard, D, 64th.
52. Lieut. Julius Ferretzy, D, 119th.
53. Chester Smith, A, 44th.
54. Rowland L. Ormsby, G, 64th.
55. James F. Joloph, G, 66th.
56. Richard Corcoran, G, 2d
57. Frederick Rempmir, B, 52d.
58. Patrick Martin, D, 61st.
59. John O'Brian, C, 63d.
60. Corp. George Dalgleish, K, 2d.
61. Corp. Peter Junk, E, 119th.
62. L. A. Godfrey, 9th, Cavalry.
63. W. A. G, A, 125th.
64. Z. C. Wiggins, D, 136th.
65. Elias Gage, B, 136th.
66. Arzy West, H, 136th.
67. John Salsbury, E, 64th.
68. Serg. Platt, 86th, S. M.
69. Mike Caddy (color sergeant), ., 42d.
70. Lieut. Col. Max. A. Thoman, 59th.
71. Corp. George S. Smith, G, 64th.
72. Myron H. Van Winkle, E, 111th.
73. H. Williams, F, 2d.
74. Serg. J. B. Wilson, C, 2d, S. M.
75. Serg. James M. Martin, H, 59th, S. M.
76. George Shaffer, A, 39th, S. M.
77. J. D. Slattery, K, 40th.
78. E. A. Potter, I, 40th.
79. A. Krappman, A, 40th.
80. Thomas Sebring, I, 126th.
81. 1st Lieut. Theodore C. Pausch, 39th.
82. Conrad Schuler, D, 2d Excelsior.
83. Jacob Van Pelk, B, 11th.
84. 2d Lieut. C. A. Foss, C, 12th.
85. John C. Curren, E, 4th Excelsior.
86. Edwin A. Hess, F, 5th Excelsior.
87. Corp. Henry Burk, B, 5th Excelsior.
88. Eldridge G. Thompson, G, 86th.
89. Daniel O'Hara, G, 40th.
90. C. J. Crandell, K, 125th.
91. A. B. Usher, D, 125th.
92. Stephen Baldwin, B, 122d.
93. Serg. I. L. Decker, F, 70th.
94. Philip Bansell, E, 10th, Cavalry.
95. David Knapp, I, 111th.
96. Unknown.
97. John G. Bigg, 5th Ind. Battery.
98. Unknown.
99. Frederick Feight, F, 140th.
100. E. Bryant, K, 137th.
101. Unknown.
102. J. Dore, B, 137th.
103. H. Moore, H, 149th.

NEW YORK—SECTION A—*Continued.*

104. Thomas Gannon, 6th, Cavalry.
105. Samuel Stills, F, 40th.
106. Frederick Wentz, I, 41st.
107. Color Corp. Albert Miracle, H, 154th.
108. Henry Rhoades, B, 108th.
109. Serg. Lewis Bishop, C, 154th.
110. Jeremiah Barry, E, 134th.
111. William Weight, K, 84th.
112. Horace Anguish, I, 157th.
113. Corp. J. B. Thomas, E, 134th.
114. Thurston Thomas, D, 134th.
115. Samuel Hague, B, 119th.
116. Philip Daney, E, 134th.
117. P. C. Wilber, E, 134th.
118. Thaddeus Reynolds, I, 154th.
119. Lewis Frento, G, 76th.
120. Charles F. Webber, A, 14th, S. M.
121. Henry Miller, B, 147th.
122. George A. Douglass, F, 14th, S. M.
123. Serg. F. Leaffled, D, 104th.
124. Albert D. Wilson, E, 157th.
125. Serg. W. Shea, I, 104th.
126. J. Lohruss, 104th.
127. Mortimer Garrison, B, 126th.
128. Corp. George W. Forrester, C, 14th.
129, 130. Unknown.
131, 132. Unknown, 134th.
133. P. Lappen, H, 2d.
134. 2d Serg. Marshall E. Hiscox, D, 125th.
135. John Bell, E, 123d.
136. W. W. Scott, C, 145th.
137. D. Welch, E, 147th.
138. W. Pooke, G, 76th.
139. 1st Serg. Thomas J. Curtis, A, 104th.
140. Serg. H. Roberts, C, 104th.
141. Chaurcy Snell, F, 147th.
142. Elias Hannis, C, 147th.
143. Unknown, C.
144. Lieut. Theodore Blume, 2d, Battery.

SECTION B.

1. William Cranston, Company —, 76th Regt.
2, 3, 4, 5. Unknown, 76th.
6. Serg. Carey, F, 9th.
7. Unknown, 157th.
8. Amasa Topping, D, 157th.
9, 10, 11. Unknown, 157th.
12. Corp. Philander Stone, K, 157th.
13. Unknown, 157th.
14. Serg. Amos Hummiston, C, 154th.
15. —— Chamburg, 134th.
16. Unknown, 134th.
17. Edward Van Dyke, C, 134th.
18. Levi Carpenter, D, 164th.
19. Harris Henschell, E, 140th.
20. John P. Van Altype, A, 150th.
21. John P. Wing, A, 150th.
22. G. Ulmer, B, 149th.
23. Corp. W. Foster, C, 137th.
24. Serg. C. Gray, I, 60th.
25. P. Ayres, K, 60th.
26. James H. Mullin, B, 127th.
27. John Carnine, E, 137th.
28. Benjamin Clark, K, 137th.
29. Serg. Henry Johnson, E, 137th.
30. Hannibal Dorset, F, 60th.
31. Hugh Murphy, G, 42d.
32. Peter Brentzel, I, 42d.
33. Unknown.
34. Lieut. R. P. Holmes, G, 126th.
35. Unknown.
36. A. M'Gillora, G, 111th.
37. G. Bemis, K, 111th.
38. Albert Bruner, 2d, Battery.
39. Franklin Cole, G, 61st.
40. John F. Fanssen, K, 2d.
41. Unknown, Artillerist.
42. Daniel Mahoney, B, 69th.
43. John Burns, I, 59th.
44. William M. Stewart, C, 2d, S. M.
45. Daniel L. Confer, H, 136th.
46. John Stowell, K, 136th.
47. C. C. Elwell, H, 136th.
48. James Doran, E, 136th.
49. Serg. William Hoover, G, 136th.
50. David Reed, A, 59th.
51. William Bryan, K, 42d.
52. Ord. Serg. Sigm. Webb, 52d.
53. Thomas J. Boyd, H, 2d, S. M.
54. John King, K, 2d, S. M.
55. J. B. Morse, E, 124th.
56. T. Harrigan, A, 40th.
57. Timothy Kelly, D, 40th.
58. Benjamin F. Atkins, F, 40th.
59. William Peisdale, C, 68th.
60. Simon Freer, F, 40th.
61. Frank Staley, A, 40th.
62. W. M. M'Aboy, G, 4th Excelsior.
63. J. Galliger, I, 4th Excelsior.
64. J. J. Conniff, K, 4th Excelsior.
65. David Maywood, E, 5th Excelsior.
66. Serg. Thomas King, E, 2d Excelsior.
67. Serg. Ira Penoyar, D, 111th Excelsior.
68. John J. Dunning, D, 111th Excelsior.
69. J. K. Saulspaugh, E, 126th Excelsior.
70. P. D'Vos, E, 111th Excelsior.
71. B. Conrad, 125th Excelsior.
72. Ambrose Paine, 42d Excelsior.
73. George Nicholson, K, 126th Excelsior.
74. Dennis M'Carthy, K, 122d Excelsior.
75. John Norton, C, 60th.
76. William Marks, E, 140th.
77, 78, 79, 80. Unknown.
81. 1st Lieut. M. Stanley, E, 60th.
82. T. Wood, C, 150th.
83. W. H. Keyes, G, 78th.
84. J. Kough, G, 102d.
85. Serg. S. A. Smith, B, 137th.
86. W. Johnson, B, 60th.
87. G. W. Strong, G, 137th.
88. J. Bowie, I, 102d.
89. James E. Homan, H, 124th.
90. Bernard Germann, D, 119th.
91. Daniel V. Hull, G, 136th.
92. Albert Hatch, E, 157th.
93. William Schumne, D, 54th.
94. J. E. Jayner, E, 157th.
95. Serg. J. C. Weisensal, E, 45th.
96. G. M. Reagles, H, 134th.
97. Lieut. L. Dietrick, 58th.
98. John Cassidy, D, 108th.
99. Morgan L. Allen, C, 147th.
100. H. F. Morton, F, 147th.
101. George W. Lampheart, E, 76th.
102. Corp. Elias A. Norris, B, 126th.
103. Francis A. Chapman, K, 76th.
104. Corp. William M'Kendry, G, 94th.
105. D. Lynes, I, 76th, S. M.
106. Serg. John Stratton, A, 94th.
107. John Kurk, H, 97th.
108. Charles A. Hyde, B, 76th.
109. P. Sheets, G, 147th.
110. W. S. Besey, C, 104th.
111, 112. Unknown, 134th.
113, 114, 115. Unknown.

NEW YORK—SECTION B—*Continued.*

116. ——— Chamberlain.
117. ———d ———ngton.
118. Frank Deicenroth, A, 108th.
119. John Hofer.
120. George Clark, B, 65th.
121. Patrick Burns, H, 9th, S. M.
122. N. A. Thayer, K, 123d, S. M.
123. Serg. M. Buckingham, C, 104th, S. M.
124. Samuel G. Spencer, D, 76th, S. M.
125. John M. Dawson, H, 76th, S. M.
126, 127. Unknown.
128. James Montgomery, E, 1st Excelsior.
129. Dennis Brady, 15th I. B.
130. Supposed, Excelsior.
131. Robert Shields, C, 140th.
132. John Allen, C, 140th.
133. Unknown.
134. John Zubber, B, 140th.
135. Sanford Webb, G, 140th.
136, 137. Unknown.
138. Lieut. Charles Clark, B, 9th, S. M.

SECTION C.

1, 2, 3. Unknown.
4, 5, 6. Unknown, Company —, 157th Regiment.
7. Sergeant, unknown.
8. Orderly Sergeant, unknown.
9. Levi Rush, A, 150th.
10. B. C. Blunt, G, 150th.
11. Chase Wingate.
12. George Mabee, D, 137th.
13. Unknown.
14. A. Wallace, A, 111th.
15. W. Brown, H, 111th.
16. J. Morgan, H, 111th.
17. James Cullen, F, 42d.
18. John Smith, D, 42d.
19. Thomas Barren, D, 42d.
20. John Enosense, K, 59th.
21. Serg. M. Dicker, C, 20th, S. M.
22. Serg. L. H. Dicker, K, 20th, S. M.
23. James Gallagher, F, 2d, S. M.
24. J. L. Halleck, G, 20th, S. M.
25. T. D. Hawkin, E, 111th.
26. H. W. Roberts, E, 111th.
27. Corp. George Blackall, G, 136th.
28. William Whitmore, E, 111th.
29. John Cripps, A, 111th.
30. Unknown.
31. Corp. A. G. M'Afee, 111th.
32. D. M'Gill, A, 10th Battalion.
33. William H. Cross, G, 61st.
34. ——— Conrad, C, 2d.
35. 2d Lieut. Frank K. Garland, A, 71st.
36. Corp. Amos Cogswell, F, 71st.
37. John H. Philips, E, 95th.
38, 39. Unknown.
40. Serg. P. Rinboldt, B, 39th.
41. August Ellenberger, H, 59th.
42. Serg. John Larkins, E, 2d.
43. Peter West, K, 42d.
44. William L. Stuart, K, 80th.
45. John Blockman, I, 86th.
46. James Partington, H, 124th.
47. John Carrigan, I, 186th.
48. Ira W. Ross, B, 86th.
49. Walter Gloobson, K, 40th.
50. William Morgan, K, 126th.
51. G. Huskey, 3d Excelsior.
52. Wilson M. Molloy, C, 4th Excelsior.
53. Lieut. George Dennen, C, 4th.
54. George Andrews, B, 4th Excelsior.
55. Alfred G. Armes, H, 2d Excelsior.
56. 1st Serg. George E. Smith, G, 120th.
57. Daniel Cauty, C, 2d Excelsior.
58. Corp. J. A. Thompson, 4th Battery.
59. James Higgins, I, 1st Excelsior.
60. Jacob Raish, I, 125th.
61. J. F. M'Cormick, D, 10th.
62. William N. Norris, C, 44th.
63. Unknown, 64th.
64. Joseph Laroost, H, 140th.
65. Ezra Hyde, B, 146th.
66. Unknown.
67. P. Tillbury, B, 137th.
68. Capt. J. N. Warner (removed), K, 86th.
69. Charles Rosebill, H, 119th.
70. John Paugh, I, 154th.
71. Henry Miller, B, 141st.
72. M. A. Culver, C, 157th.
73. Peter Linck, K, 134th.
74. George Rodeloff, E, 119th.
75. J. F. Chace, D, 154th.
76. Benjamin Bice, A, 134th.
77. Corp. Peter Berer, K, 134th.
78. Ord. Serg. Augustus Willman, F, 54th.
79. Thomas Haley, E, 157th.
80. George Conner, D, 157th.
81. Broughton Hough, K, 157th.
82. George Halbring, G, 119th.
83. Henry Limerick, F, 136th.
84. Corp. Jerry Johnson, C, 157th.
85. J. B. Church, F, 147th.
86. C. E. Day, D, 94th.
87. Serg. A. W. Swart, I, 20th, S. M.
88. J. Glair, Jr., D, 94th.
89. John Glair, B, 104th.
90. Horace Burgess, D, 104th.
91. Serg. F E. Munsun, D, 97th.
92. James Mahoney, B, 147th.
93. Serg. Henry Sanders, C, 94th.
94. J. M. Bouren, C, 154th.
95. Unknown, 154th.
96. Unknown.
97, 98. Unknown, 154th.
99. Unknown, 134th.
100. C. W. Radeu, B, 1st Artillery.
101. Unknown.
102. John Fitzner, F, 108th.
103. Henry J. Davis, B, 125th.
104. Edward Beren, I, 125th.
105. J. O'Brien, A, 2d Excelsior.
106. D. Hammond.
107. Lafayette Burns, I, 2d Excelsior.
108. Unknown.
109. Corp. D. Casey, G, 122d.
110. William Raymond, B, 126th.
111. Asa Pettingill, F, 147th.
112. Jo. Stowtenger, G, 147th.
113. James Pfeiffer, E, 145th.
114, 115. Unknown.
116. James Gray, Cowan's Battery.
117. Edward Peto, 1st Battery.
118. R. Ellot, K, 2d, S. M.
119. Ord. Serg. Thomas Devine, D, 2d, S. M.
120, 121. Unknown.
122. Unknown, supposed Excelsior.
123. K. E. Claflin.
124. Unknown.
125, 126, 127, 128. Unknown, Excelsior.
129. Ord. Serg. Edward F. Krause, K, 19th.
130, 131, 132. Unknown.

NEW YORK—SECTION D.

1. Frederick D. Clark, Company K, 78th Regt.
2. Unknown.
3. William C. Marsh, H, 78th.
4. Loren Eaton, D, 149th.
5. Frederick Phelps, C, 137th.
6. William Murphy, I, 60th.
7. Michael Moloy, C, 149th.
8. E. B. Roberts, B, 14th.
9, 10. Unknown Cavalrymen.
11. Ord. Serg. James P. Cush, B, 59th.
12. Unknown.
13. N. Southerd, K, 20th, S. M.
14. John Capper, E, 2d, S. M.
15. Patrick M'Marra, E, 43d, S. M.
16. Frederick Tybal, K, 42d, S. M.
17. Serg. Darvoe, B, 1st Battery.
18. H. Wood, 111th.
19, 20. Unknown.
21. James H. Griswald, E, 111th.
22. J. J. Beck, D, 45th.
23. Henry C. Dunnell, D, 1st Excelsior.
24. Serg. Patrick Farrington, G, 2d, S. M.
25. Corp. Albert H. Edson, A, 8th, Cavalry.
26. Unknown, Cavalryman.
27. Patrick M'Donald.
28. Wm. Kreis, I, 52d.
29. Casper Bonnell, C, 66th.
30. Elisha Allen, A, 59th.
31. Wessel Whitbeck, E, 111th.
32. Serg. Edwin G. Aylesworth, G, 147th.
33. Unknown, 20th.
34. George M'Connell, I, 14th, S. M.
35. Francis Chapman, K, 76th, S. M.
36. Serg. James Harrigan, E, 136th, S. M.
37. Thomas Hurley, G, 2d, S. M.
38. David R. Johnson, I, 2d, S. M.
39. Philip Martyler, 39th.
40. George Shumdeher, B, 39th.
41. Serg. L. Stone, G, 42d.
42. J. W. Cresler, K, 1st Excelsior.
43, 44. Unknown, 1st Excelsior.
45. F. Platt, E, 72d, S. M.
46. Patrick Lynch, D, 4th Excelsior.
47. Serg. J. Murphy, B, 4th Excelsior.
48. W. M. Brown, G, 4th Excelsior.
49. Corp. Samuel Lambert, F, 1st Excelsior.
50. H. Rose, F, 111th.
51. Joseph Battel, A, 2d Excelsior.
52. J. D. B., I, 120th.
53. Corp. N. W. Winship, K, 86th.
54. Jabez Fisk, K, 86th.
55. Matthew Bryan, C, 2d.
56. Serg. C. Farnsborth, G, 126th.
57. William M'Cort, C, 39th.
58. E. Whitmore, E, 111th.
59. William Danice, 39th.
60. John Furgeson, E, 39th.
61. Serg. Carlton Sanders, H, 120th.
62. John Cain, K, 122d.
63. C. H. Carpenter, I, 44th.
64, 65. Unknown.
66. H. M'Dowell, C, 60th.
67. J. Walton, H, 14th, S. M.
68. James Ivers, A, 14th, S. M.
69. Jacob Eiser, A, 134th.
70. ——— Heyden, 147th.
71, 72. Unknown.
73. J. Finlin, 15th Independent Battery.
74. Unknown Zouave, 14th, Brooklyn.
75. Unknown Zouave Sergeant, 14th, Brooklyn.
76, 77, 78. Unknown, Excelsior.
79. Robert Blair, D, 140th.
80. Unknown.
81. Daniel Casey, D, 44th.
82. Josephus Simmons, E, 44th.
83. James Look, A, 44th.
84. Charles Speisberger, D, 140th.
85. Philip Beckner, D, 140th.
86. Justice Eisenberg, D, 140th.
87. David Nash, F, 44th.
88. George Lervy, F, 44th.
89. Serg. Sidney S. Skinner, D, 44th.
90. Jesse White, G, 44th.
91. Corp. William C. Crafts, A, 44th.
92. George Strobridge, E, 140th.
93. Ross Thomas, E, 140th.
94. Corp. Goodman, H, 44th.
95. George Nole, E, 44th.
96. Leander T. Burnham, E, 44th.
97. R. M'Elligot, C, 44th.
98. F. Griswald, C, 44th.
99. Peter Beers, B, 44th.
100. John M. Irons, E, 44th.
101. E. Strong, K, 34th.
102, 103, 104. Unknown.
105. Joseph Sneebacker, F, 146th.
106. Unknown.
107. Unknown Cavalryman.
108. Unknown.
109. Martin Roe, K, 111th.
110. H. W. D., 111th.
111. J. C. K.
112. Charles Johnrid, H, 5th Excelsior.
113. Unknown Cavalry Sergeant.
114, 115, 116, 117. Unknown.
118. W. L. Bort, B, 157th.
119. J. C. Kent, K, 136th.
120. W. W. Clark, B, 60th.
121. T. Manly, A, 63d.
122. D. Smith, I, 57th.
123. George S. Moss, C, 125th.
124. William Wyer, A, 119th.
125. F. M. Stowell, D, Excelsior.
126. H. Dale, C, 135th Excelsior.
127. Unknown Cavalryman.

SECTION E.

1. James Gray, Company C, 2d Regiment, S. M.
2. Unknown, 2d, S. M.
3, 4. Unknown.
5. Nicholas Paquet, E, 49th.
6. Charles Root.
7. John P. Conn, Battery L, 1st Artillery.
8. Frederick Blackstein, A, 40th.
9. A. R. Townsend, I, 60th.
10. Charles Manning, C, 137th.
11. H. W. Nichols, F, 137th.
12. E. Van Tassel, C, 60th.
13. P. Stevenson, A, 60th.
14. P. M'Donald, I, 60th.
15. Corp. W. W. Rand, E, 102d.
16. Corp. L. Vinning, A, 137th.
17. Serg. Charles F. Fox, A, 137th.
18. Mahlon J. Pardee, F, 137th.
19. Oliver English, A, 137th.
20. F. A. Archibald, C, 137th.
21. Serg. J. W. Brockham, C, 137th.
22. William W. Wheeler, F, 137th.
23. Richard W. Rush, A, 137th.
24. A. Stanton, C, 137th.
25. Peter Hill, A, 137th.
26. Dean Swift, A, 137th.
27. Serg. Daniel Corbett, B, 60th.
28. Serg. Hiram G. Hilts, C, 122d.
29. P. Fanning, C, 122d.

NEW YORK—SECTION E—*Continued.*

30. W. P. Huntington, C, 123d.
31. James W. Wickham, E, 122d.
32. J. Vaudyke, K, 107th.
33. R. Gandley, B, 44th.
34. G. Christanna, A, 120th.
35. Daniel Cook, U. S. Ambulance driver.
36. Serg. F. Jell, I, 95th.
37. R. T. Myres, K, 111th.
38. Felix M'Cram, K, 42d.
39. Josephus Gee, G, 137th.
40. A. J. Chafee, E, 44th.
41. William J. Sutliff, B, 137th.
42. John Jolloff, F, Excelsior Brigade.
43. Elisha Loomis, C, 137th.
44. Michael Burns, C, 140th.
45. James Giles, I, 104th.
46. Serg. S. Lasage, A, 147th.
47. John Sloven, I, 61st.
48. Heinrich Droeber, C, 119th.
49. John Riley, B, 145th.
50. H. Hawkins, 94th.
51. Jacob Dilber, G, 119th.
52. Joseph Cotrell, A, 43d.
53. Orin Shepherd, A, 60th.
54. Lieut. A. Wagner, F, 39th.
55. P. Newman, K, 73d.
56. John M. Wastrant, G, 111th.
57. A. S. Van Volkenburg, G, 64th.
58. Tyler J. Snyder, G, 126th.
59. Unknown, D, 157th.
60. Hendrick Hayman, 39th.
61. J. Clegg, I, Excelsior.
62. Corp. A. Ralph, C, 62d.
63. J. E. Bailey, I, 111th.
64. F. Sweney, D, 40th.
65. Thomas Smith, K, 1st Exceisior.
66. Serg. S. Vanderpool, I, 125th.
67. Unknown Captain.
68. Unknown, Excelsior.
69. 1st Lieut. J. Ross Horner, K. 20th.
70. H. Berman, E, 41st.
71. Unknown.
72. ——— Delmot, E, 41st.
73. Unknown Corporal, E, 41st.
74. Solomon Lesser, E, 41st.
75. Corp. Bollinger, E, 41st.
76. ——— Klebenspies, E, 41st.
77. Corp. Conrad Waelde, K, 41st.
78. Albert Spitz, H, 41st.
79. ——— Eiershan, B, 41st.
80. Corp. Woell, B, 41st.
81. J. Smith, 4th, Battery.
82. C. A. Caldwell, E, 64th.
83. H. C. Rosegrant, B, 1st.
84. Timothy Kearns, A, 1st Excelsior.
85. P. Owens, A, 61st.
86. G. W. Secose, F, 4th Cavalry.
87. Unknown, 4th Cavalry.
88. P. Trainer, D, 4th Cavalry.
89. John Kenton, C, 4th Cavalry.
90. John Smith, D, 57th.
91. Serg. William H. Ambler, D, 57th.
92. John Lanegar, D, 5th Cavalry.
93. 1st Serg. Selden D. Wales, A, 5th Cavalry.
94. Adjutant Gaulk, 5th Cavalry.
95. J. B. Cowill, E, 108th.
96. John P. Wells, E, 104th.
97. William Franklin, H, 136th.
98. A. N. Post, A, 43d.
99. John Ferry, I, 88th.
100. 1st Sergeant, unknown, 116th.
101. James M'Bride, A, 88th.
102. Unknown.
103. Patrick Kenney, B, 63d.
104. Charles Hogan, A, 63d.
105. Henry Hitchcock, 1st Ind. Battery.
106. George Claxton, C, 111th.
107. Amos Otis, K, 146th.
108. Serg. Samuel Fuller, G, 105th.
109. Unknown, Excelsior.
110. E. Develin, A, 4th.
111. J. Raetchner, D, Excelsior.
112. Unknown Zouave.
113. Corp. Richard Sheridan, E, 2d, S. M.
114. D. C.
115, 116. Unknown.
117, 118, 119, 120. Unknown, Excelsior.

SECTION F.

1. Capt. J. S. Corbin, Company F, 20th Regt.
2. Cicero Tolls, A, 134th.
3. A. D. Tice, E, 20th.
4, 5, 6. Unknown, 147th.
7, 8, 9. Unknown, 76th.
10. Serg. Frederick Derbin, I, 78th.
11. Thomas Dawson, A, 78th.
12. Alfred Trudell, A, 78th.
13. Fred. Hei———.
14. Elbert Traver, E, 44th.
15. Unknown.
16. William Lacy, H, 4th Excelsior.
17. J. Simond, D, 4th Excelsior.
18. Serg. T. Lally, K, 4th Excelsior.
19, 20, 21. Unknown, Excelsior.
22. Unknown, Cavalry.
23. Unknown.
24. Unknown, Cavalry.
25. David Holland, F, 2d Excelsior.
26. Unknown, Excelsior.
27. Michael Flanegan, B, 1st Excelsior.
28. Ord. Serg. Patrick Sullivan, K, 4th Excelsior.
29. K. H. P., 126th.
30, 31. Unknown.
32. Charles W. Gaylord, B, 126th.
33. Unknown, Excelsior.
34. Charles Welden, D, 111th.
35. Unknown Corporal.
36. Unknown, Cavalry.
37, 38. Unknown.
39. Lieut. A. W. Estes, H, 2d Excelsior.
40. Unknown, Excelsior.
41, 42. Unknown, 1st Division 5th Corps.
43, 44, 45, 46, 47. Unknown.
48. Unknown, E, 5th Corps.
49. Unknown.
50. John Kapp, K, 1st Excelsior.
51. Michael Ryan, C, 1st Excelsior.
52, 53. Unknown.
54. Charles M'Kenney, B, 1st Excelsior.
55, 56. Unknown.
57. Unknown, 2d Brigade 2d Division 5th Corps.
58. Unknown Corporal.
59. Unknown.
60. James Brady, 2d Excelsior.
61, 62, 63, 64, 65. Unknown.
66. Charles Gorman, E, 2d Excelsior.
67. Unknown, 2d Excelsior.
68. Patrick Olvany, A, 2d Excelsior.
69. Alonzo Henstregt.
70. Supposed.
71. George W. Douglass, I, 1st Excelsior.
72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80. Supposed.
81, 82. Unknown.
83. Unknown Orderly Sergeant, Excelsior.
84. Unknown, E, 5th Corps.

NEW YORK—SECTION F—*Continued.*

85. Supposed.
86, 87. Supposed, Excelsior.
88. Jacob Jones.
89, 90. Unknown.
91. Unknown, 11th Corps.
92. Unknown, Artillerist.
93. William M'Clellan, G, 88th.
94. Unknown.
95. P. J. Hopkins, H, 126th.
96. Unknown.
97. Unknown Corporal, 126th.
98. Lieut. R. D. Lower, I, 157th.
99. Unknown Corporal, 157th.
100. Supposed, Excelsior.
101, 102. Unknown, Excelsior.
103. G. M'Cleary, F, 4th Excelsior.
104, 105. Unknown, Excelsior.
106. Edmund Holmes, F, 4th Excelsior
107. T. Tetworth, D, 4th Excelsior.
108. Adam Shaw, 4th Excelsior.
109, 110. Supposed, Excelsior.
111. William H. Bell, F, 120th.
112. Corp. James M. Delaney, I, 120th
113. Corp. Andrew De Wit, H, 120th.
114. Supposed.
115. Theodore Bogart, I, 120th.

SECTION G.

1. 2d Lieut. F. F.
2, 3. Supposed.
4. Supposed, 120th.
5. Daniel Smith, Company E, 120th Regiment.
6. Supposed, 3d Excelsior.
7. Corp. Gilbert Myer, I, 120th.
8. Supposed, Excelsior.
9. Theodore Van Deborgert, I, 120th.
10. R. M. W., supposed.
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. Supposed, Excelsior.
22. W. H. Ackerman, I, 1st Excelsior.
23, 24. Supposed, Excelsior.
25. Corporal, supposed, Excelsior.
26, 27, 28, 29. Supposed, Excelsior.
30, 31. Supposed.
32. Corp. Lewis Solomon, B, 1st.
33, 34. Supposed.
35. Ord. Serg. P. Farrel, D, 4th Excelsior.
36. Rufus Thomson, C, 120th.
37. Seth Harpell, C, 5th Excelsior.
38. Henry Wilson, E, 126th.
39. Alexander Gacon, B, 5th Excelsior.
40. W. H. Piper, H, 1st Excelsior.
41. Sergeant Bie———, A, 1st Excelsior.
42. Charles Gorman, E, 2d Excelsior.
43. Serg. Washington Knight, C, 5th Excelsior.
44. George Buggins, I, 1st Excelsior.
45. Michael Riley, G, 42d.
46. Elbert Brown, G, 111th.
47. John Carey, H, 5th.
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55. Unknown.
56. O. W. Hotchkiss, F, 120th.
57. William Shuly.
58, 59. Supposed.
60. Justus Warner, I, 120th.
61. Supposed.
62. Unknown Corporal, Excelsior.
63. Unknown.
64. Unknown, supposed.
65. Serg. John Knox, K, 5th Excelsior.
66. John Nolan, K, 1st Excelsior.
67. Serg. J. H. Mead.
68, 69. Supposed, Excelsior.
70. George Washington Sprague, G, 2d.
71. Serg. L. H. Lee, B, 2d.
72. Corp. Luke Kelly, F, 2d, S. M.
73. Thomas Murphy, F, 2d, S. M.
74. Henry Irvin, F, 2d, S. M.
75. Henry Diemer, F, 2d, S. M.
76. Supposed, S. M.
77. H. Thompson, I, 111th.
78. Adam C. Cadmus, I, 126th.
79. Jacob Frey, B, 149th.
80. M. Stout, F, 136th.
81. Charles Jones, C, 9th, Cavalry.
82. Serg. James Melchen, H, 2d, S. M.
83. Thomas Hunt, H, 2d, S. M.
84. Supposed.
85. Robert Laning, K, 86th.
86. John Sloat, E, 126th.
87. Serg. George Baker, A, 40th.
88. Supposed.
89. Joshua Pursel, C, 126th.
90. Daniel Day, B, 126th.
91. Charles T. Harris, C, 126th.

TOTAL, 867.

NEW JERSEY.

SECTION A.

1. 2d Lieut. Richard H. Townsend, Company C, 12th Regiment.
2. 1st Serg. T. Sutphin, F, 5th.
3. I. L. T.
4. L. Kreisel, Battery A, 1st.
5. G. Kutter, Battery A, 1st.
6. Isaac H. Copeland, E, 12th.
7. John Albright, F, 12th.
8. Joseph B. Spachius, B, 12th.
9. George H. Martin, A, 12th.
10. S. Platt, B, 12th.
11. Unknown.
12. Daniel Kiernan, H, 12th.
13. Unknown.
14. George W. Adams, F, 12th.
15. Thomas J. Rudrow, G, 12th.
16. William H. Spencer, B, 12th.
17, 18. Unknown.
19. Jacob Sheik, I, 4th.
20. Linson W. Creamer, K, 12th.
21. W. J. Button, K, 5th.
22. R. S. Price, Battery B, 1st Artillery.
23. Stewart Parent, G, 11th.

NEW JERSEY—SECTION B.

1. Patrick Ryan, Company A, 5th Regiment.
2. Serg. John M'Ivers, B, 5th.
3. Thomas Van Cleave, F, 8th.
4. B. F. Jackson, B, 11th.
5. John H. Rue, B, 11th.
6. James Fletcher, G, 7th.
7. Michael Goff, G, 11th.
8. Joseph Burroughs, B, 8th.
9. Henry Elbertson, G, 11th.
10. Serg. Samuel Shackleton, K, 5th.
11. William Preser, Egg Harbor City Cavalry.
12. Henry Damig, G, 13th.
13. Charles B. Yearkes, B, 6th.
14. Daniel Schuh, H, 3d.
15. J. Parliment, C, 13th.
16. John Smith.
17. W. T. Hawkins, H, 12th.
18. James A. Riley, E, 12th.
19. James Bennett, F, 7th.
20. Joseph Hall, F, 7th.
21. H. Rourke, F, 7th.
22. Unknown.

SECTION C.

1. Wm. A. Ezeikel, Company I, 7th Regiment.
2. Unknown, 7th.
3. Unknown.
4. Unknown, 7th.
5. John Ryan, C, 5th
6. James Flanegan, A, 7th.
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. Unknown.
18. Thomas Flanagan, G, 7th.
19. Martin Van Houten, A, 7th.
20. George W. Berry, B, 7th.

SECTION D.

1. Unknown, 7th.
2, 3. Unknown.
4, 5. Supposed.
6. Corp. William H. Ray, Company F, 12th Regt.
7. Serg. Corum Righter, C, 11th.
8. Edward Barber, H, 11th.
9, 10. Supposed.
11. J. McNulty, F, 7th.
12. Unknown.
13. Peter Wean, H, 6th.

TOTAL, 78.

PENNSYLVANIA.

SECTION A.

1. Robert Lockhart, Company K, 29th Regt.
2. Theodore Saylor, C, 72d.
3. Lieut. J. D. Gordon, B, 56th.
4. Alexander Creighton, F, 148th.
5. Serg. R. H. Cowpland, 121st.
6. J. J. Finnefrock.
7. Samuel Finnefrock.
8. Corp. C. Walters, C, 142d.
9, 10. Unknown, 149th.
11. Corp. J. S. Gutelius, D, 150th.
12. Nathan H——, A, 149th.
13. Unknown, F, 149th.
14. F. E. Northorp, 150th.
15. Unknown, 149th.
16. Unknown.
17. William H. Harman, I, 149th.
18. Unknown, 149th.
19. Corp. James Logan, G, 149th.
20. Robert M'Guire, F, 53d.
21. Serg. Daniel Harrington, F 53d.
22. C. Herbster, C, 69th.
23. Franklin Myers, D, 99th.
24. Thomas Hand, K, 99th.
25. Josiah Butterworth, E, 114th.
26. Thomas Burns, B, 2d Reserve.
27. Thomas M. Savage, H, 2d Reserve.
28. Color Serg. John Greenwood, I, 109th.
29. J. Bainbridge, F, 147th.
30. G. Deisroth, F, 147th.
31. Corp. Abraham Crawley, A, 68th.
32. Serg. John Wogan, G, 69th.
33. James M'Intyre, G, 69th.
34. James Clary, G, 69th.
35. James Coyle, G, 69th.
36. James Rice, G, 69th.
37. William Kiker, K, 72d.
38. John Hope, H, 71st.
39. Nelson Reaser, B, 151st.
40. Robert Lesher, D, 71st.
41. Washington Liminger, B, 145th.
42. William Conley, 140th.
43. Lieut. G. H. Finch, E, 145th.
44. Isaac E. Dorman, A, 145th.
45. John Stockton, I, 71st.
46. Robert W. Bell, I, 56th.
47. Unknown, B, 149th.
48. John E. White, D, 53d.
49. Matthew Smith, G, 1st California Brigade.
50. Lieut. Michael Mullin, G, 69th.
51. Samuel W. Barnet, H, 140th.
52. J. Rich, H, 106th.
53. Frederick Gillhouse.
54. R. J. Akan, I, 145th.
55. John M'Casland, D, 72d.
56. Harrison Long, I, 148th.
57. John Kunkle, E, 148th.
58. John Weidner, B, 68th.
59. Thomas B. M'Cullough, I, 148th.
60. Jeremiah Dermandy, G, 19th.
61. William Munsen, 1st Artillery.
62. Charles Carmer, A, 57th.
63. Corp. Martin Berry, D, 140th.
64. Absalom Link, G, 64th.
65. Serg. J. Hunter, B, 57th.
66. Lawrence Bennet, B, 141st.
67. J. Rhodes, C, 105th.
68. Unknown.
69. George Howard, I, 111th.
70. Serg. Francis M. Burley, A, 110th.
71. Corp. George W. Ingraham, A, 68th.
72. Corp. David Stoup, E, 63d.
73. John Devon, F, 26th.
74. William Callan, C, 26th.
75. J. Hayman, A, 26th.
76. William H. Knichenbecher, K, 141st.
77. Corp. W. Gordon, I, 26th.

PENNSYLVANIA—SECTION A—*Continued.*

78. John C. Downing, C, 57th.
79. J. J. Wood, I, 114th.
80. Serg. Vonderfeer, H, 71st.
81. A. Delinger, K, 71st.
82. Joseph A. Furgeson, A, 139th.
83. Benjamin Hassiler, D, 93d.
84. James Kay, E, 91st.
85. G. W. Stalker, I, 83d.
86. Lieut. P. Morris, D, 62d.
87. C. D. Coyle, D, 83d.
88. Stephen Kelly, E, 91st.
89. T. P. Swoop, H, 111th.
90. Unknown, 26th.
91. D. Hanna, A, 29th.
92. Patrick Fury, F, 115th.
93. Benjamin Slavach, 153d.
94. Corp. Uriah M'Cracken, G, 153d.
95. James Irving, G, 73d.
96. John Reimel, H, 153d.
97. Fritz Smittle, H, 74th.
98. Emil Preifer, E, 27th.

SECTION B.

1. Capt. A. J. Sofield, Company A, 149th Regt.
2, 3, 4. Unknown, 149th.
5. George Seip, 148th.
6. Unknown, 149th.
7. Unknown Corporal, 149th.
8, 9. Unknown, 149th.
10. D. G., 149th.
11, 12, 13, 14. Unknown, 149th.
15. David C. Kline, H, 149th.
16. Serg. Philip Peckens, F, 141st.
17. Robert Morrison, A, 69th.
18. Corp. Samuel Hayburn, B, 106th.
19. Samuel R. Garvin, E, 72d.
20. John M'Hugh, K, 72d.
21. Ira Corbin, D, 145th.
22. H. S. Thomas, I, 145th.
23. S. Taylor, G, 145th.
24. S. Shoemaker.
25. Corp. William H. Myers, E, 62d.
26. Major W. G. Lowry, 26th.
27. James Hill, I, 142d.
28. Thomas D. Allen, A, 157th.
29. Patrick Hayes, D, 81st.
30. Charles M'Carty, K, 72d.
31. Joseph Newton, D, 81st.
32. Alexander Mills, E, 72d.
33. D. A. Ammerman, B, 148th.
34. James S. Linn, G, 140th.
35. William Van Buskirk, K, 142d.
36. Henry A. Comwell, A, 121st.
37. George Young, F, 150th.
38. Albert Dustun, 75th.
39. Serg. Almond M. Chesbro, G, 53d.
40. Joseph Kile, G, 53d.
41. E. A. Allen, I, 145th.
42. Richard Miller, C, 140th.
43. M. Charrity, A, 71st.
44. Louis Dille, D, 140th.
45. Ethiel A. Wood, B, 141st.
46. Serg. Major Joseph G. Fell, 141st.
47. Robert Michaels, A, 145th.
48. Peter Hilt, G, 68th.
49. Ord. Serg. Herrick, H, 110th.
50. J. W. Guthrie, B, 105th.
51. Moses Miller, B, 110th.
52. George Rowand, K, 26th.
53. George Osman, C, 148th.
54. Serg. Peter Hilgers, D, 73d.
55. Frederick Heinley, K, 74th.
56. W. Cragle, D, 143d.
57. Corp. B. F. Ulrich, B, 153d.
58. Charles Clyde, I, 150th.
59. Jacob Mauch, I, 150th.
60. Corp. William Holmes, G, 150th.
61. William S. Stamm, G, 150th.
62. J. Jones, A, 142d.
63. Samuel Cramer, B, 142d.
64. John W. Crusan, B, 56th.
65. Solomon Shirk, B, 107th.
66. James Lukens, E, 150th.
67. M. Kelley, E, 106th.
68. Serg. John O. Lorner, G, 69th.
69. John Harrington, K, 69th.
70. James Keatings, H, 90th.
71. Isaac Jenkins, G, 107th.
72. J. Ruppins, B, 107th.
73. William Beaumont, A, 88th.
74. James Amsley, H, 107th.
75. J. N. Burr, 147th.
76. James W. Taft, D, 142d.
77. Joseph Montange, D, 143d
78. Alfred Boyden, A, 149th.
79. Unknown.
80. Charles E. Webster, C, 26th.
81. J. H. Rendools, 68th.
82. Alonzo M'Call, B, 1[illegible]th Reserve.
83. Ord. Serg. J. W. Molineaux, B, 91st.
84, 85. Unknown.
86. James S. Rutter, B, 1st Reserve.
87. Unknown.
88. B. E. True, B, 83d.
89, 90. Unknown.
91. 1st Serg. T. J. Belton, B, Bucktail.
92, 93. Unknown.
94. James Wallace, G, 26th.

SECTION C.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. Unknown, 149th.
13. H. M. Kinsel, Company H, 110th Regiment.
14. Charles T. Gardner, H, 111th.
15. Hiram Woodruff, G, 1st Bucktail.
16. P. O'Brian, A, 69th.
17. John Hurley, H, 69th.
18. George Dunkinfield, I, 72d.
19. William Evans, I, 71st.
20. David Stainbrook, F, 71st.
21. William W. Clark, A, 72d.
22. William Brown, D, 71st.
23. Robert L. Platt, C, 149th.
24. D. Bumgardner, A, 141st.
25. George Hiles, C, 68th.
26. Serg. John Loughery, E, 26th.
27. G. T. Bishop, I, 141st.
28. Corp. Robert Thompson, I, 83d.
29. Serg. J. Myers, G, 62d.
30. Joseph Sherran, F, 62d.
31. J. Simonson, I, 28th.
32. Gideon F. Borger, H, 153d.
33. Gotfried Hamman, 74th.
34. William L. Miller, E, 153d.
35. 2d Lieut. John O'H. Woods, D, 11th Reserve.
36. Serg. William Reynolds, I, 142d.
37. Amos P. Sweet, H, 150th.
38. Serg. Lorenzo Hodges, G, 150th.
39. 1st Lieut. F. Keimpel, E, 27th.

PENNSYLVANIA—SECTION C—*Continued.*

40. Unknown.
41. James O'Neil, B, 69th.
42. Lieut. William H. Smith, B, 106th.
43. Unknown Orderly Sergeant.
44. Serg. James M. Shea, B, 69th.
45. F. Gallagher, B, 69th.
46. John Heneison, C, 153d.
47. Serg. E. N. Somercamp, I, 29th.
48. Unknown.
49. William Douglass, B, 155th.
50. George W. Wilson, I, 155th.
51. Patrick J. O'Connor, D, 91st.
52. E. Berlin, G, 83d.
53. Unknown.
54. Robert Griffin, A, 83d.
55, 56, 57. Unknown.
58. Unknown Corporal.
59. Unknown.
60. L. F., E, 53d.
61, 62. Unknown.
63. Unknown Sergeant.
64. Ord. Serg. M. G. Isett, C, 53d.
65, 66, 67, 68, 69. Unknown.
70. Unknown Orderly Sergeant.
71, 72. Unknown.
73. John K. Inery, C, 2d Reserve.
74. Isaac Eaton, D, 10th Reserve.
75. Patrick Hunt, F, 99th.
76. William Danchy, H, 1st Reserve.
77. Thomas Shields, H, 99th.
78. John Lusk, I, 1st Reserve.
79. J. Kleppinger, D, 153d.
80. Lieut. William H. Beaver, D, 153d.
81. J. Quinn, H, 99th.
82. William Thomas, E, 110th.
83. D. Hemphill, E, 72d.
84. H. Purdy, C, Hampton's Battery.
85. James E. Beals, H, 148th.
86. F. Bordenstedt, A, 69th.
87. William J. Strause, H, 151st.
88. Serg. James Parks, C, 139th.
89. James Kelly, C, 69th.
90. Jacob Frey, C, 105th.

SECTION D.

1, 2. Unknown, 149th.
3. Calvin Potter, Company H, 149th Regiment.
4, 5. Unknown, 149th.
6. Corp. Samuel M. Caldwell, D, 118th.
7. Frederick Shoner, E, 72d.
8. Serg. Jeremiah Boyle, H, 69th.
9. George Herpich, H, 71st.
10. Corp. James M'Manus, D, 69th.
11. James Gallagher, H, 71st.
12. Serg. J. Gallagher, D, 69th.
13. S. S. Odare, F, 71st.
14. Corp. William Shultz, I, 71st.
15. William Simpson, D, 145th.
16. Anthony Stark, G, 106th.
17. Charles Trisket, G, 140th.
18. Charles F. Loby, I, 118th.
19, 20, 21, 22, 23. Unknown.
24. G. H. Allen, C, 59th.
25. Charles M. Connel, K, 11th.
26. John Aker.
27. Unknown, 26th.
28. Jacob Keirsh, Hampton's Battery.
29. Unknown.
30. J. Graves, C, 1st.
31. Unknown, 6th.
32, 33, 34, 35. Unknown.
36. George Moyer, F, 2d Reserve.
37. Cordillo Collins, D, 1st Reserve.
38. A. J. Bittinger, C, 11th Reserve.
39. Milton Campbell, C, 11th Reserve.
40. Samuel Zeckman, E, 6th Reserve.
41. A. S. Davis, G, 1st Rifles.
42. George Stewart, E, 2d Reserve.
43. Serg. Robert Sensenmyer, E, 2d Reserve.
44. F. Smith, I, 20th.
45. Unknown.
46. James Binker, B, 106th.
47. Henry W. Beegel, H, 110th.
48. James S. Puryne, Battery F, 1st Artillery.
49. O. S. Campbell, K, 111th.
50. J. Watson, I, 29th.
51. Thomas Acton, B, 29th.
52. James Morrow, I, 29th.
53. Corp. James D. Butcher, D, 28.
54. John Richardson, B, 111th.
55. Charles Miller, B, 111th.
56. G. B. Wireman, E, 107th.
57. Corp. John S. Pomeroy.
58. T. Miller, Battery G, 1st Artillery, Reserve.
59. S. D. Campbell, A, 142d.
60. John Metz, A, 68th.
61. E. T. Green, E, 14th.
62. S. N. Warner, H, 83d.
63. A. P. M'Clarey, B, 63d.
64. N. P. Govan, C, 150th.
65. Elisha Bond, 27th.
66. I. Beider, F, 1st.
67. N. M'Witkin, A, 15th.
68. Corp. Hugh Farley, H, 57th.
69. H. H. Hay, A, 145th.
70. Mager Sorber, B, 143d.
71. Mark Beary, D, 1st.
72. John Harvey, A, 69th.
73. Joseph Werst, C, 153d.
74. John Boyer.
75. S. M. Little, F, 62d.
76. William H. Dunn, F, 62d.
77. J. A. Walker, D, 62d.
78. Richard Loudman, H, 62d.
79. T. R. Woods, A, 62d.
80. John Mathers, L, 62d.
81. George M'Intosh, L, 62d.
82. Serg. J. S. Osborn, I, 62d.
83. E. M'Mahon, I, 140th.
84. John Buckley, B, 140th
85. John Long, D, 62d.

SECTION E.

1. Reuben Miller, Company K, 1st Regiment.
2. Jacob Christ, D, 56th.
3. Robert Johnson, G, 28th.
4. Auton Frank.
5. John W. Buchanan, A, 1st Reserve.
6. N. Townsend, C, 1st Reserve.
7. W. H. Burrel, F, 148th.
8. William Orr, I, 62d.
9. Serg. K. Doty, F, 105th.
10. David Winning, D, 18th Cavalry.
11. Jacob Harvey, M, 18th Cavalry.
12. William Crawford, C, 18th Cavalry.
13. W. N. Williams, K, 143d.
14. Jacob Zimmerman, I, 151st.
15. A. H. Fish, I, 150th.
16. A. Lees, A, 150th.

PENNSYLVANIA—SECTION E—*Continued.*

17. Wilson Miller, 90th.
18. J. Stroble, I, 11th.
19. C. B. Ling, B, 56th.
20. Wendle Dorn, I, 139th.
21. Unknown, 148th.
22. Samuel Dearmott, C, 62d.
23. John Stottard, A, 110th.
24. Francis Merrian Hansel, E, 140th.
25. Ord. Serg. Joseph H. Core, A, 110th.
26. J. D. Campbell, C, 140th.
27. T. J. Carpenter, K, 140th.
28. Tobias Jones (removed), B, 153d.
29. Unknown.
30. Jesse Coburn, C, 142d.
31. John W. M'Kinney, K, 1st Reserve.
32. Ord. Serg. H. M'Carty, K, 114th.
33. Unknown.
34. Unknown Zouave.
35. Unknown.
36. Unknown Zouave.
37, 38. Unknown.
39. John Walker, C, 110th.
40. Unknown.
41. William Crowl, K, 141st.
42. Robert Robinson, L, 4th Cavalry.
43. Guy Southwick, L, 16th Cavalry.
44. John G. Coyle, C, 75th.
45. F. Hubbard.
46. Unknown.
47. William Vosburg, Buford's Cavalry.
48. Unknown.
49. G. Wm. ——, A.
50. Unknown.
51. Serg. George O. Fell, B, 143d.
52, 53. Supposed.
54. Supposed Sergeant.
55, 56, 57. Supposed.
58. Unknown Orderly Sergeant.
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64. Supposed.
65. Unknown.
66. Unknown Corporal.
67. Unknown Sergeant.
68, 69, 70, 71, 72. Unknown.
73. Supposed Sergeant.
74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80. Supposed.
81. 2d Lieut. John F. Cox, I, 57th.

SECTION F.

1, 2. Unknown.
3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Supposed.
8. —— Barr, Company B, 105th Regiment.
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Unknown Zouaves.
16. —— Oxford.
17. William M'Grew, K, 1st Reserve.
18. Unknown Sergeant.
19. Charles Martin, C, 107th.
20. Unknown.
21. A. K. Coolbaugh, C, 141st.
22. Joshua M. Hider, I, 106th.
23. Unknown Sergeant.
24. Matthew Johnston, H, 11th.
25. Unknown Zouave.
26. G. M. S.
27. Jos. Conner, Carner or Carver, C, 148th.
28. John M'Nutt, G, 140th.
29. Francis A. Osborne, E, 16th Cavalry.
30, 31. Unknown.
32. George Cogswell, A, 156th.
33. John Bunn, C, 26th.
34. William Kelley, A, 126th.
35. Unknown.
36. Supposed.
37. S. Brookmeyer.
38. J. Little, B, 26th.
39, 40. Unknown.
41. Corp. Peter M'Mahon, E, 26th.
42. Charles Kelly.
43. E. H. Brown, K, 26th.
44, 45. Supposed.
46. John Zouwell.
47. Supposed.
48. William M'Neil, I, 26th.
49, 50. Supposed.
51. Corp. Samuel Fitzinger, B, 106th.
52. Supposed.
53. H. C. Tafel, I, 62d.
54. Supposed.
55. David W. Boyd, G, 140th.
56, 57, 58, 59, 60. Supposed.
61. Harry Evans, B, 88th.
62, 63, 64, 65. Supposed.
66. G. Mickle, C, 72d.
67, 68. Supposed.
69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74. Unknown.
75. S. B. Stewart, F, 2d Reserve.
76. —— Welsh.
77. Unknown.
78. Adjutant Walter S. Briggs, 27th.
79. W. D. Millard, F, 149th.
80. Andrew R. M'Kinney, B, 21st Cavalry.

SECTION G.

1. Serg. Samuel James, Company B, 106th Regt.
2. A. F. Strock, D, 12th.
3, 4, 5. Unknown.
6. Charles Hevermehl, I, 87th.
7. Unknown.

TOTAL, 535.

DELAWARE.

SECTION A.

1. Corp. William Strong, Company D, 2d Regt.
2. Serg. Thomas Seymore, B, 1st.
3. William Dorsey, D, 1st.
4. John B. Sheets, D, 1st.
5. T. P. Carey, E, 1st.
6. John S. Black, K, 1st.
7. Serg. Michael Cavanagh, G, 2d.

DELAWARE—SECTION B.

1. Peter Boster, Company A, 2d Regiment.
2. Jacob Stiles, A, 2d.
3. ——— Downey, B, 1st.
4. Serg. Jacob Boyd, E, 2d.
5. A. Huhn, A, 1st.
6. Lieut. George G. Plank, E, 2d.

SECTION C.

1. James Dougherty, Company I, 1st Regiment.
2. Stephen Carey, A, 2d.

TOTAL, 15.

MARYLAND.

SECTION A.

1. Southey Stirling, Company K, 1st Regiment.
2. Unknown.
3. Wm. P. Jones, B, 1st E. Shore.
4. Edward Pritchard, B, 1st.

5, 6, 7. Unknown.

8. H. Miller, C, 1st P. H. B.

SECTION B.

1. Wm. H. Eaton, Co. E, 1st Regt., E. Shore.
2. G. H. Barger, H, 1st.
3. A. Saterfield, I, 1st E. Shore.
4. Joseph Bailey, B, 1st.
5. Teter French, E, 1st P. H. B.
6. Unknown.
7. Stephen Ford, D, 1st.

SECTION C.

1. G. W. Lowry, Company K, 1st Regt., P. H. B.
2. John Conner, F, 1st P. H. B.
3. David Krebs, G, 1st P. H. B.
4. M. F. Knott, F, 1st.
5. Frank Baxter, D, 1st.
6. John W. Stockman, 1st Brigade.

SECTION D.

1. Unknown.

TOTAL, 22.

WEST VIRGINIA.

SECTION A.

1. Simon Maine, Company F, 7th Regiment.
2. John Brown, 7th.
3. Aaron Austin, E, 7th.
4. Theodore Stewart, C, 7th.
5. George Berger, C, 7th.
6. Martin L. Scott, B, 7th.
7. Capt. William N. Harris, E, 1st Cavalry.

SECTION B.

1. Serg. Garret Selby, Co. F, 1st Regt., Cavalry.
2. Serg. George Collins, L, 1st Cavalry.
3. Charles Lacey, C, 1st Artillery.
4. William Bailey, E, 1st Cavalry.

TOTAL, 11.

OHIO.

SECTION A.

1. Enoch M. Detty, Company G, 73d Regiment.
2. 2d Lieut. George W. M'Gary, 82d.
3. William Folk, D, 82d.
4. Martin Jacob, D, 82d.
5. John Wiser, D, 82d.
6. Richard Bradler, D, 82d.
7. E. A. Hain, H, 82d.
8. ——— Busk, H, 82d.
9. J. Warner, H, 82d.
10. Elmer L. Ross, C, 82d.
11. Francis H. Blough, C, 82d.

12, 13, 14. Unknown.

15. John M'Cleary, D, 66th.
16. George K. Wilson, B, 8th.

OHIO—SECTION A—*Continued.*

17. Orville A. Warren, K, 8th.
18. Ozro Moore, I, 8th.
19. William Brown, B, 8th.
20. Serg. John K. Barclay, C, 8th.
21. Frank Shaffer, D, 8th.
22. Danford Parker, K, 8th.
23. Jeremiah N. Crabaugh, C, 75th.
24. John Edmunds, H, 1st.
25. Frederick Meyer, 1st Battery.
26. A. Houck, F, 82d.
27. Joseph Klinefelter, F, 55th.

SECTION B.

1. Edward T. Lovett, Company I, 25th Regt.
2. William Williams, I, 73d.
3. Henry Ophir, E, 55th.
4. William Ackerman, D, 72d.
5. John R. Meyer, C, 55th.
6. Serg. Caleb Dewees, F, 73d.
7. Ai Maddox, G, 73d.
8. Ozias C. Ford, A, 55th.
9. William Whitby, H, 73d.
10. Joseph R. Blake, I, 73d.
11. Andrew Miller, I, 73d.
12. William M'Clue, B, 13th.
13. Corp. James H. Lee, H, 73d.
14. William E. Haynes, B, 73d.
15. Allen Yaple, A, 73d.
16. A. M. Campbell, E, 185th.
17. Henry Stark, I, 4th.
18. James W. Harl, A, 4th.
19. Bernard M'Guire, B, 8th.
20. John M'Kellips, C, 8th.
21. George H. Martin, G, 4th.
22. Serg. Philip Tracey, G, 8th.
23. Color Corp. William Welch, I, 30th
24. Samuel Mowery, 107th.
25. Corp. Edward G. Ranney, D, 61st.
26. Unknown, 1st Battery.

SECTION C.

1. Anthony Mervale, Company G, 5th Regt.
2. J. Senard, D, 5th.
3. Charles Rhinehart, Battery I, 1st Artillery.
4. George Nixon, B, 73d.
5. August Raber, F, 107th.
6. Elisha L. Leake, G, 73d.
7. Lucas Struble, A, 107th.
8. John Davis, K, 75th.
9. Thomas Gilleran, F, 61st.
10. Corp. George B. Greiner, G, 73d.
11. Jacob Swackhamer, G, 73d.
12. Isaac J. Sperry, G, 73d.
13. Jacob Mitchell, C, 55th.
14. Chauncey Haskell, F, 82d.
15. William E. Pollock, C, 55th.
16. Benjamin F. Hartley, E, 75th.
17. Serg. Thomas H. Rice, B, 73d.
18. Joseph Barrett, G, 73d.
19. Andrew Samiller, A, 107th.
20. William R. Call, B, 73d.
21. Isaac Richards, A, 82d.
22. Adam Snyder, H, 107th.
23. Corp. James H. Goodspeed, D, 75th.
24. William Miller, G, 25th.
25. Nathan Heald, H, 73d.

SECTION D.

1. Serg. Charles Ladd, Company E, 25th Regt.
2. Caspar Bohrer, G, 107th.
3. Jacob Hoff, E, 107th.
4. Joseph W. Cunningham, I, 25th.
5. John Aigle, K, 107th.
6. Balts Beverly, C, 107th.
7. George Richards, D, 75th.
8. Serg. Philip Shiplin, F, 75th.
9. Samuel L. Conner, E, 82d.
10. Joseph Gasler, K, 107th.
11. William M'Vey, H, 73d.
12. Asa Hines, 11th Corps.
13. Serg. William Norton Williams, C, 108th.
14. David W. Callins, G, 4th.
15. William Bain, G, 4th.
16. Lieut. Addison Edgar, G, 4th.
17. Andrew Myers, G, 4th.
18. 1st Lieut. George Hayward, E, 29th.
19. Jeremiah Myers, G, 74th.
20. John Owens, G, 75th.
21. Ira L. Brigham, H, 8th.
22. G. Walker, F, 82d.
23. John Glouchlen, H, 25th.

SECTION E.

1. Thomas Durm, Company K, 25th Regiment.
2. B. F. Pontious, D, 29th.
3. George H. Thompson, G, 5th.
4. B. F. Sherman, G, 61st.
5. Corp. John Debolt, B, 4th.
6. Haskell Farr, G, 55th.
7. Corp. William Myers, A, 8th.
8. J. Laveden, E, 75th.
9. Perry Taylor, G, 75th.
10. T. M'Cain, E, 29th.
11. George Case, C, 5th.
12. Corp. Isaac Johnson, K, 1st Artillery.
13. Asa O. Davis, G, 4th.
14. William Overholt, I, 73d.
15. Lewis Davis, D, 75th.
16. 1st Serg. John W. Pierce, C, 25th.
17. Hiram Hughes, H, 25th.
18. Wesley Rakes, G, 75th.
19. Samuel P. Baughman, C, 75th.
20. Joseph Juchem, G, 107th.
21. Jacob Bise, K, 107th.
22. H. Schram, H, 1st.

SECTION F.

1. Serg. Jasper C. Briggs, Company G, 73d Regt.
2. Serg. John C. Kisska, A, 8th.
3. Andrew J. Dildine, A, 8th.
4. Jacob I. Ranch, A, 8th.
5. Josiah D. Johnson, F, 29th.
6. Serg. Isaac Willis, G, 73d.
7. Daniel Palmer, D, 73d.
8. James Ray, G, 73d.

TOTAL, 131.

INDIANA.

SECTION A.

1. Lieut. R. Jones, Company B, 19th Regiment.
2. Serg. Dougherty, 19th.
3. James Sticklep, C, 19th.
4. W. Hoover (or Houer), C, 19th.
5. Alexander Burk, C, 19th.
6. R. Clark, C, 19th.
7. A. Sulgroof, F, 19th.
8. Unknown.
9. Peter L. Faust, C, 19th.
10. William Simmons, E, 19th.
11. Serg. Ferguson, 19th.
12. Wesley Smith, A, 20th.
13. Amos D. Ashe, A, 20th.
14. John Sager, A, 20th.

SECTION B.

1. F. H. K., Company H, 6th Regiment.
2. Joshua Richmond, B, 20th.
3. George Sylvester, 20th.

4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Unknown, 20th.
9. Unknown, A, 20th.
10, 11, 12, 13. Unknown, 20th.

SECTION C.

1. P. Umphill, Company D, 27th Regiment.
2. J. Gilmore, I, 27th.
3. E. Stallup, H, 27th.
4. J. Gardner, K, 27th.
5. Silas Upham, G, 19th.
6. John E. Weaver, A, 3d Ind. Cavalry.
7. Serg. A. C. Lamb, E, 120th.
8. Serg. G. H. Redrick, F, 20th.
9. P. A. Bussard, K, 20th.
10. J. Williams, B, 20th.
11. C. Showalter, A, 27th.
12. E. Holt, G, 27th.

SECTION D.

1. John Shehan.
2. A. G. Wright, Company A, 20th Regiment.
3. C. E Wishmyer, A, 27th.
4. L. C. Antrim, C, 27th.
5. D. C. Calvin, C, 27th.
6. John Tice, A, 20th.
7. Ord. Serg. E. Tumey, D, 27th.
8. Levi Bulla, C, 20th.
9. James W. Whitlow, B, 19th.
10. Jesse Smith, D, 3d Cavalry.
11. George Bales, A, 27th.
12. T. Hunt, A, 27th.

SECTION E.

1. J. K. Fletcher, Company F, 27th Regiment.
2. Jesse Wills, C, 27th.
3. Samuel R. Lewis, D, 27th.
4. John D. Noble, K, 27th.
5. James Chapman, E, 27th.
6. J. D. Lynn, D, 27th.
7. Thomas J. Lett, H, 27th.
8. W. H. Wilson, E, 27th.
9. Unknown, K, 27th.
10. E. M'Knight, F, 27th.
11. D. T. David, G, 27th.

SECTION F.

1. Serg. Jeremiah Davis, Company H, 20th Regt.
2. Unknown.
3. F. W., 14th.
4. R. Pavy, B, 3d.
5. J. Robinson, K, 7th.
6. F. W. Smith, K, 27th.
7. H. Ambrose, H, 20th.
8. A. J. Crabb, D, 20th.
9. Serg. George W. Batchelor, H, 27th.
10. William Tillottson, I, 14th.

SECTION G.

1. Corp. H. S. B., Company I, 14th Regiment.
2. Unknown.
3. A. Lister, F, 27th.

4, 5, 6, 7. Supposed.
8. Thomas J. Wasson, B, 19th.

TOTAL, 80.

ILLINOIS.

SECTION A.

1. J. Wallikeck, Company H, 82d Regiment.
2. John Ellis, G, 12th.
3. Charles Wm. Miner.
4. David Dieffenbaugh, 8th Cavalry.
5. Corp. John Ackerman, K, 82d.
6. Supposed, 8th.

TOTAL, 6.

MICHIGAN.

SECTION A.

1. George Colburn, Company G, 24th Regiment.
2. Edward B. Harrison, K, 24th.
3. Erson H. Smith, A, 3d.
4. Silas E. Thurston, G, 3d.
5. Serg. George Pettinger, G, 24th.
6. Charles B. Burgess, A, 3d.
7. Lieut. G. A. Dickey, G, 24th.
8. James O'Neil, H, 3d.
9. R. K. Horman, H, 24th.
10. Corp. Otis Southworth, C, 24th.
11. Charles Phelps, B, 4th.
12. Corp. F. P. Worden, C, 4th.
13. Corp. Wm. A. Pryor, D, 4th.
14. Charles A. Rouse, D, 4th.
15. Charles A. Thurlach, A, 4th.
16. Charles W. Gregory, H, 4th.
17. James H. Pendleton, H, 4th.
18. George Purdy, H, 4th.
19. Joseph Brink, H, 4th.
20. Serg. Nicholas Gosha, F, 7th.
21. Edwin Beebe, E, 7th.
22. A. R. Evans, A, 5th Cavalry.
23. James T. Bedell, F, 7th Cavalry.
24. George W. Lundy, 7th Cavalry.

SECTION B.

1. John Durre, Company D, 24th Regiment.
2. A. Jenks, A, 24th.
3. Corp. W. H. Luce, G, 24th.
4. William H. Cole, G, 5th.
5. Herson Blood, I, 3d.
6. E. B. Browning, G, 24th.
7. Corp. J. T. Fails, G, 24th.
8. Serg. George Kline, B, 24th
9. Serg. John Powell, H, 24th.
10. Corp. Norman King, D, 4th.
11. Ellis Comstock, D, 4th.
12. A. Hoisington, F, 24th.
13. Corp. Charles H. Ladd, A, 24th.
14. H. B. Fountain, F, 4th.
15. Corp. Jerome Shook, B, 5th.
16. Corp. A. Benson, A, 4th.
17. Robert Sligh, K, 3d.
18. Oliver N. Culver, K, 3d.
19. Serg. Reuben Power, K, 3d.
20. 1st Serg. Daniel A. Vodria, A, 5th.
21. Thomas Shanahan, H, 1st Cavalry.
22. D. C. Laird, A, 4th.
23. C. Pease, C, 4th.

SECTION C.

1. S. Bisonette, Company A, 4th Regiment.
2. Corp. Charles A. Turner, B, 5th.
3. Charles Jelioke, K, 5th.
4. 1st Serg. James Hazzard, C, 5th.
5. Serg. John Sholes, G, 7th.
6. William Underwood, F, 7th.
7. ——— Almas.
8. 1st Serg. Thomas J. Divit, D, 5th Cavalry.
9. John Lavaby, A, 5th Cavalry.
10. John Roberts, C, 5th.
11. Frank Barbour, A, 5th Cavalry.
12. Samuel Christopher, D, 5th.
13. Andrew R. Evans, A, 5th Cavalry.
14. Nelson A. Allen, A, 5th Cavalry.
15. Charles Masters, A, 5th Cavalry.
16. Corp. Horace Barse, E, 5th Cavalry.
17. Frank Anderson, D, 5th.
18. Unknown, supposed, 3d or 5th Cavalry.
19. Serg. Charles E. Miner, 7th Cavalry.
20. L. Gibbs, C, 5th Cavalry.
21. J. Falketts, H, 5th Cavalry.
22. W. B. Hunt, I, 16th.

SECTION D.

1. Henry Butler, Company I, 5th Regiment.
2. Serg. Charles Ballard, E, 5th Cavalry.
3. Christopher Miller, E, 5th Cavalry.
4. Edward A. Warner, I, 5th Cavalry.
5. Serg. Henry Bicker, F, 5th Cavalry.
6. Richard Alwayra, E, 5th.
7. Henry Riolo, F, 5th Cavalry.
8. D. M. Merefield, F, 5th Cavalry.
9. Francis R. Kent, G, 5th Cavalry.
10. J. M. Skinner, G, 5th Cavalry.
11. Artemus Clark, G, 5th Cavalry.
12. Corp. Delos Harris, C, 7th Cavalry.
13. John M. Brown, K, 3d Cavalry.
14. Corp. Wm. A. Cole, G, 5th Cavalry.
15. James M. Pierce, A, 3d.
16. George Lawrence, C, 5th.
17. John Roberts, C, 5th.
18. 2d Serg. R. B. Godfrey, B, 7th.
19. J. K. Beagle, I, 16th.
20. Isaac H. Scott, K, 16th.
21. Serg. Henry Raw, I, 16th.

SECTION E.

1. Mason Palmer, Company B, 24th Regiment.
2. Luther Franklin, C, 5th.
3. Richard Aylward, E, 5th.
4. Peter E. Roy, C, 5th.
5. 1st Lieut. John P. Thelan, A, 5th.
6. Unknown, C, 5th.
7. D. Zimmerman, D, 4th.
8. G. W. Stevens, D, 16th.
9. Serg. E. Trip, H, 4th.
10. J. Geiner, G, 16th.
11. G. W. Ervey, H, 16th.
12. Serg. Hiram Hopkins, I, 7th.
13. Serg. D. C. Kimbal, B, 4th.
14. Serg. Joseph Mallenbre, B, 4th.
15. C. H. Wilson, H, 4th.
16. R. Moody, K, 4th.
17. Serg. Fred. Sheets, D, 4th.
18. J. Bags, I, 16th.
19. J. Hart, G, 16th.
20. Edward Burton, K, 16th.

MICHIGAN—SECTION F.

1. C. W. Martin, Company C, 16th Regiment.
2. C. H. Hulmer, G, 7th.
3. Peter La Valley, A, 5th Cavalry.
4. Thomas Motley, G, 7th Cavalry.
5. Nelson Walters, A, 7th Cavalry.
6. Philip Wilcox, L, 1st Cavalry.
7. Robert Hasty, I, 7th Cavalry.
8. George Ketchler, E, 5th Cavalry.
9. Philip Hill, E, 5th Cavalry.
10. W. A. Crowell, G, 5th Cavalry.
11. Miles A. Webster, G, 5th Cavalry.
12. A. S. Norris, G, 5th Cavalry.
13. John Nothing, I, 5th Cavalry.
14. Moses Cole, I, 5th Cavalry.
15. John G. Folkerts, K, 5th.
16. J. Mason, D, 16th.
17. Corp. J. M. Weston, A, 16th.
18. Emery Tuttle, B, 16th.

SECTION G.

1. Carlisle Bennett, Company I, 1st Cavalry.
2. Corp. Reuben Hone, C, 5th Regiment.
3. S. G. Harris, B, 7th.
4. J. S. Rider, B, 24th.
5. W. Williams, B, 24th.
6. J. M'Nish, F, 24th
7. Color Serg. E. Moore, E, 7th Cavalry.
8. Corp. Albert Smith, D, 5th.
9. Capt. Peter Generous, B, 5th.
10. Chester W. Alex, D, 5th.
11. Joseph Sutter, E, 5th.
12. Serg. Alexander Moore, 7th.
13. 2d Lieut. Albert Slafter, E, 7th.
14. John W. Barber, 1st Artillery.
15. Serg. J. M. Stevens, E, 16th.
16. J. R. Hall, D, 16th.
17. Corp. Beck, I, 16th.

SECTION H.

1. Lieut. B. Brown, Company E, 16th Regiment.
2. Lieut. W. Jewett, K, 16th.
3. Corp. Charles M'Brahmie, D, 16th.
4. Orin D. Wade, D, 3d.
5. J. Hyde, D, 4th.
6. Asher D. Ashley, F, 5th.
7. Corp. Charles Thayer, I, 5th.
8. George H. Miller, 5th.
9. John Dover, K, 5th.
10. Charles Sits, L, 1st Cavalry.
11. William Brennan, B, 5th Cavalry.
12. Joseph Tucker, I, 5th.
13. Lieut. M'Ilhenny, 1st Cavalry.
14. Corp. Josiah G. Bond, F, 16th.
15. Serg. H. H. Barret, B, 15th.
16. Corp. H. Hart, C, 6th Cavalry.

SECTION I.

1. C. J. Pattin, Company E, 24th Regiment.
2. L. W. Lampman, K, 4th.
3. Unknown.
4. Corp. Thomas Sugget, G, 20th.
5. Charles Ruff, D, 24th.
6. Corp. David Rounds, D, 24th.
7. Serg. W. H. Jackson, Detroit.
8. Corp. R. Howe, C, 5th.
9. Charles Crouse, A, 6th Cavalry.
10. Corp. Wm. C. Harlan, F, 5th.
11. Major Noah H. Ferry (removed), 5th Cavalry.
12. Serg. Frank A. Barker, A, 5th Cavalry.
13. Unknown, G, 5th Cavalry.
14. Lieut. F. J. Diatt, D, 5th Cavalry.

TOTAL, 175.

WISCONSIN.

SECTION A.

1, 2, 3. Unknown.
4. Corp. Edward H. Heath, Co. H, 2d Regt.
5, 6, 7. Unknown.
8. Lieut. William S. Winnegan, H, 2d.
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Unknown.
16. Lieut. Charles Broket, I, 26th.
17. Christian Stier, F, 26th.
18. Corp. James Kelly, B, 6th.
19. Corp. William E. Evans, B, 6th.
20. Serg. George W. Sain, C, 7th.
21, 22, 23. Unknown.

SECTION B.

1, 2. Unknown.
3. Marcellus Chase, Company A, 7th Regiment.
4, 5. Unknown.
6. Corp. John T. Christie, F, 2d.
7. Corp. Frank M. Bull, D, 7th.
8. Edward Leaman, E, 6th.
9. 1st Serg. Frederick A. Nichols, A, 2d.
10. Corp. John M'Donald, A, 2d.
11. Charles Branstetter, A, 2d.
12. 1st Serg. James Gow, C, 2d.
13. Henry R. M'Collum, H, 2d.
14. Hanford C. Tupper, G, 2d.
15. Serg. William Gallup, D, 6th.
16. Henry Anderson, B, 6th.
17. Peter Kraescher, C, 26th.
18. Peter Kuhn, G, 26th.
19. Joseph Balmes, C, 26th.
20. Mathias Scheivester, E, 26th.
21. Leion Stedoman, C, 6th.

WISCONSIN—SECTION C.

1. Corp. Abraham Fletcher, Co. K, 6th Regt.
2. Corp. William H. Barnum, K, 7th.
3. George H. Hawes, B, 7th.
4. John B. Straight, E, 7th.
5. William Rampthen, K, 2d.
6. Silas Castor, B, 7th.
7. Philip Bennetts, F, 7th.
8. John W. Scott, D, 7th.
9. William D. M'Kinney, K, 7th.
10. A. Fowler, A, 7th.
11. Corp. Ernst Shuhart, K, 2d.
12. William Wagner, F, 3d.
13. Thomas Barton, F, 3d.
14. Philonas Kinsman, K, 7th.
15. Lewis H. Eggleson, H, 6th.
16. Corp. John Krauss, A, 26th.
17. Frank King, E, 6th.
18. James C. Perrine, I, 2d.
19. Frantz Benda, F, 26th.

SECTION D.

1. 1st Lieut. Martin Young, Co. A, 26th Regt.
2. Serg. Spencer M. Train, C, 2d.
3. Uriah Palmer, A, 6th.
4. Ord. Serg. W. S. Rouse, E, 2d.
5. 1st Serg. Andrew Miller, I, 6th.
6. 1st Serg. Albert E. Tarbor, K, 6th.
7. 2d Lieut. Orin D. Chapman, C, 6th
8. Fritz Zilsdorf, G, 26th.
9. Charles Hasse, F, 6th.
10. Lt. Col. George H. Stevens, 2d.

TOTAL, 73.

MINNESOTA.

SECTION A.

1. Joseph V. Sisler, Company G, 1st Regiment.
2. Alonzo C. Hayden, D, 1st.
3. George W. Grands, D, 1st.
4. Capt. Nathan S. Messick, G, 1st.
5. Corp. William N. Peck, I, 1st.
6. Charles H. Gove, B, 1st.
7. Freder Glave, A, 1st.
8. Corp. Wilber F. Wellman, I, 1st.
9. Israel Durr, K, 1st.
10. Serg. Philip Hamlin, F, 1st.
11, 12. Unknown, F, 1st.
13, 14, 15, 16. Unknown, 1st.
17. J. H. Prime, D, 1st.
18. Unknown, 1st.

SECTION B.

1, 2, 3. Supposed, 1st Regiment.
4. Serg. Frederick Diehr, Company H, 1st.
5. John Ellsworth, C, 1st.
6. Clark Brandt, A, 1st.
7. Corp. Timothy Crowley, A, 1st.
8. Corp. Peter Marks, A, 1st.
9. Capt. Joseph Periam, K, 1st.
10. Charles Baker, D, 1st.
11. Byron Welch, I, 1st.
12, 13. Unknown, 1st.
14. Lieut. Waldo Farrer, I, 1st.
15. W. Moore, 1st.
16. Henry Nickels, A, 1st.
17. John M'Kenzie, E, 1st.

SECTION C.

1. Edward P. Hale, Company I, 1st Regiment.
2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Unknown.
7. Serg. Wade Lufkin, C, 1st.
8. Serg. Oscar Woodward, I, 1st.
9, 10. Unknown.
11. Unknown Orderly Sergeant.
12, 13, 14, 15. Unknown.

SECTION D.

1. Edwin Parl, Company I, 1st Regiment.
2. Corp. Phineas L. Dunham, G, 1st.
3. Ervine Lawrence, D, 1st.
4. Corp. L. J. Squires, F, 1st.
5. Corp. Peter Welm, E, 1st.
6. Hans Simonson, A, 1st.

TOTAL, 56.

UNITED STATES REGULARS.

SECTION A.

1. T. E. Sheets, Company G, 14th Regiment.
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Unknown, B, 2d Battalion.
9. Unknown Sergeant, B, 2d Battalion.
10. Serg. D. W. Clock, 11th.
11. Unknown, B, 2d Battalion.
12. Christian Engers, H, 4th Battalion.
13. Peter M'Manimus, H, 4th Battalion.
14. Corp. Barrington, B, 4th Battalion.
15. Peter Robinson, F, 4th Battalion.
16. Roger M'Denald, H, 4th Battalion.

UNITED STATES REGULARS—SECTION A—*Continued.*

17. Christian Albett, H, 4th Battalion.
18. Serg. John Reily, K, 4th Battalion.
19. Unknown, 2d Battalion.
20. W. Mare, 4th Battalion.
21. Unknown, A, Battalion.
22. T. H. Mulligan, A, 14th Battalion.
23. John Creridon, B, 11th.
24. Ransom B. Russell, F, 6th.
25. Corp. John Small, D, 17th.
26. William Curtis, A, 7th.
27. John Keenan, A, 7th.
28. Corp. John Fallbright, B, 2d.
29. William D. Hammond, F, 14th.
30. Serg. S. P. Blanchard, B, 17th.
31. C. H. Whitney, C, 17th.
32. William Duffy, D, 17th.
33. John O. Keefer, F, 11th.
34. Thomas Murry, F, 14th.
35. Charles Horton, G, 11th.
36. J. Lutz, E, 14th.
37. Lieut. Rockford, 11th.
38. Capt. Thomas O'Barre, 11th.

SECTION B.

1. Thomas Whitford, Battery F, Artillery.
2. Amest Fassette, A, 4th Artillery.
3. Unknown, A.
4. John Porter, Battery C, 5th Artillery.
5. Martin Slograt, Battery A, Artillery.
6. Thomas Padgett, Battery I, 1st Artillery.
7. Joseph W. Erwin, 4th Artillery.
8. William Patton, Battery A, 4th Artillery.
9. James Murphy, Battery A, 4th Artillery.
10. John Marklein, Battery H, 1st Artillery.
11. William Becker, Company K, 4th Regiment.
12. Serg. Charles Giles, B, 11th.
13. Serg. Judas Thetart, I, 6th.
14. Playford Woods, B, 14th.
15. William Byrne, D, 17th.
16. Benjamin Way, A, 14th.
17. John Willis, K, 2d.
18. Corp. Mills Jamson, G, 2d Battalion, 14th.
19. Corp. Frank Berchard, G, 14th.
20. J. Reeman, G, 6th.
21. John Pine, I, 3d.
22. John Hare, I, 2d.
23. M. Carroll, H, 14th.
24. G. Moran, D, 12th.
25. —— Sullivan, 5th Corps.
26. Unknown.
27. Lieut. William Chamberlain, 1st Battery, 7th.
28. Patrick Tighe, I, 3d Artillery.
29. L. Griswold, Battery D, 5th Artillery.
30. E. Brower, Battery D, 5th Artillery.
31. O. F. Drake, detailed from 16th Michigan Vol., Battery D, 5th Artillery.
32. G. H. White, G, 2d S. S.
33. Serg. J. Gray, D, 2d S. S.
34. Serg. Henry Lye, G, 1st S. S.
35. Benjamin Hamlet, A, 1st S. S.
36. Eli S. B. Vincent, G, 1st S. S.
37. Charles Thatcher, E, 1st S. S.

SECTION C.

1. Levi G. Strickland, Company C, 11th Regt.
2. James Agin, D, 14th.
3, 4, 5, 6. Unknown.
7. Charles Wilson, G, 11th.
8. Charles Schmidt, E, 14th.
9. D. A. M'Kean, 11th.
10, 11, 12, 13. Unknown.
14. M. Kennedy, D, 10th.
15. W. R. Davis, H, 10th.
16. S. Coriell, A, 2d Battery, 17th.
17. Julius Fergeson, A, 7th.
18. B. M. M.
19. Unknown.
20. E. M. Williams, I, 3d.
21. Casper Kupferly, G, 3d.
22. Robert Furlong, C, 3d.
23. Unknown.
24. W. F. M., 7th.
25. Daniel Kinney, C, 1st Battery, 12th.
26. Serg. H. Rogers, D, 12th.
27. Robert Morrison, Battery C, 3d.
28. Unknown, Battery I.
29, 30, 31. Unknown, 6th Cavalry.
32. 1st Lieut. Christian Balder, 6th Cavalry.
33. Unknown, 6th Cavalry.
34. J. Moles, C, 12th.
35. C. T. Ridder, Battery D, 4th Artillery.
36. E. Dennis, Battery D, 4th Artillery.

SECTION D.

1. Silas A. Miller, Company —, 12th Regiment.
2. H. Gaertner.
3. Unknown, 6th Cavalry.
4. William Reynolds, C, 6th Cavalry.
5. Augustus Nelson, E, 6th Cavalry.
6. William S. Mottern, H, 6th Cavalry.
7 John Pattinson, 6th Cavalry.
8, 9, 10, 11. Unknown, 6th Cavalry.
12. Charles Bodman, G, 11th.
13. C. F. Smetzer, G, 6th.
14. J. Conway, F, 11th.
15. James Stanton, H, 11th.
16. D. Wallace, Battery I, 5th Artillery.
17. George Smith, I, 7th.
18. C. Miller, E, 7th.
19. P. M'Grinity, I, 1st Artillery.
20. F. Rovey, G, 14th.
21. Serg. Alfred E. Cook, C, 11th.
22. Unknown.
23. 2d Lieut. G. W. Sheldon, I, S. S.
24. William H. Woodruff, G, st S. S.
25. George Van Buskirk, 11th.
26. Edmund W. Howard, C, 14th.
27. Unknown, 13th, 2d Division.
28. 1st Lieut. Wesley F. Miller, 7th.

TOTAL, 139.

LIST OF DEAD (RESIDENCES UNKNOWN) BURIED IN THE UNKNOWN LOTS.

30. J. H., Section C, South.
18. Jeremiah Chadwick, F.
41. Ord. Serg. Michael, F.
18. Hooker, G, South.
37. —— Hutchkins, G, South.
43. Unknown, G, South.
2. Serg. C. M. Hall, H, South.
24. M. Riggs, H, South.
12. William Martin, H, South.
22. G. W. Miley, A, North.
4. Corp. I. Hilton, B, North.
44. Unknown, C, North.
22. E. Gilbert, F, North.
35. H. Irvin, F, North.
38. I. D. H., F, North.
29. John Morrison, G, North.
34. S. J. Braddock, G, North.
35. Isaac Cavalry, G, North.
23. Cyrus A. Drot, L.
27. W. M'——, L.
2. Oley P. Thompson, K.
H. R. Clark, K.

SOLDIERS BURIED IN EVERGREEN CEMETERY, GETTYSBURG, PA.

Edward Stinson, Co. I, 5th Reg. New Hampshire.
Aaron A. Clark, G, 14th Connecticut.
Lieut. Herman Donarth, C, 19th Massachusetts.
George Kelley, C, 126th New York.
Samuel Blew, C, 126th New York.
Charles F. Harris, C, 126th New York.
Cornelius S. Baley, C, 126th New York.
John E. Dougall, H, 134th New York.
C. P. Le Clear, New York.
Robert C. Burns, A, 144th New York.
Henry Comstock, F, 108th New York.
Albert E. Dixon, B, 94th New York.
John B. Owen, D, 157th New York.
L. Willie Hobart, B, 126th New York.
James H. Bump, A, 111th New York.
S. Potter, 147th New York.
Serg. A. E. Banta, 140th New York.
Corp. Wentworth E. Dudley, E, 64th New York.
Arthur M'Alpine, G, 111th New York.
Jeremiah Bigelow, K, 111th New York.
Benjamin Van Wirt, K, 111th New York.
Capt. J. K. Backus, F, 157th New York.
Edward Grinnel, K, 111th New York.
Capt. A. J. Sofield, A, 149th Pennsylvania.
James M'Cleary, Bat. B, 1st Pennsylvania Art.
A. P. Alcorn, Bat. B, 1st Pennsylvania Art.
Evan Edwards, Philadelphia.
Sidney R. Breidninger, E, 15th Pennsylvania.
S. B. Stewart, F, 2d Pennsylvania Reserve.
Charles Gibbs, K, 62d Pennsylvania.
Corp. L. S. Greenlee, A, 140th Pennsylvania.
Jacob F. Strouse, C, 143d Pennsylvania.
W. D. Millard, F, Pennsylvania.
George W. Wood, K, 26th Pennsylvania.
Albert Otterson, F, 62d Pennsylvania.
George Stuart, C, 72d Pennsylvania.
A. Graw, F, 68th Pennsylvania.
Serg. William Shaffer, 62d Pennsylvania.
Corp. J. M. Young, I, 83d Pennsylvania.
Lieut. W. S. Briggs, 27th Pennsylvania.
Hiram H. Hartman, F, 1st Maryland.
Serg. Alpheas M'Vickers, E, 7th Virginia.
George W. Stuart, H, 55th Ohio.
Lewis A. Sanford, C, 73d Ohio.
Corp. William Gridley, D, 8th Ohio.
Lieut. S. H. Shoub, I, 4th Ohio.
Corp. J. S. Allison, K, 75th Ohio.
Matthias Frey, Cleveland, Ohio.
E. Welsh, I, 14th Indiana.
Serg. William Park, E, 3d Indiana Cavalry.
Marcus A. Past, D, 1st Minnesota.
W. K. Allen, 1st Minnesota.
Lieut. A. J. Barber, 11th Regulars.
Serg. Frank Littinger, K, 3d Regulars.
Joseph A. Campbell, Battery C, 4th Artillery.
Charles Long, F, 3d Regulars.
Unknown, 134th.
Unknown.
Unknown.
J. S. Hopping.
Unknown.
Matthew M'Grow, E, 1st New York Excelsior.
Serg. Jeremiah Gallagher, D, 69th Pennsylvania.
Thomas C. Diver, I, 69th Pennsylvania.
Charles August, G, 2d Delaware.
Unknown.
Unknown.
Unknown.
Unknown.
Unknown.

SOLDIERS BURIED IN UNITED PRESBYTERIAN BURYING GROUND, GETTYSBURG, PA.

William W. Story, Company F, 3d Indiana Cav.
Ebenezer H. James, A, 122d Pennsylvania.

SOLDIERS BURIED AT YORK, PA., WHO DIED AT U. S. A. GENERAL HOSPITAL, YORK, PA.

1. Serg. Vincent A. Keiflin (removed), Company K, 105th Regiment, Pennsylvania.
2. D. L. Wade (removed), K, 2d Massachusetts.
3. Serg. James M. Coroden, I, 149th Penna.
4. D. Zimmerman, B, 9th New York S. M.
5. Serg. Samuel Lamb, C, 3d Indiana Cavalry.
6. Charles C. Holmes, K, 149th New York.
7. Henry Brehl, A, 44th New York.
8. Michael Donavan, D, 12th Regulars.
9. Franklin A. Rollins, D, 1st Minnesota.
10. August Stein, H, 1st U. S. Artillery.
11. Michael Hagden, B, 6th Wisconsin.
12. Thomas A. Reedy (removed), A, 73d Ohio.
13. Serg. Winslow A. Morril, A, 16th Maine.
14. Thomas Moriartz, B, 22d Massachusetts.
15. Ira Hunt, I, 27th Independent.
16. William H. Dinsmore, F, 140th Pennsylvania.
17. Charles Groesot, B, 83d Pennsylvania.
18. Corp. Henry J. Smith (removed), G, 12th New Hampshire.
19. William H. Heise, B, 107th Ohio.
20. George Werner, A, 12th Regulars.
21. William Patent, A, 107th Pennsylvania.
22. Sylvester L. Brown, 5th Maine Battery.
23. William H. Batcheldor, I, 16th Maine.
24. Corp Emet Kneirin, E, 143d Pennsylvania.
25. Michael Vogelbach, F, 5th Ohio.
26. John Cooley, 2d Regulars.
27. Serg. Charles Herbstritt, 74th Virginia.
28. Job B. Flagg, B, 19th Maine.
29. Corp. Simeon Cooper, G, 111th New York.
30. Adam Eckler, A, 74th Pennsylvania.
31. Nicholas Conner (removed), E, 136th N. Y.
32. Ephraim Guyer, D, 151st Pennsylvania.

SYNOPSIS.

Maine	104	West Virginia	11
New Hampshire	49	Ohio	131
Vermont	61	Indiana	80
Massachusetts	158	Illinois	6
Rhode Island	14	Michigan	175
Connecticut	22	Wisconsin	73
New York	867	Minnesota	56
New Jersey	78	United States Regulars	139
Pennsylvania	535	Unknown—Lot North	411
Delaware	15	Do Lot South	425
Maryland	22	Do Lot Inner Circle	143

Total buried in the Soldiers' National Cemetery 3575

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